Mr Matlala is facing corruption and money laundering charges in Specialised Commercial Crimes Court case A16/212/26, charged 24 March 2026, related to Health tender awarded by SAPS to Medicare 24 Tshwane (Pty) Ltd, of which he was sole director.
“I am also facing a case that is pending before the Specialised Commercial Crimes Court under case number A16/212/26. I was formally charged with corruption and money laundering on the 24th day of March 2026... with respect to the Health... tender awarded by SAPS to Medicare 24 Tshwane (Pty) Ltd. I confirm that at the time of submission of the bid and the subsequent award of the tender, I was the sole director of Medicare 24.”
Medicare was previously contracted by SAPS to provide health and risk-related services; the tender has since been terminated.
“My company, Medicare, was previously contracted by SAPS to provide health and risk-related services. I place on record that the Medicare tender has since been terminated.”
The following SAPS officials are co-accused with Mr Matlala in the criminal case regarding the SAPS Medicare tender: General Fannie Masemola, Brigadier Rachel Matjeng, Brigadier Alpheus Thembinkosi Ngema, Patrick Nethengwe, Brigadier Kirsty Jonker, Brigadier Petunia Reabetsoe Lenono, Brigadier Onica Ofentse Tlhoaele, Colonel Anton Paulsen, Colonel Natseng Johannes Monyai, Colonel Nonjabulo Nomfundo Mngadi, Colonel Tumisho Nehemiah Maleka, Captain Brian Neville Cartwright, and Major General Busisiwe Precious Temba.
“The following SAPS officials are my co-accused in the criminal case with respect to the SAPS Medicare tender... General Fannie Masemola, Brigadier Rachel Matjeng...”
Mr Matlala knows General Phahlane but meetings occurred after Phahlane left SAPS employment; no business dealings, no favours asked or offered.
“I place on record that I know General Phahlane. I am unable to recall how many times I have met with him and place on record that these meetings were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, at the time when he was no longer with the employ of the SAPS. I confirm that I have no business dealings with General Phahlane, nor have I ever asked for any favours from him or offered him any gratifications.”
Mr Matlala has been transferring funds from his Medicare account to Luxor Africa Brand company, which has been charged with money laundering due to monies from the SAPS tender.
“So the funds that, I have been transferring funds from my Medicare account to this company. And so this company has been charged with money laundering because they have been following all the monies that have been coming from the SAPS tender.”
The loan agreement with Mr Suleiman Karim (or his companies) forms part of an ongoing criminal matter (Medicare) pending before court, and answering questions about it may lead to self-incrimination.
“The loan agreement referred to herein is part of an ongoing criminal matter, and as such I am unable to respond to the question posed on the paragraph under reply. I am of the view that I may incriminate myself by answering questions related to this loan agreement as I believe it forms part of the Medicare criminal matter which is pending before Court.”
MR MATLALADay 160 · 17 Aug 2026Refers to: June 2024Evidence: paragraph 17 of affidavit, page 14
A financial investigation is being carried out by SAPS with respect to all monies paid by SAPS into Medicare and any transaction made in general within Medicare bank accounts.
“I was advised that there is a financial investigation being carried out with respect to all monies paid by SAPS into Medicare and any transaction made in general within Medicare bank accounts”
Mr Matlala's relationship with Mike van Wyk (CEO of Medicare) is the subject of a pending court matter involving Medicare's SAPS contract, and he claims the right not to incriminate himself.
“My relationship with Mike van Wyk is a subject of the matter that is pending before Court, and as such I am unable to comment on this question. I do not wish to incriminate myself, as Mike was the CEO of my company, Medicare, the very same company that had a contract with SAPS. I therefore claim my right to not incriminate myself.”
Matlala approached Mr Suleiman Karim for funding for Medicare 24 Tshwane, concluded a funding agreement (oral, R50 million loan) with a company belonging to Karim (Tamiz); Matlala has been charged regarding the Medicare SAPS tender and declines further comment to avoid self-incrimination.
“I confirm that I know Suleiman Karim . I previously approached Mr Karim to request for funding for my company Medicare 24 Tshwane . ... I have since been charged with respect to the Medicare SAPS tender”
MR M A T L A L ADay 160 · 17 Aug 2026Refers to: July-August 2024Evidence: Medicare SAPS tender investigation
Adv Serunye questioned why six SAPS Generals risked their jobs to appoint a 29-year-old inexperienced civilian, Mokwele, as Brigadier in Crime Intelligence, implying potential quid pro quo corruption for a gratification.
“Why did these Generals in the SAPS go out of their way, risk their jobs... to appoint a 29-year-old inexperienced civilian to the rank of Brigadier in Crime Intelligence? Who is this young lady (Mokwele) for whom six Generals in the SAPS are risking losing their jobs? What did they stand to gain... by giving her gratification, which is the position or the job? What did they stand to gain?”
The applicant listed only three qualifications as relevant to the job application, specifying that she was relying only on those for the application to SAPS.
“in her job application on page 263 , the only three qualifications she lists as being relevant to her application . ... for the purposes of my application , you need only look at these set two”
Mr. Raphesu stated he cannot investigate any SAPS or security cluster matters including those involving members sitting in the security cluster.
“Page 129 of 131 cannot investigate any matter that has to deal with any SAPS matters, security cluster, that will include all the people that are sitting in the security cluster. I am barred from investigating those cases.”
Ms Ramasamy was appointed as an aspirant prosecutor in Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal on 1 February 2015, and worked on drug-related prosecutions in the Pinetown cluster, KwaZulu-Natal from 2016 to 2020, collaborating closely with SAPS members including Karl Saunder.
“I was appointed as an aspirant prosecutor in Pietermaritzburg-KwaZulu-Natal on the 1st of February 2015 ... I was based within the Pinetown cluster, KwaZulu-Natal, from the period of 2016 to 2020. During this period, I have dealt with drug-related prosecution and worked closely with SAPS members, such as Karl Saunder, who has given evidence before this Commission.”
High-ranking Crime Intelligence, SAPS, and political figures were alleged to have misappropriated money from SAPS and SSA and thus matters were kept vague.
“high-ranking Crime Intelligence , high-ranking SAPS , high-ranking political individuals that were alleged to have fleeted money from SAPS and SSA”
The Provincial Commissioner is to get weekly or monthly updates when allegations were made against high-ranking SAPS officials.
“When these allegations were made against high-ranking officials within SAPS, the instruction was that the Provincial Commissioner is to get weekly or monthly updates.”
Fraud and corruption in SAPS pertain to awarding tenders and contracts and circumventing procurement processes, including misuse of SSA funds.
“Fraud and corruption pertaining to awarding tenders and contracts within SAPS and circumventing procurement processes... use of the SSA fund for laundry and those things”
General Matlou is Head of Risk at SAPS, has personal ties to Perumal and is a witness in many IDAC matters.
“General Matlou is a witness on many matters within the IDAC... She has a very close personal relationship with Mr Perumal... He is also former SAPS...”
Brian Padayachee submitted an affidavit on behalf of IDAC opposing the amendment of bail conditions for Accused 3 (Madondo), arguing it was not in the interest of justice as she lacked top secret security clearance and had a propensity to commit criminal offenses.
“The purpose of this affidavit is to inform the Honourable Court why it is not in the interest of justice to admit the bail conditions of accused 3.”
Division Commissioner Lieutenant General Khumalo failed to take action since February 2024 regarding General Madondo's presence in Crime Intelligence, which poses a security risk.
“The fact that no action was taken by Division Commissioner Lieutenant General Khumalo since 2024 February, raises serious concern as Madondo's mere presence in the Division Crime Intelligence poses a serious security risk to Crime Intelligence and the SAPS.”
The police docket relating to the active warrant was closed and marked undetected around October 2023 or October 2024, despite the warrant remaining active on the system and uncancelled.
“According to him, the docket is closed, marked undetected, and this docket would have been closed in October of 2024. October of 2024 or October of 2023? But it was in that time that the docket was closed. I said to him, but that still does not help me. The warrant is active.”
ADV JOHNSONDay 150 · 29 Jul 2026Refers to: 2023-10 or 2024-10Evidence: Pretoria West CAS 7/05/2021 / CAS system
When ADV Johnson took office in March 2022, there were IPID investigators at ID who had transferred their matters, mostly corruption in SAPS supply chain management, PFM, to IDAC.
“When I took office in March 2022, there were already some IPID investigators at the then ID and they had come over with their matters... the matters they came over with ... were ... corruption matters in the South African Police Services ... Supply Chain Management issues, corruption, PFMA and all of those things.”
IDAC took over cases/dockets from IPID and investigated them, even those traditionally within SAPS jurisdiction, presumably under accepted protocols or memorandums of understanding among agencies.
“IDAC, in its former formulation, took over matters from IPID which fall within the jurisdiction of IPID... There are protocols ... memorandums of understanding or service level agreements to ensure legitimacy for why we are asking from somebody else.”
An affidavit was submitted by Major General Charity Madlala Matlou of SAPS Risk and Integrity Management supporting a criminal investigation into the alleged unlawful awarding of the Medicare 24 Tshwane contract.
“Ms Charity Madlala Matlou , who says she is a Major General in SAPS Component Head, Risk and Integrity Management ... I hereby submit this affidavit to the Investigating Directorate Against Corruption in support of initiating a criminal investigation into the alleged unlawful awarding of the Medicare 24 Tshwane District (Pty) Ltd”
The affidavit alleges that the procurement processes for a tender to Medicare Tshwane 24 may have been flouted or manipulated to the undue advantage of Medicare and its sole director Vusimuzi Matlala, with possible corruption and money laundering causing prejudice of approximately 50 million to SAPS.
“I reasonably suspect that procurement processes may have been flouted or manipulated to the undue advantage of Medicare. I also suspect that corruption and money laundering may also have been perpetrated to the prejudice. ... I have advised the National Commissioner, General Masemola of the SAPS that he should consider terminating the contract... General Masemola ultimately terminated the contract with Medicare on or about the 15th of May 2025. By that time, SAPS had suffered prejudice of approximately 50 million.”
The referral affidavit (section 27) was filed after the procurement contract termination and expresses suspicion that the award to Mr Matlala was unlawful and that certain members of SAPS unlawfully assisted and favoured him during the procurement process.
“The referral affidavit is filed after the contract was terminated. It alleges or at least expresses suspicions that it was unlawfully awarded, that the beneficiary, Mr Matlala, has questionable ties to certain members of SAPS who unlawfully assisted and favoured him during the procurement process.”
IDAC was created with the mandate to investigate serious high profile or complex corruption, commercial or financial crime cases, not to duplicate SAPS investigations.
“IDAC was created... otherwise you are going to be investigating exactly what SAPS is investigating. So we have to read your 7(1A) within mind what is in fact the purpose of IDAC, why it was created”
Commissioner Baloyi correctly stated that irregular appointments in Crime Intelligence were investigated by the Public Service Commission, not IDAC, and related complaints had been previously addressed by the PSC with recommendations to the National Commissioner and Minister.
“... By the time Mr Adams brings these things to IDAC, the Public Service Commission has already investigated them and made recommendations... It is not IDAC's mandate to be investigating these issues because there are other bodies that are responsible for these investigations.”
The affidavit suggests unlawful awarding of a tender, flouting or manipulation of procurement processes, and questionable ties between SAPS members and Mr Matlala, who assisted and favoured him and his company.
“the affidavit suggests an unlawful awarding of a tender. It suggests flouting or manipulation of procurement processes at 4. It suggests questionable ties between members of SAPS and Mr Matlala, which members then assisted and favoured him and his company”
The affidavit concludes that nobody has the right to defraud and commit crimes against SAPS and therefore reports the matter to IDAC for criminal investigation, including defrauding SAPS.
“nobody has the right to defraud and commit crimes against SAPS and I therefore report this matter to the IDAC to conduct the criminal investigation. So I take the crime includes defrauding SAPS”
General Masemola is charged with gross negligence for failing to comply with PFMA section 8(1)(d) by failing to manage SAPS contractual liabilities and stopping acceptance of orders from Medicare 24.
“Count 2 ... General Masemola was grossly negligent in that he failed to comply with PFMA section 8(1)(d) in that he failed to manage contractual liabilities of SAPS by failing to stop the acceptance of orders from Medicare 24”
General Masemola was negligent in failing to comply with PFMA sections requiring disciplinary steps against SAPS officials involved in unlawful procurement, failing to act against them.
“Count 4 ... he was negligent in that he failed to comply with the PFMA to take effective and appropriate disciplinary steps against officials in SAPS involved in unlawful procurement”
General Madondo was given a lateral transfer without top secret clearance, posing a risk to Crime Intelligence (CI), South African Police Service (SAPS), and the country, according to an IDAC charge.
“We know the complaint is that she got this lateral transfer without a top clearance, top secret clearance certificate. At paragraph 3 it states: "Madondo poses a risk to CI, the SAPS and the country."”
General Madondo and Mr Adams do not have top secret clearance certificates but are handling intelligence documents they are not authorized to access, posing risks.
“General Madondo not having that clearance certificate poses a risk to CI, the SAPS and the country... equally too must Mr Adams. You agreed that he does not have a top secret clearance certificate, and yet he is handling documents seemingly that come from Crime Intelligence and for which he does not have lawful access or authorised access.”
Mr Adams laid complaints with SAPS but the Inspectorate did not initially enquire with SAPS about these complaints, delaying the investigation process.
“When Mr Adams gives you an affidavit, the section 27, and he says, I have laid these complaints, and nothing is happening, or they have been intercepted, before you make the decision to investigate, is there a reason you do not enquire with the SAPS? They are your sister agency...Why is it not the first reaction, to find out where the complaint has been laid, before you demand the dockets?”
The Inspectorate is empowered to investigate service complaints against SAPS members.
“I assume that you are aware of the function, or what the function was of the Inspectorate, that it plays a specific role, and that perhaps you know, in general, it is empowered to investigate service complaints against SAPS members.”
The Inspectorate plays a specific role empowered to investigate service complaints against SAPS members.
“I assume that you are aware of the function, or what the function was of the Inspectorate, that it plays a specific role, and that perhaps you know, in general, it is empowered to investigate service complaints against SAPS members.”
The police could have legally refused IDAC access to the dockets, which would have ended the matter.
“No , no , I was just clarifying , just in case the impression you leave us with , is that , well , you know , SAPS could have refused with those dockets , and that would have been the end of it .”
Appointments to senior management at SAPS are governed by National Instruction 11 of 2017, which gives detailed procedures for appointments and handling issues of non-compliance or false information.
“appointments to senior management at SAPS level are governed by National Instruction 11 of 2017”
Appointments to senior management posts in SAPS are governed by National Instruction 11 of 2017, which outlines procedures for appointment, interview, scoring, recommendation and appointment approval processes.
“appointments to senior management at SAPS level are governed by National Instruction 11 of 2017”
The documents docketed containing original section 27 and A1 statements were exactly what the legal adviser at SAPS said and matched what the Inspectorate had, providing the basis for the charges preferred.
“Those documents, the original section 27, the A1 in the respective dockets, which is what the legal adviser at SAPS said, that is all that was contained in the dockets and I assume that is precisely what you found. You could not have found any more than the Inspectorate had.”
Advocate Johnson explains that additional statements were taken in a case related to theft of secret or slush funds, which are linked to appointment grievances and charges of gratification.
“They took additional statements... relates to the allegations of the appointment, but that there would have been other statements that would relate to the theft of the funds... that this grievance as it relates to this employee... her ending up being charged...”
Investigators abused section 28(13) preliminary investigation to conduct a full investigation before authorization and obtained documents from SAPS to prepare an A1 statement in January.
“I will say the investigators in this case abused the section 28(13) preliminary investigation to conduct a full-blown investigation before you so authorise them. They have gone so far as to obtain documents from SAPS to prepare an A1 statement in January.”
The investigators used SAPS to obtain documents to address deficiencies in a section 27 affidavit that lacked supporting documentation.
“The shortcomings ... can only be addressed by us obtaining the necessary documentation to either support or to dispute the claims made by Mr Adams ... these shortcomings in the section 27 do not have supporting documentation.”
There is confusion about why a docket was registered with SAPS on 6 January 2025 during preliminary investigation, with the docket number showing registration in June 2025.
“Why is IDAC at Brooklyn Police Station opening a case in January 2025?”
Mr Fadiel Adams made a referral which was supervised and overseen like any other referral; four dockets relevant to the referral were requested from SAPS Division Commissioner Detective Lieutenant General Senthumele by ADV JOHNSON.
“The referral was made by Mr Fadiel Adams. It was not treated any differently. It was supervised and overseen like any other. There were four dockets that were relevant to the referral. Following the common established process, I sent a letter to SAPS Divisional Commissioner, Detectives, Lieutenant General Senthumele requesting the dockets.”
The docket was registered without a CAS number and the CAS number was added later, possibly in June 2025, although the matter was substantively from January 2025, raising questions why IDAC was involved with SAPS during the preliminary investigation stage.
“the docket was registered without a CAS number and a CAS number was added later on ... All of that would have been done in January 2025 ... The CAS number could have been added later in June ... why is IDAC involved in SAPS in January 2025 when it is still at the preliminary investigation stage?”
Advocate Johnson confirms that Mr Adams did not approach IDAC but rather IDAC approached Mr Adams, contrary to what was said before the ad hoc committee.
“You mention in your statement that when he approached IDAC, he had already gone to SAPS... Now we know that he did not go to, he did not approach IDAC. IDAC approached him. We know that now for a fact. Do you confirm?”
A letter from Mr Nkabinde contained allegations implicating senior members of the SAPS and requested the Investigating Director to consider investigating alleged criminal misconduct by Honourable Fadiel Adams.
“a letter from Mr Nkabinde ... Allegations contained therein implicate very senior members of the SAPS and are reviewed in a serious light ... due to the nature of the allegations made by Fadiel Adams, Honourable Fadiel Adams, which is deemed to be quite sensitive and which contains allegations of criminal misconduct, this officer requests the Investigating Director to consider investigating the same.”
The allegation about disclosing a docket to General Khan relating to an ongoing criminal investigation against him is vague and unsupported by particulars and the witness does not recall disclosing any docket.
““The allegation referred to above is also vague and unsupported by particulars... Nor where the alleged disclosure took place, how the docket was allegedly disclosed… Your answers seem to suggest that you are not able to respond to paragraph 2.6 because you have not been given the details of the docket ... implying there may very well be more than one docket ... For me, you are talking about relationship and allegations that you disclosed to General Khan a SAPS docket relating to an ongoing criminal investigation ... I was seeking the details of this docket and who made the allegation... And it became – at the time, I did not recall disclosing a docket”
Advocate Johnson denies knowledge of any Khan-IDAC cabal in SAPS or within IDAC and denies authorising, encouraging or benefiting from such unlawful associations.
“I have no knowledge of the existence of a Khan-IDAC cabal in SAPS. I also have no knowledge of a Khan-IDAC cabal within the IDAC. It follows that if such a cabal exists, I am not party to it. I have not authorised, encouraged, or facilitated its existence, nor have I benefited from any unlawful association involving General Khan, IDAC, SAPS officials, or any other person.”
Advocate Johnson knows Major General Khan from Crime Intelligence Head Office and had engaged with him in meetings prior to becoming Investigating Director in March 2022.
“I know Major General Khan, as a General based at Crime Intelligence Head Office. Before I became the Investigating Director in March, 2022, I engaged with him in meetings with other stakeholders, attended NAC joints or other SAPS meetings at which he was present and to which I had been invited by relevant Component Heads, Deputy National Commissioners or Divisional Commissioners.”
The Investigating Directorate (ID), predecessor to IDAC, was already dealing with several complex fraud and corruption matters implicating very senior SAPS members in the supply chain management unit when Advocate Johnson joined.
“When I joined the Investigating Directorate (ID), predecessor to the IDAC, there were already several complex fraud and corruption matters in place. These matters implicated very senior members of SAPS in alleged criminality. This was especially so in the supply chain management unit.”
Senior SAPS members implicated in corruption matters included Acting National Police Commissioner General Phahlane, General Ngwenya, General Nematunzela, and various other senior SAPS officials.
“The accused in those matters included, amongst others, then Acting National Police Commissioner General Phahlane, General Ngwenya, who was our first black female Deputy National Police Commissioner in the SAPS, and also at the time, the wife of Lieutenant-General Shadrack Sibiya, General Nematunzela, who was the Head of Analysis at Crime Intelligence, and various other very senior SAPS officials.”
Advocate Johnson denies knowledge of the existence of a 'Khan-IDAC cabal' within SAPS or IDAC and denies authorizing or facilitating any unlawful association involving General Khan.
“I have no knowledge of the existence of a Khan-IDAC cabal in SAPS. I also have no knowledge of a Khan-IDAC cabal within the IDAC. It follows that if such a cabal exists, I am not party to it. I have not authorised, encouraged, or facilitated its existence, nor have I benefited from any unlawful association involving General Khan, IDAC, SAPS officials, or any other person. To the extent that Mr Thulani Shongwe's evidence suggests otherwise, I deny that suggestion.”
Advocate Johnson describes his professional and personal relationship with Major General Khan began prior to March 2022 and involved meetings with stakeholders and social engagements.
“I knew Major General Khan, as a General based at Crime Intelligence Head Office. Before I became the Investigating Director in March, 2022, I engaged with him in meetings with others stakeholders, attended NAC joints or other SAPS meetings at which he was present and to which I had been invited by relevant Component Heads, Deputy National Commissioners or Divisional Commissioners.”
Advocate Johnson informed the Murray family member that IDAC could not assist with the investigation but explained how to escalate concerns to SAPS management.
“I informed him that IDAC could not assist but explained how he could escalate his concerns about the investigation to SAPS management.”
Advocate Johnson states that after this engagement, he had very limited contact with General Khan and no contact for approximately one and a half years, and describes the allegations regarding disclosure to Khan and SAPS as vague and unsupported.
“After the engagement referred to above, I had very limited contact with General Khan and I have had no contact with him for approximately the past year and a half. The allegation referred to above is also vague and unsupported by particulars. No particulars have been provided as to whom made the allegations, which docket is implicated, when or where the alleged disclosure occurred, how the docket was allegedly disclosed, or what information was allegedly conveyed.”
IDAC is not involved in any investigation related to Molefe but is involved regarding Vusimusi 'Cat' Matlala concerning allegations of collusion, corruption, and unlawful awarding of a tender to his company, Medicare 24.
“IDAC is not involved in any investigation relating to Molefe. With regards to Vusimusi “Cat” Matlala (Matlala) IDAC's only interest arose out of a section 27 referral from SAPS with regards to the unlawful awarding of a tender to his company, Medicare 24, and allegations of collusion and corruption with Matlala and some SAPS officials.”
IDAC received cyber search warrants for Matlala's cellphones and electronic devices presented by Lieutenant Colonel Khumalo to investigate the tender matter.
“IDAC did get cyber search warrants for the cellphones and electronic devices of Matlala. These were presented to IDAC by a Lieutenant Colonel Khumalo. The data was downloaded in his presence and he left with the devices.”
The section 27 referral against Matlala is entirely separate from other referrals, including one relating to Mr. Adams.
“It is a section 27 referral entirely based only on allegations against Matlala, irregular awarding of a contract, Medicare 24, and it is from someone completely different and does not relate to the one we have been discussing or the one we have been discussing about Mr Adams.”
There are current IDAC matters involving General Phahlane and others, based on section 27 referrals from SAPS, which are either part-heard or set down for trial but not yet finalized.
“The ones in IDAC currently are matters that are either part heard or matters set down for trial. They are not finalised yet.”
IDAC allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant-General Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence to further political interference in SAPS.
“That IDAC allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant-General Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence in the furtherance of ongoing political interference in SAPS”
IDAC allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence to further ongoing political interference in SAPS.
“That IDAC allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence in the furtherance of ongoing political interference in SAPS.”
The subpoena served on 4 July 2026 required appearance to give evidence on issues arising from Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi's testimony on political interference and criminal syndicates in SAPS and related bodies.
“On 4 July 2026, I was served with a subpoena in terms of section 32 of the Commission's Act 8 of 1947, requiring me to appear personally before the Commission on Monday 3 July 2026 to give evidence and to be questioned about ... matters arising from the evidence of Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi before the Commission ... Political interference ... criminal syndicates... SAPS...NPA...Crime Intelligence...IPID ...”
Upon joining the Investigating Directorate (ID), predecessor to IDAC, Advocate Johnson found several complex fraud and corruption matters implicating very senior SAPS members, especially in the SAPS supply chain management unit.
“When I joined the Investigating Directorate (ID), predecessor to the IDAC, there were already several complex fraud and corruption matters in place. These matters implicated very senior member of SAPS in alleged criminality. This was especially so in the supply chain management unit of the SAPS.”
The senior members of SAPS implicated in those matters included then Acting National Police Commissioner General Phahlane, General Ngwenya (first black female Deputy National Police Commissioner), General Nematunzela (Head of Analysis at Crime Intelligence), and various other very senior SAPS officials.
“The accused in those matters included, amongst others, then Acting National Police Commissioner General Phahlane, General Ngwenya, who was our first black female Deputy National Police Commissioner in the SAPS, and also at the time, the wife of Lieutenant-General Shadrack Sibiya, General Nematunzela, who was the Head of Analysis at Crime Intelligence, and various other very senior SAPS officials.”
IDAC was investigating multiple matters involving senior members of the South African Police Service related to supply chain management issues which had already been enrolled in various courts when Advocate Johnson joined IDAC.
“IDAC had other matters, that it was investigating against senior members of the South African Police, which matters I found were already within that space when I arrived, and that those matters related to the supply chain management issues, and that the officials mentioned in 32 are of the officials that were charged in the various Courts on these matters.”
IDAC denies allegations that it operated outside its mandate and that the criminal case against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo was politically motivated.
“11. I deny these allegations. I expand on this denial as follows here under 1.1 IDAC has a prima facie criminal case against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence. That matter was not pursued for any political purpose at the instance of any political actor or to advance any form of political interference within SAPS.”
The subpoena served on 4 July 2026 required testimony about allegations including IDAC operating outside its mandate, pursuing politically motivated criminal cases, and interference in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
“On 4 July 2026, I was served with a subpoena in terms of section 32 of the Commission's Act 8 of 1947, requiring me to appear personally before the Commission on Monday 3 July 2026 to give evidence and to be questioned about... matters arising from the evidence of Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi ... Whether criminal syndicates, organised criminal groups, politically connected persons, or other unlawful actors have infiltrated... SAPS, NPA, Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, Crime Intelligence, IPID... The factual and evidentiary basis for any allegations attributed to me...”
In past cases involving allegations of malfeasance, fraud, and corruption implicating SAPS top brass, convictions were secured, including a prosecution involving Major General Solly Lazarus, CFO of Crime Intelligence, where the prosecutor was involved.
““26. The point to all of this is that there is nothing new with sound allegations of malfeasance, fraud, and corruption, implicating the top brass in the SAPS. Not only has it happened in the past, when some of those cases were presented to the Courts, we secured convictions. ... we also had another matter where the CFO of Crime Intelligence, Major General Solly Lazarus, had been charged and prosecuted. I was one of the prosecutors on that matter, but halfway through, I was gone to a different office, but he was also convicted.”
Advocate Baloyi suggests Colonel Jacob wanted to create the impression that other SAPS members who had no experience in these operations were part of the operation to legitimize the operation.
“What we suggested or put to Colonel Jacob and why he would say that they were part of the operation, is because he wanted to create an impression that other SAPS members, other than yourself and Sibiya, who had absolutely no experience in these kind of operations, and him who came back from leave just to do this operation and disappear on the same day”
Exhibits in SAPS Register 13 were supposed to have exhibit bags, but in their absence, they proceeded by describing and putting them in without bags.
“And in registering these exhibits, was it not needed that they have exhibit bags? ... Yes, the were supposed to ... We proceeded, carried on putting them in ... By describing the exhibits.”
For more than 24 hours there is no SAPS record of where certain exhibits (drugs) are between being booked in and the entry in the Port Shepstone SAP 13 register, indicating a loss of record of these exhibits.
“for more than 24 hours there is no SAPS record of where these exhibits are”
Colonel Prinsloo testified that at Port Shepstone there was no SAPS transfer register or documentation for the receipt of exhibits or the safekeeping key, and no formality or documentation was done.
“Colonel Prinsloo testified that there was no SAPS transfer register completed or any form of documentation either in recording the receipt of the exhibits and then to the other part of the safe key. There was no formality or any documentation .”
Advocate Baloyi asks if at that time Warrant Officer Mpangase did not know that the national protocol requires exhibits to be recorded in SAP 13 and accounted for.
“Does it mean at that time you did not know that the protocol the national instruction requires that exhibits must be recorded in SAP 13 ? They must always be accounted for ?”
There is no record of the exhibits in any SAP 13 from 25 June until they were stolen, which means it is unknown how many exhibits were in SAPS possession at the time they were stolen and their condition then is unknown.
“because there is no record of how many are in SAPS’ possession at that time, we have no way of knowing that the original number that was booked in on the 2nd at Isipingo Police Station, taken out, booked in at Port Shepstone Police Station, the 3.1 up to 3.34, we have no way of knowing that they were still complete on the day that they were stolen, by the time they were stolen. There is no way of knowing, because you never made any record anywhere after the 24th of June.”
Warrant Officer Mpangase recorded the exhibits in the SAPS registers but after entry 6.1, SAPS does not have a written record of where the exhibits are stored.
“SAPS does not have a written record of where these exhibits are”
On 1 November 2024 at 11:45, a communication from within SAPS requested urgent attention and feedback must reach the Office of the National Commissioner and the Office of the Minister by specified deadlines concerning the complaint.
“Kindly see the email below for your urgent attention and important, feedback must reach the Office of the National Commissioner on Monday 12h00 and report to the Office of the Minister by Monday 4 November 2024 at 15h00”
Investigations involve issuing subpoenas to National Commissioner for specific documents related to security clearances and vetting files of implicated individuals including Mrs Mokwele.
“you issue a summons to the National Commissioner... It is security clearances and vetting files for seven people. This is the six SAPS members plus Mokwele”
Summons dated 6 February 2025 referenced investigation into serious fraud and corruption committed within SAPS, invoking section 28(13) of the NPA Act.
“The information required from you relates to the conducting of an investigation into serious fraud and corruption committed within SAPS ... invoke section 28(13) of the NPA Act ...”
The initial subpoenas for investigation were sent to BMW and involved looking into security clearances from Brigadier to Lieutenant General level within SAPS.
“The very first subpoena you send to the National Commissioner ... is to BMW ... looking into security clearances of people from Brigadier level to Major General level to Lieutenant General level ... within SAPS.”
Colonel Padayachee confirms that the investigation is focused on unlawful or irregular appointments and vetting processes.
“The appointments and vetting processes of the people who are alleged to have been unlawfully appointed or irregularly placed ... in a position of power ...”
The summons issued on 6 February 2025 signed by Advocate Johnson requests original personnel files for senior officers of SAPS including Khumalo, Lushaba, Madondo, Moyana, Ncube, Van Vuuren, Mokwele, and Bobi, regarding promotions and appointments.
“This summons requires all original files , records , correspondence , and documents regarding the promotions , appointments of the following senior officers , Khumalo , Lushaba , Madondo , Ncube , Van Vuuren , Mokwele , Bobi .”
They obtained a version of the appointment file which includes documents such as the request for advertisement, internal and external advertisements, the list of applicants, approved selection panel, confidentiality declarations, shortlisted candidates, approvals, assessments, and announcements.
“We have obtained a version of that file and if we could go to file 2. For the moment, Commissioners, we can close the piles that have caused you to have opened and look at file 2. And in file 2, I invite us, Commissioners, to CJC 370 and that starts at page 172 with an index and what I call record of decision, that entire file. The first document there under tab A in that file is the request for advertisement. It is followed by an internal advertisement. The internal advertisement referred to the advertisement for the position as circulated within SAPS. You agree? Yes, 174, yes....Yes. Then it has got a copy of the external advertisement. It has what it calls an erratum and an extension of the closing date. That was the closing date for the applications. It was pushed out. Then it has got a list of those who applied. Then it has got a list of approved selection panel, declaration of interest and confidentiality, shortlisted candidates, approval of shortlisted candidates, applications for shortlisted candidates, invitation letters, security clearance, assessments, centre mark sheets, list of recommended candidates, minutes and announcements...”
General Khumalo, Head of Crime Intelligence, had the authority to select the panel for recruitment processes as allowed by SAPS prescripts, and the panel selection is subject to approval by Head Office.
“the prescript gives him the authority to choose that panel and then send it for approval”
Advocate Khumalo explains that the job requirements for the post are advertised and approved by SAPS and cannot be altered by IDAC after the fact to include covert criteria.
“So IDAC cannot make up the requirements of the job and say the post is secretive, it is this, it is that. The requirements are as advertised, because members of the public, when they apply for the position...”
Advocate Baloyi questions IDAC's concern over SAPS including someone outside of Crime Intelligence environment in a panel advertised externally.
“Why is it your business as IDAC that SAPS has allowed Accused 5 to be part of a panel and it is advertising externally in this what you describe as a secret environment?”
Advocate Baloyi criticizes IDAC for interfering in the SAPS Crime Intelligence personnel panel appointments which falls outside IDAC's statutory mandate.
“You are a creature of statute. When you raise a complaint, you were influencing the decision maker who is going to give you the warrants that you are applying for.”
Colonel Padayachee states that SAPS chose and externally approved the panel, despite serious corruption and arrests among senior management.
“We say that SAPS chose a panel, approved a panel, advertised it externally. When we look at SAPS today and the number of senior managers... and senior officers being arrested for corruption...”
Colonel Padayachee states the National Commissioner has been arrested for contraventions of the PFMA, which does not amount to corruption at this stage.
“The National Commissioner has been arrested for contraventions of the PMFA. That does not amount to corruption at this stage, sir.”
The senior management of SAPS, including the National Commissioner, has many arrested persons for various offenses, leading to distrust in SAPS senior management.
“You say there is a lot wrong with the senior management of SAPS starting from the National Commissioner, a substantial number of whom have been arrested for whatever offences. And you then basically say therefore, you do not trust senior management...”
Colonel Padayachee explains that the undue advantage was related to manipulation of the vetting process of the application and letter, which prejudiced SAPS.
“The fact that of the manipulating of the vetting process of the application and the letter that is there, that it prejudiced the SAPS”
There was a stringent bail condition imposed that effectively suspended the accused by prohibiting them from going to work, although SAPS had not suspended them.
“a condition that is so stringent that its effect is to suspend the accused because what it meant is that they could not go to work”
SAPS has a policy and national instruction (11 of 2019) encouraging issuing summons to secure attendance at trial rather than using arrest, reserving arrest as a last resort due to its drastic infringement on individual rights.
“SAPS has got a policy position about it and that policy position that has been adopted in the National Instruction 11 of 2019 ... arrest is one of these methods ... constitutes one of the most drastic infringements of the rights of an individual and a member should therefore regard it as a last resort”
SAPS national instruction advises members to always exercise discretion in deciding whether to arrest and to refrain from arresting if attendance can be secured by summons per section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
“A member, even though authorised by law ... should always refrain from arresting a person if the attendance of the person may be secured by means of a summons as provided for in section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act.”
COLONEL PADAYACHEE acknowledges the SAPS regulations and discretion each case requires, but asserts that serious Schedule 5 charges at IDAC are dealt with by applying for arrest warrants and calling accused to the station, not home arrest.
“I see the SAPS Regulation and the manner in which they do and each case is decided on its own merits ... When the matter is serious ... it is a serious charge ... schedule 5 ... the normal thing is that we apply for J 50 s ... the J 50 that we have is not taken to the person's house ... they are brought to the station and they are processed there ... The warrant is there in case ... the person does not report or decides ... to evade justice ...”
Colonel Padayachee denies any knowledge or involvement with a 'Khan IDAC cabal' in SAPS or IDAC.
“I have no knowledge of an existence of a Khan IDAC cabal in SAPS. I also have no knowledge of a Khan IDAC cabal within IDAC. It follows that if such cabal exists, I have no party to it. I have never investigated such because I do not know of it and neither am I involved in it.”
Colonel Padayachee denies disclosing any investigation or SAPS docket information to Major General Khan regarding an ongoing criminal investigation against Khan.
“I have never disclosed any investigation or any docket to Major General Khan... The allegation that I disclosed the SAPS docket to General Khan relating to an investigation against him... I have a complete denial that I shared any information and docket with regards to him.”
Colonel Padayachee denies accessing SAPS dockets or disclosing any docket to General Khan relating to any ongoing criminal investigation.
“I do not work with SAPS dockets, neither do I have access to SAPS dockets. I deny that I disclosed any docket to General Khan relating to any ongoing criminal investigation against him.”
If SAPS decide to refer a case to IDAC for some reason, they do so, but IDAC looks at complaints where complainants feel alleged corruption or other issues are not properly investigated by SAPS and then Intake Committee decides if it falls within IDAC mandate or should go back to SAPS.
“we would normally get , if SAPS decides they have a case which they want to refer to the Investigative Director for some other reason , yes , but when you look at a complainant that has referred a matter to SAPS and is not satisfied because alleged corruption or something that he suspects with regards to his case not being investigated properly ... and that is where the case Intake Committee , I think that they will look at those factors there ... to decide whether , look , it falls within our mandate , no , this should go to SAPS .”
In a situation where a docket was opened by complainant at various police stations but then closed without further action, upon a section 27 referral, IDAC requests and takes those dockets from SAPS to assist investigations.
“dockets was opened by a complainant at various police stations and then he was not happy and these dockets , he did not hear about them and these dockets were closed . So , when that section 27 referral came , we looked at these cases , were requested the case dockets from the SAPS ... and we took those dockets to assist us in our investigations .”
In the Mokwele matter, Member of Parliament Adams initially reported at police stations before escalating the same complaint via section 27 referral to IDAC.
“Member of Parliament Adams goes to a police station to lay a complaint against General Khumalo and others relating to the Mokwele appointment . He does that . And then he decides to refer to IDAC in terms of section 27 , the same complaint . He completes an affidavit and he submits it to IDAC in terms of section 27 .”
Upon IDAC's receipt of the section 27 referral related to the Mokwele matter, IDAC requests the dockets from SAPS, finds them closed with little evidence, and takes over the investigation from SAPS.
“a request is made for the dockets with SAPS ... the dockets were opened in Cape Town and other police stations ... the dockets were given over to us ... there was hardly anything in those dockets ... so we started to investigate further ... So you took over the SAPS investigation . Yes ... does it mean that in investigation or that complaint , which was lodged at SAPS , is now closed ? Is that how IDAC deals with it ? It is now closed ? We are now investigating it ? Yes .”
The dockets from SAPS are now in possession of IDAC, and IDAC is responsible for those dockets, continuing all reporting to the criminal accountability system (CAS).
“on the SAPS system , it will show that the dockets are now in possession of IDAC . And IDAC is responsible for that docket . And all the processes that flow must be still reported to keep the CAS system or criminal system updated .”
IDAC does not negotiate with SAPS to take over a docket; rather, IDAC asserts its authority upon receiving a section 27 referral to take charge of the investigation.
“IDAC does not just go and take dockets . IDAC is tasked with an investigation into which there are allegations made ... We requested those dockets , officially requested those dockets to see and verify what the section 27 or the complainant is saying ... We requested those dockets ... And that those dockets do exist .”
IDAC requested the dockets from SAPS in writing, addressing the Head of Detectives, but SAPS could legally refuse the request.
“What I would say from my interpretation is the dockets were requested from SAPS. It was requested... I believe that request was done in writing... I think it was to the Head of the Detectives... As far as I can recall, we were lying at the inspectorate... There is a possibility of SAPS refusing...”
With the SAPS, a person reports to a police station or community service centre, a complaint is registered and a case number is given immediately, even before investigation.
“With the police and the SAPS , a person goes to the police station , to the Community Service Centre , and they report a complaint , and they register , and they register his case .”
The form related to the affidavit is kept by IDAC, which has copies and is in the process of rebranding related documentation from SAPS to IDAC, including exhibit bags.
“I D A C i s i n t h e p r o c e s s o f d o i n g , i n t e r m s o f t h e d o c k e t s a n d a n n e x u r e s w h e r e i t s a y S A P S , w e a r e c o n t i n u o u s l y d e l e t i n g S A P S a n d p u t t i n g I D A C o n i t . Fo r e x a m p l e , e x h i b i t b a g s , I D A C h a s n o w g o t i t s o w n e x h i b i t b a g s , s o w e a r e a n o f f i c e i n p r o g r e s s w h e r e w e a r e g e t t i n g a n d m o v i n g a w a y f r o m S A P S .”
According to SAPS records, on 15 December 2021, the NPA informed the investigating officer that it would not prosecute the assault and intimidation case against General Khan, and on 13 January 2022, the docket was withdrawn.
“According to SAPS records , on 1 5 D e c e m b e r 2 0 2 1 , t h e N P A i n f o r m e d t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r t h a t i t w o u l d n o t p r o s e c u t e t h e a s s a u l t a n d i n t i m i d a t i o n c a s e a g a i n s t G e n e r a l K h a n a n d o n t h e 1 3 t h o f 1 0 J a n u a r y 2 0 2 2 , t h e d o c k e t h a s b e e n w i t h d r a w n .”
The Colonel has led many investigations into corruption by police officials in SAPS, particularly in Crime Intelligence, and is aware of the dangers in prematurely releasing witness names which could jeopardize investigations and the safety of witnesses.
“I have led many investigations into corruption by police officials within the SAPS, with a specific reference to Crime Intelligence... It puts the investigation into jeopardy, and more importantly, it has the potential to put the life of the witness in danger.”
The whistleblower is a current SAPS member with serious personal concerns, granted anonymity under the Protected Disclosures Act, with no circulation of her identity and requesting the Commission to maintain anonymity throughout.
“"That whistle-blower, however, is a member of SAPS, is currently in service, and has got serious personal concerns... Her disclosure was then initiated in terms of the Protected Disclosures Act, and her name has not been circulated or published in any manner. She would like to Commission to provide the necessary evidence, but would prefer that the anonymity extends."”
The whistle-blower fears that if her identity is disclosed within the SAPS environment, she may suffer pushback, occupational detriment, intimidation, or other consequences that might affect her employment.
“She fears that if her identity is now disclosed, she may suffer pushback and some level of occupational detriment, including intimidation or any other that may eventually affect her employment.”
The whistle-blower will testify virtually/remotely and her voice will not be distorted, but people impacted by her evidence will know who she is, though the broader SAPS community will not know her identity.
“The idea is that she, as with Witness N, will be testifying virtually, remotely, her voice will not be distorted. It is accepted that those people who are impacted by her evidence will know who she is, and that has always been the case, even during the stage of investigation. But the broader SAPS community does not know who she is, and that is what she is quite desirous to retain and that is the sole basis for why she is in camera.”
The report focuses on corruption prevention in SAPS as part of the broader public sector, emphasizing the financial disclosure system as an integral part of the corruption prevention architecture.
“The rest of the report looks at corruption prevention in SAPS, but as applicable to the broader public sector and a lot of this is through the lens of the financial disclosure system, which forms a very integral part of the corruption prevention architecture.”
DR Schoeman references SAPS annual reports for 2023/24 and 2024/25 describing internal mechanisms for reporting fraud and corruption, including risk and integrity management, ethics workshops, information security standards, restrictions on remunerative work, screening and gift declarations, and polygraph testing.
“Page 9 of SAPS' annual reports speaks to the mechanisms, their internal mechanisms for reporting fraud and corruption ... they mention measures carried out by the risk and integrity management section ... ethics workshops ... minimum information security standards ... restrictions around applications for additional remunerative work ... security screening, declarations around gifts and sponsorship ... measures for detection in terms of polygraph testing.”
DR Schoeman states that SAPS has mechanisms on paper for public sector integrity and corruption prevention, but there is a disjuncture between these mechanisms and the real-world impact.
“And so it would seem that all of these mechanisms are in place on paper ... all of the standard requirements that one would expect. Now, the question that I pose ... is having heard the testimony so far and hearing this list of mechanisms ... it seems to me that there is a disjuncture between what is on paper and the impact that we see in the real world.”
The Acting Minister of Police indicated in a recent Parliamentary question that lifestyle audits within SAPS have not yet been conducted but are still under discussion with SIU to second officials to perform these audits.
“My understanding is that no lifestyle audits have been conducted within SAPS as of yet ... I think it was last week ... where the Acting Minister of Police indicated that they were still in discussions with the SIU to second officials to SAPS to do these lifestyle audits for them.”
Gaps in financial disclosure requirements and a weak institutional framework have allowed misconduct and unexplained wealth among SAPS officials over the last five years; policy frameworks for sanctioning are inadequate to address this.
“The gaps in the financial disclosure requirements and the vulnerabilities of a weak institutional framework help explain why no misconduct or unexplained wealth has been detected among SAPS officials over the last 5 years. However, even if any discrepancies, conflicts, or unexplained wealth were to be detected, the policy framework for issuing sanctions against”
Annual lifestyle reviews are conducted within SAPS with only a few escalating to lifestyle investigations, and all such investigated cases have been cleared with no referrals for lifestyle investigations between financial years 2021/22 and 2023/24 except 5 SMS members investigated and cleared in 2024/25.
“within SAPS, every year, these lifestyle reviews conducted, and some of them have led, in very few cases, to lifestyle investigations. In each case, they have been cleared... Between financial year 2021/22 and 23/24, no SAPS officials were referred for lifestyle investigation. In 24/25, 5 of 23 SMS members underwent lifestyle investigations and all were cleared.”
DR SCHOEMANDay 136 · 09 Jul 2026Refers to: 2021/22 to 2024/25Location: South African Police Service
The current SAPS lifestyle audit framework relies on financial disclosure forms reviewed by ethics officers, lifestyle investigations by departmental investigators, and forensic lifestyle audits by certified auditors, with audits outsourced to external companies due to lack of internal audit capacity.
“a lifestyle review is something that is conducted by an ethics officer within a line department... The lifestyle investigation would be conducted by an investigator... An audit is once you involve a certified auditor... In the current framework... departments are outsourcing these audits to external company...”
SAPS lifestyle investigations examine additional sources such as bank records and qualifications to detect unexplained wealth or corrupt income sources, while lifestyle audits apply forensic techniques and require more specialty skills than internal auditors usually have.
“The lifestyle investigation... would look at additional sources of info to determine unexplained wealth... lifestyle audit would be the next stage... apply forensic audit techniques... requires a very particular skill set as it requires auditors...”
SAPS Special Investigating Unit (SIU) officers seconded to departments lack mandate and resources they would have normally had, limiting effective financial record access in lifestyle audits leading to reliance on auditee submitted records which can be incomplete or concealed.
“these SIU officials are seconded to the department... effectively no longer function with SIU's powers... they no longer have the same mandates, access to resources... To conduct a lifestyle audit, you would rely on the auditee... The challenge being... somebody could very well hide some of their bank records...”
The current disclosure requirements allow officials to evade declaring assets like cars by claiming ownership belongs to others, even if they use the assets daily, which undermines the intent of disclosure.
“a senior General in the SAPS drives a R3 million car and then when it comes time to disclose, he says, well, it is not mine, so I do not have to disclose it ... it is his friend's car ... although it parks in his garage every day and he uses it every day ... current gap in requiring disclosure of beneficial ownership ... official can entirely declare that they own zero cars and would be following the rules”
Persons conducting lifestyle audits, whether private auditors or SIU auditors seconded to SAPS, have no statutory powers to collect information from financial institutions and rely entirely on information voluntarily provided by the person being audited.
“whether they are conducted by private auditors or by SIU auditors seconded to SAPS, the persons conducting lifestyle audits have no statutory powers to collect information from financial institutions . So they depend entirely on information that is voluntarily provided by the person they are auditing”
There have been no lifestyle audits conducted at SAPS generally.
“when you talk about the senior management service and lifestyle audits across the board , you are talking about the public service generally , not SAPS , because we have seen there have been no lifestyle audits at SAPS .”
The SIU has not yet been seconded to SAPS to support lifestyle audits as of 5 June 2026, despite a formal request by the National Commissioner on 5 August 2025.
“the South African police service has formally engaged the special investigating unit to assist with independent lifestyle audits . The National Commissioner signed a formal request on 5 August 2025 , which was submitted on 6 August 2025 , requesting the secondment of SIU personnel to support SAPS in conducting lifestyle audits . As of 5 June , the SIU has not yet been seconded to SAPS to support lifestyle audits .”
An internal SAPS survey conducted in 2022/23 found that only 24.4% of SAPS officials agree they conduct themselves professionally, and 31.6% agree the police do not abuse their power, indicating internal recognition of significant misconduct.
“The latest SAPS survey conducted in 2/23 found that only 24.4% of SAPS officials agree that the police conduct themselves professionally while 31.6% agreed that the police do not abuse their power .”
Despite advocacy and campaigns against corruption, it is difficult to change organizational culture within SAPS due to widespread misconduct experienced by officials in daily life.
“So the point that I want to make here is by SAPS ' own internal surveys , the way most people see their own organizational culture is that they do not see it as an institution with great integrity , that they recognize that their colleagues do not behave the way that they should . In many cases , they understand that that misconduct is rife . And so when we compare this to some of the initiatives mentioned in terms of advocacy programs , in terms of campaigns , in terms of statements to say that we do not tolerate corruption , it is very difficult to imagine how a message like that cuts through when people 's everyday lived experience is their colleagues engaging in misbehaviour .”
To turn around organizational culture of SAPS, reliance solely on messages about ethics and integrity is insufficient; strengthening legal and regulatory mechanisms and controls is necessary to enforce compliance and detect misconduct.
“And so to turn around an organizational culture like this , you cannot solely rely on messages about ethics and integrity . What you really need to do is focus on strengthening these other types of controls around your legal and regulatory mechanisms , ensuring that you have the right policy framework , the right controls in place , the right measures for detecting this kind of misconduct to bring people into line .”
The Public Service Commission verifies financial disclosures and identifies conflicts of interest, which are then referred to line ministries; ethics officers within line ministries conduct lifestyle reviews and verify disclosures below the Senior Management Service (SMS); the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) proposes to lead lifestyle audits for all public entities, or this function is performed by external contractors; any findings from that process are referred either to SAPS or the Hawks for criminal investigation or to the individual line ministry for disciplinary action.
“The Public Service Commission verifies financial disclosures and identifies conflicts of interest, which are then referred to line ministries. Ethics officers within line ministries conduct lifestyle reviews and verify disclosures below the SMS. The SIU proposes to lead lifestyle audits for all public entities, or this function is performed by external contractors. And any findings coming out of that are then referred either to SAPS or the Hawks for the criminal investigation or to the individual line ministry for disciplinary action.”
Dr Albertus Schoeman testifies about flaws in the existing asset disclosure regime and possible reforms to strengthen the capacity of the SAPS to resist infiltration by organized crime.
“He is going to testify about flaws in the existing asset disclosure regime and possible reforms to that system that might assist in strengthening the capacity of the SAPS to resist infiltration by organized crime.”
Dr Schoeman describes serious corruption problems in the SAPS including systematic conflicts of interest where public officials' personal interests override official duties, abuse of authority to obstruct investigations, disclosure of confidential information to criminal actors, and manipulation of procurement processes for reciprocal benefit.
“Testimony before the Commission reveals systematic conflicts between the duties of public officials and their personal interests, whereby beneficial relationships with criminal actors have taken precedence over official duties. This includes the abuse of positions of authority to intervene and obstruct investigations, the disclosure of confidential information to criminal actors, and the manipulation of procurement processes to direct contracts to associates, each underpinned by an expectation of reciprocal benefit...”
There is a serious failure in the institutional framework for detecting and combating corrupt infiltration of the SAPS through abuse of authority, disclosure of confidential information, and procurement process manipulation.
“... speaks to a serious failure in the institutional framework for detecting and combating corrupt infiltration of the SAPS.”
A middle group within an organization may not be extremely ethical or unethical, they might turn a blind eye to misconduct to avoid involvement, and ethical behavior must be enforced through rule-based mechanisms to restore integrity in public sector organizations including SAPS.
“n e i t h e r e x t r e m e l y e t h i c a l n o r u n e t h i c a l . T h i s i s a g r o u p o f p e o p l e t h a t g o a l o n g w i t h w h a t t h e c u l t u r a l n o r m i s ... A n d s o h e m a k e s t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t t o s w i t c h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e , t o w i n o v e r t h i s m i d d l e ... t o r e s t o r e e t h i c s ... through rule-based following and that is the kind of approach that I think that South Africa should be focusing on , I think particularly within SAPS , but as the broader public sector as well ...”
The SAPS annual report survey question measured the percentage of officials agreeing that their police colleagues conduct themselves professionally and ethically.
“p e r c e n t a g e o f o f f i c i a l s t h a t a g r e e d t h a t t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s , t h e p o l i c e , c o n d u c t t h e m s e l v e s p r o f e s s i o n a l l y a n d e t h i c a l l y . T h a t w a s t h e q u e s t i o n f r o m t h e S A P S r e p o r t .”
Mr Sayed forwarded a request from Mr Malema on 15 June asking to know the complaint in case number Sandton 79/07/2019, which General Khan promptly responded to by accessing SAPS computerized database and sending a screenshot identifying the complainant as Mr Rooplal.
“Mr Sayed forwards a message: 'Need to know the complaint in case number Sandton case 79/07/2019'... General Khan responds very promptly... has gone on to the SAPS computerized database of cases, and he sends what looks like a photograph or a screenshot from that database which identifies who the complainant is in that case ... identifies the complainant as Mr Rooplal”
Mr Sayed forwarded to General Khan details of Bertobrite, a company that bid for the SAPS fleet management tender, implying that it came from Mr Malema and that they wanted General Khan and Mr Sayed to do it.
“On 3 August 2021, Mr Sayed forwarded to General Khan details of the company Bertobrite that had bid for a tender for fleet management for SAPS. He stated that it came from Juju and said, I think he wants us to do it.”
On 15 June, General Khan sent a draft question via Mr Sayed to Mr Malema related to the complaint in a Sandton case numbered 79/07/2019, including a screenshot from SAPS computerized case database identifying the complainant as Mr Rooplal.
“on the 15th ... General Khan has sent this draft question to the Inspector General, to Mr Malema through Mr Sayed ... Mr Sayed forwards a request from Mr Malema ... to know the complaint in case number Sandton case 79/07/2019 ... General Khan responds very promptly ... he has got onto the SAPS computerized database of cases ... he sends what looks like a photograph or a screenshot ... which identifies the complainant as Mr Rooplal”
Mr Sayed forwarded details of company Bertobrite's bid for a fleet management tender for SAPS, stating it came from Mr Malema who wanted them to proceed with it.
“On 3 August 2021, Mr Sayed forwarded to General Khan details of the company Bertobrite that had bid for a tender for fleet management for SAPS. He stated that it came from Juju and said, I think he wants us to do it.”
General Khan said some provinces (Eastern Cape, Limpopo, and Northern Cape) did not submit prices in a transversal tender for SAPS, intending to rectify it later by finding ways to increase prices.
“General Khan at the top of the page says: “Eastern Cape, Limpopo, and Northern Cape prices were not submitted. We should have.” ... “We were too cheap, but we must find a way to upprice later.””
The tender contract concerns SAPS and General Khan is a senior member of SAPS, creating a conflict of interest regarding the tender evaluation and award.
“The second is the fact that you are a senior member of the SAPS, this contract concerns the SAPS.”
The SAPS vehicle parts procurement tender was done through National Treasury because it is a transversal contract covering multiple provinces and centralized there.
“This tender relates to SAPS vehicles but was done through the National Treasury ... because it is a transversal contract ... It is centralized in National Treasury and is for procurement for SAPS but across provinces.”
A Microsoft Teams meeting was arranged for 3 May 2022 with Peace Gumede and Zanele Mkhwanazi from Treasury and SAPS team to discuss SAPS garage's purchasing buyouts of items or categories not listed on the RT452021 pricing schedule.
“we are having a Microsoft Teams meeting on Tuesday, 3rd May 2022 at 9 a.m. with Peace Gumede and Zanele Mkhwanazi from Treasury and team from SAPS to discuss SAPS garage's purchasing buyouts (items or categories not listed on the RT452021 pricing schedule)”
Mr Vally forwarded a message to General Khan on 1 May 2022 stating the meeting went badly and that SAPS wants a retender for all the missed parts, representing 70% of the volume, essentially buyouts.
“Meeting went badly. Meeting went S-H-I-T. They want a retender for all the parts they missed. Basically buyouts, which are 70 percent of the volume.”
In April 2022, a tender was announced for the appointment of service providers for provision of reflective marking of SAPS vehicles for the period April 2022 to March 2025.
“an announcement of a tender for a contract for the appointment of service providers for provision of reflective marking of SAPS vehicles and that is for the periods, as you can see stated there, April 22 to March 2025”
Mr Vally sends General Khan an email from Kaizen complaining to SAPS and Treasury about insufficient purchase orders, indicating contractual financial non-viability.
“Mr Vally sends General Khan a copy of an email from Kaizen to Ms Mkhwanazi, complaining to them, SAPS and Treasury, about not getting enough orders.”
Financial disclosure processes and forms in the SAPS seem not to be a workable or functioning system for accountability in respect of financial disclosures of its officers.
“it would seem that this is not a workable or a functioning system that lends itself to accountability”
Mr Sayed sends SAPS tweet recording a successful raid at Protobac factory, showing details of seized goods including large quantities of raw tobacco and cut rag.
“Mr Sayed sends to General Khan a SAPS tweet recording a successful raid at the Protobac factory ... particulars of the goods detained ... "152 x 200 kg boxes of raw tobacco; 1127 x 200 kg of cut rag."”
The inquiry is focused on whether a SAPS Crime Intelligence officer acted as a conduit for private, commercial, or criminal interests and compromised law enforcement structures.
“It is directed at whether a SAPS officer, a Crime Intelligence officer, a senior member of the service was a conduit for private, commercial or criminal interests and whether they were able to gain access or influence or corrupt or compromise law enforcement structures.”
The Nyatlo affidavit suggests that Carnilinx improperly utilizes organs of state against competitors, which Carnilinx unequivocally denies, asserting it responsibly reports suspected unlawful conduct to relevant authorities and does not control investigative functions of state organs such as SARS or SAPS.
“The Nyatlo affidavit further suggests that Carnilinx improperly utilizes organs of state against competitors. Carnilinx unequivocally denies those allegations. Like any responsible corporate citizen, Carnilinx has where appropriate reported information concerning suspected unlawful conduct to the relevant authorities. There is nothing improper in providing information to SARS, SAPS, or any other competent authority. Once such information is provided, all investigative and enforcement decisions remain those of the relevant authority acting under its own statutory powers. Carnilinx has never exercised control over the investigative functions of SARS, SAPS, or any other organ of state.”
Mr Sayed requested help to get a contract to supply SAPS with masks bearing SAPS logo in January 2021, during the time of Covid when there was a flurry of tender activity for protective equipment.
“Mr Sayed saying: 'Who can I speak to, to get contract to supply SAPS with masks, with SAPS logo. I am making upstairs, need to sell.' The response from General Khan, I do not think I mentioned the date, this is 12 January 2021 and it is at 0:56 in the morning.”
Mr Sayed requested General Khan to check SAPS procurement system for masks and inquire if General Khan was on the Central Supplier Database (CSD) in May 2021.
“Sayed says: 'Bru, let me know what the procurement for SAPS say for the masks.' ... General Khan responds: 'Are you on CSD?' ... This takes place in May 2021.”
General Fani Molefe, recently suspended from SAPS Supply Chain Management, was referenced in chats under the codename 'Pilot' and was associated with procurement and transversal contracts.
“The Fani that is being referred to in this chat is General Fani, who has recently been suspended from SAPS, where he was in Supply Chain Management. ... Pilot is the codename they use for Molefe Fani.”
General Khan provided Mr. Sayed with internal SAPS information on the required number of disposable face masks per province, which could benefit a bidder.
“G e n e r a l K a h n s e n d s t o M r S a y e d ... a p i c t u r e o f a s c r e e n d e t a i l i n g t h e n u m b e r o f m a s k s r e q u i r e d b y d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s o f t h e S A P S ... i t w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t w a s p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e ... I t i s i n t e r n a l S A P S i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t w o u l d b e n e f i t a b i d d e r”
Pilot refers to Molefe Fani, who was at the time employed in Treasury before moving to SAPS and was involved in procurement and supply chain management.
“...I w i l l s h o w t h a t P i l o t i s M o l e f e F a n i ... a t t h a t p o i n t w h e n M r Fa n i a t t h a t p o i n t w a s e m p l o y e d i n Tr e a s u r y ... h e w a s i n s u p p l y c h a i n m a n a g e m e n t ...”
There was ongoing pressure applied by Mr Sayed to secure procurement orders for masks through General Khan's facilitation and contacts within the government, including Treasury and SAPS officials.
“Mr Sayed says, at 3.39 on the 4th of August: “Please push Gen 1 and P, bru K.” General Khan responds: “Pilot is back tomorrow. I am going to see him.” He says, he complains, it is another week gone by, he is getting quite despairing at this point... Mr Sayed says: “Please follow up with General 1, need the orders.” General Khan responded to all of his messages, acting as a facilitator.”
General Khan provided procurement related information and contact details and allowed himself to be used to facilitate access to SAPS and Treasury procurement channels for a private businessman, Mr Sayed, who is a Carnilinx director.
“General Khan provides procurement related information and contact details and internal SAPS information... General Khan allowed himself, if I can put it at the lowest bar, to be used for access to the SAPS and Treasury procurement channels for a private businessman... Mr Sayed, a private businessman, Carnilinx director, wanted access to these SAPS masks orders... General Khan responded to all of his messages, acting as a facilitator.”
The SAPS internal letter signed by Lieutenant General RIT specified that future surgical mask procurement would occur through the National Treasury contract and there would be no further emergency procurement.
“It is a protocol for containment of COVID and it says that this is approval for all SAPS employees to use both masks when wearing uniforms... (letter) said there will not be any further emergency procurement, but instead the procurement of the surgical masks will be sourced through the National Treasury contract... The letter was by the Divisional Commissioner for Supply Chain Management, RIT, addressed internally to all sections within SAPS only.”
Mr Molefe Fani joined SAPS on 1 August 2022, transferring from Treasury, and was promoted to Divisional Commissioner for Supply Chain Management without rising through SAPS ranks.
“the date at which Molefe Fani joined the SAPS was 1 August 022, and he was a Divisional Commissioner for Supply Chain Management in the SAPS”
Mr Molefe Fani did not rise through the SAPS ranks but was appointed at the rank of Lieutenant General due to seniority from his previous position at Treasury, a common practice in SAPS.
“he did not come through the ranks in SAPS at all. ... he was given the rank of Lieutenant General. ... people are appointed by SAPS and they are given a higher rank so they do not start from the very bottom when they join SAPS. ... he was given the rank that is commensurate with your seniority in SAPS ... anybody who would come from another institution or organisation ... would be placed at the level, you would be given the rank that is commensurate with your seniority in SAPS”
General Khan participated in a private commercial effort concerning Cyberia's master agreement with National Treasury, acting as an intermediary to connect parties for the contract's successful conclusion.
“General Khan participated in this private commercial effort concerning Cyberia's master agreement with National Treasury,... General Khan facilitated or arranged meetings between Pilot and other members, including Mr Sayed and Josie... that General Khan has transmitted information from General Fani and himself about internal SAPS communication.”
Mr Sayed forwarded to General Khan pictures of helicopters in relation to potential sales, discussing that SAPS are reselling their helicopters and seeking to negotiate prices.
“On 13 April 2022, Mr Sayed forwards to General Khan a series of pictures of helicopters... 'Did you know SAPS are selling their helicopters? I am sure you know the right guys to talk to. If you could get them at the right price, we could sell them.'”
There are detailed conversations and continuous meetings involving Mr Sayed and General Khan regarding contracts and opportunities potentially involving financial benefits.
“there are a couple of very detailed conversations with regard to some contracts ... It is continuous meetings ... every time there is a message from Mr Sayed ... General Khan facilitates and says he is going to do so, and responds to say, yes, I, the meeting is set”
General Khan shows willingness to assist a private entity or individual using his position within SAPS, including speaking to people such as J Reed.
“General Khan's willingness to assist using his position in the SAPS ... he said I will speak to J Reed or somebody ... he has access to people within SAPS that is able to approach on behalf of a private entity or individual”
An article from the Daily Maverick alleges that top police officers tasked with investigating Peter Jacobs for tender fraud are themselves potentially guilty of tender fraud.
“a conversation with a person ... shares with General Khan an article from the Daily Maverick ... The headline of the article is “SAPS PP E scandal Clash of Top Brass Amid Claims of Massive Corruption.” And so what the article is alleging is that there are top cops who were tasked with investigating the then Head of Crime Intelligence, Peter Jacobs, for tender fraud. The article is alleging that those top cops are themselves potentially guilty of tender fraud.”
The identity of the second communicator with General Khan is redacted for public protection but is believed to be a member of SAPS.
“The only reason it is redacted is for the public. It should not be redacted on your version, but because you do not have a version, all you can see is what is being flighted ... It is a person who is, I believe, a member of the SAPS.”
Mr Vally and General Khan discuss difficulties in pricing and warehouse contracts in chats dated 31 May and 1 June 2021, indicating ongoing unresolved issues and discussions involving tender pricing.
“On the 31st of May 2021 , half way down the page , Mr Vally says : “ Salams . I can not find RT 84 . Also looking for anything related to warehousing . I will keep on checking my bro . Okay , thanks . ” ... And on the 1st of June 2021 : “ Nothing on warehousing . Please , when you can , to message your man and also around SAPS pricing . ””
A screenshot shared by Mr Vally to General Khan shows multiple tenders including a PPE tender for disinfection, sanitization and deep cleaning of municipal offices and warehouses, implying negotiations related to this tender apart from the main auto parts tender.
“It is a screenshot of more tenders and one of the tenders is a PPE tender ... For disinfection , sanitization , and deep cleaning of all municipal offices , warehouses ... He shares the screenshot with General Khan and says : “ Bro , dispensers we can do . And last one , we can do . And its says sensitization , but I think what he meant was sanitization . General Khan responds : “ Salams , bro , I will speak to Fani . ” And Mr Vally responds : “ Thank you . We are already doing small ... small sanitization monthly at SAPS . ””
General Khani, a wealthy businessman with a low SAPS salary, was strategically positioned in intelligence and allegedly uses his position for extortion and influence.
“General Khani is one, a business person ... SAPS salary is too little ... But when you look at this thing ... General Khani is sitting in a strategic position ... it is like an extortionist type of way ...”
Mr. Shongwe worked in SAPS from 2006 to about 2015 in the colleges space, training members in advanced and tactical driving and was an examiner of vehicle and driver licenses.
“I was employed at SAPS in the colleges space ... I was trained by SAPS to be instructors in the space of advanced driving and tactical driving ... I did my two diplomas of examiner of vehicle and examiner of driver's licence ... From 2006, coming up. I left SAPS.”
Mr. Shongwe left SAPS because of an allegation that instructors not employed under the Police Act could not train SAPS members, despite being offered later ranks.
“there was an allegation that we cannot train SAPS members under the Police Act while we are not employed under the Police Act ... we were then offered later ranks but at that time I decided to leave...”
General Khan is alleged to be a multi-millionaire businessman who remains employed in a sensitive intelligence position within SAPS.
“General Khan is a multi-millionaire and a businessman of considerable means, yet he seeks to remain in employment within the SAPS, specifically within the intelligence division.”
Mr Nku called Dr Precious Mabuza, daughter of the late Deputy President Mabuza, to share his discomfort with the drug bust situation. Dr Mabuza promised to inform Lieutenant General Mboto of the Hawks in North West Provincial Head office, but Mr Nku's phone was taken away and he did not receive that call. Later, Dr Mabuza informed him that Lieutenant General Mboto tried to call him multiple times after his phone seizure.
“I then called Dr Precious Mabuza, who is the daughter of the late Deputy President Mabuza. I told her that I gave information to SAPS about a drug bust, but the situation was making me feel uncomfortable. She promised me that she will inform Lieutenant General Mboto from Provincial Head of Hawks, DPCI North West. However, my phone was shortly taken away and I did not receive that call. I was later informed by Dr Mabuza that General Mboto tried to call me multiple times on the day, by the time my phone had been seized.”
Chief Mashaba was supposed to organize law enforcement to arrive at the 'Yellow Jersey' location at 6:30 am to confiscate drugs, but there was no reason to pay him cash for this assistance.
“Chief Mashaba was supposed to organise law enforcement and they were to arrive at Yellow Jersey at 6 . 3 0 in the morning and law enforcement confiscated all these drugs, what was going to be the benefit for him to wake up at 5 . 0 0 in the morning to be there at 6 . 3 0 for something that SAPS or DPCI was going to take and claim credit ? ... There would not have been any reason , because , hence I say , in my experience , in my past experiences , there have been instances I have given information and then things comes short . So I would not have had any need to pay him . I stayed there , hence I maintained that I was neutral . My number one objective was to make sure that there is a bust , it is a recorded bust.”
General Mkhwanazi has known about the links between Organised Crime and SAPS for many years, and took unlawful steps to deal with a senior police official involved in the penetration of Organised Crime into the criminal justice system.
“General Mkhwanazi has known about the links between Organised Crime and SAPS for many years ... not only his knowledge, but the steps he took, in my opinion unlawful steps, to deal with one of these senior police officials that was involved in the penetration of Organised Crime into the criminal justice system”
General Lebeya unlawfully agreed with General Masemola to move Major General Mokotedi from DPCI to SAPS instead of dismissing him, effectively moving the problem rather than solving it.
“Instead of dismissing him, General Lebeya unlawfully agreed with General Masemola that he could simply be moved from DPCI to SAPS. So, that is moving the problem instead of removing the problem.”
General Mkhwanazi colluded with illegal interference by the Minister and President in relation to the Freedom Under Law litigation to cover up executive interference in SAPS, which he knew was unlawful.
“General Mkhwanazi's collusion with the illegal interference of the Minister and the President is even more stark... he assisted to cover up the executive interference in the SAPS, which he knew to be unlawful”
Mr O'Sullivan quotes the judgment that the Commissioner in discharging obligations under SAPS Act must protect and give effect to SAPS discipline regulations.
“To ensure the proper function of the SAPS, the Commissioner in discharging his obligation under section 11 of the SAPS Act must protect and give effect to SAPS discipline regulations”
General Mkhwanazi did not disclose knowing of an unlawful instruction from the Minister of Police until 8 years later, despite frequent media coverage and court proceedings.
“the only time this comes out is here, 8 years later. It never came out before then, never.”
General Mkhwanazi was aware of the unlawful obstruction allegations central to the Freedom Under Law application and chose to sidestep those allegations in his deposition, thus acquiescing to the cover-up by omission or deliberate participation.
“General Mkhwanazi was aware of the allegations in the Freedom Under Law application because the founding affidavit had been served on SAPS while he was Acting National Commissioner and he had deposed to the initial answer ... but chose to sidestep the unlawful obstruction allegation and simply not comment ... if he knew and chose to keep quiet, he colludes by omission ... or he was part of the cover-up.”
General Mkhwanazi knew the core allegation of unlawful obstruction was part of the Freedom Under Law application while he was Acting National Commissioner and chose to sidestep the allegation rather than confront it.
“General Mkhwanazi was aware of the allegations in the Freedom Under Law application because the founding affidavit had been served on SAPS whilst he was Acting National Commissioner and he had deposed to the initial answer ... chose to sidestep the unlawful obstruction allegation and simply not comment.”
It is not unheard of within SAPS to appoint someone with no policing experience to high ranks based on a required expertise, including from industries like motor vehicle manufacturing.
“it is not unheard within SAPS to appoint someone with no experience at all in policing ... that person is being appointed for the expertise they possess ... applies over several types of industries or environments ... for this position, they require a certain expertise and that this expertise is to be found within the motor manufacturing industry”
The PowerPoint presentation used by General Mkhwanazi had metadata showing it was created on a SAPS computer, not Mkhwanazi's personal computer.
“The PowerPoint presentation used by Mkhwanazi had metadata which showed it had been created on a SAPS computer, which is, emphasis, not Mkhwanazi's computer.”
The PowerPoint presentation was said to be prepared by a collective within SAPS, not just General Mkhwanazi alone.
“General Mkhwanazi says it is a whole lot of us ... not created on his own computer, but on another SAPS computer ... a member of SAPS ... the collective that General Mkhwanazi references in his statement”
Mr Nku considered himself a confidential source rather than having a formal handler-informer relationship with SAPS members like Lieutenant General Mfazi or Chief Mashaba.
“I regarded myself as his confidential source, not the handler-informer relationship. ... knowing that he is not a SAPS member, in the context of SAPS, I do not think that that would be the case.”
Mr Nku warns that the drugs involve senior people in the SAPS and was careful whom he involved, hence he did not want to spread the word about the bust.
“He was quite careful who to involve ... You warned him that these drugs belong or involve some senior people in the SAPS, so he was quite careful who to involve ... It was his, Magane's operation, and yours ...”
WhatsApp communication discussed doesn't relate to the SAPS contract; prior business relations with George van der Merwe ended unconstructively.
“The WhatsApp communication does not relate to the SAPS contract in as far as I know. I have had previous business relations with George van der Merwe, which related to close protection services, which was not a constructive business relationship and which I terminated.”
The SAPS was asked about awareness of narcotics rebranded with the Prestige logo and crown symbol; Brigadier Allen from SAPS Chemistry section provided information confirming the drug analysis results.
“And we asked the SAPS if they were aware of any narcotics that are rebranded in this fashion and we received an information note from Brigadier Allen, who is the Section Head of Chemistry in the SAPS”
Mr van Wyk and Commissioner Mkhwanazi discussed establishing a reserve force for EMPD involving private individuals engaged in a similar capacity to police reservists in SAPS.
“Mr van Wyk and Commissioner Mkhwanazi are floating the idea of establishing a reserve force for the EMPD, which would then involve private individuals who are not EMPD employees being engaged by the EMPD in some sort of capacity, just like police reservists engage with the SAPS.”
Mr Matlala had a criminal conviction for housebreaking sentenced to 4 years imprisonment in 2001 which meant he should have a criminal record, but it was allegedly "sorted out" illegally.
“Mr Matlala had been convicted of housebreaking and sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment in 2001 , which meant that he should have a criminal record . And that if he sorted out that problem , it was sorted out illegally”
Mr van Wyk sent a SAPS clearance certificate certifying that Mr Matlala has no criminal convictions, but this document could not lawfully have been issued since Mr Matlala had a prior housebreaking conviction that could not be expunged.
“Mr van Wyk sends through a SAPS clearance certificate certifying that Mr Matlala has no criminal convictions . Now this document , it seems to us , could not lawfully have been issued , because he did have a criminal conviction for house breaking in 2001 , and that was not a conviction that was capable of being expunged .”
By March 2025, both Mr Matlala and Mr Van Wyk appeared to be in financial difficulties related to SAPS contract payments, impacting their process for law enforcement appointment statuses.
“by March 2025 ... both Mr Matlala and Mr Van Wyk appear to be in financial difficulties and that in part has to do with problems ... securing payment on the SAPS contract”
Since January 2026, the Commission has acquired significant relevant documents and testimony from other witnesses regarding the infiltration or influence of criminal syndicates over entities including the SAPS and DPCI.
“since his appearance in 2026, the Commission has been placed in possession of significant documents that are relevant to the issue. Other witnesses have testified and, too, produced documents before the Commission... what this Commission is mandated to interrogate is whether criminal syndicates, including but not limited to drug cartels, have infiltrated or exerted influence over a range of entities, including the SAPS, of which the DPCI is a part”
There are people in the SAPS and HR offices who are passively watching the Commission proceedings and pouncing on people based on notes they take, which is an inherent danger in such proceedings.
“...there are people, whether in the inappropriately named unit or whatever its name is... or the HR offices of SAPS, whose task as quiet laziness, to be honest, as just sitting here and watching here and then making notes and then pouncing on people. That might be... an inherent danger in proceedings like this.”
Senona is aware of the SAPS protocol on Search, Seizure, Handling, Processing and Disposition of Illegal Drugs, a document he partially knows from prior experience and training, but was office-bound from 2011 and not attending crime scenes.
“I have seen this document when I was here in January. Part of it, I am aware of the content, part of the content, but not the entire document. ... I attended the detective course when I was appointed as a Detective in 1989. ... I was office-bound since 2011. Being a manager, overseeing things, not attending to crime scenes or dealing with certain things.”
Witness J explained how they profiled a phone number (starting with 27) used by a person linked to the South African Police Service (SAPS) system and Home Affairs population register.
“That is correct. The number starts with 27... it is a SAPS system... population register... information from Home Affairs”
Samuel Mashaba was referred to as 'General' on an audio found on his device and in chats, although within the traffic department there is no rank called 'General', the equivalent is Chief Director; only SAPS has a general rank.
“M a s h a b a w a s r e f e r r e d t o a s G e n e r a l”
General Senona invited the DPCI management to his father's unveiling ceremony in 2021 in Pretoria, which the speaker attended along with Brigadier Kgama and other SAPS members.
“I do recall that he invited the DPCI management to his father's unveiling ceremony in 2021 in Pretoria, which I attended as I was in Gauteng that weekend. Brigadier Kgama also attended the unveiling, as did other SAPS members”
The team involved in the operation consisted of specifically selected people from the same unit, not multiple unrelated teams.
“you have a team of specifically selected people. You do not have multiple teams that just happen to be on the scene and they are not necessarily friends or in any way associated with each other, other than that they all fall under the umbrella of the SAPS”
Brigadier Nyuswa accepts that the evidence chain was compromised because exhibits were not placed in bags immediately at the crime scene, but explains that this is a practical reality often due to operational constraints, and asserts that the risks of wrongdoing are minimal when a small, specifically selected, connected team is involved rather than unrelated multiple teams.
“chain of evidence is already compromised when they leave ... Sometimes it is practically not possible ... Most cases, when these incidents are occurring, there is multiple people ... The chances of anyone doing something wrong are very minimal ... except in cases where they are all acting in concert ... You have got a team of specifically selected people ... Two of them say they were selected by the Crime Intelligence Officer ... So your reasoning that it is unlikely that anyone would do anything inappropriate when there are multiple players does not apply in this case ... I concede”
Captain van Niekerk was involved in the procurement process for enhanced security at Port Shepstone before becoming a procurement officer, relying on Colonel Nxumalo of SAPS to check and advise on the application file.
“because at that point Captain van Niekerk was not appointed as a procurement officer, so we relied on the mother board, the SAPS, which was Colonel Nxumalo. So they would poke holes on the file that this and that must be rectified and it would be sent back...”
Despite the drugs being in full public view after the container was opened, Chief Mashaba did not mobilize other SAPS units or call the appropriate people, relying on Magane and others to know what to do.
“You do not call other SAPS ... You say we are under the impression Mr Magane ... will know what to do ... I left everything to Magane ... for him to say, I called Phakula ... then I know we are safe now because they are calling the relevant people.”
Chief Mashaba physically fought with General Khan on scene despite other SAPS officials taking charge who were appropriately qualified, raising questions why he fought with them.
“You fight with Khan when he comes there and takes charge ... other people are now there ... you and Magane are completely inappropriate for this operation ... Why do you fight when SAPS officials, appropriately qualified, come and take control of the scene?”
The SAPS operation at the scene was under the control of a General, and Chief Mashaba questions why he was actively trying to remove Magane, who was believed to be under arrest.
“It is a SAPS operation. It is not a Traffic Department operation. It is a SAPS operation. You continue to, you want to continue to be active to a point of wanting to take Magane, who you think is under arrest, you want to take him out of that arrest which has been ordered by a General.”
Mr Riekert, a retired SAPS Captain and Security Manager at Scania, states that during the investigation, Chief Mashaba was very aggressive, obstructed others' work, and intimidated by threatening arrest if interference occurred.
“He says: 'Being a retired Captain in the Police, I asked him why they were not following normal investigation protocols. With a very aggressive attitude he told me not to try to do his work and that he would arrest me for interfering in the investigation.'”
The witness was ready to assist Mr Nku using his police position for unlawful operations and did not inform superiors about the operations until after getting arrested.
“you did not inform your superiors ... until you got arrested”
The witness is alleged to be part of a criminal network engaging in unlawful activities including drug trafficking, unauthorized arrests, spying on vehicles, and manipulation of investigations for Mr Nku.
“appears you are part of a criminal network ... activities that included drug trafficking ... arrests without proper authorization ... spying on people's vehicles ... enquiring within officers about exhibits because Mr Nku wants that”
Chief Mashaba confirms Traffic Officers have blanket power to do any and all things members of SAPS are empowered to do, except investigating dockets, and in crime in progress situations they support SAPS which takes lead.
“Yes, I can do, except investigating a docket. That, and I do not have the power over, but other than that, as a law enforcement official, it does not mean when I see, for example, a crime in progress, let us say rape, I cant turn a blind eye. I can not turn a blind eye, and I can not just turn a blind eye because I do not work with rapes. It is not my line of duty, but it is crime in progress. I can not just turn a blind eye. But when I am with the Police, jointly working, the protocol dictates that the Police will take the lead. I will be playing the supporting role.”
Chief Mashaba clarifies as a Traffic Officer he does not investigate serious crimes such as murder or armed robbery on his own accord, but would report such crimes to SAPS if brought to his attention.
“No. Hence I am saying … Specifically, not that I can out of my own way go investigate a murder, but if it is brought to my … I would not do that . I will either , either I will report to SAPS .”
Chief Mashaba says as a law enforcement official, he must report to the relevant authority when intervening outside his immediate jurisdiction and in related crimes off the road.
“I must do something as a law enforcement official. Step number one, I will have to report, make the relevant authority aware”
Chief Mashaba says he can enforce law on the road within Gauteng as a Traffic Officer, without needing permission from SAPS, but for other crimes he must seek SAPS assistance.
“Well, on the road, I do not need any permission from SAPS on the road because that is where my crime scenes are. As a Traffic Officer. But on other related, no related, on other crimes committed, I will have to seek assistance that SAPS”
Chief Mashaba confirms he would invite SAPS when conducting searches or raids inside a commission's premises as he would not act alone.
“I would invite SAPS. I would invite SAPS. No necessarily that I cannot, but I am saying, well, to limit a lot of issues, a lot of questions, it is simply, it is quite simple to just invite SAPS because they are the ones that quickly can apply for search warrants and stuff like that.”
Chief Mashaba explains SAPS officers have specific operational areas and he must relate information to the relevant SAPS member before acting in that area.
“I need to relate that to a Diepkloof member because that is his area of operation.”
Mr Nku's warning to Chief Mashaba about involving senior law enforcement officials referred generally to SAPS, metros and others, without specifying which agencies.
“Nku was trying to say, I understood it, because he is not a law enforcement official. I knew that he means it can be SAPS, it can be metros, and others. When he did not say do not be careful not to involve Samuel Mashaba... he did not specifically say SAPS”
Chief Mashaba claims the information about the truck did not fall under their mandate, so he did not tell his team to look out and did not report to SAPS, requesting manpower instead.
“Remember the information I got, it is, it does not fall under our mandate. So if I would have said that to them, I am saying that to them to do what? To call me, and then? I was not going to do it, because I know it is going to give us difficulty in dealing with it. It still needed SAPS. ... I did not report. I requested manpower in the morning.”
Chief Mashaba did not report a narcotics operation to SAPS because he was cautioned by Mr Nku, a civilian, and this decision led to him breaching existing prescripts.
“you are saying Mr Nku said do not comply with your prescripts .. you do not comply with your prescripts”
Chief Mashaba did not instruct or mandate his team at the weighbridge to pull over the vehicle linked to an investigation, choosing instead to verify information first and act accordingly.
“why do you got to Yellow Jersey Logistics without the SAPS member ... but you cannot mobilize your official team at the weighbridge to look out for this vehicle and pull it over? ... Because the information came to me. I wanted to verify. If I saw it fit, nothing would have stopped me to call my team.”
Chief Mashaba asserts as a Traffic Officer he is permitted by law to enter property and conduct operations except investigate docket, and he needed SAPS involvement for expertise but could have acted alone.
“He said as a Traffic Officer, it is something else. As permitted by law, under 334, nothing stops me. He said the only thing that I cannot do is to investigate the docket. Other than that, I can ... I need SAPS, but ... nothing would have stopped me from doing that if I was following or did exactly what I did from Yellow Jersey.”
Chief Mashaba confirms he could have conducted the operation at Scania without involving SAPS but still needed SAPS presence for ease and expertise.
“I could have done that. ... To make things easy, you quickly involve people you know life will be easy because that is the area of expertise, so that is SAPS.”
Adv Baloyi asserts that Chief Mashaba did not need to involve SAPS to conduct the operation at Scania and the operation was legally within his powers as a Traffic Officer.
“there is nothing that obliged you to bring the SAPS on to this operation ... it is an operation that, in terms of the law, your prescripts, your rules, your protocols, you are entitled to do exactly what you did without the SAPS.”
Chief Mashaba states he was aware that the drugs and money laundering enquiry was opened, and that he would have asked someone in SAPS to open such an enquiry.
“Yes, according to this, yes, I would have known. Maybe the person that I referred to opened that enquiry and confirmed to me that the enquiry is opened. Ask them to open an enquiry.”
Chief Mashaba admits that he himself and someone else would have approached the 'big boss' regarding the enquiry because it involves drugs and money laundering, which he said he could not deal with and had to refer within SAPS.
“When I say we, it means yes, I am involving myself. Because he is talking drugs and money, I know I would have done nothing about it. I would have referred it to somebody else and that will be in SAPS and nowhere else. Because he is talking about big boss.”
The complainant gave false information to IPID which was withheld by the police and characterized as causing division within SAPS and Crime Intelligence.
“you giving information that is clearly false to IPID because you were the main complainant in the IPID complaint ... And that is material information that you withheld from IPID, from the police”
Chief Mashaba confirmed that he constituted a team of police officers who were doing a favor for Mr Nku and were paid by him, working outside their official duties.
The group involved in the 2019 operation at OR Tambo, paid by Mr Nku, was not an official police operation and members did not perform official police functions but were involved in planned arrests relating to stolen gold.
“which we have established is not an official police operation, because these three people who are your team that are paid by Nku, they are not in a police operation to follow up on this”
Chief Mashaba acknowledges he is engaged in off-the-books unlawful operations with Mr Nku involving misuse of SAPS members and their positions.
“We know that you have off-the-books operations with him and your team that he is paying ... operations that are not authorised by law ... unlawful conduct that the two of you are engaging in using your position and getting SAPS members to use their positions to do things that are not in ...”
Mr Nku is involved in problematic activities including drug trafficking, and there is an allegation that he is being improperly introduced to SAPS members by others implicating corrupt relations.
“He is involved in activities about drug trafficking. That is the evidence before this Commission, and that will still play out. He is involved in that, and here you are yet again having introduced him to SAPS members, doing his bidding.”
WITNESS I informed other SAPS units with whom he was familiar when they encountered drug-related scenes where they would call WITNESS I for assistance.
“It is something I informed other units within SAPS, other unit members, whom I know.”
ADV Khumalo accuses Witness I of using the inquiry number to legitimise an unlawful operation by Maganean, Phakula, and Mashaba which was interrupted by SAPS members dispatched by 10111.
“Your presence there and your use of this 2020 inquiry number was to legitimise what was otherwise an unlawful operation ... to steal the drugs.”
Inquiry files are handled manually and not registered on the SAPS system, making it possible for files to be manufactured or destroyed manually.
“My understanding with the enquiry file, Commissioners, they only do things manually. They do not register the file on the system. ... So even if there was no file before, I can simply create it because I do it manually. And if I want to destroy it, I can simply destroy the one that I created manually. ... That is true Commissioners. Something like that can happen.”
Assistant Director Maphosho said that General Khan was told if he had a statement related to Booysen CAS 97/7/2021 that IPID did not have, he could attach it to the warning form during completion.
“I told him that if he does have a statement because IPID were not in possession of that statement, remember SAPS refused with the copies of the docket, so we did not have the copies of the statement that he was referring to. However, I told him that if he can manage to get that statement, he can attach that statement as his annexure to the warning form.”
Advocate Khumalo questions whether technicalities such as timing or possession of a SAPS statement matter given that General Khan complied with IPID’s instruction to give a warning statement.
“Mr Mosikili, seeing that IPID’s response was that you should come and be interviewed and make a warning statement or give a warning statement, and he does go and he does give the statement, do those technicalities matter, whether they got hold of the SAPS statement or not, because their instruction to General Khan in response to his letter was you must come. We want a warning statement and you must give a warning statement. And he did go and he did give a warning statement.”
If IPID finds a complaint totally unfounded, they make general recommendations and a positive referral indicating no wrongdoing by the members complained against.
“We make general recommendations ... at SAPS they call it undetected, but with IPID we generate a report that indicates that the allegations were unfounded, and then we compile general recommendations ... it's a positive referral ... if I am saying there is nothing wrong that these members have done”
A negative recommendation was sent to SAPS to initiate disciplinary proceedings against members involved, including Major General Khan, General Kadwa, Brigadier Sekgobela, Colonel Steyn, and Colonel Sebola.
“a negative recommendation was sent to SAPS to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the members involved. Then I mentioned the members, Major General Khan attached to Crime Intelligence, General Kadwa, Brigadier Sekgobela, Colonel Steyn, and Colonel Sebola”
Management in SAPS has differing perspectives about IPID recommendations and initiation of disciplinary processes, often initiating their own investigations causing delays.
“In my day-to-day performance of my duties I have experienced that management in the SAPS have different perspectives about IPID recommendation and initiation of disciplinary process. They also have different criticisms against the investigation conducted by IPID. They often opt to initiate their own investigation, seemingly resulting in a delay in the disciplinary processes as a whole.”
There is general knowledge within SAPS of conflict of interest or possible compromise involving senior members around narcotics matters; members speak off-record about it but not publicly.
“There is a conflict of interest with SMS members when it comes to narcotics within SAPS ... it happens that the mission will not be accomplished as the target will be tipped off or it will come to their knowledge ... members will not publicly speak about it, but within corridors and on the street, they speak of it off record.”
Mr Vusi Matlala is alleged to use SAPS to eliminate his opposition, which is unknown to Witness I who never participated in operations involving him.
“I have heard of the allegations that Mr Vusi Matlala is using SAPS to eliminate his opposition. This is unknown to me as I never had an operation or been involved in an operation where TO MS was used by any individual.”
Communication culture in SAPS is flawed, with information bypassing proper chain of command, causing issues with accountability and oversight.
“Information can jump me from the last man on the ground to the upper structure... that is not the culture of SAPS... not what we have been told of going back to basics”
The memorandum seeks approval from the Executive Director or delegate to give IPID permission to investigate cases involving SAPS members, but these cases do not mention Section 28(1)(a) to (g).
“The purpose of this memorandum is to seek approval from the Executive Director or someone delegated by the Executive Director to give IPID permission to investigate these kinds of cases where the SAPS members are involved. But those are not the cases that are mentioned in terms of Section 28(1)(a) to (g).”
IPID officers do not investigate their complainants but focus on police conduct during incidents.
“at IPID , most of our complainants are suspects on the SAPS cases ... we are checking whether the conduct of the police , they acted within the scope of their mandate or not”
Assistant Director Maphosho confirms that there are cases where Traffic Police work with SAPS members, especially the Hawks, in operations, although he is unsure about their memorandum of understanding.
“we also have cases where people from the Traffic Police working with the SAPS members, especially the Hawks, do some operation.”
The investigation of the truck driver's suspicious travel and failure to stop at weigh bridges should have been conducted by the Hawks, but it is difficult as it might look like interference with SAPS investigations.
“I think it is difficult to investigate these kinds of issues because it would look like we are now overstepping on the investigations that is being conducted by the SAPS”
The police failed to properly investigate whether the truck driver avoided weigh bridges, which should have been done by SAPS or the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) since the driver is not a police officer.
“if we had to see as to what is in the docket, whether the police followed the issue of these weigh bridges or not. If not, IPID was going to do that. But we did not want to investigate this issue, and this truck driver is not even a police officer where IPID have mandate to investigate such”
There was an issue with drug exhibits being unaccounted for in the SAPS system as they were booked out for analysis but did not appear in the SAPS records until after the following day.
“there was no record of it . You booked them out ... they landed at a place which is not recorded anywhere in the system until you are back the following day . They are not in bags , in evidence bags , and they are not recorded in any SAPS system at that point”
Exhibits were placed into forensic evidence bags only on the 23rd, although they were returned on the 23rd and left only on the 24th, and before that were not recorded in the system nor in evidence bags.
“We returned on the 23rd ... We put all the exhibits in the forensic bags . Then we left ... They were still not recorded in the system”
Colonel Jacob confirmed that all property and exhibits seized must be registered as per National Instruction 8 of 2017 and transferred to the relevant unit's SAPS 13 register.
“All property and exhibits seized must be entered in the SAP 13 property register of the relevant police station ... and then transferred to the relevant unit and entered in the SAPS 13 of the relevant unit.”
The absence of LCRC involvement was to avoid the formal record as the entire seizure was never meant to formally enter SAPS records except for a cryptic SAPS 13 entry at Isipingo.
“why you did not call LCRC was to avoid this formality that Colonel Sander confronted, because this entire seizure was never really meant to go formally into the records of the SAP, besides a cryptic SAPS 13 entry at Isipingo”
Colonel Jacob confirms that drugs need to be sealed in exhibit bags upon entering SAPS, but that the drugs were not sealed at the scene due to unavailability of bags at the depot.
“drugs need to be sealed in an exhibit bag upon entering into the SAP... needs to be sealed at the scene in exhibit bags ... they were not sealed at the scene being at the depot... because there were no exhibit bags”
The SAPS system shows Colonel Jacob as officially on leave during the period 10 to 30 June 2021, not working as a policeman during that time though he booked on duty to attend the operation.
“You are not working as a policeman during that time? Yes, yes, Commissioner. That is correct... The system books you off. You are not there. How do you get to attend operations during that time?”
Colonel Jacob requested Warrant Officer Mpangase to inform Brigadier Nyuswa that he would book on duty for 22nd to attend an operation, which is acceptable to be done verbally in SAPS and DPCI.
“you asked Warrant Officer Mpangase had to inform him that you are booking on duty... request on your behalf from Brigadier Nyuswa that you be back on duty for the 22nd to attend to this operation”
Customs does not always coordinate or share interest with SAPS; there can be clashes between the two agencies regarding container interests.
“in not all cases that we have encountered Customs and SAPS are on the same page. To give you an example practically, it sometimes happens that it clashes, like SAPS is interested in a certain container, and then you learnt that Customs is also now interested.”
The mandate of Division Crime Intelligence is to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse information to prevent and combat crime, and to provide Crime Intelligence in support of the operational requirements of the operational components of the SAPS.
“The mandate of Division Crime Intelligence is to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse information to prevent and combat crime... The primary focus is to provide Crime Intelligence in support of the operational requirements of the operational components of the SAPS.”
Reports of intelligence gathered are submitted to the commander who signs them off, after which they are registered and forwarded to the Intelligence Analysis Centre for dissemination to all operational components of the SAPS.
“Intelligence gathered is reduced to writing by the operative and submitted to the commander who will sign off the report. The report is registered and forwarded to the Intelligence Analysis Centre where the reports and the information get disseminated to relevant addresses which are on the reports within Crime Intelligence and all operational components of the SAPS.”
The process of gathering evidence or intelligence starts with identifying threats via crime statistics, conducting a threat analysis, gathering information from sources, and then planning, directing and conducting operations, followed by analysis, production, dissemination, action and feedback.
“Basically, we will be going back to our intelligence collection process where we sit, we look at the crime statistics, and we identify the threats that are a problem... we then task our sources on the ground to look into the threats... From there, you start gathering information with regards to the threats... you evaluate the information... you analyse it... you hand it to the analyst to analyse it... and then from there, you will know exactly what you are dealing with, which is the interpretation... and then from there, it is production... From there, you disseminate it... it is action which means you operationalise it... Once you have operationalised it, you get feedback from the operational team... and then from there, you close your investigation.”
The intelligence collection and operationalising process requires registration of enquiries, engagement with pre-project and full-blown project phases, and the involvement of multiple offices including DPCI, NPA, Asset Forfeiture, surveillance and other SAPS units.
“The process is that, as I have explained, which runs from enquiry to pre-project, then to a full-blown project... You will have to have your operational team, which will include DPCI, which will include NPA, and which will also include other offices like your Asset Forfeiture, and other relevant units within SAPS, your surveillance and everything.”
During operationalising, engagement with prosecutors is necessary to keep the focus on the threats and avoid deviation.
“In most cases, you will have to engage with the prosecutor to get the guidance going forward, so that you do not go off and focus somewhere else, so that you keep your gathering focused with regards to the threats that you are dealing with.”
Lt-Col Duma gathered intelligence about a consignment of drugs at a private depot in Durban, contacting the depot manager for permission to inspect container BEAU595535 placed for inspection on 2026-06-22.
“I was holding the rank of a Captain working at Security Intelligence in Border Security Durban. During the performance of my duties, I gained intelligence about consignment of drugs in one of the depots... I informed the manager that I had received the permission from transporter and clearing and forwarding agents to have container number BEAU595535, placed for inspection, and to be inspected by members of the SAPS on 2026-06-22... The container was secured by the depot manager of our assembly and operational team.”
LT-COLDUMADay 111 · 02 Jun 2026Refers to: 2026-06-21 to 2026-06-22Location: Border Security Durban, private depot 14 Avenue E, Prospecton, Durban
When the seal of the container was broken during the operation, there were no customs or SARS personnel present, only SAPS, DPCI, and the Depot Manager.
“In the opening of this when, in this, now we are back in this operation, when the seal is broken there was no customs or veterinarian together with your police people. They were not there. You had only your SAPS, DPCI, the Depot Manager I think you say and, ja, pretty much. There was no SARS people there or customs people.”
Lt-Col Duma disputes all allegations made by General Flynn that implicate him but confirms he was present at the scene throughout and called DPCI and SAPS people to the scene.
“you dispute allegations made by General Flynn to the extent that they implicate you ... you confirm your presence at the scene, and the DPCI and SAPS people who were there were called by you”
Warrant Officer Sander believes a corrupt policeman and customs official are necessary to keep the drug supply chain functioning properly.
“For the supply chain to work correctly, you need a corrupt policeman there. You need a corrupt customs official, you need a corrupt policeman. Then your system flows.”
Warrant Officer Sander stated that there will be no further promotion in SAPS at his current rank and taking early retirement is logical.
“I w i l l n o t q u a l i f y f o r a n y f u r t h e r p r o m o t i o n i n t h e S A P S a t m y c u r r e n t r a n k . ... T h e r e a r e q u i t e a f e w o t h e r f e l l o w m e m b e r s t h a t w e a r e a l l a p p l y i n g t o l e a v e .”
Warrant Officer Sander stated that early retirement applications are subject to SAPS management approval and questioned how 40 years of skills can be transferred in 2 months.
“T h a t i s i m p o s s i b l e . F o r t y y e a r s o f s k i l l s , h o w d o y o u t r a n s f e r i t i n 2 m o n t h s ?”
The SAPS do not have suitable storage facilities for drugs like Methaqualone that would avoid the hazards described.
“If I answer this question honestly, I will get fired today. I will say no. The correct place where to store it would be something like Pretoria Forensic Science Laboratory. I am not going to mention the other locations.”
The crime scene at CHC is guarded by Metro and SAPS personnel and has security checks including a gate and controlled access.
“Before you can get in ... there is security at the front ... gate you go through ... check you in ... drive nearly 300 metres before you can get to the container stack ... I had Metro there ... SAPS there ... we were all armed ... I believe we are safe.”
Narcotic presumption test kits are self-obtained, usually purchased at personal cost, not supplied by SAPS ordinarily.
“That is one of the other tools, as explained earlier, self-obtained ... I believe these were obtained during some of the training interventions that I attended. And the facilitator would then give us whatever they had to use.”
Mr Mogotsi repeatedly called Mr Chaskalson on the night of 9 March seeking protection from being falsely blamed and trying to provide evidence against Mr Carrim including about the Medicare4 contract.
“Mr Mogotsi then called three more times that night. Mr Chaskalson says... that Mr Mogotsi conveyed his concern that Mr Carrim had been blaming him for everything... Mr Mogotsi offered evidence against Mr Carrim, as well as further evidence relating to the Medicare4 contract that was also a subject of debate with Mr Carrim.”
Mr Mogotsi says all names he provided have been departmental charged and many individuals mentioned have been caught except an informant and investigating officer of the informant who he says was killed.
“Even if I was prepared to incriminate myself, all the names I have given you, even one man is in hospital, has been departmentally charged. Every person I mentioned here... the informant ... the investigating officer of the informant ... he was killed.”
Mr Mogotsi was aware in March or April 2025 about the need to investigate a SAPS tender awarded to Mr Matlala through a company Medicare 24 with links to former Minister Bheki Cele.
“You found out about the possible need to investigate his tender with SAPS according to your statement in March , April 2024 . ... That is the statement . ... 2025 . ... So you found out about the need to investigate the tender in March , April 2025 .”
SA NCB drug unit officers, who specialize in drugs, take over crime scenes from initial responders who lack drug expertise, and provide confirmation about suspected drugs.
“The reason why we are called to the scene first, we are specializing in drugs. Once they say drugs are involved, we are the team that can deal. When they say, when you arrive at the scene, you suspect something, call the necessary people. We are, in fact, we are amongst the necessary people. We are the one who can say, yes, indeed, we can confirm these are the suspected drugs.”
It is general SAPS practice that officers specialized in an area take over the scene to manage the situation, for example explosives scenes are evacuated by the first arriving officer until appropriate specialists are brought in.
The SAPS vehicle parked in front of the black bakkie to block it from leaving because there was no other reason to park there given the availability of nearby parking spaces.
“the only reason for the SAPS vehicle to park in front of the black bakkie was to block it from leaving because there could be no other reason for them parking in front of it when there is so much parking area nearby, or even park in front of the truck if they wanted to.”
Lt-Col Sebola confirmed that Chief Traffic Mashaba, from Traffic Gauteng, is not part of SAPS and cannot lead a drug bust operation but can only provide information.
“He cannot , Commissioner . Here main source of information .”
Brigadier Shibiri phoned Lt-Col Sebola at the scene and ordered arrests to be made, following a call from Mashaba to General Kadwa, who was then called himself due to the dropped call.
“He said, no, he also phoned me. He wanted to know. Because when he was calling me... General Kadwa was said, he received... if the telephone, the cellphone records could state, it will show that it was Mashaba and then General Kadwa. Because he did not call me on my phone. He was phoned by Mashaba. After dropping the call, then he called General Kadwa... and when I was presenting on what looked suspicious.”
The area where the exhibits were kept at Pretoria College is not an SAPS safe and usual check-in procedures do not exist there.
“the college or the area in which the exhibits were kept is not an SAPs safe ... the check-in that are usually done at SAP registers and a clerk and all of that, that does not exist at a college”
During the incident at Booysens, members of the public and SAPS interfered, defeating the ends of justice and obstructing a police officer.
“There was interference from members of the public and SAPS members. This amounted to defeating the ends of justice, as well as obstructing a police officer from performing his lawful duties.”
Warrant Officer Phakula was charged with defeating the ends of justice and possession of drugs, and his hearing was chaired by Brigadier Kgopoditha, before he was dismissed from SAPS on 20 September 2021.
“I was charged with defeating the ends of justice and possession of drugs. The Chairperson of the hearing was Brigadier Kgopoditha ... On Monday, the 20th of September 2021, I was dismissed from the SAPS.”
The witness successfully won an appeal to be reinstated into SAPS, with reinstatement terms equal to before dismissal, but only reported for duty months later in April 2024.
“My reinstatement into SAPS. In November 2023, I successfully won my appeal to be reinstated in the SAPS. The awards stated that I should be reinstated with the same terms and conditions as before my dismissal. I, however, reported for duty on 16th April 2024.”
Senior members were still trying to appeal the reinstatement decision, causing delays in implementing the award to reinstate the witness.
“I was also concerned with the amount of time that it took for the SAPS to finally implement the award that I should be reinstated. And it became clear at a later stage that some of these senior members were still trying to appeal the decision for my reinstatement in the SAPS.”
On 11 November 2025, Acting Divisional Commissioner Major General Mogale confirmed the speaker's post-promotion by signing the post-acceptance certificate, but the speaker has not yet been promoted for more than four months and no reasons or explanations are given, believed to be unfair treatment due to arrest in the Booysen CAS 98/7/2021 case and unfair dismissal from SAPS for the same case.
“On 11 November 2025, the Acting Divisional Commissioner, Major General Mogale, confirmed my post-promotion by signing the post-acceptance certificate. It has been more than four months. I am not yet promoted. No reasons, no explanation is given. I believe I am unfairly treated due to my arrest in Booysen CAS 98/7/2021. I was unfairly dismissed from the SAPS for the same case.”
In 2025, the speaker was shortlisted and recommended for post-promotion 3557/2024/2025 but after exhausting all avenues within SAPS, the promotion is still not confirmed even though the matter was settled at SSSBC and Major General Govender holds the promotion document but no action has been taken.
“In 2025, I was shortlisted, recommended for post-promotion 3557/2024/2025. I have exhausted all avenues within the SAPS with regards to that post. My promotion is still not yet confirmed. The matter was settled at SSSBC with ruling confirming my promotion. Then, when I last spoke to my union representative, he informed me Major General Govender is in possession of my promotion document but nothing has been done.”
There was talk within the police service that the seized drugs were associated with General Khan, but this information was at the level of corridor gossip among colleagues, not formal information.
“It was corridor gossip, Commissioner. Casual chats, casual talks among colleagues, yes.”
The scene where police responded was a hijacking attempt of a Scania truck involving suspects Magane and Mashaba, who are criminals impersonating police officers.
“The officers who were there, who were in uniform, who were responding to a complaint that both Mashaba and Magane are criminals who are impersonating police officers and they are trying to hijack a Scania truck. SAPS officers went there to prevent that.”
Warrant Officer Magane introduced himself as a member of SAPS and showed his appointment card when introducing himself at the scene, while Mr Mashaba also introduced himself but did not produce an appointment card.
“We introduced ourselves by showing them our appointment cards and we also told them that we are from the police ... It is only me who produced ... Yes … Mashaba also introduced himself”
The intention of the police was to call all relevant role players, including DPCI and national SAPS office, to come and process the scene if drugs were found, rather than seizing drugs immediately.
“No, no, no, we were going to phone all the relevant role players to come and process the scene ... We were going to source assistance from DPCI, the national office ...”
Adv Baloyi accused Warrant Officer Magane and SAPS of not considering the risk of driving the truck with drugs, revealing the truck contained drugs to someone outside their circle, thus creating risks.
“You did not consider at all the risk of driving with those drugs in that truck ... You have created a risk that someone else might just take those drugs from you on the road ... I am not concerned about Chief Mashaba, I am talking about you, SAPS, that you think it is appropriate ... it is not appropriate having disclosed already to the security at the gate that there is a truck that has drugs on it, you have now disclosed to Mr Hardug in there and then you deem it appropriate”
Deputy Director Dumisani Pompi says he was told Mashaba could not tell him about the undercover drug operation and Mashaba's superior indicated that SAPS responsible for the operation will discuss misunderstandings with the Intelligence General Khan.
“He then told me and then he called him and then he told me he could not tell me that they had an undercover operation of drugs . This is Mashaba now . He finds him on the phone . After now he is arrested . That the operation was successful but they are just having a misunderstanding with other members of Crime Intelligence . The indication from him was that they are fine and they will handle the situation . This is Mashaba to his superior . And then this is what the superior says in the statement : “ for me this denote(d) that the responsible person for SAPS that approved this operation will discuss the misunderstanding with the General from Intelligence . ” This was a reference to General Khan, a telephone call from General Khan .”
Warrant Officer Magane was involved in a drug bust operation led by Mashaba, whom he does not normally work with and has no experience in drug busts, yet he assisted without following proper protocol.
“You leave your desk job to go and assist him in a drug bust where you have absolutely no experience ... You do not know the protocols that apply, you have never done a drug bust, but you go and assist and join him when you have no relevant experience.”
The accused Warrant Officer Magane may have been used by Mashaba innocently but was likely part of an illegitimate police operation involving illicit drug delivery not intended for police stations.
“This operation was not a legitimate police operation ... The suspicion that these drugs were not intended ... according to WhatsApp messages ... all of them ... supposed to be delivered elsewhere other than police stations ... You created cover for Mashaba ... you were brought in just to create the cover of SAPS ... You created cover for someone who in fact ... this was his consignment ... It was not your consignment ... You did that ... knowing or unknowingly.”
The DPCI is not the only narcotics enforcement team in South Africa; Gauteng also has a Provincial Investigation Unit within SAPS Detectives that investigates narcotics cases, usually focusing on drug labs, but the DPCI is involved in major drug busts.
“There is, I cannot talk for other provinces, but Gauteng also has a Provincial Investigation Unit... part of SAPS Detectives, not DPCI Detectives and they also do indeed deal with narcotic cases... usually when there is major drug busts, the DPCI will in some way, for or fashion, also be involved in that investigation.”
The IPID recommended initiating disciplinary proceedings against five SAPS and Hawks members, including Major General Khan, Major General Kadwa, Brigadier Sekgobela, Colonel Steyn, and Lieutenant Colonel Sebola, after an investigation based on various statements and evidences including a radio control transcript and forensic report.
“The recommendation is to initiate disciplinary proceedings as the SAPS members involved are ... Major General Khan, Major General Kadwa, Brigadier Sekgobela, Colonel Steyn, and Lieutenant Colonel Sebola”
No further arrests have been made relating to the seized drugs or conduct of SAPS members after the four initial arrests at the scene, and the case was removed from the roll after representations.
“On the scene, as indicated, there were four people arrested. In the interim, that case has been removed from the roll after representations. And after that, I am not aware of anyone else that was arrested on this case relating to the exhibits, relating to their conduct, and the like.”
The black vehicle used was registered as a sub vehicle of SAPS but it was not necessarily being driven by a policeman, indicating possible misuse of police vehicles for criminal purposes.
“The black vehicle... it is registered as a sub vehicle. But as you know, even vehicles registered as SAPS vehicles can be used to commit offences.”
There is no clear escalation mechanism within the SAPS or DPCI to address ongoing security concerns about the storage of seized drugs at different command levels and beyond.
“You still do not have security, and they are sitting there and you are raising the matter of security continuously... I would like to have more people watching this... Is there no mechanism where you can escalate it directly or copy, say, General Senona, but ultimately then General Lebeya? There is no such mechanism?”
General Flynn confirms that Major General Senon performed an investigation to establish if misconduct was committed in handling and storage of exhibits, in terms of SAPS Disciplinary Regulation 2016, and provided the outcome of the departmental investigation.
“That the National Head appoint a senior functionary at the level of a Major General to lead an investigation in terms of SAPS Disciplinary Regulations 2016 to establish whether misconduct was committed in the handling and storage of the exhibits... That the senior functionary provides the outcome of the departmental investigation in terms of Regulation 8(1) of the SAPS Disciplinary Regulation 2016”
Seized narcotics, once submitted to Forensic Science Laboratory, are not returned to SAPS facilities but are kept until finalised and subsequently disposed of.
“Once a narcotics specifically is handed or submitted to the Forensic Science Laboratory, it is never returned to a SAP 13 facility. It is kept at Forensic Science Laboratory until the matter is finalised and then disposed of.”
Reaction vessels used in illegal synthetic drug manufacturing are exclusively for illegal purposes, and authorities including SAPS are not aware of any manufacturers of these vessels in South Africa, but they are known to be manufactured abroad.
“from my own knowledge, these reaction vessels are exclusively used for the illegal purposes... Not in South Africa, Commissioner, but abroad indeed”
The 47 kilograms of Mandrax seized in Durban was booked into the SAP13 at Isipingo Police Station, with further details to be provided later in evidence.
“the Mandrax was booked into the SAP13 at Isipingo Police Station... will be attended to later on in my evidence”
Combating clandestine synthetic drug labs is a focus area for the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) and SAPS, requiring a whole-of-government and community approach.
“it is a focus area not just of the DPCI, but of SAPS in general... a whole-of-government and a whole-of-community approach, wherever that can assist to dismantle clandestine laboratories”
Community members aware of drug supply under police protection should report the activities to higher levels within SAPS and DPCI for attention and investigation.
“if community members are aware of such, is to report that activities to higher levels within SAPS and the DPCI, and we will definitely give the necessary attention to it”
There was a complaint by Director Nwandule regarding 13 requisitions created without invoices, and it was clarified that these requisitions could not be created without attached emails on the SAPS system, a function controlled by Director Nwandule's staff.
“email response to Nwandule regarding his complaint that 13 requisitions were created without invoices. ... they said, they do not have a function that is used to create purchasing requisitions without invoices. But it is Director Nwandule's staff who have got that function on the SAPS system.”
Invoices must be submitted for further handling, which includes creation of purchase requisitions and purchase orders on the SAPS system, processes currently performed by Director Nwandule's environment.
“I must put it on record before the Commission that invoices are submitted for further handling, of which further handling would include creation of purchase requisitions and POs going forward ... functions that are, as we speak currently, performed within the environment of Director Nwandule.”
The taxi industry is alleged to be linked with organised crime and efforts to infiltrate the SAPS and TMPD, introducing investigation questions about Deputy Chief's role in the taxi industry.
“Investigating all allegations of people who are linked to the taxi industry and are alleged to have been involved in organised crime and efforts to infiltrate the SAPS and the TMPD ... Your status as someone inside the TMPD and a taxi business operator raises questions.”
Brigadier Nkhwashu and Katiso discussed general personal circumstances and Katiso mentioned involvement in various business interests including security sector, and suggested potential employment after Brigadier's retirement from SAPS.
“When I met Katiso, we conversed generally about our respective personal circumstances... He mentioned that he was involved in various business interests, including the security sector... He indicated that I was approaching retirement from the SAPS... he will want security forces to come and work there, so should I be interested when I retire I can just go into work with him in that space with my experience as a police officer... I accepted and then I said no, I will be interested, but we will talk, because there are processes to undergo.”
B R I G A D I E R N K H W A S H UDay 95 · 22 Apr 2026Refers to: End of June 2024
Brigadier Nkhwashu discussed a social gathering with police officers including Sergeant Lebogang Tshukudu, where they talked about escorting suspects, including a police officer suspect named Michael Pule Tau.
“After that meeting, Fundiswa contacted me to enquire how the meeting had gone. I informed her ... The gathering was attended mainly by the police officers ... including Sergeant Lebogang Tshukudu ... Tshukudu and I have been friends since around 2017 ... During the stock fair, Sergeant Tshukudu and the colleagues mentioned that they were ... escorting suspects ... Amongst the suspects that they were escorting, there was a police officer suspect ... Michael Pule Tau”
Brigadier Nkhwashu discussed a murder case in Vereeniging involving a police officer arrested in that case and stated the investigating officer is Witness B.
“Brigadier Nkhwashu mentioned of a murder case that happened in Vereeniging, and the case is with our unit...the investigating officer of the case is Witness B”
The document specifying dockets to be collected was addressed to Lt-Col Prowse and copied to Col Bezuidenhout of SAPS, with Lt-Col Prowse reporting to Col Bezuidenhout.
“It says it has a name there with a cell phone number ... addressed to – at the bottom it says Attention Lt-Col Prowse. And then at the bottom, it is a Colonel Bezuidenhout ... Col Bezuidenhout is senior to Lt-Col Prowse ... Prowse reporting to Colonel Bezuidenhout.”
The values paid for the vehicles as trade-ins correspond exactly to the declared values to SAPS and to the amounts stated in the spreadsheet under scrutiny.
“And just lastly, if we are to check the values that are being paid for these cars as against the values that you have also declared to SAPS, it would be the same? It would be the same, Advocate.”
Mr Mnisi admits he never reported the fraudulent matter officially to SAPS as the suspects disappeared and did not respond to formal correspondence.
“No, I have not reported it to SAPS. But ... Since the disappearance of these individuals, I guess I was overtaken by events because they never ever came up. They never ever called, nor did they ever respond to this formal correspondence. Officially, no.”
Commissioner Mkhwanazi claims that instructions for law enforcement operations have been ongoing since he was a constable, including periods of suspension and illness, and these operations have been executed closely with SAPS and other municipalities in Gauteng.
“It has been happening once I was still a constable, and it is happening. Even if when I was suspended, even if when I am sick due to COVID, such operations have been taking place... I lead the unit under instruction, and we executed work very closely with SAPS, work very closely with the other municipalities.”
Commissioner Mkhwanazi states that the EMPD has conducted joint operations and can conduct operations independently of JMPD and SAPS, including entering homes and confiscating stolen goods, with authorization from memoranda of understanding.
“We have done that a million times, Commissioner... Yes, and JMPD have done that a million times in our site... Yes.”
The newly registered law enforcement skills programme exists and includes different courses according to attachments provided by SAPS and National Commissioner instructions to all Metro Police departments.
“this new skills development, it is having different courses, according to the attachment... as per SAPS, or as per the National Commissioner's instruction to all Metro Police departments”
Deputy Chief Dhlamini states his section is not to interrogate the invoices but to verify that there is a Service Level Agreement (SLA), a contract, and a budget in relation to invoices loaded on the SAPS system.
“Our section is not there to interrogate the invoices. Once someone, an official attached, he confirms to say these services were received accordingly and they were rendered. So, he confirmed with his signature there. Our is to verify that there is an SLA that we have loaded on SAPS system, there is a contract in place, and also there is a budget in relation to this on the SAPS system”
The forensic audit report concerns Metro Police Inspector issuing instructions to deploy guards beyond his mandate, involving 22 companies, but the investigation faced challenges due to lack of evidence and inability to interview key individuals.
“The subject matter was the Metro Police Inspector issuing written instruction to deploy ad hoc guards beyond his mandate . And the letter then in the introduction portion it specifically stated : “ On 27 June this Directorate received allegations to investigate against Inspector Phiri for issuing written instructions to Gubis 85 Security Solution to deploy ad hoc guards which is way beyond his mandate . ” ... the investigation is unable to test the allegation against 22 companies to establish whether Inspector Phiri issued the instruction to all these service providers to deploy ad hoc guards . ... unable to interview Director Malatji ... director Malatji has then already been suspended ... He refused and he could not get hold of him at all to actually do this and he could also not confirm with SAPS if there were any cases ... He was also unable to source the standard operating procedure ... he was unable to source full financial records ...”
After the meeting between Minister Cele and SANACO Executive Committee, some official channels of communication were designated within SAPS and the Ministry to address taxi violence issues.
“some mechanism to take the matter forward ... at that meeting ... Minister Cele designated someone within SAPS or someone within the Ministry to be approached on all taxi violence issues ... SANACO designated anyone who would be their communication point to take matters forward”
Sergeant Nkosi said Mr Mthakathi Mswazi sent the list to make him aware of the investigation progress related to Mr Sibanyoni's cases.
“the call was about ... there is going to be a movement from the SAPS because we have already spoken to the Minister. So he was making a follow-up upon the photos that he sent me.”
Sergeant Nkosi forwarded a SAPS situation report about an ongoing investigation at a house where suspected stolen property was found, but the suspect had not initially been apprehended.
“You forward to Mr Mampane a situation, a SAPS situation report ... try to find the owner of the house ... The house is locked and fenced with electric fence ... but final situation report says: There is no suggestion that the suspect has been arrested.”
Sergeant Nkosi sent an internal SAPS communication about a double murder and attempted murder in Soshanguve on 23 December 2024 to Mr Mampane, circulating details like the injured victim location and vehicle information outside SAPS.
“By circulating what was an internal SAPS communication to someone outside SAPS, in the process you took outside SAPS details of where the injured victim was now to be found, who drove the injured victim to the place where the injured victim was now to be found, to the clinic, and what vehicle that person who drove the victim to the clinic uses, the registration number, so the vehicle could be identified as well.”
ADV CHASKALSON SCDay 80 · 18 Mar 2026Refers to: 23 December 2024Location: Soshanguve
Information about a surviving victim and the details of the hospital to which he was taken was already published on Yusuf Abramjee's page before Sergeant Nkosi circulated the internal SAPS communication to Mr Mampane.
“All of this information , including that there is a surviving victim and the details of the hospital to which he was taken , are you saying Mr Abramjee had published that already ? That is correct .”
ADV BALOYI SC / SERGEANT NKOSIDay 80 · 18 Mar 2026Refers to: Before 23 December 2024
The police report about Mr Sithole, a known taxi boss shot and killed in Soshanguve, was already publicly available on Facebook by the time Sergeant Nkosi circulated it to Mr Mampane.
“And I still confirm that event though it looks like a , indeed it is a police report , but by the time I sent it , it was all over the news . ... And with the same format that it is like that , it was circulating on Facebook . ... That is correct .”
SERGEANT NKOSI / ADV CHASKALSON SCDay 80 · 18 Mar 2026Refers to: By August 2024Location: Soshanguve
Sergeant Nkosi admitted that Mr Matlala, who was running security for the Msibi family, was at risk of having his contract with SAPS terminated and he shared this information with Mr Mampane.
“So you were letting Mr Mampane know that Mr Matlala who was running security for the Msibi family was at risk of having his contract with SAPS terminated.”
The document containing the suspects' details was shared with Mr Motsumi on 27 May before public notification on 29 May 2025, so it was confidential and not public domain.
“all suspects will appear in Brits Court on the 29th of May 2025. But you, on the 27th of May, have already shared this document including the details of the suspects with Mr Motsumi. So, you cannot be correct when you say it was already in the public domain”
Sharing the complainant's name, address, and cellphone number, as well as witness details, is internal SAPS information and should not be disclosed to the public or civilians like Mr Motsumi.
“this document has the name and the address of the complainant... It tells Mr Motsumi, who is the complainant. It gives him the address, and it gives him the cellphone number of the complainant ... It also has the details of a witness. Gives the name of the witness and says where the witness is. That is information that you share with a member of the public whose interests you have not clarified to us... This is internal SAPS information that is never shared with the public.”
The document lists detailed stolen property including serial numbers of pistols and rounds, and the names and dates of birth of suspects including their nationalities and case involvements.
“It lists the details of what exactly was stolen. The truckloads of chrome. Pistols. It even gives serial numbers of pistols. And the number of rounds ... It has names and dates of birth of suspects following their arrests ... It also says they are involved in certain case numbers ... It lists them at the bottom of that page and then at 596 ... it also says when the suspects will appear ... It says investigations will continue to track the buyer and tracking of the stolen chrome.”
Sharing internal police information with Mr Motsumi, including witness names and complainant details, cannot be justified by his interest in crime and shows lack of openness about the reason for sharing such information.
“Here you are you have shared with Mr Motsumi ... you give him the name of a witness, for example, and the cellphone number and the address of a complainant and of a witness... There is another reason you gave it to him, and you are not open and frank about why you gave him that information.”
Sergeant Nkosi says he is sending the document to Mr Motsumi to praise the police good work despite allegations against police.
“I am sending this to Mr Motsumi to praise the good work that the police have done... Even though I send allegations against the police, I am also sending you good things that the police have done. This was already in public, but for me, I am sending it in that sense that the police have done a good job... they have arrested people and whatsoever.”
Adv Chaskalson asserts that the photograph taken by Sergeant Nkosi shows a SAPS screen containing a SAPS officer's service number, home address, and email address, which implies whoever took the original photograph had access to a SAPS internal computer.
“If you look at the picture, it is a SAPS screen. It has the service number of a SAPS officer. It has the home address of a SAPS officer. It has the SAPS email address of a SAPS officer. So whoever took the original picture that you photographed would have to have been someone with access to a SAPS computer.”
Sergeant Nkosi's informant had access to SAPS personnel computer systems and was in possession of SAPS personnel details meant to be confidential.
“He knows people inside SAPS who are going to leak SAPS personnel details...that informant is in possession of information that he should not be in possession of.”
Sergeant Nkosi informed General Shibiri about the informant leaking SAPS personnel information but took no further steps against the informant.
“I informed the matter to General Shibiri...Did you take any steps against this informant? No...Because I referred the matter back to General Shibiri...I was expecting such to be done by him...he said to me he would make a follow-up.”
The informant wanted to communicate an address where kidnappers were holding people against their will, and chose to do so by providing the SAPS personnel screen giving the address details of a SAPS officer.
“the informant to give you an address where the informant said he had heard kidnappers were holding people against their will ... by providing you with a SAPS personnel screen, giving the address details of a SAPS officer”
Sergeant Nkosi clarifies that Mr Motsumi is not a SAPS member and questions why he was sent sensitive SAPS information regarding arrests, implying possible special interest or relationship.
“Mr Motsumi is not a member of the SAPS, so you have to have an explanation why you are sending him information about SAPS members being arrested... The only reason you would have sent it to him... is because you knew he would be interested in this story.”
An unnamed speaker asserts that Sergeant Nkosi is not being truthful about the reasons he sent the material to Mr Motsumi; the real reason was due to Mr Motsumi's interest in events involving a faction in the SAPS referred to by Mr Chaskalson.
“The only explanation that makes sense, it is because he had an interest in it, and you are not being truthful in your answer.”
There is a suspicion that on 6 December 2024, Mr Matlala was tipped off by someone within SAPS about a planned raid on his house, and potentially others may have also tipped him off.
“there is a suspicion that on the day, the 6th of December 2024, Mr Matlala was tipped off by somebody within SAPS that GCI ops will be raiding his house. And there is a suspicion that you or somebody else may have tipped him off”
Sergeant Nkosi denies leaking sensitive SAPS information to Mr Motsumi and says he only shares because of a love for the country and concern about safety and security.
“That is not true. ... Mr Motsumi has got no interest in these criminal reports that I send him... I am just sharing with him because of the love for the country and his concern about the safety and security of the Republic.”
Sergeant Nkosi acknowledges forwarding internal SAPS reports about arrest relating to business robberies in Mooinooi in the Northwest to Mr Motsumi.
“you forwarded to Mr Motsumi an internal SAPS report about a series of arrests relating to business robberies in Mooinooi in the Northwest, an internal SAPS report.”
Sergeant Nkosi shares a great deal of confidential SAPS information with Mr Motsumi, which looks like leaking information to enable Mr Motsumi's own activities.
“there is a great deal of confidential SAPS information that you share with Mr Motsumi. And certainly, from the outside, it looks like you are leaking SAPS information to him so that he can take advantage of it in his own activities.”
Sergeant Nkosi shared the audit report with Mr Motsumi because he knew Mr Matlala owed Mr Motsumi money and would be concerned if the contract was terminated.
“you said you shared the audit report with Mr Motsumi because you knew that Mr Matlala owed him money and that he would be concerned if Mr Matlala's contract with SAPS is terminated.”
The document shared by Sergeant Nkosi was not a confidential SAPS document at the time he sent or received it because it was already circulating on social media and the news.
Advocate Baloyi SC stated the document in question was an internal SAPS communication addressed to a General.
“This is internal SAPS communication. Somebody reporting to someone internally. You did not pull this from the media. It is an internal SAPS-write-up.”
The document, identifying suspects, was shared by Sergeant Nkosi with Mr Motsumi on 27 May, which is against the SAPS practice of not identifying suspects before court appearance.
“No. Now, looking at this document, it identifies suspects. And remember it is the 27th of May when you shared it with Mr Motsumi.”
Sergeant Nkosi established the September 2024 date for the first meeting by inferentially using the contract award date, noting issues with payments around that time.
“I recall that it must have been around September because that was when Mr Matlala had issues with his payments”
To prevent information leakage and avoid being refused entry by police, tickets to an event where Musa Khawula would perform were arranged.
“A n d t h e n I p h r a s e d t h e i s s u e t h a t i f h e i s p e r f o r m i n g i n a n e v e n t , t h e r e a r e t w o p o s s i b i l i t i e s . O n e , w e m i g h t b e r e f u s e d e n t r y a s t h e p o l i c e . T w o , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n m i g h t l e a k t h a t w e a r e l o o k i n g f o r h i m b e c a u s e h e i s a p u b l i c f i g u r e . S o , t h e b e s t w a y , t h e n h e s u g g e s t e d , l e t m e g e t t h e t i c k e t s s o t h a t y o u m i g h t , i f t h e i s s u e o f t h e a p p o i n t m e n t c e r t i f i c a t e b e i n g r e j e c t e d , u s e t h e t i c k e t s . O r t h e b e s t w a y i s t o u s e t h e t i c k e t s t o b e u n d e r c o v e r , t h e n y o u c a l l t h e m , d o o u r w o r k .”
Sergeant Nkosi said SAPS did not pay for concert tickets because it was a weekend and finance offices are usually closed, not anticipating any problem.
“I t w a s o n w e e k e n d t h a t d a y a n d w e d i d n o t t h i n k , t o b e v e r y h o n e s t w i t h y o u , w e d i d n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e r e w o u l d b e a n y p r o b l e m .”
SAPS finance offices are usually closed on weekends, which prevented buying tickets earlier for the undercover plan.
“It i s t h e w e e k e n d s , u s u a l l y f i n a n c e o f f i c e s , t h e y a r e o p e n d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e w e e k . A n d a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , I a m j u s t b e i n g h o n e s t , w e d i d n o t t h i n k i t i s a p r o b l e m a t i c t h i n g t o d o .”
The docket related to the Khawula matter remained at the station and was part of organised crime docket but was not yet called because Mr Khawula was not arrested.
“It was still there in the station, but the plan was once he is arrested, the docket is going to be called.”
The plan was to have unidentifiable SAPS members at the concert to establish the location of Mr Khawula and arrest him, but none of the six tickets were allocated to the investigating officer actually performing the arrest.
“I thought that the whole purpose of this operation was to have SAPS members at the concert not identifiable as SAPS members so that they could establish where Mr Khawula was and arrest him. That was the purpose.”
Sergeant Nkosi admitted that the investigating officer was expected to follow the team to the concert but arrived late and never got a ticket to get in, so no plans were made for his entry.
“When I phoned him that the information said or suggested that Mr Khawula is at the concert, the investigating officer promised to follow us there. But on that particular time when we arrived, he was not there...so we thought we would as a team make a plan for him to get in when he is there...he did not arrive there, so we did not make any plan.”
Sergeant Nkosi forwarded screenshots to General Shibiri because Mr Matlala had an issue with payment from SAPS and was discussing the issue with General Shibiri and General Sibiya.
“Mr Matlala had an issue with the payment from SAPS and this was one of the reasons I have sent it to General Shibiri, because I know for a fact he was talking about same with General Shibiri and General Sibiya”
There was an internal audit report recommending termination of Mr Matlala's contract due to possibly regular expenditure and suspected corrupt or fraudulent practices.
“It is being displayed actually . ... The expenditure incurred should be declared as possibly regular expenditure for further assessment and determination . Test investigation is required ... The bids should be terminated ... The termination of the bid is consistent with ... that the purchaser ... has engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices ...”
General Sibiya forwarded materials related to a journalist Abram Mashego's enquiry about termination of Mr Matlala's contract, including an internal audit report recommending contract termination for fraud and corruption.
“on the 22nd of March 2025 , General Sibiya forwards you , ... actually four documents . The first is an enquiry from a journalist , Abram Mashego . ... The last is the final page of an internal audit report done by SAPS , which recommends termination of the contract ...”
Mr Matlala would speak with Brigadier Bokaba and General Fannie at SAPS head office about his contract and was advised by Brigadier Bokaba to approach Deputy National Commissioner General Sibiya.
“he will say he is coming to head office to meet with Brigadier Bokaba and to meet either with General Fannie ... when he filed his court papers that he was advised by Brigadier Bokaba that he must approach the Deputy National Commissioner, General Sibiya”
Sergeant Nkosi does not know the reasons for Mr Matlala's meetings with Brigadier Bokaba and General Fannie or if these officials were obliged to deal with his contract as part of their duties.
Sergeant Nkosi forwarded messages from General Sibiya to Mr Matlala despite knowing Mr Matlala was about to face contract termination by SAPS.
“So when you forwarded all of this, all of these messages from General Sibiya to Cat, or to Mr Matlala... SAPS are threatening to terminate his contract. That is correct, is it not? That is correct.”
Sergeant Nkosi shared a SAPS audit report marked confidential, which was available on Facebook before he received it from General Sibiya.
“I saw it in a Facebook... it was in public domain. Yes... The audit report... That is correct... I did not see the danger of it or problem about it because I thought it is already in public and in public it came as...”
Sergeant Nkosi admitted it was wrong to share a confidential SAPS document outside SAPS but justified it by stating General Sibiya sent it to him first.
“Do you accept that it was wrong to send a SAPS document to somebody outside of SAPS? I do not accept that it was wrong because even General Sibiya sent it to me.”
Sergeant Nkosi forwarded the confidential SAPS audit report to Mr Matlala because he assumed Mr Matlala was entitled to receive it as a service provider.
“He is a service provider there... I also assumed at the time, I thought as a service provider, he was also issued with such officially, so I took it on that level.”
General Shibiri has an interest in Mr Matlala keeping the contract at SAPS or what is happening with the contract, suggesting involvement beyond payment.
“General Shibiri would have an interest in Mr Matlala keeping that contract at the SAPS or what is happening with the contract”
Sharing internal audit report WhatsApp pages with Mr Motsumi was in furtherance of Mr Motsumi's interest in the contract.
“when you were sharing this page of the internal audit report to Mr Motsumi, whose interest were you advancing? ... Mr Motsumi ... yes ... And it would be adverse to his interests if this contract was terminated by SAPS”
Lt-Gen Shibiri indicated that initially he referred to the 'other side' as the faction of General Sibiya and expressed difficulty identifying members of this faction.
“I was referring to General Sibiya and his faction”
Lt-Gen Shibiri acknowledged that he was referring to General Sibiya and expressed difficulty identifying specific members in General Sibiya's faction within SAPS.
“I agree... I was referring to General Sibiya... having difficulty to identify... who is in his faction from the police side.”
A senior SAPS official named Brigadier Nkhwashu, who was not actively involved in the murder investigation, visited a prison facility and accused Mr Molefe of a serious crime.
“Brigadier Nkhwa shu had attended at the prison facility on 9 December 2024 and introduced himself as the brother-in-law of Mr Molefe.”
Lt-Gen Shibiri indicates that the Commission is probing interference and infiltration of the South African Police Service (SAPS) by alleged crime syndicates at very high levels.
“Can you see this Commission is probing interference and infiltration of the SAPS? ... By alleged crime syndicates? ... I have full understanding ... And a again, without us coming to testify, the Commission will not exist.”
Lt-Gen Shibiri requested a threat risk assessment from SAPS but did not receive a response, stating he feels considered a loyalist to General Sibiya and is vulnerable without protection unlike other protected witnesses.
“I even requested a threat risk assessment, and I did not get any response, because I said I am considered maybe to be a loyalist to General Sibiya ... And those people are under protection. I am not.”
The Commission is probing issues of interference and infiltration of SAPS by criminals syndicates at very high levels and if Lt-Gen Shibiri is reluctant to share relevant information, it hinders the Commission's mandate.
“Have criminal syndicates infiltrated SAPS at the very highest levels? ... If you are reluctant to share information with us, information that you know is relevant ... We are probing these very issues ... I do not want to be left with the feeling that General knew something, but he did not want to tell us or was reluctant to tell us.”
General Sibiya suspects some promotions within SAPS are dubious but states these promotions follow SAPS policy and some are due to deserving reward.
“With due respect, promotion in SAPS, there is a policy... I am talking about suspicion... The suspicion comes from the person approved and promised a rank for information.”
Perceptions matter for senior police officers who associate with people accused of serious misconduct, as public faith in SAPS can be affected.
“Do you accept that perceptions matter when the public sees you keeping the company and friendship of people who, in the public space, are accused of serious misconduct?”
The witness is close friends with Mr Matlala, has received a loan from him, and publicly providing assistance to him justifies the loan as an act he would do for any member of the public, but acknowledges the public may view the relationship with concern affecting public faith in SAPS.
“The public be come aware, as it has now become aware through your evidence that you are close friends with Mr Matlala, that you have received the benefit of a loan, what you say was a loan, from him. The public now knows that you actually do provide assistance. You justify it, that well, this is assistance that I would have given to any member of the public. But knowing the facts, as you have testified to at least that you have conceded about your relationship with him, do you accept that in the eyes of the public that may be an issue for concern and it is something that must concern you, because it impacts on what people think about not just you, not just you, but also the SAPS?”
General Shibiri indicated knowledge in September that Mr Matlala had a contract with SAPS and that Mr Matlala had inquired about his travel because he was involved in contract work.
“That is when I knew he has got contract with SAPS because he said he is doing that... also, I did indicate that at the beginning of the year he indicated that he heard I am back in the office. He was there around our office.”
National SAPS structures and command chains are governed by national instructions such as 12/2017, including organized crime components under Divisional Commissioner.
“There is a national instruction called 12/2017. It calls detective policy... under the detective, there is a DNC... then under the Div Com, there is Components Head. Myself Organized Crime...”
Lt-General Shibiri initially said the other side was one faction within SAPS but later changed to say it was the family, indicating he was not truthful.
“So, when you said it was his side of the SAPS faction, you were lying to the Commission.”
The Commission questions the appropriateness of General Sibihiri sharing bad news articles with a junior officer Sergeant Nkosi, given the perceived factional tensions within SAPS.
“He is far junior in the organisation... There has to be another reason why you are sharing with this junior employee”
Sharing as gossip or information within SAPS could be innocent but might also align with factional groupings within SAPS, a point put to General Sibihiri for comment.
“It may have been gossip at its most innocent, ... that you, like Sergeant Nkosi, you were part of a particular grouping within the SAPS”
Lieutenant General Shibiri advises caution in sharing certain articles as they might be used against recipients, though all SAPS members have seen them.
“I will phone him and then talk to him to say, as I said about this other one, to say, hey, be careful of these other things. If you send it to other people, then it might be used against you. But the rest, all SAPS members, they have seen it.”
General Shibiri denies belonging to any faction within SAPS during his 38 years of service, asserting he will continue not to belong to any faction as he is about to exit the service.
“For the 38 years I had in the police, I never belonged to any faction. And I will never belong to a faction now because I am about to exit.”
Lt-Gen Sibiri stated that the sharing of social media messages and articles among SAPS members about departmental conflicts is tarnishing the image of SAPS.
“this thing is turning ugly and dragging through the integrity of SAPS into disrepute”
Lt-Gen Sibiri acknowledged that there are groupings or divisions among officers within the SAPS, but that not all information shared about them is true.
“I know there were groupings of officers in the , within the SAPS, then he, I said yes, I know that there were those. So not necessarily whatever is written there, it might be true or not true.”
Lt-Gen Sibiri shared various negative and disparaging articles about specific SAPS personnel, including ones related to General Masemola, General Khumalo, Mr Matlala, and others.
“in the main, what is shared is only negative and disparaging articles about specific people within the SAPS... all those from page 116 all the way to 26 is basically that article related to General Mosikili... there is a very long piece on Mr Matlala and various allegations that have been made against him or incidents that were linked to him... there is an article related to the PKT and the implication of police officers in the killing of Sindiso Magaqa... there are allegations made against General Khumalo”
Sergeant Nkosi sent Lt-Gen Sibiri multiple articles via chat messages concerning General Masemola, Lt-Gen Khumalo, Mr Matlala's tender, the Tembisa hospital scandal, the death of Babita Deokaran, the cancellation of Mr Matlala's tender, and an internal SAPS audit related to it.
“Sergeant Nkosi sends you an article related to... General Masemola and Lt-Gen Khumalo... Mr Matlala's tender... linked to the Tembisa hospital scandal and the death of Babita Deokaran... media enquiry related to the tender and cancellation of the tender, as well as an internal audit conducted by SAPS”
Mr Matlala is a special case given his friendship and financial loan relationship with General Shibiri, suggesting a particular interest by General Shibiri in his contract with SAPS.
“But General, what distinguishes Mr Matlala, ... he is your friend ... loaned you money. You take a particular interest in him. ... suggests you have a particular interest in his contract.”
The first operations at Mr Matlala's premises happened on 6th December and 18th December.
“the operations that were conducted at Mr Matlala 's house or premises , the first happened on the 6th of December. The second happened on the 18th of December at his premises .”
Mr Matlala had a lot going on in relation to him and SAPS in December and often approached Lt-Gen Shibiri with personal legal issues.
“in December Mr Matlala had a lot going on in relation to him and the SAPS and we know from your evidence that Mr Matlala approached you often with personal legal issues .”
Lt Gen Shibiri claims he is not involved with the SAPS contract held by Matlala and does not deal with contracts or supply chain matters.
“I have nothing to do with the contract. I do not deal with the contracts and I think even if it comes to the integrity, it deals with those who are in supply chain...So for me ...”
Adv Pooe challenges Shibiri's claim that it is not wrong to take money from a contractor because he is not in the supply chain and that the loan was not disclosed as required by employment regulations.
“General, is your suggestion that there would be nothing wrong with taking money from a contractor as general within SAPS because you are not in supply chain?...And despite...this is precisely because where there is a relationship...you may be able to gain some benefit from a contractor...did you disclose this loan?”
Lt-Gen Shibiri states he did not warn Sergeant Nkosi not to get involved with SAPS service providers or payment issues because he does not know why the communication happened.
“I do not know, that he just showed him, he shows me out of him liking posting things, I do not know. But I know he can access these things.”
Lt-Gen Shibiri states it is too bad the contract was found to be fraudulent and is going to be terminated, involving SAPS and Mr Matlala.
“It is too bad that the contract is found to be fraudulent and is going to be terminated. And we talked about this. Remember I indicated to say some of the things I was sending to him was to say, but this guy, it might be a problem in certain things. And this is in March ‘22 ... It is too bad because it involves the police and himself, himself being done a criminal act and the police also afforded him without not doing due diligence.”
Lt-Gen Shibiri states it is too bad the contract termination involved SAPS and Mr Matlala, and SAPS was involved in awarding the contract.
“It is too bad what is happening. It involves both SAPS and him, and then SAPS also, they are involved in the awarding of these things. So it will not be only him.”
Adv Pooe suggests that Lt-Gen Shibiri's expression that the contract termination was 'too bad for SAPS' indicates a negative view of SAPS's involvement, but Shibiri maintains it is about the contract's fraudulent nature, not SAPS blame.
“General, when you do respond to say that it is too bad for SAPS, you actually do say that, you say this is bad, this is not a good look for SAPS. ... It does not seem likely that this was directed at the SAPS part. It is more likely that it is directed at the contract that you and Sergeant Nkosi were trying to assist Mr Matlala with.”
Lieutenant General Shibiri was asked for assistance with a matter unrelated to his official portfolio, suggesting the requester believed Shibiri was a friend or a contact who could help with issues beyond his normal scope, including finance.
“he thinks you are his friend or connection ? You say the language you used was he has got a person inside . Just from the request itself , that he thinks you are a person that can assist him about matters that have nothing to do with your portfolio .”
Mr Matlala is a friend and benefactor of the witness, who frequently receives loans from him and advises him on personal and legal matters including a contract with SAPS.
“He is your friend. He is your benefactor. You take loans from him, frequently advise him on matters of personal, say, legal problems ... on top of that, he clearly comes to you about this contract ... You take interest in how much he gets paid.”
