Advocate Johnson gave instructions that had to be followed, and deviation or contradiction would lead to internal investigation, unlawful treatment, and counseling due to the stress caused among IDAC employees.
“If you do not follow the instructions, you receive emails of a nature that – when I was consulting with the DPCI officer, when I intended on making protected disclosure in June last year, I likened it to being treated worse than a scullery maid. You would be internally investigated, unlawfully so. You would be made redundant for an entire period in 2023 because I objected to Mr Perumalan and Advocate Johnson. And it happened again this year because I objected.”
On or about 30 June 2025, after the Mokwele arrest and first appearance, the witness contacted a DPCI officer to report problems at IDAC and to initiate protected disclosure by arranging a meeting on 2 July 2025.
“On or about the 30th of June 2025, after the Mokwele arrest and the first appearance, I contacted a DPCI officer... to inform him that there is a problem at IDAC and that I need to see him and explain and show him the documentation that I had in my possession, I asked if I could do protected disclosure. We agreed to meet on the 2nd of July 2025, where I showed him a prosecutorial memo prepared by me...”
Ms Ramsamy contacted the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) because of discord among the Crime Intelligence Investigation team and sloppy investigation procedures regarding Project Diversion.
“I contacted DPCI because I had previously, in late April 025, informed Advocate Santhos Manilall, the DDPP, of the discord amongst the team, the team being that of the Crime Intelligence Investigation, and that the investigation procedures were being flouted and that the investigation was sloppy.”
In November 2025, Ms Ramsamy reported to DPCI that Advocate Johnson lied to the Ad Hoc Committee and provided proof.
“In November 2025, after Advocate Johnson testified at the Ad Hoc Committee, I contacted the same officer at the DPCI. I informed him that Advocate Johnson had lied to the Ad Hoc Committee and that I had proof of this.”
Ms Ramsamy met with DPCI officer around March 2026 after the appointment of the new NDPP Advocate Mothibi because nothing would have been done with the previous NDPP regarding her concerns about Advocate Johnson.
“Once the new NDPP, Advocate Mothibi, was appointed, I met with the DPCI officer. This would have been around March 2026. ... Because I knew that if I had reported or we had taken these concerns to the then-sitting NDPP, nothing would have been done.”
A specific investigation under Section 41(6) relates to one person suspected as a suspect, with documents used to obtain bank statements and cellphone records of multiple employees including M S Ramsamy.
“One person being named as the suspect, but I am also aware because I had handed the documents to the DPCI officer through the protected disclosure that I was busy with prior to this happening. That CIN number was used to obtain bank statements and cell phone records of multiple employees, including myself.”
In a meet and greet meeting, the Minister of Police wanted to know about IDAC, how it works and operates, and briefly discussed IDAC's relationship with the police and stated they get along with the DPCI.
“I recall that as a meet and greet. He wanted to know what we do at IDAC. ... I think we did talk about IDAC's relationship very briefly with the police and I said we all got along together with the DPCI.”
Advocate Johnson clarifies that a meeting wanted by someone to discuss a criminal matter was unrelated to IDAC and was about figuring out if the matter should go to IDAC or the DPCI; he declined to stay as it did not fall within IDAC's mandate.
“He wanted to, it was nothing to do with IDAC. It was not even a matter within IDAC and I think he was trying to figure out whether this matter, this referral, however he was going to do it, must go to IDAC or to the DPCI. And within probably 10 minutes of the way the matter was introduced, I was able to say, apologies, this does not fall within the mandate of IDAC and that, Lebeya, if you do not mind, you stay and I am going to leave and I had left.”
The dockets were found to be with the SAPS Inspectorate headed by General Peter Jacobs, not with the Provincial Commissioner of Detectives Khumalo or the DPCI.
“the dockets actually were with the SAPS Inspectorate, more so the head of the Inspectorate, General Peter Jacobs.”
IDAC does not have mandate to investigate some matters but refers such matters to other agencies such as detectives, DPCI, or SIU, and informs complainants where to approach for recourse.
“whilst this does not comply with IDAC's mandate, you are able to refer this matter to the detectives, we are writing to... We inform the complainant where they can go to, and then we also write to the agency that we are able to send it to”
The provincial commissioner of detectives Major General Khumalo indicated he knew about the dockets but they were not with him and that the dockets could be with the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), but the dockets were actually with the SAPS Inspectorate headed by General Peter Jacobs.
“General Khumalo ... indicated that he knew about these dockets, but ... these dockets were not with him ... indicated that the dockets could be with the DPCI ... the dockets actually were with the SAPS Inspectorate, more so the head of the Inspectorate, General Peter Jacobs.”
Advocate Baloyi accused Warrant Officer Mpangase of recording a false entry stating exhibits were taken out for investigation when in fact they were booked out for storage at DPCI.
“it is a lie that is recorded here that you are taking them out for investigation ... they were being booked out because , out of their book , you are taking them out of the SAP 13 because the clerk said ... So they are out of their book ... they are not there ... you know at that time ... they are stored somewhere else”
Warrant Officer Mpangase resigned from DPCI before 7-8 November 2021 when exhibits were stolen but was still around when the theft happened, having put in resignation earlier with immediate effect.
“I left before. I resigned before ... No, what I mean by resignation is that I put the application there of, but when they were stolen I was still around”
In the Mokwele matter, one leg of the matter is already being investigated by the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) and IDAC is not involved in it because it falls under DPCI's space; IDAC liaises with DPCI who are busy with their investigations.
“DPCI is already engaged with that , so we are not involved with it because it is also reported that this particular thing took place and when we looked at it , it is in DPCI space , we liaise with them , they are busy with their investigations , so that does not form part of our leg .”
There were about six or seven dockets in the Mokwele matter related complaints, but they were essentially duplicates describing the same case, reduced to four different complaints for investigation, with one already investigated by DPCI; IDAC did not interfere with that docket and took the remaining dockets for investigation.
“When you look at it , you know , the Cape Town dockets and the dockets that were opened here in Gauteng , it is about basically one and the same thing ... it is like duplicated ... I narrowed it down to four different complaints . One of those dockets ... was already being investigated by , I think it is DPCI ... It had to do with something that was purchased . They were busy with that . So that docket there , the actual docket that was opened , we did not interfere with that docket . We took the remaining dockets and , ja , we conducted investigations from there .”
The sharing of the whistleblower’s statement between DPCI, NPA and Advocate Johnson was done legitimately, at the request of General Lebeya to assist with the investigation.
“I do not, we do not have an issue because we requested, the reason we gave that copy of the statement to General Lebeya is to request a prosecutor from the NPA to assist us, to guide us in the investigation and also to get our Section 205 authorised because otherwise we could not get anything done.”
In August 2022, the statement from Colonel Roelofse was received recounting events of 4 July 2018; at that time Advocate Johnson was head of IDAC where Captain McLean was attached to DPCI.
“In August of 2022, we received the statement from the Colonel, setting out events of 4 July 2018. At this stage, Advocate Johnson was the head of IDAC where I was placed, even though I was attached to the DPCI.”
Advocate Johnson's position as Head of IDAC placed the witness in a precarious position, due to conflict arising from allegations implicating Advocate Johnson.
“Advocate Johnson 's position also placed me in a precarious position, because I had been placed at IDAC in Advocate Johnson 's office, as part of a duty arrangement between the DPCI and IDAC .”
The witness decided to approach National Head of the DPCI, Lieutenant General Lebeya, for assistance due to the circumstances he found himself in and informed him of the allegations contained in the Colonel's statement, requesting a senior prosecutor be assigned.
“I decided to approach the National Head of the DPCI, Lieutenant General Lebeya, for assistance, because of the circumstances that I found myself in. I met General Lebeya in the last week of August 022, but I do not recall the exact date. I informed him of the allegations contained in the Colonel 's statement and furnished him with a copy of the Colonel 's statement. I told General Lebeya that we needed the NPA to assign a senior prosecutor to the matter. I expected General Lebeya to request the NPA head, at the time, Advocate Shamila Batohi, for a senior prosecutor to be assigned to the case.”
The witness could not approach Advocate Johnson because of her position as Head of IDAC and allegations of interference and defeating the ends of justice, and instead approached the Head of the DPCI.
“Advocate Johnson 's position also placed me in a precarious position, because I had been placed at IDAC in Advocate Johnson 's office, ... I could not take the matter to a lower Court due to Advocate Johnson 's position as Head of IDAC. ... She also informed me ... that she understood why I did not deal with the incident within IDAC, but instead we went to the Head of the DPCI.”
Witness O approached the Hawks on the condition that his identity would be protected to inform them of the incident and prepared a statement of his recollection in August 2022, but nothing came of the investigation conducted by the DPCI officers.
“I approached them on the condition that my identity would be protected. I informed them of the incident and that I would prepare a statement setting out my recollection of the incident. I did so in August 2022. As far as I am aware, the DPCI officers investigated the matter, but nothing has come of it.”
Captain Mark McLean states he was part of a team assigned in May 2020 to investigate state-owned enterprises and entities as part of a duty arrangement between IDAC and DPCI.
“In May of 2020, I was part of a team placed at the Investigating Directorate, the ID, of the National Prosecuting Authority, also commonly known as IDAC, as part of a duty arrangement between IDAC and the DPCI, where we were assigned to conduct investigations relating to inter-alia state-owned enterprises or state-owned entities.”
Initial plan was for Chief Mashabatha to arrange law enforcement agencies to intercept the truck at appropriate locations, possibly at weigh bridges.
“At that stage I expected Chief Mashaba, given the position within the DPCI, to arrange for the involvement of the appropriate law enforcement agencies and personnel... the truck could be tracked and intercepted at an appropriate location, including possibly at one of the weigh bridges along its route.”
Chief Mashaba was supposed to organize law enforcement to arrive at the 'Yellow Jersey' location at 6:30 am to confiscate drugs, but there was no reason to pay him cash for this assistance.
“Chief Mashaba was supposed to organise law enforcement and they were to arrive at Yellow Jersey at 6 . 3 0 in the morning and law enforcement confiscated all these drugs, what was going to be the benefit for him to wake up at 5 . 0 0 in the morning to be there at 6 . 3 0 for something that SAPS or DPCI was going to take and claim credit ? ... There would not have been any reason , because , hence I say , in my experience , in my past experiences , there have been instances I have given information and then things comes short . So I would not have had any need to pay him . I stayed there , hence I maintained that I was neutral . My number one objective was to make sure that there is a bust , it is a recorded bust.”
The investigator sent a serious complaint about General Mabasa to General Dramat and General Sibiya, who were then heads of DPCI in Gauteng, leading to General Mabasa being suspended and later given a golden handshake instead of being prosecuted for corruption.
“my complaint , which is a very serious complaint , which I sent to General Dramat and General Sibiya at the time was the head of DPCI in Gauteng . And I sent them a very serious complaint . And within a week or two , General Mabasa was suspended and then he was later given a golden handshake .”
DPCI and the National Prosecuting Authority were captured by unlawful conduct leading to a formal complaint in 2016.
“by that stage I am saying DPCI was captured and the National Prosecuting Authority was captured. As a result of this unlawful conduct, I laid a formal complaint”
A formal complaint comprising three lever arch files with all the evidence was laid with a retired DPCI judge in 2016.
“I laid a complaint comprising three lever arch files and that complaint was laid in 2016 ... I laid the complaint in July 2016 and it comprised of three lever arch files with all the evidence”
General Mokotedi did not have the required top secret security clearance to be appointed Provincial Commissioner of DPCI, making his appointment unlawful.
“You cannot be appointed as a Provincial Commissioner of DPCI if you do not have top secret security clearance. He never had it.”
Major General Mokotedi was appointed as Provincial Head of DPCI despite being found wanting and lacking security clearance, and instead of being dismissed, he was moved sideways within the police service.
“Major General Mokotedi was the Provincial Head of DPCI ... you are appointed as Provincial Head of DPCI and then you are found wanting and you do not have security clearance ... instead of him being dismissed, he was just moved sideways into the Police Service from DPCI.”
General Masemola did not promptly act on the DPCI judge's report and Major General Mokotedi remained on the taxpayers' payroll, not working, for about two years before finally leaving the service towards the end of 2024.
“General Masemola did not lift a finger to deal with the DPCI judge's report ... General Mokotedi only finally left the service towards the end of 2024, which means he sat on the payroll, the taxpayers' payroll, for a further two years, twiddling his thumbs. He was not working.”
General Lebeya unlawfully agreed with General Masemola to move Major General Mokotedi from DPCI to SAPS instead of dismissing him, effectively moving the problem rather than solving it.
“Instead of dismissing him, General Lebeya unlawfully agreed with General Masemola that he could simply be moved from DPCI to SAPS. So, that is moving the problem instead of removing the problem.”
Major General Mokotedi was moved to the police division known as the Inspectorate, colloquially called the 'departure lounge', where senior officers are placed when there is no work for them.
“He was moved to the division known as Inspectorate which functions or is supposed to function as the internal standard monitoring the police ... Here you have Major General Mokotedi moved out of DPCI where he cannot be because he does not have top secret clearance, and he was put in the Inspectorate. The Inspectorate is quite commonly known as the departure lounge in the police ... if they have not got work for a senior person, they stick them in the Inspectorate and that is often where these Generals end up before they find another job somewhere.”
The DPCI judge's report made findings largely concerning the conduct of Major General Mokotedi and recommended action against him to National Commissioner General Masemola, not against General Phahlane.
“The DPCI judge's report makes findings, is in large part concerning the conduct of Major General Mokotedi and makes findings as you have tabulated them at page 14 ... deserves the attention of National Commissioner General Masemola ... was action invited to be taken against Major General Mokotedi and not General Phahlane ... I do not mention General Phahlane.”
General Phahlane was the target of a criminal complaint opened by Mr O'Sullivan, and the conduct listed against him happened to Mr O'Sullivan and others connected to him, driven mainly by Major General Mokotedi acting on instructions from General Ntlemeza and General Phahlane.
“The only thing it is to do about General Phahlane is that all of this conduct happened against me because I opened a criminal complaint against General Phahlane ... but the driving force, according to the DPCI judge's report, was Major General Mokotedi who was acting on the instructions of both General Ntlemeza ... and General Phahlane.”
Mr Nku did not refer solely to Chief Mashaba in providing intelligence but gained acquaintance with a DPCI member, Captain Dale Nortje, who was part of the arresting team and started providing information directly to DPCI members.
“Subsequent to the arrest ... I had gained the acquaintance of a DPCI member ... It was Captain Dale Nortje ... He was in the arresting team ... I started providing the information directly”
Several DPCI members sought information from Mr Nku and he provided intelligence he acquired to them.
“a couple of these DPCI peoples started getting hold of me, wanting information. If I can provide information, I must give them. So I started then forwarding any intel that I have acquired.”
General Senona was not intended to be engaged as an implicated person regarding the Port Shepstone drug bust, but as head of DPCI-KZN as part of management ultimately responsible.
“He was never intended to be engaged on the matter as an implicated person . The thinking has always been to engage him as head of DPCI-KZN , ... at the end of the day would , except that the buck stops with him”
Since January 2026, the Commission has acquired significant relevant documents and testimony from other witnesses regarding the infiltration or influence of criminal syndicates over entities including the SAPS and DPCI.
“since his appearance in 2026, the Commission has been placed in possession of significant documents that are relevant to the issue. Other witnesses have testified and, too, produced documents before the Commission... what this Commission is mandated to interrogate is whether criminal syndicates, including but not limited to drug cartels, have infiltrated or exerted influence over a range of entities, including the SAPS, of which the DPCI is a part”
Warrant Officer Sanders indicated he believed the drug theft suspects are known and was informed by Colonel Jacob personally about their identities and links to management of DPCI.
“The suspect who stole the drugs are known...I was informed by Colonel Jacob personally who they are, but the links to the management. Commissioner Khumalo then interjected and said, the links to the management of DPCI, and Warrant Officer Sanders agreed.”
The investigation into the complaint against Warrant Officer Sander was conducted in line with the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and involved a Risk and Integrity Management section.
“When we conduct investigation in the DPCI, there are different things that we do. You will realise that on paragraph 4, it talks about the investigation that was conducted in line with the FIC, Financial Intelligence Centre.”
Maj General Senona complied with directives from the National Head of DPCI who delegates correspondence to an executive support officer level of a Major General.
“At national office DPCI ... there is a post called executive support at the level of a Major General ... The national head ... does not sit and write letters ... that person holding this post will do those type of correspondences through directive given by the National Head ... I received that directive and complied with it.”
Maj-Gen Senona did not personally attend the scene nor participate in operational handling or processing of 41 kg seizure, limited to oversight and administrative decisions.
“My involvement was limited to oversight and administrative decisions after being briefed by Operational Commanders.”
The Unit Commander reports operational crime scene handling to the Provincial Commander, a Brigadier, who then reports to the General, who reviews and authorizes reports after seeking clarity if needed. Members of the DPCI undergo training in crime scene processing under a curriculum called Resolving of Crime Course, which includes necessary protocols such as cordoning off crime scenes and calling the LCRC.
“The Unit Commander will report, provide reports to the Provincial Commander, who is a level of a Brigadier. A Brigadier will read once he is happy, he reports to me. I receive reports. I will read it. If I need clarity seeking questions, I will send it back. They will rectify and then I sign it. So part of this, I saw that during those years, in terms of processing the crime scenes, we know the crime scene must be cordoned off and you must call the LCRC and all those kind of stuff. It is something that is in the curriculum of the current course that is called Resolving of Crime Course. All the members of the DPCI underwent that type of training.”
The General as head of the DPCI is aware of the admissions by members that they messed up in handling the scene and is brought to his attention for further steps, especially following his disciplinary process clearance.
“I am speaking to the General as the head of the very DPCI members who have made the admissions. I do not depart from the premise that he is aware of the admissions made. This afternoon, the General comes back into the Commission to inform you that the disciplinary process that he was subjected to has cleared him, which I would expect would result in him going back to the position that he held. Now, the question that would arise is steps that he would take pursuant to learning what his members did on the day if he was not aware at the time. And it is for that purpose that I am bringing these facts to his attention.”
The General was cleared in a disciplinary process that is not related to the drug bust operation under inquiry.
“Just in case we are accused of misleading the Commission, just to clarify that the DCI in respect of which the General was cleared is not the one about the what is it called ? Drug bust. Ja. So, ja, and if he gave that impression, then we, I think, General Khumalo, Commissioner Khumalo, maybe also wanted to assist me in that regard.”
Major-General Senona as the Head of DPCI did not designate or approve Port Shepstone offices to maintain an SAP 13 register as required by national instruction paragraph 12(1).
“y o u a s t h e H e a d D P C I d i d n o t d e s i g n a t e o r a p p r o v e t h e P o r t S h e p s t o n e o ff i c e s t o m a i n t a i n a n S A P 1 3 r e g i s t e r. Yo u d i d n o t t a k e t h e s t e p s c o n t e m p l a t e d i n 1 2 ( 1 ) . Yo u h a v e n e v e r d o n e t h a t .”
At Port Shepstone, the premises used had two strong room safes accessible only with keys; however, there was a security lapse with the alarm not working after loadshedding.
“When I was the Unit Commander at Port Shepstone, the premises had two strong room safes. What made the property attractive for the DPCI was that the landlord informed us those safes could not be breached. They could only be accessed with the key. I was aware of the security lapse at the premises, such as the alarm not working after loadshedding, but my main focus was the safe that could be used since it was very secure and could only be accessed with the key.”
The breaches prior to thefts targeted the offices, not the safes, which remain in a very private space only known to DPCI members and employees.
“The breaches that were there were not directed at the safe, were directed at the offices and the safes are in the very private space. Only members of the DPCI and employees will know where the safes are, not any private person. It was out of sight, and is still out of sight.”
Prior to the February 2024 complaint, a July 2023 complaint was received from the office of the DPCI Judge about a certain Captain formerly with SANEB, relating to white members of the KZN DPCI in SANEB and other units working with drug syndicates. Lieutenant Colonels Jacoba and Dwarika were assigned to investigate but no outcome has been reported.
“Prior to the February 2024 complaint, another complaint was received from the office of the DPCI Judge in July 2023 about a certain Captain who used to work at SANEB, but the name of Warrant Officer Sander was not mentioned. The complaint contained the Captain and the complaint was about white members of the KZN DPCI in SANEB and other units working with drug syndicate. Lieutenant Colonel Jacoba and Lieutenant Colonel Dwarika were assigned to investigate the complaint, but to date there has not been no outcome.”
Members compile a WhatsApp report for successes or incidences and send it to Brigadier Nyuswa who forwards it to management and then to General Senona.
“The procedure is when there is successes or incidences, you compile a report. And the Unit Commander will send it to me. I will send it to the management group of the DPCI. And the General will read it. If he is happy with it, he will then send it to the DPCI management group.”
The security application for enhanced security at Port Shepstone was processed but not financed due to lack of funds at DPCI head office, leading to delays with completion.
“when finally Captain van Niekerk got the authorisation to be a procurement officer, last year we did the application and when everything was done, it was finalised, I think it was February and we submitted the application, but it was not financed because the head office of DPCI Finances said there was no money, and that application is going to be redone this year.”
DPCI appears to take no action when prescripts are disregarded and there is delay of five years before action is taken against Brigadier Nyuswa for his part in the failure to properly handle exhibits in 2021.
“It seems like DPCI does not take action when prescripts are disregarded and people do not do what they are supposed to do ... it bothers me that it is five years later and only now they appear to be taking action.”
Witness I deliberately misled their superior by telling them they were going to Johannesburg High Court when they instead were going to an operation scene to legitimize an unlawful operation and conceal their true purpose.
“You made a decision not to inform the Acting Unit Commander that you are going to Aeroton because ... you are hiding from her for wrong reasons ... you told her that you had gone to the High Court ... You arrive at the scene ... you do not speak to DPCI who have jurisdiction ... you speak to Phakula ... this conduct up to this point is calculated conduct ... to legitimise an unlawful operation ...”
ADV Khumalo says the unlawful operation was interrupted by Booysen's SAPS and other units including Flying Squad and Officer Rikhoitso, yet Witness I did not inform their superiors or speak to all officers on scene but only later spoke with Colonel J. C.
“When you arrived at the scene, you found DPCI who have jurisdictional control ... why did you not speak to them ... others including Booysens police, Flying Squad, Officer Rikhoitso ... you spoke with Colonel J C afterwards ... why did you not talk to all the other officers on scene?”
Major General Kadwa and his DPCI team were not charged, and during General Khan's hearing DPCI issued a report clearing all members.
“Major General Kadwa of the DPCI and his team were not charged ... During General Khan's hearing, the DPCI issued a report that all their members are cleared”
Lieutenant Colonel Maluleke was subpoenaed to attend a crime scene because the container was a duplicate of his inquiry file about drugs, but the inquiry file is missing and could not be located.
“He further asked if I still have Lieutenant Colonel Maluleke's from DPCI in Pretoria and asked me to also subpoena Lieutenant Colonel Maluleke as the container is a duplicate of his enquiry file of which I did subpoena Lieutenant Colonel Maluleke and promised to attend. ... I was told that it was missing. It was handled by a certain Sergeant, I forgot his name, and he could not locate the file.”
On 9 July 2021, Sergeant Mogobo called for urgent assistance at the Scania warehouse in Aeroton where several police officers from Crime Intelligence, DPCI and Gauteng Traffic Department were trying to remove the contents of a container suspected of containing drugs.
“On 9 July 2021, at about 09:50, I received a telephone call from Sergeant Mogobo of Gauteng Highway Patrol. He informed me that he was at the Scania warehouse in Aeroton and that there were several police men who claimed to be from Crime Intelligence, DPCI and Gauteng Traffic Department who were trying to remove the contents of a container that he suspected to contain drugs and was supposed to be delivered to the Scania warehouse.”
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR MAPHOSHODay 116 · 09 Jun 2026Refers to: 2021-07-09Location: Scania warehouse, Aeroton
IPID received a report signed by National Head of DPCI, General Lebeya, indicating that disciplinary proceedings against DPCI members involved were declined.
“IPID received a report dated 2024-12-10, signed by National Head of DPCI, General Lebeya, indicating that they declined to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the DPCI members involved.”
Investigators made administrative errors regarding exhibit count; members did not fully explore and receive all exhibits, considered a human error with lack of follow-up on alibis.
“There were fundamental administrative errors made by the investigators. A number of exhibits collected were 700, whereas FSL received 715. One brick of cocaine was recovered by Local Criminal Records Centre and then handed over to DPCI, indicating that members did not fully explore and receive all exhibits. That was regarded as a human error. Lack of follow-up upon alibis.”
IPID does not deal with cases of unlawful arrest but there is serious implication for any future representation to have Booysens CAS 8/07/2021 placed back on the roll due to prior decisions by NDPP that there are no reasonable prospects of successful prosecution.
“With regard to unlawful arrest, IPID does not deal with the cases of unlawful arrest. ... Serious implication on any future representation by DPCI to have Booysens CAS 8/07/2021 to be placed back on the roll, the Investigator knew or ought to have known that the matter was referred to NDPP and a decision was already made on 2024-06-21 that there are no reasonable prospects of successful prosecution.”
A departmental investigation by Major General Gerber concluded that Generals Khan and Kadwa were doing their job, which the witness did not find comforting.
“Major General Gerber concluded that Generals Khan and Kadwa were doing their job. General Gerber interviewed me at DPCI Head Office in Silverton. I did not find this comforting.”
On 29 January 2025, Witness met Brown Mogotsi and a CI member at a meeting facilitated by Mr Vusi Matlala through Warrant Officer Faleni Zungu, who is now Captain and was a DPCI member.
“On 29 January 2025, I met Mr Mogotsi and CI member. The meeting was facilitated by Mr Vusi Matlala through Warrant Officer Faleni Zungu, now Captain. Captain Zungu was a member of DPCI but now moved.”
After his appointment as Divisional Commissioner of DPCI, General Mbotho visited the TOMS office to introduce himself and started making threats to the unit, insisting members report every work-related movement and get approval for work outside Gauteng.
“General Mbotho, after his appointment as Divisional Commissioner of DPCI, visited the TOMS office to introduce himself and meet the team, but started making threats to the unit during the introduction. He insisted that all members must inform him of every work-related movement and that no member should conduct work outside Gauteng without his knowledge and approval”
The DPCI provided downloads of phones' data, which enabled confirmation that certain screenshots with bell and phone icons were from the Threema app found in the gallery of Mr Nku's downloads, with metadata indicating when screenshots were taken rather than when messages were sent.
“the DPCI did provide us with the downloads of the phones . And how we were able to confirm that this is Threema is that all of these ones that are grey and a light green that have a bell and a little phone icon at the top were all found in the gallery of Mr Nku's downloads . And if you look at the metadata of it , it specifies just the phone that it was taken . So all of the ones that come from Threema appear like that . And what you can get from it is just the date on which the screenshot was taken and not necessarily when the messages themselves were sent .”
IPID sent formal communications to DPCI including emails and requests for meetings, but these were not adequately accommodated by DPCI.
“On the 28th an email was sent to General Kadwa, seeking his intervention, and a meeting was arranged between IPID and DPCI for the 5th of November 2011... the meeting was cancelled due to unavailability of General Kadwa and Legal Services, however, there was no other date provided... IPID also sought intervention from General Lebeya and requested assistance there... General Lebeya did not assist with the request... IPID must investigate without copies of the docket.”
Major General Kadwa found no evidence warranting findings of misconduct against any DPCI members implicated in the IPID report, and that the implicated members acted bona fide within their mandate, though fundamental administrative errors were made by investigators.
“According to his findings, he was unable to identify any evidence that would warrant the findings of misconduct against any DPCI members implicated in the IPID report... The findings indicate after the consideration of the evidence available, there was no evidentiary basis to support allegations of misconduct against implicated members... They acted bona fide within the scope and mandate of the DPCI... There were fundamental administrative errors made by the investigators assigned to the team...”
Major General Gerber's report found no evidence indicating wrongdoing by DPCI members including Lieutenant Colonel Sebola, who acted bona fide within the scope and mandate of the DPCI.
“General Gerber found...no evidence indicating wrongdoing on the part of the DPCI members, including yourself... On the contrary, they acted bona fide within the scope and mandate of the DPCI.”
One brick of evidence was recovered by LCRC and handed over to DPCI, and there is criticism that members did not fully explore and receive all exhibits, categorized as human error.
“One brick that was recovered later is dealt with... the criticism there is that it indicates members did not fully explore and receive all exhibits. It is categorized as a human error in her view.”
Members of the DPCI arrived and arrested police officers involved in the drug bust, charging them with dealing and possession/use of drugs.
“Members of DPCI , amongst others , General Kadwa , Brigadier Sekgobela , Colonel Steyn , Captain Sebula , arrived at the crime scene , and they arrested the police officer who made the drug bust . That is Warrant Officer Magane , Warrant Officer Phakula , Chief Mashaba , and Tumelo . They were charged with dealing in drugs and possession of drugs / use of drugs .”
Lieutenant Colonel Sibiya began his police career in 2005, progressively promoted through ranks up to Lieutenant Colonel by December 1, 2024.
“In 2005, I began my career with the police as a Student Constable. I was appointed as a Constable in 2007... Most recently, December 1, 2024, I was promoted to a Lieutenant Colonel at DPCI, SOCI.”
The container with serial number BEAU5955535 was inspected by Lieutenant-Colonel Jacobs and others; the seal was intact but broken by an employee of the depot in the presence of management, DPCI members, Captain Duma of CIORS, and depot security members.
“The container with serial number BEAU5955535 was placed down for inspection and the shipping document were handed over to Lieutenant Colonel Jacobs. The doors of the container were inspected by Lieutenant Colonel Jacobs. The seal was intact with seal number, that. The seal was broken by an employee of the depot in the presence of the management of the depot, DPCI members, Captain Duma of CIORS members and depot security members.”
Lt-Col Sibiya observed that there were a lot of people at the depot during the processing of the crime scene, including members from management, DPCI, Captain Duma, and O.R.S members.
“I saw O R S members. I also saw people wearing reflectors from customs ... there were a lot of people ... management of the depot ... three of us from D P C I ... Captain Duma ... O R S members”
Lieutenant Colonel Jacob and his team escorted individuals to Isipingo SAP where they assisted in offloading black bags containing suspected cocaine bricks which were then counted by DPCI members.
“Then we were escorted by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob and his team to Isipingo SAP, where we assisted in offloading the black bags. The DPCI members were busy counting the bags. The yellow and black bags, bricks, sorry, of suspected Cocaine when we left the scene.”
Warrant Officer Perumal was approached by Colonel Jacob from DPCI who informed him about the recovery of a huge quantity of drugs from CHC containers in Prospecton, and the intention was to book it into the SAP 13 register, sign for it, and take it away without intending to store it at Isipingo.
“On the 22nd of June 2021, I was approached by Colonel Jacob from DPCI who informed me that they recovered a huge quantity of drugs from CHC containers in Prospecton, and they want to book it into our SAP 13 register and sign for it and take it away.”
FS Laboratory (FSL) is responsible for performing analysis on exhibits where the crime scene is a non-clan lab scene, but it does not attend the crime scene or police stations to collect samples, nor does it receive samples from DPCI or other investigating teams for analysis.
“FSL is responsible for performing analysis on the exhibits ... FS L does not attend the crime scene or the police station where the drugs are stored for safekeeping to collect samples, nor does FS L receive samples collected from DPCI or other investigating teams for analysis”
Colonel Jacob reads from Govender's second statement where he states they transferred 27 black bags containing about 20 cocaine bricks each, escorted by Lt. Colonel Jacob and his team to Isipingo SAPS where they offloaded bags and counted bricks before leaving the scene.
“Sergeant Mkhize and I, together with other DPCI members, transferred these black bags from the container to an H1 marked state vehicle that I was driving. I counted 27 such bags. We were escorted by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob and his team to Isipingo SAP, where we assisted in offloading the black bags... The DPCI members were busy counting the yellow and black bricks of suspected Cocaine when we left the scene... each bag contained approximately 20 such bricks. We then left the scene and proceeded with our normal duties.”
The theft incident caused embarrassment to the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), the police as a whole, and the country, and should not go unpunished.
“This incident has caused embarrassment to the DPCI, the police as a whole, as well as the country, and should not go unpunished.”
Colonel Jacob testified that he believes members of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) conspired with criminal elements to commit the theft incident discussed.
“I do believe that the DPCI members have conspired with criminal elements to carry out this crime.”
Colonel Jacob testified he would not make a blanket denial that those involved did not have a hand in the theft, as he believed DPCI members were involved.
“I would not want to mention names, but obviously I did go on to say that I believe that DPCI members were involved.”
Colonel Jacob made a decision not to move exhibits from the crime scene to the CHC depot due to being a 5-minute drive away, no available exhibit bags, and the presence of uniformed border police members, although he now regrets that decision.
“I took that decision at that stage, based on no bags, based on our situation that we were working in... I knew in my mind, I knew that Isipingo SAP is going to have exhibit bags.”
Colonel Jacob requested Warrant Officer Mpangase to inform Brigadier Nyuswa that he would book on duty for 22nd to attend an operation, which is acceptable to be done verbally in SAPS and DPCI.
“you asked Warrant Officer Mpangase had to inform him that you are booking on duty... request on your behalf from Brigadier Nyuswa that you be back on duty for the 22nd to attend to this operation”
Warehouse manager Ms Pillay and other warehouse staff were present during the operation that included DPCI members and Captain Duma from Crime Intelligence.
“at the end, where we land is the only people who were present in this operation were the DPC members, led by yourself, and Captain Duma from Crime Intelligence. And warehouse staff. Not only Ms Pillay, some other warehouse staff as well. But the manager was Ms Pillay.”
The DPCI sometimes adheres to the protocol when a clearing agent has a representative to send over, but often permission is granted as long as the warehouse supervisor is present.
“It is in cases where the clearing agent has a representative to send over. There are the times where they just grant you permission as long as the warehouse supervisor is present.”
The DPCI does not have a formal memorandum of understanding or standard operating procedure for working with Border Police and Customs when conducting interdictions at the harbour or depots, relying instead on verbal agreements.
“There is nothing in place in terms of a memorandum of understanding between ourselves, Border Police, Customs... There is no formalised document that talks to how do we jointly approach these type of things. It is verbal agreements.”
For the particular drug operation discussed, the DPCI only has an investigation diary and lacks any inspection report or formal record equivalent to that used by ORS.
“In this particular operation, all we have is that investigation diary. We have nothing that is the equivalent of this kind of inspection report.”
DPCI captures inspection-related information in an inquiry but does not have a structured document like an inspection report to capture the detailed information at the scene.
“Our inquiry would carry all of this information. No, there is no document. So it is information that is there, but it is scattered all over.”
The intelligence collection and operationalising process requires registration of enquiries, engagement with pre-project and full-blown project phases, and the involvement of multiple offices including DPCI, NPA, Asset Forfeiture, surveillance and other SAPS units.
“The process is that, as I have explained, which runs from enquiry to pre-project, then to a full-blown project... You will have to have your operational team, which will include DPCI, which will include NPA, and which will also include other offices like your Asset Forfeiture, and other relevant units within SAPS, your surveillance and everything.”
Warrant Officer Sander was charged for failing to declare directorship in a shooting club related to victimisation issues within the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI).
“the verbal warning was in consequence of the alleged, well, that you failed to declare your directorship in the shooting club”
Warrant Officer Sander indicated that there were other members victimised and protection of certain DPCI members with serious allegations against them.
“the other issue was the protection of certain members at the DPCI who did have serious allegations against them”
A whistleblower at the DPCI was victimised immediately after reporting complaints and subsequently moved to a different environment still within DPCI but another part of the province.
“The whistle blower got victimised straight away. The whistle blower has since moved to a totally different environment, but still within the DPCI, but in a different part of the province now”
In counter-narcotics operations in the area, containers suspected of containing drugs are inspected with the involvement of DPCI if drugs are found positive.
“Basically, in operations that are conducted in this area let us say you are getting information of a container that is coming. Maybe your information says it has counter-narcotics. So, you have two ways of doing it. After requesting a stop or arrest to put a stop you can request the DPCI to be present or you can ask the ORS inspection team to open the container for inspection to confirm what commodities are inside or if there is drugs inside. And if there are drugs, if it is positive, then you summon the DPCI to come to the scene.”
ORS is responsible for opening the container for inspection and, if drugs are found, contacts DPCI.
“Because the inspection will be done by the inspection team of ORS who will open the container for you. You are not going to open the container as an operative yourself. You will be there to say, this is a container. I have identified. Obviously, they will call you when it is ready for inspection and then you meet them there and you do inspection with them. You observe what is inside. And when they confirm, yes, it is counternarcotics then they will have to conduct the relevant units, which will include the DPCI.”
ORS has an inspection team that, upon finding drugs during container inspection, contacts DPCI to attend the scene.
“Yes, ORS has an inspection team. When after opening a container, then they found drugs, they will contact the DPCI. Or you as a handler, you can also contact the DPCI.”
There is no written process for container inspections; decisions to involve DPCI or only ORS depend on discretion and operational context.
“As I explained, this is the process that we follow when we deal with containers. There is no written process that we can say, this is the office process that was designed. This is what we must do when we deal with containers. So, a handler can decide, here is the information I am getting of drugs. Do I take DPCI with? Or the container is still at the harbour. It must know it is still at the harbour. If it is still at the harbour, it is under the control of ORS. There is nothing wrong by using ORS before contacting the DPCI.”
Once the container is sealed and moved to the depot, brand attorneys take samples to confirm counterfeit goods, then commercial crime unit of DPCI takes over investigation.
“And then that container will be sealed using a polystyrene. They will seal it. And then it should be taken to the depot, where a date will be set for a full unpack of the container, where the brand attorney can then come and take samples to confirm whether it is counterfeit. Then they will be notified to take over that investigation.”
Operational communication between units such as ORS and DPCI is mostly via phone calls or informal liaison, not formal paperwork, but formal letters (SAP21) are used if necessary.
“You know, Commissioners, at the operational level, it works differently. It does not work with paper all the time. It works with understanding between units which are working operationally. Some of these things, there is no time to say, now here is a container, now you found counterfeit goods, then you must go to your office and write a letter to request DPCI. It does not work that way. You pick up the phone, you call. The person that you are speaking to, you will say, okay, speak to my commander. You speak to the commander, you explain. Or you speak to a commander who lies with the commander of DPCI at their level, at their seniority. They will liaise this, you know. But if there is a need for an official letter, which we refer to as SAP21, which is the letter that we write when we request any information or any assistance within the police, that will be drawn up.”
If a commodity is found to be false declaration or under declaration by customs, customs takes over; if it involves criminal cases like illicit cigarettes, drugs, counterfeit goods, police take control and DPCI must be informed for investigations.
“It is also determined that the commodity was – if it is determined that the commodity was false declaration or under declaration , then customs will take over and do the necessary. Whether there is a criminal case , for example, illicit cigarettes , drugs , counterfeit goods or precursor chemicals , the police will usually take control of the commodities. Whenever there is information of drugs , DPCI must be informed in order to take over the crime scene for investigation.”
Customs may detain and inspect containers under Customs Act without police unless drugs are detected, in which case DPCI must be called for investigation and command/control of drug seizures and forensic processing.
“Customs may detain and inspect containers in terms of the Customs Act and do not require the police unless they have detected drugs. In that instance, DPCI must be called out to conduct an investigation. In the case of drug cases, DPCI will have to command and control. These seizures, packaging and forensic processing is controlled by DPCI.”
Lt-Col Duma introduced the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) after the container's seal was broken and then handed over the matter to DPCI to continue with the investigation.
“after the container was opened, from breaking the seal, I introduced the DPCI, we went to a place and pointed it out and met with the manager. Then from there, whatever happened from there, it was in the hands of DPCI to continue with it. So it was out of my hands by then.”
LT-Colonel Duma chooses which police officers to inform based on the commodity involved and the trust and working relationship with certain individuals rather than distrusting other members of the DPCI.
“It first depends what commodity you are dealing with... Normally, Commissioner, when it comes to that, it depends on the relationship and trust of members... you have to work with people that you trust in order to make sure that your information is safe and secure and is operationalized accordingly.”
Lt-Col Duma did not interact directly with the ORS or his Commander at the time regarding the container; his interaction was with Ms Pillay and the DPCI.
“No, no . . . Ms Pillay, the logistics, Pillay, all I did was to check where the container was”
Lt-Col Duma was not aware that SARS had put a stop on the container until after the operation was conducted on 23rd; this stop was not brought to his attention beforehand.
“At the time I was not aware that SARS had put a stop on the container ... The only time that it came to my notice was on the 23rd when the operation was already conducted and it was not brought, I do not know, maybe DPCI it was brought to their attention that SARS had put in a stop, but to me it was not brought to my attention”
DPCI was not informed about the stop on the container until Lt-Col Duma's involvement caused their involvement, so they were unaware beforehand.
“we know it was not brought to the attention of DPCI, because DPCI becomes involved through you. It is because of your involvement that DPCI is involved.”
When the seal of the container was broken during the operation, there were no customs or SARS personnel present, only SAPS, DPCI, and the Depot Manager.
“In the opening of this when, in this, now we are back in this operation, when the seal is broken there was no customs or veterinarian together with your police people. They were not there. You had only your SAPS, DPCI, the Depot Manager I think you say and, ja, pretty much. There was no SARS people there or customs people.”
The breaking of seal number H1905754 occurred in the presence of Lt-Col Duma, the Warehouse Manager, DPCI, and a worker with bolt cutters, with a photo taken before the seal was broken.
“the seal number H1905754 was broken in my presence as well as of the Warehouse Manager, DPCI, one of the workers working at the depot with the bolt cutter. Prior to the seal being broken a photo of the seal was taken and it was intact”
Numerous black canvas bags containing seven bricks of suspected cocaine were found at the container entrance, inspected by DPCI in Lt-Col Duma's presence, and the exhibits were conveyed to Isipingo SAPS by ORS.
“numerous black canvas bags were noticed at the entrance of the container. These bags were inspected by DPCI in my presence and found to contain bricks of suspected Cocaine. 7 bags were discovered ... exhibits were conveyed to Isipingo SAPS by ORS”
DPCI was in charge of everything at the scene and the operation and handled the crime scene management and exhibits; LT-Colduma only stood back to observe as a Crime Intelligence member and prepared reports for the Crime Intelligence office.
“No, I did not have that because at that stage, DPCI was in charge of everything, so I just stood back and you know, observed.”
Crime Intelligence officers do not interfere in cordoning off the crime scene, calling Local Criminal Record Centre or Forensics, conducting searches or making arrests; these are duties of Detectives, here specifically DPCI members.
“Crime Intelligence officers do not get involved in cordoning off the crime scene, calling of Local Criminal Record Centre or Forensics, conducting searches and making arrests, as this is the duties of the Detectives, which in this instance was the members of DPCI.”
DPCI members at the scene took charge of the crime scene and made decisions regarding it, having experience and expertise in handling crime scenes.
“In this matter, DPCI members who were in the scene took charge of the crime scene and made decisions. DPCI have experience and are experts in handling crime scenes, and it is their mandate to handle the crime scene and exhibits.”
Lt-Col Duma disputes all allegations made by General Flynn that implicate him but confirms he was present at the scene throughout and called DPCI and SAPS people to the scene.
“you dispute allegations made by General Flynn to the extent that they implicate you ... you confirm your presence at the scene, and the DPCI and SAPS people who were there were called by you”
Lt-Col Duma claims he provided accurate and strategic intelligence to DPCI which led to the successful operation and recovery of exhibits under his mandate, and that his actions were not part of any scheme to store exhibits unsafely.
“I provided accurate and strategic intelligence to DPCI, which led to the successful operation and recovery of exhibits as part of my mandate. My actions were not part of the scheme or design to store them in unsafe storage to make them vulnerable to theft.”
Lt-Col Duma lost trust in the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) after drugs he recovered disappeared from the DPCI custody, describing it as disgraceful to SAPS.
“I lost the trust to the DPCI as a component ... I thought those drugs were lying in the forensic . So to gets stolen like that , ... It bring us back to square one , where we are trying to remove these drugs off the street and they are going back under the police watch . So it was a sore matter which is a bit disgraceful to the SAPS .”
The clan lab team does not assist DPCI or investigating officers by guiding them on how to sample exhibits as this is a forensic lab function to be done by forensic experts.
“I clearly defined and explained to Brigadier Maluleke that clan lab team do not assist DPCI or investigating officer on guiding them on how to sample because that is a forensic lab work to be done”
LT-COL SONGCA explained that she makes efforts to clarify sampling restrictions to senior officers and informs them of her good relationship with DPCI for information seeking and assistance.
“I did my extent to explain to them my restriction as a clan lab manager so that they understand clearly even to the person who have phoned them to request. I even further explained to them, if you have got any challenge to the requestee, you can ask him to call me back because I have got a good relationship with DPCI.”
LT-COL SONGCA has often been requested by DPCI to send members out but never to go and guide on sampling.
“Have you ever been requested by DPCI directly to send your members out? A lot of time, Counsellor. But not to go and guide on sampling? No, Counsellor”
LT-COL SONGCA stated they have a good working relationship with DPCI and that she was shocked to receive calls from senior officers requesting assistance contrary to their protocol.
“So we have got a good relationship working with them. So it was shocking for me now that I received a call from a senior but I am working with them. Almost they are my primary customers when it comes to clan lab”
On October 27, 2021, Warrant Officer Setshedi informed LT-COL SONGCA about a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Jacob of DPCI, who usually works with him.
“On this day, Warrant Officer Setshedi, around 11:20, he called me and he informed me that he had a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Jacob of DPCI, who I usually work with him also”
Warrant Officer Setshedi communicated with Lt Colonel Jacob about whether a case sampled by DPCI and forwarded to the FSL lab for analysis could be analyzed by one of the crime scene analysts, meaning his team members could assist.
“Warrant Officer Setshedi informed me that there was Lieutenant Colonel Jacob early this morning and Lieutenant Colonel Jacob asked him if it is possible that the case that the DPCI sampled and forwarded to FSL lab for analysis could be analysed by one of the crime scene analysts, which means on those words, he was meaning my team members, can assists”
Not all exhibits come to the FSL because a subsection collects exhibits; the witness does not have details on whether there was an error in sampling or timing regarding a case brought as a sample by DPCI.
“Firstly, not all the exhibits come to the FSL, because there is my subsection that goes out there to collect exhibits. And secondly, the issue of sampling, I do not have the details whether sampling or they analyse or they brought it the wrong time, because I know nothing about this.”
It was well known that FS L Amanzimtoti did not have space to store large quantities of drugs, and any storage request would require FS L Amanzimtoti to contact FS L Pretoria.
“At the time, it was well known that FS L Amanzimtoti simply did not have the space to store such large quantity of drugs. Therefore, if I was told that DPCI needed the members to collect the exhibits, not just to assist in sampling, I would have informed DPCI and that FS L Amanzimtoti did not have space and had I been told about the quantity. If in any event, DPCI members already knew that FS L Amanzimtoti does not have the capacity to store such large quantities, the safe is not big enough. However, there was never a discussion about FS L receiving exhibits. The discussion was only about sampling.”
After the theft of exhibits in November 2021, DPCI inquired from FSL whether DPCI could destroy the exhibits instead of FSL, which is irregular since only FSL is permitted to destroy exhibits and the process is quite involved.
“After the theft of the exhibits in November 2021, I was made aware that DPCI had enquired from FSL whether DPCI could destroy the exhibits instead of FSL. This request is highly irregular as only FSL is permitted to destroy exhibits and the process is quite involved.”
On 22 June, a DPCI member calling Colonel Khuzwayo did not inform him that members would need guidance on sampling, only that FSL members were needed to be available for a crime scene.
“On the 22nd , the DPCI member that called you , either Brigadier Nyuswa or Colonel Jacob , does not tell you that they are going to need guidance on sampling . They just say they will need FSL members ... to be available , yes , for a crime scene”
Colonel Khuzwayo was not told on 23 June where the members would be needed to assist with sampling as details were to be obtained directly by the members from DPCI.
“No , they did not . They were not specific . I just called the members to tell them that the DPCI , they need them . I know that members , normally they communicate with them directly . So they were going to phone them to get all those details . So it was not for me to get those details for them .”
Warrant Officer Sander developed and has been involved in training the Specialized Narcotics Investigation Program since about 2000, which includes training members of SAPS, SANEB, DPCI, Customs, Organized Crime, Crime Intelligence, and FSLA members.
“For the last , yoh , I began in about 2000 , traveling around the country , training the different Narcotics units , Crime Intelligence , and Organized Crime . We began developing a training program . It is the program that I mentioned now . It is the Specialized Narcotics Investigation Program . There was a team of us , and that is what I did . It trained the DPCI , the SANEB members , the Station members , Organized Crime , Crime Intelligence , Customs . We sit in with members from FSLA as well , so it is quite a cool course .”
In 2024, Warrant Officer Sander was moved away from narcotics investigations to the provincial head office under General Senona, working in supply chain management looking after weapons for the KZN Armory for the DPCI.
“I was moved away from my work environment, Commissioner... The provincial head office under General Senona... Supply chain management... I looked after all the weapons for the KZN Armory for the DPCI.”
Warrant Officer Sander alleges management did not like his corruption investigation involving theft of exhibits, missing exhibits, and missing dockets, resulting in him applying unsuccessfully for transfer to Durban Central charge office.
“Prior to me being moved, this investigation of the corruption, myself and my immediate Commander were not seeing eye to eye due to, let us just say, there was allegations of theft of exhibits, exhibits going missing, dockets going missing. ... I filed a complaint like that. ... And I do not think management took like to that. That would have been the start. I then applied for a transfer from the DPCI to Organised Crime at the provincial head office ... I applied to go as an Investigator at Durban Central ... that application was changed to Durban Central charge office and the transfer was approved not to, so remember the question is being asked now, do you have scarce skills? Yes. Are you an Investigator? Yes. ...”
Warrant Officer Sander claims that despite being accused of corruption, he managed the DPCI armory and passed an audit with clean results from the Auditor General.
“Let us just say my office I had a vault full of fully automatic weapons at my disposal...I took over the armoury for the DPCI....We got a clean audit from the Auditor General for all our weapons and ammunition....If I was corrupt, I would not sell drugs, I would sell guns.”
Warrant Officer Sander reports working outdoors with strict time controls and limited freedom, finding only his coffee machine as a personal safe space before it was stolen.
“I work outside. You clock in through a checkpoint in the morning. You clock out at a checkpoint. There is no time. You cannot go out at a certain time. My only safe space was my coffee machine. And then they stole my coffee machine inside the DPCI.”
There are two polygraph examination reports related to certain events, one unsigned and the other finalized and signed by FSL, but it is unclear if the signed one was submitted to the DPCI, and investigations continue regarding discrepancies in reporting.
“this polygraph examination, it was then finalised ... but we do not know when it was submitted ... There is another report that is also relating to the polygraph which I want to refer to. It is an unsigned report ... one is signed by FSL ... We do not know whether it had been submitted to the DPCI ... we are still investigating the differences in the reporting”
The DPCI had units in Johannesburg, Germiston, West Rand, Vaal, and Pretoria.
“we had the unit in Johannesburg, we had the unit in Germiston, we had the unit in the West Rand, we had the unit in Vaal, we had the unit in Pretoria”
The number of solid substance blocks measured about 715, with a minor packaging counting discrepancy potentially explained by one block sticking to the side of a bag due to adhesive tape and submitted late to the lab.
“Those kilograms, as long as they are above 500... 715 is the number... one of the bricks got stuck onto the side of the bags... that it was taken and put together with the rest at a later stage... I think in the docket Captain Nortje brought me another statement to say this is an additional statement... affidavit by Mabasa that deals with the additional brick... explained if you look at page 310... they discovered that one of the bricks was stuck and they gave it to the DPCI, Warrant Officer Nortje... And that was taken a month later to the lab, bringing the count to 716.”
Warrant Officer Rikhotso from DPCI arrived, questioned the delay in registering an inquiry, and insisted immediate action was necessary based on information received that morning.
“I was later informed that the name of the gentleman was Warrant Officer Rikhotso from DPCI . Warrant Officer Rikhotso further asked if I had an enquiry registered for that operation and I told him there was no time to first drive to Pretoria to register an enquiry and then drive back to the scene as the delay would have defeated the purpose . The information was received that same morning and I had to act on information first.”
Warrant Officer Phakula pointed out questionable actions by others involved and implied that the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) could have investigated the case better given their experience and resources.
“there are a lot of things ... questionable ... if they wanted to... investigate this case, I believe they could have done it better ... I refer to the DPCI”
Warrant Officer Phakula and others opened a case against Major General Khan and members of DPCI for defeating the ends of justice and theft of drugs, investigated by IPID.
“We opened a case against Major General Khan and the members of the DPCI ... We opened a case of defeating the ends of justice and the theft of drugs. The case was investigated by IPID.”
Advocate Drotsky declined to prosecute General Khan and members of DPCI, decision upheld by Advocate Chauke.
“The Booysens CAS 252/10/2021 was submitted to Gauteng Local DPP for decision. The decision was taken by Advocate Drotsky, declining to prosecute General Khan and the members of DPCI. We then decided to appeal the decision and wrote to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Advocate Chauke, who also agreed with the decision by Advocate Drotsky.”
The intention of the police was to call all relevant role players, including DPCI and national SAPS office, to come and process the scene if drugs were found, rather than seizing drugs immediately.
“No, no, no, we were going to phone all the relevant role players to come and process the scene ... We were going to source assistance from DPCI, the national office ...”
Warrant Officer Magane admits that by opening the truck and allowing bags to fall out before other components such as K-9 unit or DPCI arrived, he contaminated the crime scene and did not follow required procedures.
“...you are looking at these seals and things have then been taken out... I think it is a function of you simply not being familiar with what happens at crime scenes when you come across a scene like that.”
The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) recommended that all members involved in an arrest be charged departmentally, though members of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) were not charged.
“IPID then recommended that all members who were involved in our arrest must be charged departmentally. General Khan was charged separately and members of DPCI were not charged.”
While the commissioner was deciding on Major General Khan's matter, the DPCI issued a report clearing all their members and there were media reports that witnesses were facing imminent re-enrolment of their case, and the case was provisionally withdrawn on 12 November 2022.
“While the Commissioner was still deciding on the verdict of Major General Khan's matter, DPCI issued a report that cleared all their members. At the same time, there were media reports that witnesses of Major General Khan's hearing, which is us, were facing an imminent re-enrolment of their case. Our case was provisionally withdrawn on 12 November 2022.”
Colonel Francois Steyn joined the South African Police Service in 1987 and worked in various units including Vehicle Theft Unit, Vehicle Finance Fraud Unit, Organised Crime Unit and Serious Organised Crime Unit with increasing ranks, currently serving as Unit Commander in West Rand Serious Organised Crime Unit.
“I joined the South African Police Service in 1987... transferred to the Hillbrow Vehicle Theft Unit...promoted to captain ...Unit Commander of the Vehicle Finance Fraud Unit...Organised Crime Unit in Pretoria...promoted to Senior Superintendent ...Unit Commander of East Rand Organised Crime Unit... transferred to Priority Violent Crime Unit as Team Leader ... Provincial Coordinator for SANEB ... transferred to West Rand Serious Organised Crime Unit, where I was appointed Unit Commander, and currently still serving there.”
During 2022, the NPVC and SANEB teams were disbanded; Colonel Steyn remained as project manager for undercover investigation into a drug syndicate at the provincial office while continuing as Provincial Coordinator for SANEB and KFR investigations.
“During 2022, both NPVC and SANEB teams were disbanded... I remained stationed at the provincial office, where I continued with being the project manager of undercover investigation into a drug syndicate... I continued to perform duties as the Provincial Coordinator for SANEB and KFR...”
There was a shortage of correct vehicles for transport of narcotics exhibits for a long time, but the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) now has armoured vehicles which has improved the situation.
“For a long time, we did not have the correct vehicles... The DPCI has now obtained armoured vehicles, which will make that a lot easier”
Scania's risk manager requested that the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) be involved exclusively to avoid involvement of other law enforcement agencies with the container matter.
“he then requested that, because of the issue of the 9th of July, he then requested that, can the DPCI not get involved in this, to come to this yard of the transporter to actually deal with the matters so that there is no other law enforcement involvement into this container.”
There was a developed trust relationship between Scania's risk management and the DPCI, which led Scania to specifically request DPCI assistance regarding the container case.
“Scania was happy with the way that we dealt with the Booysens, the Aeroton case. And there was sort of a trust built between the Scania risk-management people and the DPCI. So hence the call from their side and assistance requested specifically from the DPCI.”
Through intervention by Brigadier Naicker, the cocaine was taken to the DPCI head office and then sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory in Pretoria the next morning.
“That Cocaine, through the intervention of Brigadier Naicker, he is at our DPCI head office, through his intervention, the Cocaine was the very next morning brought up to Forensic Science Laboratory here in Pretoria.”
The DPCI is not the only narcotics enforcement team in South Africa; Gauteng also has a Provincial Investigation Unit within SAPS Detectives that investigates narcotics cases, usually focusing on drug labs, but the DPCI is involved in major drug busts.
“There is, I cannot talk for other provinces, but Gauteng also has a Provincial Investigation Unit... part of SAPS Detectives, not DPCI Detectives and they also do indeed deal with narcotic cases... usually when there is major drug busts, the DPCI will in some way, for or fashion, also be involved in that investigation.”
For major drug consignments like heroin or cocaine that are not grown in South Africa, the matter typically becomes a DPCI responsibility due to international border trafficking.
“When you talk about a big consignment and specifically something like Heroin or Cocaine that is not grown in South Africa... it would be a DPCI matter.”
Colonel Steyn arrived at the scene around 1 o'clock on the same day of a meeting he was involved in, and found a large number of police officers and detectives present, including members of his team Brigadier Sekgobe (DPCI Serious Organised Crime Provincial Commander) and General Kadwa (DPCI Provincial Head).
“I arrived at the scene at about 1 o'clock on the same day. I found a large number of police officers on scene, uniformed and detectives. Also on scene were members of my team, Brigadier Sekgobe al. The Brigadier is the DPCI Serious Organised Crime Provincial Commander and, in essence, my direct commander. Also, there was General Kadwa, the DPCI Provincial Head.”
When it comes to large drug consignments believed to be transnational or trans-international trafficking of illicit narcotics, DPCI typically takes over investigations because of their larger footprint and national coordination including with foreign agencies.
“when it comes to this size of drug consignments, it is clearly a transnational or even trans-international trafficking of illicit narcotics that is taking place. So that is why the DPCI would typically take over such an investigation. Because we have a bigger footprint and as I indicated earlier, our national coordinator also deals with law enforcement agencies outside of our borders. So that is why it would typically be a DPCI matter, Commissioner.”
In 2024, after an IPID investigation into the matter, the IPID case was dismissed by the DPP with no charges against members including Colonel Steyn, but a departmental investigation into DPCI members was requested and conducted by Major General Gerber, which concluded members acted correctly and no departmental steps were taken.
“During the course of 2024, after an IPID investigation ... the IPID case was dismissed by the DPP ... But the IPID requested a departmental investigation ... Major General Gerber was appointed ... After his investigations ... no departmental steps will be taken”
Major General Gerber was the Provincial Head of the DPCI in Mpumalanga at the time and conducted the investigation, interviewing Colonel Steyn telephonically and obtaining a statement.
“Major General Gerber ... was the Provincial Head of the DPCI in Mpumalanga ... He did telephonically interview me and I tendered a statement”
Colonel Steyn overheard that the call regarding the missing evidence investigation was made by General John Matroos who heads that section in the DPCI, succeeding General Kadwa who is no longer in the police.
“I overheard the call that General Kadwa made ... it was General John Matroos who was heading up that section within the DPCI”
The number of evidence collected was 700 according to some statements, but the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) received 715; witnesses confirmed 715 indicating incomplete exploration and receipt of exhibits by members, considered a human error.
“The number of evidence collected, 10 statements indicate 700, whereas FSL received 715. Several witness statements also confirmed 715. The one brick of Cocaine recovered by LCR and handed over to DPCI, indicating members did not fully explore and receive all exhibits, a human error given the circumstances.”
Due to the premature arrests and lack of follow-up on alibis, the Booysen case was not successful and was removed from the roll following representations.
“The above will have serious implications on any future representations made by the DPCI to have the Booysen case placed back on the roll. So, the effect of it is no successful prosecution will come from this.”
The DPCI had multiple departments in each province during Lt-Col Prinsloo's time, including Serious Corruption Investigation, Serious Commercial Crime Investigation, Serious Organised Crime Investigation, and Priority Crime Specialised Investigation, each led by a Provincial Commander normally at the rank of Brigadier.
“The DPCI has different departments in each province. During my time there, it was the following departments. The biggest one was a Serious Corruption Investigation... There was a Serious Commercial Crime Investigation... And then the biggest one was a Serious Organised Crime Investigation... And Priority Crime Specialised Investigation... each of these departments' components are led by a Provincial Commander, normally at the rank of Brigadier.”
DPCI Port Shepstone office is a two-story building rented from Mr Kamisa, used for administration, operating during working hours, with controlled access and security-vetted staff.
“I have been stationed at the DPCI Port Shepstone office since 004, before the establishment of the DPCI. I was the most senior that had been at that building since we moved into it. The office is a two-story building with a ground floor and a first floor. The DPCI is renting the building from a Mr Kamisa. The DPCI office is not a police station, it is for administration and operates during working hours... Only DPCI members and staff are permitted in the offices and the access is controlled. During my tenure, we had approximately 4 members plus four administrative staff... Both members and staff are security vetted.”
The tracing team, composed of TRT and DPCI members and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dina Govender, arrived at the office around quarter past 4 with several vehicles including three Combi vans and a BMW sedan driven by Govender.
“Still on the day, quarter past 4, the members arrived at the office, several vehicles. They arrived at the same time as Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa... other members arrived in three Combis and a BMW sedan which was driven by Lieutenant Colonel Dina Govender. The tracing team is a team composed of TRT members and DPCI members... Members of the team included Lieutenant Colonel Dina Govender, who was their commander.”
Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa interacted with members of the TRT and DPCI as they arrived but did not give any instructions until after the exhibits were placed in the safe.
“Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa were together and interacted with the TRT and DPCI members as they arrived. They did not initially give any instructions to us until after the exhibits were put into the safe.”
There is no clear escalation mechanism within the SAPS or DPCI to address ongoing security concerns about the storage of seized drugs at different command levels and beyond.
“You still do not have security, and they are sitting there and you are raising the matter of security continuously... I would like to have more people watching this... Is there no mechanism where you can escalate it directly or copy, say, General Senona, but ultimately then General Lebeya? There is no such mechanism?”
Brigadier Nyuswa and Major General Senona were present, observing and had no objection to the handling and storage of exhibits, implying they had ultimate responsibility and authority to issue commands.
“Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa observed this. They had no objection. ... As a Provincial Commander of the DPCI, Provincial Head, they had the ultimate responsibility and authority to issue commands.”
Brigadier Naicker, SANEB coordinator under DPCI, told Lt Colonel Prinsloo about the cocaine stored at his office but did not provide a plan for the exhibits storage.
“‘On the 29th of July 2021, I met Brigadier Naicker at our office at Port Shepstone. As I said before, he is the SANEB coordinator. That is the South African Narcotics Enforcement Bureau and that falls under the DPCI. ‘He told me about the cocaine stored at our office. I did tell him that I was not comfortable with the exhibits being stored at the office as the security was not up to standard.’ ‘He did not tell me, so I do not think he knew what the plan was with it.’”
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo mentions a tracing team composed of TRT and DPCI members with Commander Dina Govender as commander, ordinarily dealing with cash-in-transit cases.
“You said in paragraph 0, you say that the team of people that came included the tracing team, which is composed of TRT members and DPCI members, and then their Commander is Dina Govender.”
The SAP 13 entry dated 22-06-2021 describes a DPCI inquiry number related to the investigation and refers to a package containing suspected cocaine.
“there is an entry 373 dated 22-06-2021... it is just reflecting 41, and then in brackets 541, multi one kilogram brick containing powder suspected to be Cocaine”
The enquiry DPCI enquiry 28/06/2021 is a registered enquiry at the DPCI and when an enquiry is registered, a file is created and investigations start immediately.
“the enquiry is registered at the DPCI by the DPCI ... investigations start, a file is created ... and then the enquiry is booked out to an investigating officer”
Colonel and Warrant Officer Mpangase from DPCI were contacted to assist in inspection of a container that allegedly had 27 kilograms of cocaine, which was later corrected to 27 bags, not kilograms.
“both Jacob and Mpangase, they were based at the DPCI in Durban: “We were contacted and informed of the intelligence that had been received. They were requested to assist with conducting the inspection of the container which allegedly had 27 kilograms of cocaine at the time. It was not 27 kilograms it later emerged that it was 27 bags and not 27 kilograms.”
The container, once opened, contained numerous canvas bags inspected by DPCI officers; 7 bags contained suspected bricks of cocaine wrapped in black and yellow plastic with TikTok and Jaguar logos, amounting to 541 bricks weighing 1kg each with street value between 200 and 250 million Rand.
“The bags were inspected by the DPCI officers and 7 bags containing what was suspected to be bricks of cocaine were uncovered. The bricks were wrapped in black and yellow plastic with TikTok and Jaguar logos on the packaging. There were 541 bricks of cocaine weighing 1 kilogramme each with a street value of between 200 and R 250 million.”
The DPCI has authority to have separate SAP 13 facilities and can lawfully remove exhibits from Isipingo SAPS to their warehouse at Port Shepstone.
“There are provisions in the National Instructions that the DPCI is having authority to have separate SAP 13 facilities... It is lawfully removed indeed”
Maj-Gen Flynn was promoted on 1 January 2019 to Brigadier and appointed as the Provincial Commander for Serious Organised Crime Investigation (SOCI) within the DPCI in the North West Province.
“On 1 January 2019, I was promoted to Brigadier and appointed as the Provincial Commander for Serious Organised Crime Investigation (SOCI) within the DPCI in the North West Province”
On 1 September 2024, Maj-Gen Flynn was appointed as Component Head for Serious Organised Crime Investigation within the DPCI nationally and currently reports to Lt-Gen Mbotho, the DPCI Divisional Commissioner.
“On 1 September 2024, I was appointed to my current position as Component Head for Serious Organised Crime Investigation within the DPCI nationally. I currently report to Lt-Gen Mbotho, who is the DPCI Divisional Commissioner”
Maj-Gen Flynn confirmed that he denied any involvement of his personnel in the operation at Mr Molefe's residence and was at the Excellence Awards of the DPCI on that date.
“I confirmed the enquiry that was made by General Mbotho. By then, on that specific date, we were at the Excellence Awards of the DPCI. I was approached by the General and he made enquiries with me, and I denied that any of my personnel are involved in any operation at Mr Molefe's residence”
Maj-Gen Flynn is aware of public incidents where people impersonated DPCI members to conduct raids at premises, indicating criminal impersonation activity targeting the DPCI.
“by that time there was a number of incidents where members of the public would impersonate them to be members of the DPCI and then take part in raids at premises etcetera, and indicate that they are DPCI members”
The DPCI has operational components including Serious Commercial Crime, Serious Corruption Investigations, Serious Organised Crime, Forensic Accounting Investigations, and Priority Crime Specialised Investigations. The latter provide operational support but do not carry dockets or execute arrests.
“The DPCI has the following operational components: Serious Commercial Crime, Serious Corruption Investigations, Serious Organised Crime. Also operational support components like Forensic Accounting Investigations and Priority Crime Specialised Investigations that provide support but do not carry dockets or execute arrests”
The Tactical Operations Management Section (TOMS) reports directly to the Divisional Commissioner and is headed by Brigadier Mokoena; it is not technically a component of the DPCI.
“We also have the Tactical Operations Management Section, known as TOMS, which is not technically a component. They report directly to the Divisional Commissioner, and they are headed by Brigadier Mokoena”
The then DPCI head, Lt-Gen Lebeya, decided to establish a team to investigate the Port Shepstone matter, placing Maj-Gen Khanaw in charge until his retirement in August 2024, after which Maj-Gen Flynn took over on 1 September 2024.
“Shortly thereafter, the decision was taken by the then DPCI head, Lt-Gen Lebeya, to establish a team to investigate the matter. And then the responsibility to oversee that investigation or the investigation by then was placed on Maj-Gen Khanaw, who was overseeing it from then until he went on retirement by the end of August 2024, and I took up office on the 1st of September 2024.”
The SOCI component includes investigating national priority violent crimes such as cash-in-transit robberies, trafficking in firearms or explosives transnationally and nationally by organised crime networks.
“According to the DPCI's mandate, the SOCI component includes ... national priority violent crimes such as cash-in-transit robberies and trafficking in firearms or explosives, both transnationally and nationally, by organised crime networks.”
The cocaine drugs were seized and taken to Maydon Wharf Police Station; Border Policing visited the company and placed a detention order on the container before the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) arrived.
“The drugs were seized and taken to the Maydon Wharf Police Station . Prior to the DPCI arriving at the depot , members from Border Policing visited the company and placed a detention order on the container .”
Border Policing received information about possible narcotics hidden in the container and arranged for a detention order to be placed on the container, showing timely action prior to DPCI arrival.
“In this specific case , they also received information about the possible narcotics that was hidden in that container , and that is why they arranged for that detention order to be placed on it .”
Super labs are large-scale drug manufacturing operations using specialised and imported equipment, typically located in remote areas like farms and small holdings to avoid detection. They manufacture significant quantities of drugs, which are then distributed through complex networks. In July 2024, a super lab in Groblersdal, Limpopo Province, manufacturing methamphetamine valued at about R2 billion was dismantled by the DPCI, with five suspects arrested.
“Super labs are large-scaled drug manufacturing operations using specialised equipment and producing drugs in significant quantities. They have extensive infrastructure with specially designed equipment, extraction fans, and reactor vessels. The special equipment is available in the country but is predominantly imported. Super labs are usually found in remote areas on farms and small holdings. These locations reduce the likelihood that activities such as unusual odours associated with manufacturing of large volumes of drugs, noise, or waste disposal will be observed. Once the drugs have been manufactured, they are distributed or disseminated into the market via complex networks. A manufacturer who has a super lab and thereafter distributes the drugs within their own network is referred to as an apex role player or syndicated leader. In July 2024, the DPCI detected and successfully dismantled a super lab on a farm in Groblersdal, Limpopo Province, where methamphetamine was being produced. Methamphetamine to the value of approximately R2-billion was seized and five suspects were arrested.”
MAJ-GEN FLYNNDay 101 · 05 May 2026Refers to: July 2024Location: Groblersdal, Limpopo Province
Combating clandestine synthetic drug labs is a focus area for the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) and SAPS, requiring a whole-of-government and community approach.
“it is a focus area not just of the DPCI, but of SAPS in general... a whole-of-government and a whole-of-community approach, wherever that can assist to dismantle clandestine laboratories”
Community members aware of drug supply under police protection should report the activities to higher levels within SAPS and DPCI for attention and investigation.
“if community members are aware of such, is to report that activities to higher levels within SAPS and the DPCI, and we will definitely give the necessary attention to it”
The DPCI is mandated to address clandestine drug laboratories (CDLs) manufacturing synthetic drugs and the import/export of drugs, relying mostly on intelligence from informants and international law enforcement.
“The DPCI is mandated to address both CDLs, where synthetic drugs are manufactured, and the importing and exporting of drugs. Most seizures depend on intelligence either from informants or international law enforcement agencies or when it is stumbled upon by port authorities”
An information note was prepared by Deputy National Head of the DPCI, Lieutenant General Mosikili, to the National Head of the DPCI, Lieutenant General Lebeya, appraising the latter on the feedback related to the burglary, housebreaking, and theft of 41 kilograms of cocaine from the Port Shepstone Serious Organized Crime Investigation Unit.
“this document is an information note that was prepared and submitted by the then Deputy National Head of the DPCI, Lieutenant General Mosikili, to the National Head of the DPCI, Lieutenant General Lebeya”
There is an implication of improper motives for sending the seized drugs to the DPCI facility in Port Shepstone instead of more suitable facilities.
“you seem to be implying, without saying it, that there were improper motives for sending these drugs to the DPCI facility in Port Shepstone, because you are suggesting that there were other more suitable facilities”
The cocaine was stored at the DPCI facility in Port Shepstone instead of other nearby locations like Maydon Wharf, Brighton Beach, Umbilo, or Durban Central, which was only 24 km away from Isipingo.
“the cocaine was taken to a DPCI storage in Port Shepstone. The cocaine was not stored at the Maydon Wharf, at Brighton Beach, at Umbilo, or at Durban Central, the furthest of which is Durban Central, is only 24 kilometres from Isipingo”
Samples, not entire consignments, were the focus of discussions and requests between DPCI and FSL, not the entire consignment transfer to Amanzimtoti.
“the request would have only spoken to the samples that was submitted ... there was never a request to Amanzimtoti for the entire consignment to be taken to Amanzimtoti?”
Mr Mnisi describes the letter purportedly from the DPCI as fake and fraudulent, lacking official communication protocols and proper tender details.
“first of all, the sort of fake and fraudulent letter that was sent by imposters, I am going to put it that way, imposters purporting to be from the DPCI. ... If you look at this document firstly, it does not even have a tender number. Nor does it have any official communication instruments to communicate with the purported investigation.”
Mr Mnisi states that Sergeant Nkosi is involved because he is a member of DPCI and should know the escalation process for such matters.
“He is a member of DPCI. He is a SAPS official. He should know the process of escalating these matters. From my perspective, this was a good deed. This was in good faith. I needed advice on how to deal with the situation moving forward.”
Warrant Officer Zungu was at the scene or on the way from the DPCI when he contacted Sergeant Nkosi.
“At that time, he was still in DPCI... Warrant Officer Zungu told me that, I cannot remember if they were already at the scene or still going to the scene”
There is concern that the General, who heads organized crime in the country, is fearful to mention certain names of people within organized crime and the DPCI/Hawks, which is concerning for the fight against organized crime.
“It is quite concerning that people who head organized crime should be so fearful of people who are alleged to be or are said to be within the organized crime”
The murder of Ms Babita Deokaran was connected to a 200 million tender at Tembisa and was under investigation by DPCI and IDAC at the time; Matlala's name was not known then.
“By that time it was indicated that the murder is about 200 million Tembisa tender and so forth, but I was not aware at that time that there was the name of Matlala.”
Lt-Gen Shibiri states he did not comment on the 2021 allegations at the time because he was at CIS and assisting DPCI with investigations.
“I was at CIS and a lot of things which were happening regarding that was at DPCI . Ours was to assist them with the investigation and giving people . So it might have slipped me not seeing that , but I saw it on 2024 .”