The City representative Major Phiri showed emails interpreting that Director Malatji gave instructions regarding ad hoc appointments, contrary to Director Malatji's stated position that he never gave such instructions.
“Director Malatji said he never gave any instruction to Major Phiri to do anything with regard to the ad hoc appointments. Major Phiri showed us emails which he interprets to mean that Director Malatji actually did give him instructions regarding ad hoc appointments.”
The focus of questioning is more on the instruction about emails Mr Phiri relies upon, rather than on the statements themselves.
“the focus ... is on the instruction ... more on the emails themselves, on which Mr Phiri relies in making the point that I was instructed by Director Malatji”
There is an allegation that Director Malatji did not do any scoring while he was on the BEC as it relates to the lack of scoring.
“all that he is going to be dealing with in that regard is what relates to the lack of scoring, if that is true, by Director Malatji when he sat on the BEC . So he sat there, but he did not do any scoring. That is the allegation.”
Director Malatji confirms he was provided with questions from the Commission and needed documents from his employer to support his statement.
“you were provided with questions that the Commission sought answers from, and also you had indicated that you needed some documents from your employer, correct ?”
Director Malatji confirms the statement attached to annexure TP1 is not his statement, but he has his own statement to confirm.
“On page 4 , it is not my statement . It is an Annexure TP 1 . I need a file with my statement so that I confirm . Okay , thank you very much . Correct , that is my statement .”
Director Malatji states in his statement he has attached emails marked Annexures ST1, ST2, ST3, and ST4 relating to executive discussions about outstanding invoices for Gubisa and other ad hoc security services.
“I have noted concerns from the Commission and wish to respond thereto as follows . Emails and communications detailing executive discussions regarding outstanding invoice for Gubisa and other ad hoc security services . Five , I have attached emails , marked Annexures ST1 , ST 2 , ST3 , and ST 4 , respectively .”
Revo Spies sent emails on 25 June 2025 regarding budget and fund transfer for watchman services amounting to R91 million, copied to Winnie Mahlangu and others.
“first one being from Revo Spies on Wednesday, the 25th of June 2025, at 14:07 to my PA, to myself, and he copied other colleagues, Mr Mahlangu”
Emails discuss a budget and fund transfer for watchman services involving a complaint lodged with the office of the CFO and executive meetings with senior city officials including the Chief of Police, COO, and CFO.
“a budget and fund transfer for Watchmen Services 91 million... based on these emails that at some point after a complaint was lodged with the office of the CFO, there were executive meetings arranged and held. These executive meetings included office of the Chief of Police, the COO, the CFO, and others...”
Senior officials discussed how to obtain money to pay outstanding invoices including R9.1 million for ad hoc watch services instructed by the Department of Water and Sanitation.
“these senior officials in the city met to find ways and means through which they could get money to pay for these invoices... including invoices for Gubis 85 in respect of services... result of instructions from the department in question... mainly discussing about budget and funds to enable the city to pay outstanding invoices to the tune of R9.1 million which I believe was also including ad hoc services which were instructed by the Department of Water and Sanitation.”
Director Malatji was not involved in the executive meetings regarding payment of invoices, and there appears to be an attempt by others to blame him for payments made to ad hoc service providers, although evidence shows he was not responsible for allocation or deployment of these services.
“I was not involved to participate... it looks like... everybody wants to pass the buck... to Director Malatji... through this process until today... people have created a narrative that Director Malatji is responsible for whatever amount of money that has been paid to these ad hoc service providers... but they knew before time... explanation and records show Director Malatji was not responsible or did not instruct allocation of those sites... deployment of those service providers... but they chose to come and testified the way they have testified...”
Requests for ad hoc watchman services were supported by the CFO and approved by the City Manager, implying procedural approval for deployment and payment of such services.
“I have annexed proof of requests by the Chief of Police, in respect of which requests, she was supported by the CFO, and the City Manager approved... if indeed these ad hoc services were irregular, why would they go as far as requesting money to pay for something that they know upfront is irregular?”
Director Malatji states he considers requesting and receiving irregular funds for ad hoc services, then blowing the whistle on irregular services rendered, as self-complicity in corruption.
“would not go as far as requesting money, getting money, making sure that this thing that I consider, I considered irregular gets paid. Only to come afterwards and say there were irregular services rendered, and as such, I am blowing a whistle. So, If eel there could be a reason other than the irregularity of this thing, something that I believe will come out as my testimony goes forward. But the long and short under this specific what it is called, is can I blow a whistle against my own self, come and present evidence that which, from the look of things, I am also complicit.”
Amounts for ad hoc services from January to June 2025 are around R14 million for January and approximately R82,632,210 for February to June, according to emails reviewed.
“that what they say, that is your boss, says the amounts of ad hoc services as follows, January to June 2025, the amount for January, I think that is one of the things we are going to go back to, is an amount of R14 million. Or 29. Would that be what you would recall to be what would be for January? And then for the following five month period, it is a total of R 82632210 for February to June.”
Director Malatji recalled that his office was not made aware when specific ad hoc services were procured until complaints were made about non-payment to Gubis 8 Solutions, which was escalated to the CFO's office.
“when these specific ad hoc services were procured, my office was not made aware until it reached a point where I am talking specifically to Gubis 8 Solutions, until it reached a point where they complained to the effect that they have been rendering these services and they were not paid. And fine, that was brought to the attention of the office of the CFO. It was brought to the attention of my office complaining”
Director Malatji confirmed providing a list of departments and services as a response to Commissioner Revo Spies in June 2025, indicating which departments requested services like Gubis 8 Solutions.
“in response to Revo Spies, I did provide a response, and my response was very short. But we even attached to my response a list to say, for example, Gubis 8 Solutions, the department that requested services was the Department of Water and Sanitation... I went further to say, for Klipgata ad hoc services, the department is Wastewater Treatment Plant. I believe it is also part of the Department of Water and Sanitation.”
Director Malatji testifies that ad hoc services in City of Tshwane have been managed subject to correspodence since 23 January 2023, and any ad hoc services undertaken outside this spirit would be outside official compliance and instructions.
“That ad hoc services in the City of Tshwane since the 23rd of January 2023 have been and are continuing to be managed subject to this correspondence as evidence. So, any ad hoc service that has been undertaken out of the spirit of this would not be - would not be - actually would be having been undertaken outside of what the city has instructed all departments within the city to comply with.”
Director Malatji denied involvement in managing the procurement of Gubis 8 adhoc services, stating he was unaware of them until complaints were made.
“Director Malatji and his office was not involved when those. Otherwise, I would have made it a point that at inception, the department in question complies with all these bullet points, right. I would have made sure that the department avails budget for which they are going to be servicing these adhoc services.”
Director Malatji stated that he could not cancel ad hoc services as the directive to cancel was given by Revo Spies and he was not delegated the powers to intervene or cancel non-compliant services.
“This explanation goes back to the issue of the instruction that was given to me by Revo Spies, cancel all ad hoc services... since this directive does not delegate me with powers, duties, and responsibility to intervene and address the issue of non-compliance by departments, there is no way I would have cancelled something that was not ordered or instructed by me.”
Director Malatji admitted that the deployments were done improperly and that he could not cancel them because it was not within his remit but rather was instructed by Revo Spies to cancel all ad hoc services indiscriminately.
“You say you could not cancel because the deployments were improper... I said it, Commissioner... he wanted to throw me under the bus... instruction was cancel all ad hoc services... I could not have cancelled because it was not instructed by me to deploy...”
Director Malatji maintained he did not have the power to cancel any ad hoc services himself, despite admitting some were done improperly, because the instruction to cancel all was from Revo Spies and not within his individual authority.
“No, in this respect I did not have the power to cancel... instruction was cancel all... I knew it was not all of them... I could not have cancelled because it was not instructed by me to deploy...”
Director Malatji signed disputed invoices from Gubis on February 26, 2025, around the time of a dispute concerning non-payment of these invoices.
“those invoices came to you and you stamped and signed them. And that was around the time when there was a dispute about non-payment of Gubis' 2024 invoices.”
Director Malatji testified he signed the invoices but did not sign them to close any query and was unaware that there was an issue with the invoices from Director Nwandule.
“if they came to me and I signed them ... I did not sign them because I was closing any query. I was not aware that there were these invoices that Director Nwandule has got an issue with.”
Director Malatji stated that every invoice submitted to his office is verified before further handling, including verification that sites allocated in the invoice belong to the company invoicing.
“Every invoice that gets submitted to my office, we verify. We verify and part of verification includes, we want to make sure that sites allocated, sites for which the invoice is talking to, are sites that are allocated to the company.”
Director Malatji explained that ad hoc service invoices normally do not come to him for signature if handled properly, and that the service providers consent and department consent precede his signature.
“all ad hoc services which have been handled properly ... normally those invoices would not even end up with me having to sign ... at the end of the day, the service provider consent would submit such invoices to the department consent, not me ... Gubis was instructed by Department of Water and Sanitation, while Mogalagadi and Triotic were instructed by the Office of the Chief of Police, Mr Bolhuis.”
Gubis invoices related to ad hoc services needed to be signed by Director Malatji because the executive instructed deployment and payment must come from the Watchman services vote, which falls under Malatji's responsibility.
“Gubis was instructed by the Department of Water and Sanitation ... such invoices were supposed to be signed by me ... by virtue of the executive having instructed the deployment thereof ... those invoices had to be paid from my vote, the Watchman Services.”
Payments for these services were made after executive decisions, supported by the Chief of Police, CFO, and City Manager, were taken to allocate funds into the Watchman vote account for such payments.
“already the executive ... the Chief of Police ... has requested for the 91 million, the CFO supported and the City Manager approved. So, the money got into my vote in order to ... the process.”
Director Malatji says he was not invited to participate in executive meetings despite having responsibility to ensure services are rendered.
“Somebody should have invited me to participate in these executive meetings. But let me not proceed with this. But I was never invited to participate. And at the end, whatever the executive decides upon, I accept, hence.”
Director Malatji did not respond immediately to Commissioner Spies' email regarding the cancellation of ad hoc services for procedural reasons and lack of legal authority.
“I did not immediately respond to email from Commissioner Spies. The reasons for my failure to respond immediately are stated in paragraph 8 below which are covered under response detailing a failure to immediately carry out instruction to cancel all ad hoc guards.”
Director Malatji reports to Commissioner Spies as his immediate superior as at 12 March 2025 despite Commissioner Spies lacking formal authority.
“On the 12th of March 2025, I was supposed to report to the Chief of Police. In terms of his presence, I reported to him, but... I reported to Spies, right, by virtue of him being there...”
Director Malatji fully explained to Commissioner Bolhuis the process on how ad hoc deployments work and informed him that Gubis Solutions ad hoc services were initiated by another department without complying with the SOP.
“I fully explained to Commissioner Bolhuis the process on how ad hoc deployments work... I further explained to Commissioner Bolhuis that Gubis Solutions, ad hoc services, were initiated by the Department of Water and Sanitation without complying and/or observing the SOP mentioned above.”
Director Malatji received a Notice of Suspension dated 26 June 2025 alleging misconduct including failure to declare directorships and financial interests to the municipality per the Municipal Systems Act.
“With reference to the Notice of Intention to Suspend you, dated the 26th of June 025, following allegations of misconduct, in that you failed to declare all directorships and financial interests to the municipality in terms of the Municipal Systems Act...”
Both Mr. Spies and Director Malatji share the same responsibility regarding the position of Deputy Chief of Police, Asset Protection and Security Services.
“both Mr Spies and myself are actually charged with one and the same responsibility”
Director Malatji attached documents addressing funding requests for the 2025 period and says these documents are evidence indicating who requested funds and for what purpose relating to a sum of R99.1 million.
“the documents that I have attached here are evidence ... who requested the R99.1 million ... in order to pay the invoices that have been and are continuing to be a subject of my testimony before the Commission”
Director Malatji states deployment letters are issued in respect of ad hoc services that comply with the SOP directive and any deployment outside this would have been done without his instruction.
“deployment letters are issued in respect of services, ad-hoc services ... any ad-hoc service ... would not have a deployment certificate signed by our office ... he did it out of his own, not with my instruction”
Director Malatji does not remember seeing signed deployment letters for January 2025 and denies having given authority to Mr Phiri to issue deployment letters.
“I do not remember seeing such signed deployment letters ... I was not giving him authority or delegating him responsibility to deploy any ad-hoc”
The overarching purpose of the email exchanges was ultimately to have a deployment of security at the Klapperkop water pump station which had been badly vandalised during the festive period.
“the overarching purpose of all these email exchanges was ultimately to have a deployment ... the Klapperkop water pump station has been badly vandalised during the festives”
Repeated email requests from Mr Herman Segolela and the Department of Water and Sanitation for urgent deployment of security due to ongoing vandalism at the Klapperkop Reservoir were communicated to Director Malatji.
“Good day. We have responded and forwarded all the information needed by Metro Police Department. We are still waiting for them to confirm deployment ... Today I just received the bad report that the Klapperkop water pump station has been badly vandalised during the festives ... Kindly urgently confirm when you may be able to deploy ...”
Director Malatji wrote an email to Senior Superintendent Madihlaba (Colonel) instructing him to get Phirito to handle the process and for progress to be monitored, relating to deployment.
“... you are writing to Kwapeng ... Senior Sup Madihlaba, Colonel... Good evening. Kindly find request from Mr Herman from the Department of Water and Sanitation for further handling ... Please get Phirito run with the process and let us monitor progress.”
Director Malatji stated that instructing Phirito to run with the process was about ordering him to attend the meeting, not a delegation to deploy security directly.
“My comment is starting with me ordering Mr Phirito attend the meeting.”
Director Malatji denied that by instructing to run with the process, he intended that ongoing deployment of security should continue automatically without necessary conditions being met.
“It is not true that by instructing them to run with the process, I was meaning that they should continue deploying security ...”
Director Malatji described the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) requires critical information such as budget issues to be addressed before deployment decisions can be taken.
“The SOP requires it of us to make sure that there is a critical element of, for how long are we requesting the ad hoc services, right? So it was imperative ... to have those things before a decision could be taken to deploy security.”
Chairperson accused Director Malatji of effectively just waiting for others to come back and tell him what happened instead of proactively ensuring deployment despite repeated urgent requests.
“Because from your answer, you seem to suggest that you just sat and waited for them to come back to you and tell you what happened eventually. If that is what you did... we may be inclined to interpret this email in the same way as Major Phiri.”
Director Malatji admitted issuing an instruction to run with the process meaning to do due diligence, but said no further communication or follow up was made as they did not come back to him.
“I have issued an instruction. They must run with the process. Running with the process, meaning to do due diligence. They did not come back to me.”
Director Malatji issued instructions to subordinates who had a duty to report progress back to him regarding the deployment process.
“I issued my subordinates with an instruction. They had a duty to come back to me and say this is how far we have gone, so that I could evaluate, right, whatever they say they have done.”
Director Malatji authorized deployment of security guards to Klapperkop and Brickfields Pump Stations effective 7 January 2025 after vandalism occurred.
“You give an instruction that the service provider will resume deployment of security guards today, 7 January 2025 at 8:00 hours ... So you did authorise those deployments.”
ADV KHUMALO SCDay 99 · 30 Apr 2026Refers to: 2025-01-07Location: Klapperkop Water Station, Brickfields Pump Station
Director Malatji responded that he was not aware of an email referencing deployment instructions at the time and that his evidence may change when exposed to documents.
“I respond not being aware of the email on page 60... But in this instance, I am exposed to the evidence... due diligence to a very large extent was done... hence, I issued an instruction to say deploy ...”
Director Malatji says it is unfair to expect him to respond to questions about emails he has signed without being exposed to the evidence first, asserting he feels ambushed if questioned on matters he is merely seeing through signed emails.
“But the bottom line is, I should be exposed to the evidence. And yes, as we move on, you allow me an opportunity to explain where it is necessary to explain. But under the circumstances, I feel like I am being ambushed.”
It is the job of Director Malatji to approve invoices related to deployments such as the Gubis deployments, and he signed invoices in June 2024 indicating his awareness of the payments and deployment details.
“As we have shown you with the June 2024 invoice, it came to you, you stamped it, you signed it.”
Invoices related to the Gubis deployment site payments, totaling R82 million over five months, were paid and related exactly to the topic under discussion, indicating Director Malatji's involvement in the process.
“They show that over five months it was paid R82 million. They relate exactly to the topic we are discussing.”
Director Malatji admits he agreed to instruct Mr Phiri to run with the process regarding the handling of further deployment requests despite concerns about additional sites added without proper GL account numbers.
“I agree. Yes, I did instruct Phiri on the 7th of January.”
Director Malatji says Herman Segolela took advantage of an email dated 7 January to put additional sites onto the deployment list without proper GL account numbers, which was wrong and against the correct process.
“Mr Segolela has taken advantage of my email dated the 7th of January... He was supposed to do as he did with Klapperkop and others.”
Director Malatji copied Andrew and Calvin into an email because they were already instructed to deploy to the sites; he assumed deployment authority had been given to them, although he was unsure if this was confirmed with Madihlaba or Phiri regarding the service provider.
“The reason I copied Andrew and Calvin... is simple that they were, in my view, already having instruction to deploy.”
Brickfields' security requests for Klapperkop site included an email by Segolela requesting security and a GL account for payment, aligning with the spirit of the SOP.
“the email by Segolela requesting security on this, and also providing GL account from which these services would be paid from, I would say yes to the question. It was in line with the spirit of the SOP”
Director Malatji used his personal Gmail account to send instructions related to deployment because it was late in the afternoon and the Gmail account was handy for office tasks.
“Simply because it was late in the afternoon, right? I normally rely on my Gmail account, which is handy for anything that I need to do with my office.”
Director Malatji authorized the deployment of security services at two sites on 7 January 2025 before a purchase order was created, contrary to the standard operating procedure.
“I authorised the deployment before there was a purchase order created”
Director Malatji justified deployment before purchase order due to emergency nature of security requiring urgent action, with funds requested and GL account provided afterwards.
“in security we are dealing with emergency... I want the Commissioner to take note of the fact that ... payment came from Watchmen Services as a result of funds that were requested”
Director Malatji stated the understanding was that all would be done by Water and Sanitation, including purchase order creation, but he had to act to protect sites due to urgency and potential vandalism.
“my understanding was everything would be done by Water and Sanitation... my focus was to make sure ... to prevent further vandalisms... given the nature of the signs, the pump station ... when you are dealing with security threats ... priority is given”
Director Malatji delayed compliance with SOP due to waiting on the requesting department (Water and Sanitation), but emphasized the urgency of protecting sites from vandalism.
“any amount of delay ... as a result of the requesting department taking its time would obviously have negative impact ... given the urgency of these matters”
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) requires steps from request to deployment authorization, but Director Malatji claimed the instruction to cancel ad hoc deployments was issued without observing the SOP.
“the SOP is about steps that must be followed from the time a request is made up to the time a deployment is authorised... instruction to cancel ad hoc deployments was issued without observing the SOP”
Director Malatji argued that canceling ad hoc deployments does not have to follow SOP steps that govern authorization of deployment because the SOP applies to authorizing deployment, not cancellation.
“what has that got to do with the cancellation of the ad hoc deployments?... I do not get the logic ... That is my difficulty”
Director Malatji suggested instruction to cancel ad hoc deployments was supposed to be directed to Water and Sanitation rather than himself as the administrator.
“this instruction was supposed to be directed to Water and Sanitation, instead of me”
The SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) is a directive to all the departments and is intended to be followed by them, but one department did not comply with this directive from the City Manager, and the superior directed the instruction to Director Malatji instead of the default process.
“this one department does not comply, right, and my superior takes notice of that. I am saying logically, logically, he should have directed this instruction back to the department because the department is guilty of not complying with a directive by the City Manager, but instead he directed the instruction to me”
Director Malatji acknowledges that the SOP was not observed in an actual deployment, leading to irregular deployment and subsequent inquiry before the Commission.
“it became relevant, Commissioner, because of the actual deployment that we carried out without observing or taking this SOP into consideration... because of irregular deployment.”
Director Malatji expected his superior, upon realizing the irregular deployments, to instruct cancellation but instead was instructed by his superior (City Manager) to not cancel the deployment.
“I would have expected of him to say, City Manager, here is a department which chose to do things out of the normal way... But instead, my superior instructs me to cancel...”
Director Malatji disagrees with the reasoning for not cancelling deployment based on non-compliance with the SOP, saying that not following the SOP should have actually led to cancellation instead of being used as a reason for refusal to cancel.
“to have this as a ground or basis for not cancelling, it does not make sense because not following the SOP steps should actually have been a reason to cancel... you should not have included this at all.”
Advocate Baloyi asserts that the instruction to execute the request was made by Director Malatji's department, specifically regarding appointments connected to Water and Sanitation Department projects such as Klapperkop and Brickfield.
“the instruction was not directed to the initiator of the adhoc services, and this is Water and Sanitation Department... But you made the appointment. Your department made that appointment... Klapperkop and Brickfield... the balance of them, you had given Phiri instruction to run with this...”
Director Malatji admits the appointment letter is official but suggests it might not result from a prescribed process.
“I want to establish was this appointment letter is it as a result of a prescribed process having been... Your message at page 60, your email, it did not follow the process. Okay.”
Director Malatji admits he did not inform Deputy Commissioner Spies he was the wrong person to receive certain instructions that should have gone to Water and Sanitation.
“Did you inform Deputy Commissioner Spies that you are the wrong person, he should send it to Water and Sanitation? Commissioner, I did not inform Commissioner Spies.”
Director Malatji became aware after the decision not to follow an instruction from the Chief of Police to stop adhoc services due to budget and money issues.
“Did you become aware that in fact there was an instruction from the Chief of Police that these services must stop... after the communication? Yes.”
Other authorities including Chief of Police, Mr Bolhuis and Deputy Commissioner Spies, are seen as washing their hands of responsibility, leaving Director Malatji to face the burden of 82 million rand liability alone, despite their authority to issue cancellation instructions.
“Their responsibility was to give an instruction... They even had more power than Director Malatji... They want to paint Director Malatji black as if he had a benefit to derive from these transactions... They are washing their hands...”
ADV Baloyi alleges malicious attempts by colleagues to get rid of Director Malatji who has testified about being a victim.
“I made mention of the fact that I have become a victim... colleagues that I have spoken to... demonstrated that they would stop at nothing to get rid of this Director Malatji.”
Since the day Director Malatji was instructed to terminate ad hoc security services, those services continued until June, costing the City more than R50,000,000.
“since the day you were instructed to terminate these ad hoc services, they continued until June and the cost to the City was more than R 50000000”
Director Malatji admits some payments for ad hoc services may have occurred without verification and possibly without the services or work being done due to staff shortages.
“Yes, Commissioner, I did, and I gave those reasons”
Director Malatji received a request from Commissioner Spies to provide proof of ad hoc services deployment since December 2024 to date, mostly related to ad hoc Watchman Services.
“My question was around responding to Commissioner Spies' request or instruction that you must provide proof of the deployment of ad hoc services since December 2022, 2025 to date ... the emails says please provide proof where ad hoc Watchman Services were deployed ... since December 2024 to date”
Director Malatji stated that although the requested ad hoc services proof was not part of his bundled documents, he believes proof was provided and can retrieve it for the Commission.
“The fact that it is not part of my bundled does not necessarily mean we did not provide that proof. And we can, I can always go back and have that, the kind of proof that we provided to him available for the Commission too”
Director Malatji terminated ad hoc services in compliance with Commissioner Spies' instruction in June by drafting termination letters, calling companies, and serving letters with acknowledgements of receipt.
“You deal with the instruction from Commissioner Spies and you say... in June, you complied with the instruction. You drafted letters for termination and you personally called the companies and served them with letters ... I convened a meeting with the three companies. I handed them over the original letters and I kept a knowledge receipt letter”
Termination letters referenced (marked ST6) were prepared by Director Malatji but signed by Deputy Chief Commissioner Spies.
“That letter is done by Commissioner Spies. Could you explain why would you say this is your letter? And he testified that it is his letter. Chairperson: Does he not say that he prepared the letters for signature by Deputy Chief Spies? That should explain the signature? Director Malatji: Exactly... I prepared letters. I took them to him to sign, right? He signed.”
Director Malatji attended all Bid Evaluation Committee (BEC) meetings until the 28th of May 2025 but did not attend after that due to personal reasons, and was suspended later.
“I attended, I would say, all the meetings until meeting of the 28th ... just after I arrived in the meeting, something personal cropped up and I excused myself ... since then, I did not attend any of the meetings that followed up. I did not attend any of the BEC meetings until I was caught up in a situation where I got suspended. And from that day, I do not know what has happened with the tender to date.”
Director Malatji was not aware of a BEC meeting on 29 May 2025 and does not remember becoming aware of it later, and thus did not participate in tender recommendations after 28 May 2025.
“I was not aware of that meeting ... I do not remember becoming aware of it ... and I presume that in the recommendations, you would not be aware of, you would not have participated in those recommendations to the BAC? Correct.”
Findings in a probity report noted that the BEC did not receive a score sheet from Director Malatji in the evaluation meetings, and he confirmed he did not participate in scoring or evaluation.
“... it talks about the BEC's cautions on the 29th of May ... you did not attend that meeting and you are not aware of what has transpired since then ... finding that they did not receive a score sheet from yourself in the evaluation meetings ... You are correct ... So you did not participate at all in the evaluation or scoring? Exactly.”
The minutes signed for the 28 May 2025 BEC meeting recommended TMPD-3 tender, but there are no minutes for a meeting on 29 May 2025, indicating scoring likely happened on 28 May when Director Malatji was present.
“The signed minutes for the 28th of May 025, where the committee was recommending the tender TMPD-3 for the appointment of a service provider were provided to us ... So the issue here is there is no minutes of the 29th. And since the recommendation was made on the 28th, it seems likely that the scoring happened on the 28th and not the 29th. And on the 28th, you say you were there at the meeting.”
Director Malatji left the BEC meeting on 28 May 2025 for a personal issue before the scoring and recommendation business started, and did not participate in scoring or recommendation.
“But before the BEC could start with its business of the day, there was something personal and then I ... You left ... So you did not participate in the scoring or the recommendation. Exactly.”
Deputy Chief Dhlamini accepts responsibility lapses in the section concerned, with Director Malatji being responsible for oversight of invoicing processes, but no one was held accountable for the delayed payments.
“I take the section concern, I think Director Malatji because he was overseeing these services... No one was held accountable”
There is a prescribed internal procedure to first approach Director Malatji for issues related to payment, before escalating to the Director of Finance or to Deputy Chief Dhlamini and the Chief.
“the correct procedure is to go to Director Malatji”
The unpaid invoice dispute should have started with Director Malatji as per internal process, but parties insisted on going to the CFO who had already been involved.
“let them then go and see the CFO as they have started”
Deputy Chief Dhlamini explained that the outstanding invoice related to the 23-24 financial year and was never accrued at the end of that financial year, requiring a post-factor report generated by the section APSS.
“I explained to them since this invoice relates to the 23-24 financial year, it was never accrued accordingly at the end of financial year. There should be a post-factor report which must be generated by the section. ... That is Director Malatji's section.”
Deputy Chief Dhlamini told the representatives that the payment process must go through APSS and Director Malatji who will take them through finance for processing and payment, but he refused to be on board to work directly with them.
“I told them the process that they should work through the APSS. Director Malatji, he will take them through to finance for processing and payment. But they prefer to say I should be on board, I meant to work with them and I refused.”
Deputy Chief Dhlamini stated that if payment has not been authorized by his department, it is either Director Malatji has not sent an invoice or the work has not been done.
“If your department has not authorised payment, one of two things has happened. Either Director Malatji has not sent you an invoice. Or Director Malatji has said to you this work was not done.”
Advocate Chaskalson stated it does not make sense to communicate with the CFO for the single outstanding old invoice once the process is followed and if Director Malatji makes the appropriate motivation, there is no need to go to the CFO for payment.
“Telling them to use the CFO as a gateway for the one single outstanding old invoice does not make sense... If Director Malatji makes the appropriate motivation, they will be paid. There is no need to go to the CFO.”
Major Phiri was responsible for overall coordination and command as security coordinator for municipal departments experiencing security vulnerabilities.
“It is just a document to show why Director Malatji will know that I am in overall coordination and command. It is me.”
Major Phiri stated he could not authorize deployments without conducting physical site inspections first.
“I reiterated to Director Malatji that I could not authorise deployments without conducting physical site inspections... I am doing physical site inspections now.”
Major Phiri issued deployment notices effective 15 January 2025 but acknowledges guards were deployed on site from 7 January 2025, without backdating the deployment letter to fit the actual deployment dates.
“you issued your notice on the 14th and it becomes effective on the 15th , regardless of the fact that these have already deployed on the 7th of January.”
Major Phiri denies allegations of favouring Gubis 85 Solutions or receiving incentives for channelling work to them, stating he executed his duty as instructed without improper motives.
“I have been made aware of inferences suggesting that I may have favoured Gubis 85 Solutions or received incentives for channelling work to them . I categorically deny this allegation .”
MAJOR PHIRI referred to a document identified as LA02 related to his authority and instruction for deployment, which was incomplete when he accessed it.
“The document was on page 3 of my annexures...which I could not extract from my laptop might have led to Director Malatji giving me the authority and the instruction. It is LA02”
Major Phiri states security deployment stopped because the service provider was terminated and any security issues thereafter should be dealt with by the department adjusting evidence to reflect that termination.
“I say, no, but we terminated, Director Malatji will tell you. It is now the department that must adjust evidence to say, you are terminating the security. The problem is, we are sitting with this problem. Immediately after terminating, we do not do any other assessment after that...”
Director Malatji knew Major Phiri had authority to run the process and monitor progress regarding security deployment.
“Director Malatji says, please get Phiri to run with the process and let us monitor the progress... I am indicating that he knew that I have authority.”
Director Malatji testified he did not delegate powers of allocation to anyone, including Major Phiri, for guarding sites by service providers rendering services under TMPD0226 and 2017 between December 2024 and June 2025.
“I have not delegated powers of allocation to anyone in respect of the sites to be guarded by the service providers rendering services under TMPD0226 and 2017... he did not approve or mandate the allocation of security to Gubis in the period between December 2024 and June 2025.”
Major Phiri states he had to prove to the Commissioners that he had authority from Director Malatji, who instructed him, and that water and sanitation have their own people to work, and he is not responsible for their questions.
“I had to prove Commissioners that I had authority from Director Malatji. I got an instruction from Director Malatji. Water and sanitation got their own people to work. I am not responsible for - I am answering those questions.”
Director Malatji was involved in all meetings and resolutions of the BEC regarding the same tender, attending meetings and being part of the resolutions taken for TMPT 2 from 2016-2017.
“I was involved in all the meetings and resolutions of the BEC in respect of the same tender”
Director Malatji saw for the first time a report or memorandum sent by Thembeka Mphefu about what transpired in the evaluation of tender 2 for 2016-2017.
“No, I am seeing it for the first time, Commissioner”
Director Malatji assisted Deputy Chief Mahlaulo with tender specifications for TMPD 2 2016-2017 and submitted them for review and forwarding to Supply Chain Management Department.
“I assisted as requested and submitted the tender specification to him for reviewing, consideration, inputs and further handling...The tender specification documents were then forwarded to Supply Chain Management Department for further handling.”
Director Malatji was appointed by the City Manager to serve in the bid evaluation committee to evaluate the TMPD 2 tender along with other members from different city departments.
“I was thereafter appointed by the City Manager to serve in the bid evaluation committee together with other members from different relevant departments of the city. The tender was evaluated accordingly by the BEC members, including myself.”
Director Malatji has a line of command in his Asset Protection Services including Reginald Mahlangu (Beauty Director), Dr Elvis Madihlaba, and Inspector Phiri who reports to Senior Superintendent Madihlaba.
“I have got the Beauty Director Mahlangu, Reginald Mahlangu, who reports directly to me. I have got Dr Elvis Madihlaba, who is reporting to Reginald Mahlangu in terms of our operational structure. And I have got senior security officers... particularly Inspector Phiri, who are reporting to Senior Superintendent Mahlaba.”
Inspector Phiri was promoted in 2026 to the rank of Major and reports to Reginald Mahlangu, the current Acting Director for 10 months where Director Malatji is absent.
“They have been promoted not long. He is also at the level of colonel, who is also reporting to Reginald Mahlangu, who is the Acting Director at the moment, since I am not in the office for the past 10 months or so... I am told he has been given the position of a major... It was this year, according to the information I heard, 2026.”
Director Malatji was involved in preparing the bid specification and considers it "his bid", but he did not participate in the Bid Adjudication Committee (BEC) process where the report is taken after submission to supply chain management.
“it is basically your tender. The very fact that you are asked right at the start to prepare the bid specification, it is your bid.”
Director Malatji heard informally about the bid being challenged but had no formal engagement or information that the bid was taken to court.
“I heard it like any member of the public that this bid was being challenged ... I just wanted to emphasise that there were no formal engagement and information that this bid has been taken to court in this instance.”
Advocate Baloyi pointed out that since Director Malatji was appointed by Deputy Commissioner Mahlaule to represent the APSS department in the tender, Malatji is the client with a direct interest and responsibility for the tender, and it is difficult to accept he does not know why the tender runs into problems.
“this is a tender for his department, APSS, and he appoints you to be the representative, to be the person that deals with it, but you are the client ... it runs into problems ... you do not know anything about it ... You are the one that is responsible for this service. You are the one with a direct interest to get this tender finalised.”
Advocate Baloyi rejected Director Malatji's explanation about only hearing like any member of the public and not making inquiries, emphasizing it is difficult to accept his ignorance given his role as client representative.
“I find it very difficult to accept that your remained ignorant of the issues that are delaying your tender ... You must have known, you must have asked the questions ... There is no way you did not ask that question.”
Director Malatji explained that within the department there are different stages of involvement, and at a certain stage he is not involved irrespective of whether the issue affects him; he relies on superiors to inform him of issues pertaining to the bid.
“At a certain stage, I do not get involved, irrespective of whether the issue they are discussing at top management ... such a thing never took place, hence I was never informed.”
Director Malatji was never formally informed or engaged about issues behind the litigation of the tender; he only heard rumors but no official information was given to him by top management.
“the reasons behind why this tender was litigated, it was never brought to my attention. I heard in the corridors ... but from the top management ... such a thing never happened.”
Director Malatji was the contact person and face of the tender bid and was in the evaluation committee, but admitted between May 2017 and 2019 he was taken out of the space and may have missed reasons communicated for the tender delays.
“Between May 2017 to 2019, I was not in that space. They took me out of that space, right. And I must mention that there might have been communication to the effect that the tender is not moving, these are the reasons and the like. But now, since I was taken out of the position for almost two years, I might have missed. I am not sure, Commissioner.”
Tender Evaluation Committee (BEC) member Director Malatji suggests that tender documents were received and kept in a room, but acknowledges allegations that documents were removed and some went missing before the process was complete.
“From the evidence we have heard, tender documents were received, they were in a room, there are allegations that documents were removed, some documents were missing at some point”
Director Malatji admitted he became aware tender documents were taken out of premises to a college for safekeeping but denies knowing any documents went missing during the evaluation process.
“I never became aware of documents that went missing. Hence, the documents were taken out of the premises, down to the college, and when the actual process of evaluation started, each document was gone through, and I am not aware of any missing documents”
Director Malatji denies knowing about the complaint or allegation that documents were removed and missing, which led to a court order that the tender must proceed and not be cancelled.
“You say you never became aware of that... tender went to court because there had been a complaint or an allegation that documents were removed and some documents were missing, and the Court Ordered that that is the basis to cancel the tender.It must proceed to evaluation.You say you never became aware of that”
Director Malatji admits he was the nominated contact person for the tender and clarifies he is the director responsible for the relevant function but not in supply chain management.
“I was the contact person... I am not in Supply Chain Management. I am the director responsible for the function”
Director Malatji was intimately involved throughout the tender process including development of specifications, being a member of the Bid Evaluation Committee (BEC), evaluating bids, preparing reports for bid adjudication, yet claims ignorance of litigation related to missing documents.
“my involvement ... started when I developed the tender document ... I am a member of the BEC ... you do the evaluation ... prepare a report ... tender went to court ... litigation ... I find it very strange ... you are intimately involved from the beginning, through all stages, but just before evaluation... you turn your back and forget the whole thing ... you have no idea what happened”
Director Malatji became aware that Triotic Protection Services is linked to Mr Eugene Modise only as the inquiry progressed, not at the time of evaluation.
“At that time, I was not aware. I became aware after - I became aware as we went on, you know, as we went along, that it is linked to Mr Eugene Modise, right.”
Director Malatji is not certain about the exact directorship documents for Triotic Protection Services at the time of tender evaluation due to passage of time.
“Since this has happened some years back, I would not with certainty say the documents, more especially CIPR documents that were submitted, right, indicated whether he was the sole director or there was somebody else, right. I would not with certainty say that”
Director Malatji stated that the entities recommended under TMPD 2, 2016-2017 have continued rendering services since their appointment by the court order on 22 October 2021.
“The said entities were again appointed under TMPD 2 , 2016-2017 . They have rendered services since their appointment by the court on the 22nd of October 2021 . They are currently rendering the same security services to the municipality .”
Director Malatji was involved in the bid specification process for TMPD 2, 2016-2017, assisting the department as requested by then Deputy Chief Rex Mahlaule and served as a BEC member.
“I was involved in the bid specification in respect of TMPD 2 , 2016-2017 . I assisted the department as requested by the then Deputy Chief Rex Mahlaule , and I was later appointed as a member of the BEC .”
Director Malatji was responsible for the protection of council properties since his appointment in 2013, despite other functions being taken away from him since 2017.
“I have remained consistently responsible for that function”
Director Malatji oversees a team within Asset Protection Services that monitors private guards and in-house security services protecting council assets and reports regularly on their performance.
“I have got a team within the asset protection services, which team's job is to monitor performance of both private guards and in-house security services... They make sure that security guards are in place, security measures that are put in place on specific sites are working... they report back”
Since 2018 the city has been unable to protect all its assets due to financial capacity constraints, leading to coverage of only about half the assets under private security guards and some under in-house security.
“since 2018 to date, the city has not been able to protect all its assets ... out of more than 1000 assets ... we were covering almost 545 sites... financial capacity ... the budget has not been able to enable us to cover every asset...”
DIRECTOR MALATJIDay 87 · 09 Apr 2026Refers to: 2018 to 2026Location: City of Tshwane
Since about three years ago, the city opted to insource security officers, but the number remains insufficient to cover all required sites for asset protection.
“the city went on and decided to in source security officers, and yes, the number is not enough to enable us to cover all the sites that the city needs to be covered”
DIRECTOR MALATJIDay 87 · 09 Apr 2026Refers to: circa 2023Location: City of Tshwane
Of about 545 guarded sites, most are guarded by private security guards, while a smaller portion are guarded by in-house security.
“out of 545 ... we are utilising private security guards to guard them, and there is some ... that have been guarded by in-house ... 547 are guarded by private guards and 127 are guarded by in-house”
Director Malatji had no formal input into a handover report compiled when the asset unit was moved back to TMPD, as he was not invited by his supervisor Mr Nava Pillay.
“I was not invited by my supervisor there ... I do not remember having a meeting in order to compile or make inputs into the handing over”
The executive decided to move the asset unit back to TMPD and gave a date on which the unit was recalled without further consultation with Director Malatji.
“a decision has been taken by the executive ... the date the unit would be going back to TMPD and that was it”
Contrary to a report claim, Director Malatji states that security service providers are monitored continuously, with monitoring teams on the ground 24/7 of deployment at about 545 sites.
“security service providers were ... continuing to be monitored ... monitoring teams are on the ground monitoring 24-7 deployment of security service providers ... 545 sites”
Due to shortage of personnel, it is not practical to cover every site daily with monitoring, but monitoring is ensured for effective security.
“in practical terms it would always not be easy to cover every site daily ... given the shortage of personnel ... we have been doing what we could to ensure basically the monitoring is in place”
Director Malatji accepts that monitoring was not done twice a month as required by the SLA due to lack of personnel and capacity constraints.
“I would not, I would not with certainty say I dispute what I disagree with what the paragraph is saying, more especially when they are talking twice a month... personnel capacity is always the issue... possibility is that yes, somewhere we are not able to reach the target.”
Director Malatji confirms inspection reports are used for site monitoring and are reviewed at the office to ensure monitoring is conducted.
“which inspection reports are completed on site, they are brought to the office, right, and we go in through them, we check, right, and make sure that indeed this monitoring team is doing its work.”
Director Malatji accepts that because of capacity constraints, verification of service provider invoices is based on the invoice claims and not always on site monitoring.
“probably that some invoices were paid even though services were not rendered as reflected in that invoice because you would not know if monitoring does not happen as regularly or as agreed, then you dependent entirely on the service provider to say in their invoice we did deploy our people... I accept that.”
Director Malatji states he was not involved in outsourcing or previous contracts for provision of security services prior to the TMBD 2016-2017 tender.
All municipal departments require security services from asset protection services, including various properties and personnel, involving clinics, cemeteries, water reservoirs, pump stations, electric substations, markets, regional offices, emergency services, executive mayor, mayoral committee members, and any official whose life is in danger.
“The properties, assets, and personnel which require protection are from all the departments, including TMPD. The said properties and personnel include clinics, cemeteries, water reservoirs, pump stations, electric substations, storage facilities, markets, regional offices, emergency services, executive mayor, mayoral committee members, and any official whose life is in danger, the list is exhaustive.”
Director Malatji is responsible as director for protection services to ensure protection of council premises and personnel, monitor internal and external guards.
“My role as the director responsible for protection services is to ensure that protection of council premises and personnel is executed, to monitor internal guards, to monitor external guards,”
There were interactions between the office of Director Malatji and the Gubis, including the Department of Water and Sanitation regarding ad hoc security services from January to March.
“Thereafter, from January, February, March, there were interactions between my office and Gubis, including the Department of Water and Sanitation around these ad hoc services.”
There was a city-wide communication that any request for ad hoc services must be directed to Director Malatji's office for due diligence.
“There is communication City wide, which communications say when there is a request for ad hoc services to be deployed, such a request should be directed to my office so that I can make sure due diligence is done.”
Requests for ad hoc services involve an email from the requesting department to Director Malatji's office, which acknowledges receipt and follows up for payment vote number details and budgeting.
“The requesting department would send me an email, for example, requesting ad hoc services. I would acknowledge receipt of this email and go back to them to say, colleagues, from which vote number are you going to pay this? They would then come back to me, provide me with the vote number, GL account number, from which they would be paying for these services.”
Director Malatji's office then instructs operational teams, including Dr Madihlaba's office, to conduct security risk assessments of sites requiring ad hoc security services before deployment.
“I would then instruct the office of Dr Madihlaba, right, to go and conduct security risk assessment on the site and or sites to which security, ad hoc security services are required. They would go, they would come back, then I would then say, we need to allocate the company that is going to be able to execute and or perform these functions and we take it from there.”
Once quotations from the security service company are obtained and approved by the requesting department, deployment proceeds and ongoing site management is handled by operational teams under Dr Madihlaba.
“Once we have agreed, we then get the quotation from the company in question and we send it to the requesting department for them to approve. When they have approved, then we deploy. Once we have deployed, it become now the responsibility of my office through operational management team under Dr Madihlaba to ensure that they are treating those sites like any other site where on we have deployed security officers.”
In this case, the prescribed procedure for ad hoc service deployment was not followed, resulting in delayed awareness and communication issues about outstanding invoices.
“Unfortunately, Commissioner, in this case, this procedure was not followed, hence, my statement to say, I knew after a very long time and part of the communication with them was, send me through details of these invoices and all of that, just for me to be able to know which sites, how many guards were involved and all of that.”
Discussions and communications about outstanding invoices occurred at the executive management level, but Director Malatji was not involved or informed.
“...along the way, discussion about these outstanding invoices was between my office and them and I became aware that at the executive management, there were discussions, there were meetings, there were emails exchanged, systems. But, at that level, I never participate, I was never informed of, come on board.”
Initial requests for explanation about the invoice issue started with Deputy Chief of Police Commissioner Bolhuis and then Commissioner Spies, who requested explanation from Director Malatji.
“It started initially with Commissioner, Deputy Chief of Police, Commissioner Bolhuis. And, after Commissioner Spies was appointed, he also requested me for an explanation. The same explanation that I am giving to the Commissioner, I gave it to him.”
Director Malatji received emails indicating high-level discussion about outstanding invoices, but he was not invited to participate and he cannot currently access these emails as he no longer has access to his office.
“And, as I was … would receive emails as part of people who are cc'd on those emails, hence, I could see that there was discussion, high level discussion, about these outstanding invoices. There were proposals and or options suggested at that level where I was not invited to make any input. Such emails, unfortunately, due to the fact that I am not having access to my office, I cannot avail to the Commissioner now, but, I made a commitment, I can avail them as part of my evidence to the Commissioner afterwards.”
Director Malatji personally is primarily authorized to issue notification of deployment letters for ad hoc services in his department.
“Primarily, it is myself. It is myself who is authorized, or, I can, within instruction, allow Dr Madihlaba or Phiri or any other to, say, allocate the ...”
Advocate Khumalo challenged Director Malatji's truthfulness about the timing of his awareness of the allocation letters, asserting he knew by March 2025.
“No, it cannot be now recently because in March 2025, you knew that these letters had been issued to Gubis.”
Ad hoc security services are requested by any department within the City as soon as they realize they need security outside of existing services, triggering a process managed by Director Malatji's office including due diligence and quotations before deployment.
“Ad hoc services arise the moment the department realizes that there is a need for security at either of their sites and they would ... Any department within the City. The moment it realizes that they need security outside the ones that they are having, it becomes ad hoc security services. And they would send a request or they should send a request to TMPD, my office, right, for those services. And once those services, I meant those requests are received, my office would kickstart the process of making sure that due diligence is done before the actual deployment is affected. So due diligence, Commissioner, would include the, it would include my office acknowledging receipt. I would instruct the operational team to do the security risk assessment, and once they are done with that, we would identify a need for a GL account from the department to commit that they will be responsible for the payment of that ad hoc security services that they are requesting. And I would go back to them to say kindly provide GL account from which these services would be paid for the period that you are requesting. They would do that. And also the issue of we will then get the quotations and get them to sign, approve those quotations. Once this process is done and we deploy, I instruct deployment of the companies so identified and approved by the department. I must make a mention that ad hoc services is the responsibility, payment thereof is the responsibility of the department that is requesting ad hoc services.”
Director Malatji requested a report from Gubis through Mr Calvin Mahlangu, the director of Gubis Security Solutions, to verify the services rendered and deployment details.
Director Malatji did not request internal reporting or reports from his officials but verified the information through the department which confirmed the deployments.
“To be quite honest, no, Commissioner. My focus at the time was to confirm the accuracy of that information. What I did was to check with the department ... The department officials confirmed that indeed this allocations were done.”
Director Malatji confirmed that his team was regularly meeting and confirming deployment of guards at specified sites and monitoring was taking place.
“I spoke with my team. We were meeting regularly about this and they were confirming that indeed, yes, these services are in place ... they have their guys monitoring to ensure that those sites are meant and ... they produced evidence to that effect.”
Director Malatji said that Gubis came to complain about non-payment to his office because they realized that promised payment was not happening and they thought he could help.
“I think they realize that whatever they were promised would happen, was not happening ... they thought Director Malatji would be able to help us get paid.”
Director Malatji instructed Gubis to ignore the usual payment process and suggested they come directly to his office because of payment delays from the department and CFO's office.
“Guys, you ignored the process and you chose to do what you did. And now afterwards you are coming to me.”
Director Malatji confirmed that the deployment letters were from December and January 2025 and related to outstanding payments they spoke about in December.
“I am talking about deployment letters pertaining to the outstandings that we spoke about in December ... also talk to the one attached here as evidence of January 2025.”
Director Malatji was unable to comply with an instruction due to ongoing communications involving his supervisor, Commissioner Spies, about paying for services.
“The communications were about paying for these services ... involving my supervisor, Commissioner Spies”
Director Malatji admits there was a serious oversight on his part in not terminating services and sorting out payment issues earlier, leading to continued costs.
“I think, Commissioner, like I said, that could have been, actually has been an oversight on my part.”
Mr. Baloyi SC asserts that in January and February, Phiri issued deployment letters without authority, causing a R14 million expense to the municipality, and that Director Malatji had the power to stop this but failed to act, making him responsible for the irregular expenditure.
“We know that in January and February, when Phiri issued these deployment letters, which you have already admitted he did not have that kind of authority ... it cost an expense of R14 million ... You were the effective cause of that R14 million expense ... You failed to do that ... you chose not to tell departments to direct their requests to you ... You did not ... you failed ... you are responsible for that irregular expenditure of 14 million rand.”
Director Malatji acknowledges responsibility but points out that departments also disregarded instructions to route all ad hoc security service requests through Asset Protection Services, TMPD.
“I think, given the way things have transpired, at the end, yes. But I want the Commissioner not to lose sight ... the departments said they would avail funds ... the department instructed Gubis to deploy security officers on sites they identified ... I was not involved or aware at that point in time.”
The 2024 and January 2025 deployements were irregular, resulting in costs to the City and indicating wasteful and irregular expenditure for which Director Malatji accepts responsibility.
“I think it is established that the , let us just call them the 2024 deployments, were irregular, and the 2025, January deployments, which we have in file, were equally irregular.”
Director Malatji regularly interacted with contracted security firms including Gubis as part of his contract management duties, including initial contract starting periods and operational engagements.
“I had several interactions with Gubis, including the rest of the 22, more especially round about at that time, because that was when the contract was starting. That was when the deployment was kicking off, and immediately after it kicked off, that was when we, when I interacted with them for operational reasons. By the way, as the director responsible for the function, I meet with these service providers regularly, even though sometimes it does not happen, but in terms of the service level agreement, I am to meet with them almost every month”
Director Malatji denies creating requisitions without invoices and recalls exchanging emails with Veli Nwandule but is uncertain whether he responded to the specific allegation email.
“I do not recall myself creating requisitions without invoices. I do not recall that. ... I remember exchanging emails with Veli Nwandule, but as to this specific issue, I am not sure if this specific email forms part of the exchange that we had.”
There was an accusation from Veli Nwandule accusing Director Malatji's department of creating 13 requisitions to the tune of 8 million without invoices and expecting the blind release of these requisitions.
“"13 requisitions have been created by yourselves to the tune of 8 million without invoices, and yet you expect me to blindly release these requisitions."”
Director Malatji acknowledges that the cost of irregular expenditure in his department has cost the City a lot of money and accepts his responsibility as a manager to prevent wasteful and irregular expenditure.
“Yes, it has cost the City. ... I do. [responsibility to prevent wasteful and irregular expenditure]”
The Department of Water and Sanitation identified the need for a deployment, but the deployment letter was issued by another department, which falls under Director Malatji's responsibility.
“Th e W a t e r a n d S a n i t a t i o n d e p a r t m e n t i d e n t i f i e d t h e n e e d , m a y b e s p o k e t o G u b i s , b u t y o u r d e p a r t m e n t d i d t h e d e p l o y m e n t l e t t e r”
Director Malatji confirms that the deployment letter was signed by their department, making their department responsible for ensuring payment to the deployed services.
“y e s , t h e y s i g n e d t h e d e p l o y m e n t l e t t e r”
Director Malatji admits that due process was not followed in issuing the deployment letter for the ad hoc services, specifically the security risk assessment and payment confirmation procedures were omitted.
“Yes, because due process was not followed ... To ensure that when there is a request for ad hoc services, we do security risk assessment ... we confirm with the department requesting these services that they are going to pay ... We go further to confirm with the department the vote number ... So you say all of that was not done.”
Director Malatji admits that although he was aware of the irregularities in the ad hoc deployments since December 2024, he did not take disciplinary action against his officials due to time constraints and ongoing investigations.
“But in terms of taking disciplinary action against my officials, that I did not do at the time, and I take responsibility for not having done that ... I think time was not just allowing for me to immediately ... we are focused on this because ...”
Director Malatji acknowledges that despite knowing about the irregularities from December 2024 and the suspension in July, he failed to discipline the responsible subordinate, thereby sending a message that such irregular conduct and payment of money could continue without consequence.
“So you had a good seven months to take disciplinary action against the subordinate and you did not ... You do not do anything about it ... It sends a message to Mr Phiri and others that this is okay to do ...”
Director Malatji says his focus was on understanding the issue when it was raised and gave explanations as requested, but admits it was wrong for a colleague to continue irregular actions knowing it was wrong and he did not stop it.
“I was ... my focus was on getting to understand ... I did give explanation ... I do not want to say it was right for me not to take steps ... it was wrong of my colleague to continue doing something that by the time ... was wrong and they continued ...”
Director Malatji states that he did not stop the irregular ad hoc allocations because there were ongoing discussions at the executive levels involving senior members, making it difficult for him to act.
“Though this was irregular, there were already discussions at the top ... executive members ... It was not easy for me ... even my superiors aware ... I suggested to my superior ... but never the less ... I did what was requested, being to provide information ... But now the question is, why did I not stop.”
Adv Khumalo accuses Director Malatji of allowing irregular ad hoc deployments costing the City of Tshwane millions of rands to continue despite awareness from 2024, questioning why he did not stop them.
“Ad hoc deployments are being done irregularly and they are costing the City of Tshwane millions of rands, millions, and you do nothing about it ... Why did you not stop them?”
Director Malatji did not stop the deployment of all ad hoc guards despite being given clear instructions to do so from 13 March 2025.
“you are now given a clear instruction that you must stop deployment of all adhoc guards with effect from tomorrow morning, in other words, with effect from the 13th of March 2025 . But you did not do that . You did not comply with this instruction”
Director Malatji defended his non-compliance by explaining that he needed to discuss with his superiors and that some ad hoc services were allocated to other departments without problems.
“When I asked you earlier why did you not cancel them , you said there were discussions with your superiors . That was your excuse . Yes .”
Director Malatji was not happy about the irregular ad hoc services but explained they were initiated by the Water and Sanitation Department who were responsible for payment.
“I am not happy . These irregular adhoc services , right , the Commissioner must appreciate that they were initiated by Water and Sanitation .”
Director Malatji requested Commissioner Spies to put the cancellation of irregular ad hoc services in writing and later called the companies involved to a meeting to terminate the services, which happened about four months after the instruction.
“I requested Commissioner Spies to , to put it in writing ... I drafted a letter for him to sign , and I called them into a meeting . Actually , I am the one who drafted a letter for him to sign , and I called them into a meeting ... I handed those letters of cancellation over to the three companies ...”
Director Malatji did not comply in entirety with the instruction to terminate ad hoc security services on 13 March 2025, claiming the instruction was inclusive of services without issues.
“Yes , because this instruction , in my view right , was inclusive of those that did not have a problem right .”
The irregular ad hoc security services were originally provided by Water and Sanitation Department with the understanding they would pay the service providers.
“This , when this adhoc services were dished out right , they were dished out by Water and Sanitation Department with the understanding between them and the service provider that they would pay from them .”
Director Malatji acknowledged that discussions regarding payment issues occurred but the issue to stop irregular deployments was not about payments but the propriety of allocations.
“I agree with you , Commissioner . The issue with regard to the instruction terminate this , it was not really about payments .”
Director Malatji states that normally a request for ad hoc services from departments such as Water and Sanitation comes via email, followed by an assessment and issuance of deployment notices.
“normally ... you would get an email from a department , I would imagine these are all from Water and Sanitation . That would be requesting these services and you assess them ... then you issue a notice for deployment , correct ? Yes .”
Director Malatji states he would not allocate a large number of sites to one security company because it would create challenges for the City and other contracted providers.
“I would not allocate such a number to one security company because that itself would create a challenge, right, not only for me, but for the City. It would even create a challenge with other contracted service providers once they realize that Gubisi is allocated 37 sites at a go and some are not even located on one, hence I am saying I would not allocate such a large number to one security company.”
Director Malatji admits oversight for not cancelling additional ad hoc security services added in January and February despite instructions to cancel all ad hoc services.
“Like I previously said, that it could, it has been an oversight on my part...I am not implying that somebody might have done it to hide information, but I am saying as far as this is concerned...I would not carry out the instruction immediately...”
Director Malatji states he was not able to access his office for the past 9 months due to suspension conditions, affecting his ability to respond to emails and instructions timely.
“I got it difficult to access my office for the past 9 months or so to date because conditions of my suspension included that I should not find myself next to any of office of the municipality, right, except when I am called upon to appear before the hearing.”
Mr Revo Spies issued an instruction to officials in Director Malatji's office not to provide him any information that might assist in preparing his testimony for the Commission.
“Mr Revo Spies issued an instruction to some of the officials that are in my office not to give me any piece of information that I might need in order to prepare myself for today's testimony.”
The instruction from Mr Revo Spies created an environment of fear within the department, making it very difficult for Director Malatji to prepare his testimony effectively.
“The instructions so issued have created an environment of fear within the department... It really made my testimony very difficult if not rendering it ineffective.”
Director Malatji was suspended in July 2025 following an investigation by Commissioner Spies who established that he had committed misconduct.
“You were suspended in July of 2025... Commissioner Spies had investigated your conduct and had established that as far as he was concerned, you had committed misconduct.”
Director Malatji received a call from an investigator in September (post-suspension) regarding the misconduct case and was taken through the allegations.
“it was in September... that I received a call from the investigator who was calling to say... I am investigating this case of misconduct against you and I wanted to check if we could meet just to take each other through what the allegations are.”
Director Malatji failed to declare directorships of his companies and failed to penalise service providers whose actions led to municipal losses, resulting in charges and suspension.
“I failed to declare directorships... I failed to penalise service providers who, whilst they are deployed, had activities happening that led to the municipality losing what you call. I am facing these two charges.”
Director Malatji was initially unaware that Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd received many allocations for ad hoc security services until a complaint was made and the matter was investigated.
“before I received that complaint, I was not aware.”
Director Malatji's immediate superior before Revo Spies was Sean Bolhuis, who became aware of the ad hoc security services after December 2024 and started requesting reports.
“before Revo Spies... he became aware that there are these ad hoc services, and then we started exchanging, communicating around them. He started asking me for reports.”
Director Malatji responded stating the ad hoc services were called upon and requested by the department, and payment commitment was from the requesting department.
“My response was, this adhoc services were called upon, were requested by the department, not requested, were done by the department, and I based my response on information that I gathered during investigation”
Director Malatji did not specifically inform Commissioner Spies that Mr Phiri approved the ad hoc service deployments at the time of the communication, but later agreed Mr Phiri's actions indicated his office was allocating the services.
“Not specifically, Commissioner. I did not tell Commissioner Spies that it is Mr Phiri, because at that point in time, I was of the view that these were requested directly by the department from the service provider. But given the clarities that we went through today, right, yes, I agree that whatever Mr Phiri has done, obviously, on record indicates that it was my office that was allocating. But to be specific, I did not indicate that to Commissioner Spies.”
Director Malatji is unaware if Commissioner Bolhuis responded to a query about how certain service allocations came about but confirmed a response was given to store or give background.
“I am not aware, but I am aware that Commissioner Bolhuis wrote to us to respond and or give a background as to how it came about that this were done, and we did that.”
Director Malatji stated he did not generate purchase orders for Gubis Solutions February to June 2025 for ad hoc services; purchase orders are generated by finance officials at TMPD headquarters.
“I did not generate purchase orders for Gubis Solutions during February to June 2025 for adhoc services. Purchase orders are created by the responsible finance officials at TMPD head office.”
Director Malatji was not aware initially of multiple allocations to Gubis Solutions but later recognized them as a reliable service provider.
“I am unaware that Gubis Solutions received many allocations for provision of adhoc services, however, I am aware that Gubis Solutions has been one of the reliable service providers.”
Director Malatji acknowledged he was incorrect about the period covered by procurement documents related to protected services not within TMPD, which were actually up to June 2024, not 2025.
“The documents you attached are for the year ending 30 June 2024. So I think the question that you were being asked related to the 2025 year ... So maybe when you supplementary your statement, you can deal with that question but focusing on the 2025 year.”
Director Malatji said his supervisor requested funding for TMPD2, which Chief of Police and Municipal Manager approved; Umashi Dhlamini was not involved in the funding request.
“My supervisor requested funding. I prepared the report and the Chief of Police, the Municipal Manager, approved the funding request. Umashi Dhlamini was not involved in the funding request.”
Due to a complaint by Revo Spies regarding alleged misconduct, Director Malatji was suspended in July 2025 pending a disciplinary hearing, with Revo Spies as the main witness and their working relationship described as poor.
“Due to a complaint by Mr Spies regarding the alleged misconduct, I was then suspended in July 2025 pending outcome of disciplinary hearing ... Mr Spies is the main witness on the same reported allegations ... Our working relationship is therefore not good ...”
Director Malatji alleges that if there is corruption in the appointment structure, it must be attributed to the Chief of Police or whoever approved the structure, not Deputy Commissioner Revo Spies, as he does not create the structure.
“the person then that you are accusing of corruption can not be ... must be the Chief of Police then... It cannot be Deputy Commissioner Spies ... He is not the boss of the TMPD”
Director Malatji agrees that corruption, if any, must involve those who came up with the new structure including the Chief of Police and whoever was working on structuring issues.
“It could be those who came up, right, with the new structure ... which would include the Chief of Police and whoever they were working on the issue of structures around it.”
Director Malatji is suspicious that Commissioner Spies was appointed through a corrupt and irregular recruitment process, but does not definitively say that corruption occurred.
“I am saying I am suspicious that Mr Spies was appointed through a corrupt, irregular recruitment process. I am suspicious. So I am not definitely saying somebody is corrupt.”
Director Malatji is suspicious that Commissioner Spies is not registered with PSIRA as required for persons appointed to perform, supervise, or manage private security services.
“I am suspicious that he is not registered with PSIRA, which is a requirement for any person appointed to perform, supervise, manage private security services.”
Director Malatji suspects the City made appointment requirements as registration as a Traffic Officer and Metro Police Officer for security management positions to prevent security professionals from applying.
“Why would the City make registration as a Traffic Officer and appointment as a Metro Police Officer an appointment requirement for the position in security management? And I therefore drew a conclusion that they are making this appointment requirements because they are well aware that there are security professionals out there who would obviously develop interest into the position and apply.”
Director Malatji admits he does not know any fact that Commissioner Spies is not registered with PSIRA, saying it is just a feeling based on how appointment requirements were designed.
“I do not know any fact. It is just a feeling. It is based, the feeling is based on how the requirements for appointment were designed.”
Director Malatji stated he raised the issue of PSIRA registration with the office of the Chief of Police in writing before Commissioner Spies was appointed as a complaint or inquiry.
“I raised the issue of the PSIRA with the office of the Chief of Police. That was in writing, long before Commissioner Spies could be appointed.”
Director Malatji confirms he has not lodged any grievance, complaint or report with the City regarding the three suspicions listed about Commissioner Spies since his appointment.
“Since his appointment, I have not. The only correspondence I made was prior to his appointment, and then this appointment gave rise to what I was complaining about... So the short answer is you have not lodged a grievance, a complaint, or a report about Commissioner Spies as it relates to the three suspicions that you have listed in the statement.”
Director Malatji disputes allegations made by Commissioner Spies that he was non-compliant with instructions and not working well with him, saying generally he complied with instructions and any misses were not deliberate.
“I have listened to the allegations made by Commissioner Spies about me... I disagree and dispute these allegations in this regard... generally, Commissioner Spies informed the Commission that I was not complying with instructions, I was not working well with him... generally, I have complied with instructions that were given to me by Commissioner Spies, despite the differences that I have alluded to... I might have missed one or two, and the Commission should not take it that I missed that instruction because I did not work with him...”
Director Malatji admits being on suspension and receiving a salary for almost 10 months without performing beneficial work for the City or the community of Tshwane, indicating a commitment to the community despite differences with colleagues.
“I am sitting here for 10 months, almost 10 months on suspension, getting a salary, and I am very much guilty of receiving, of getting paid, right, for so long without doing anything to benefit the City or the community of Tshwane... I am sitting here receiving a salary for 10 months without doing anything... But with me, I need the Commissioner to note this... My commitment is that... in 2017 to 2019, I was not suspended but taken out of the position and continued to be paid without doing anything...”
Since his suspension in July, Director Malatji has not sat in a hearing or started a disciplinary process and has not pleaded; the process has been repeatedly postponed.
“since my suspension in July, we never sat in a hearing and started. I have not pleaded, right. Every now and then they would postpone, they would postpone”
Director Malatji applied for the dismissal of charges, but there has been no decision on that application yet; the decision hearing is scheduled for 24th April 2026.
“applied for the dismissal of the charges... There is no decision. We are going back on the 24th of this month”
Director Malatji requested access to his workplace shortly after receiving a summons, but the request was refused and he was told he must be escorted by a colleague to gain access.
“you said earlier that you have been refused access to the workplace in order to prepare... I requested, it was a day after I received the summons... He came back to me to say EMM has decided that I should make them aware when I go into my office to work on this, they would arrange a colleague to go with me... They refused... he came back to say, no, no, no, you must inform us and then we make someone else to escort you”
Director Malatji described his working relationship with Commissioner Revo Spies since Spies' appointment as Deputy Chief of Police Asset and Protection Services on 1 March 2025; Spies' employment functions are materially the same as Malatji's.
“My working relationship with Commissioner Revo Spies since his arrival at the TMPD. Mr Revo Spies was appointed as Deputy Chief of Police, Asset and Protection Services on the 1st of March 2025. ... There is no material difference from my employment functions and his employment responsibilities.”
Director Malatji stated in 2024 his supervisor was the City Manager, not Bolhuis nor TMPD people.
“Because the 2024 year, you were still under, who was your supervisor then? It was not Bolhuis and it was not people in the TMPD. Yes. It was the City Manager.”
Director Malatji runs the APSS unit and manages the contract day-to-day but does not attend the top management budget meeting.
“Director Malatji runs that unit or section division, he runs it basically into totality, day-to-day running, managing the contract. If it starts affecting the budget, he does not sit in the top management budget meeting”
Neither Director Malatji nor senior officials Dr. K.E. Madihlaba and Inspector Lebogang Phiri consulted the witness about allocation of sites to Gubis 85 Solutions.
“I was not consulted by Director Malatji nor by the then Senior Superintendent, now Colonel, Doctor K E Madihlaba, nor by the then Inspector, now Superintendent-Major, Lebogang Phiri, about the allocation of sites in question.”
Director Malatji was the overall manager with authority over the function and delegation of powers related to site allocation, implying he would have had to authorize any delegation of power to Inspector Phiri.
“Malatji is the director, the manager over the whole function, yes ... that would be the assumption ... He would have been the one that delegates him or that gives him the power to do this.”
Inspector Phiri did not have the power or authority to allocate sites; this was the function of APS management, specifically Director Malatji.
“In my view, Inspector Phiri did not have the power or authority to allocate sites to security service providers. The allocation of sites would have been the function of APS management, specifically Director Malatji.”
If Director Malatji had authorized the allocations of ad hoc services, Commissioner Bolhuis would have serious issues with the exercise of that power.
“If Malatji, Director Malatji were the one that had authorised these allocations of adhoc services, would you take issue ... I would have a serious issue with that.”
Director Malatji was the day-to-day manager managing the whole process plus the contract; it was commonly understood he was responsible for the function from the City Manager.
“It was commonly known and understood that Director Malatji was the man, the person that ran APSS, that managed the day-to-day running, managed the contract.”
Mr AL Phiri did not have delegated powers to sign certain documents; if Director Malatji delegated authority downwards, it would have been to Mr Mahlangu, not Mr Phiri.
“I can with confidence say he did not have delegated powers because he could not have had delegated powers. If Director Malatji delegated authority downwards, he would have delegated it to Mr Mahlangu, who is the immediate level under him.”
Director Malatji was seen as an experienced senior manager in security, overseeing approximately 1300 security guards on a R2.9 billion contract, with some level of support and management, and no mistrust existed towards him at that time.
“my high-level management and oversight was very limited, and I had no reason to mistrust, at that time, Director Malatji. Seemingly, on paper and what I know from him, then he was an experienced senior manager in security. He had support, not much, but he had support, and they ran that division. The amount of people in that division... approximately just shy of 1300 security guards. On contracts still, not even fully absorbed into the city with all the benefits”
Invoices for security services contracts were required to be co-signed by Director Malatji after operational checks and then co-signed by the caretaker, as a management mechanism to ensure that no untoward activities appeared on paper.
“I required Director Malatji to provide, once invoices have been signed by the operational component and then signed off by himself, he had to bring those invoices to me for co-signing. So, he would approve the invoice after all the checks have been done and I would co-sign. That was just a management mechanism to ensure that, on paper, there is nothing untoward.”
Commissioner Bolhuis did not mistrust the process of invoice co-signing at the time but later gave evidence that irregularities in invoices were identified by Director Veli Nwandule of Management Admin Support, who highlighted the need to follow a specific financial procedure that stopped invoices being brought back for co-signing by Bolhuis.
“I did not pick up anything immediately and I did not have any mistrust at that time. However, and I do give evidence about this later, when the director of MAS, Management Admin Support, Director Veli Nwandule, he indicated that there could be some irregularity within invoices. At that stage, the finance section has indicated both to me as the caretaker and to Director Malatji that they will have to follow a certain financial procedure, which then became the procedure they needed to follow, not bringing invoices back to me for co-signing. So that then stopped and that financial procedure that was implemented by the financial section was then followed. And then subsequently, the director of MAS, Nwandule, picked up their regularity because they will be in a better position to pick up on this because they have the contracts, the SLAs, the monthly expenditure, and if there is any further expenditure than what would have been the baseline from previous months or allocated to a certain service provider, they would pick it up. And subsequently, they did pick up.”
Director Malatji and Nava Pillay are responsible for the management of a contract concerning security services, specifically deployment decisions of security officers.
“Director Malatji and Nava Pillay is responsible for the management of this contract and then in the SLA it states specifically his position as director of security services. He is responsible for deployment. He must therefore, if there is a necessity for a deployment, he makes the decision to deploy security officers.”
Commissioner Spies instructed Director Malatji to stop all ad hoc security services immediately until a new process is implemented, despite the practical limitations of stopping services already underway.
“stop the adhoc services with immediate effect until a new process is actually implemented... stop this service by tomorrow morning, that the service will not continue then.”
TMPD (Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department) is responsible for the deployment and allocation of security work to private companies.
“It is TMPD... the contract management of the tender is placed within TMPD, and the award letters and the SLA assigns this function to Director Malatji. He is the one who, in terms of the award letter and terms of the SLA is the director security, he must perform the function.”
Despite requests, Commissioner Dhlamini and Director Malatji have not responded to requests for reports and information about the ad hoc guards' deployment, hindering consequence management.
“Commissioner Dhlamini has never responded to me in my question to date, and Director Malatji has also not responded to me at all ... I have asked that reports and everything ... and that is part of why there is consequence management happening.”
Inspector Phiri is a Metro Police officer assigned as a regional supervisor for Asset Protection Security Services and reports to Colonel Madihlaba, Colonel Mahlangu, and Director Malatji but should not have deployment authority.
“Inspector Phiri has been assigned, he is a Metro Police officer that is been assigned to the APSS, the Asset Protection Security Services, as a regional supervisor. And in that turn, he reports as a regional supervisor, he reports to the then Senior Superintendent Madihlaba, who is now a Colonel Madihlaba. But he reported to, Colonel Madihlaba, Colonel Mahlangu, Reginald Mahlangu, and to Director Malatji. So that is the direct line of command between them. And as I stated already, Inspector Phiri should not have at all the authority to deploy this.”
Director Malatji was appointed project manager and responsible for dealing with all aspects of the tender; an inspector does not have authority to deploy or incur costs on behalf of the city.
“Director Malatji was appointed as the project manager, and he had to deal with all aspects of this tender, and an inspector does not have the authority to deploy or incur any cost on behalf of the city.”
Payments for January, February, and part of March were delayed, with ad hoc financial guards added as a stop-gap, but the January payments were stopped on March 12. February and March payments came through later, including what should have been a half payment for March, but full payments continued due to lack of written instruction to stop.
“...the January payments that is currently being affected, and we only stopped it on the 12th of March...there will still be payments coming through for February, and also then for the first portion of March...March should have been a half payment, and not a full payment again...he is not going to do the stop of it if it is not in writing from me.”
Despite instructions issued on 12 March to stop payments, payments continued, prompting a further letter to Gubis on 24 June because Malatji stated he wouldn't stop without written order.
“I queried with Malatji to say, but I have told you on the 12th of March already to stop this. Why is a full payment still coming through?...I have sent a letter to them to say, stop the service with effect 30 June.”
The forensic audit report concerns Metro Police Inspector issuing instructions to deploy guards beyond his mandate, involving 22 companies, but the investigation faced challenges due to lack of evidence and inability to interview key individuals.
“The subject matter was the Metro Police Inspector issuing written instruction to deploy ad hoc guards beyond his mandate . And the letter then in the introduction portion it specifically stated : “ On 27 June this Directorate received allegations to investigate against Inspector Phiri for issuing written instructions to Gubis 85 Security Solution to deploy ad hoc guards which is way beyond his mandate . ” ... the investigation is unable to test the allegation against 22 companies to establish whether Inspector Phiri issued the instruction to all these service providers to deploy ad hoc guards . ... unable to interview Director Malatji ... director Malatji has then already been suspended ... He refused and he could not get hold of him at all to actually do this and he could also not confirm with SAPS if there were any cases ... He was also unable to source the standard operating procedure ... he was unable to source full financial records ...”
