Hearing day 136

Dr Albertus Schoeman testifies about flaws in the existing asset disclosure regime and possible reforms to strengthen the capacity of the SAPS to resist infiltration by organized crime.

“He is going to testify about flaws in the existing asset disclosure regime and possible reforms to that system that might assist in strengthening the capacity of the SAPS to resist infiltration by organized crime.”

Dr Albertus Schoeman holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Sussex and has extensive experience in anti-corruption programs for the World Bank and Transparency International.

“I hold a PhD in Politics from the University of Sussex. I have worked on anti-corruption programs for World Bank units across Southern Africa and South Asia. Prior to my work with World Bank, my work on anti-corruption and governance issues has included consulting for Transparency International...”

Dr Schoeman describes serious corruption problems in the SAPS including systematic conflicts of interest where public officials' personal interests override official duties, abuse of authority to obstruct investigations, disclosure of confidential information to criminal actors, and manipulation of procurement processes for reciprocal benefit.

“Testimony before the Commission reveals systematic conflicts between the duties of public officials and their personal interests, whereby beneficial relationships with criminal actors have taken precedence over official duties. This includes the abuse of positions of authority to intervene and obstruct investigations, the disclosure of confidential information to criminal actors, and the manipulation of procurement processes to direct contracts to associates, each underpinned by an expectation of reciprocal benefit...”

There is a serious failure in the institutional framework for detecting and combating corrupt infiltration of the SAPS through abuse of authority, disclosure of confidential information, and procurement process manipulation.

“... speaks to a serious failure in the institutional framework for detecting and combating corrupt infiltration of the SAPS.”

DR Schoeman explains that corruption prevention involves measures to manage public sector integrity, avoid conflicts of interest, and includes mechanisms like financial disclosure systems, lifestyle audits, and conflict of interest management.

“So the notes start by talking about corruption prevention as a concept ... So when we talk about corruption prevention, it is all of the measures that I have just mentioned around how do we manage public sector integrity, how do we avoid conflicts of interest.”

The report focuses on corruption prevention in SAPS as part of the broader public sector, emphasizing the financial disclosure system as an integral part of the corruption prevention architecture.

“The rest of the report looks at corruption prevention in SAPS, but as applicable to the broader public sector and a lot of this is through the lens of the financial disclosure system, which forms a very integral part of the corruption prevention architecture.”

DR Schoeman highlights three reforms in the report: financial disclosure form requirements, the institutional and operational framework for managing disclosures and corruption prevention, and the sanctions in place for consequence management.

“So effectively ... the three areas of reform that I will talk about is one, about the financial disclosure form itself ... second point being around the institutional and operational framework for how we manage financial disclosures as well as corruption prevention more broadly. And then the third point being around the sanctions in place.”

The financial disclosure system is the basis for processes such as lifestyle audits, conflict of interest management, and sanctions attached to corruption prevention, highlighting deficiencies in the current framework.

“A lot of the accompanying processes build on the financial disclosure system when we talk about lifestyle audits, lifestyle reviews, conflict of interest management ... and the sanctions attached to that as a lens through understanding some of the deficiencies in the current framework for corruption prevention.”

DR Schoeman explains the distinction between deterrent prevention (transparency, mechanisms to make corruption harder) and constructive prevention (ethics, ethics training, organizational culture) as key parts of the corruption prevention toolkit.

“We can essentially understand this as two types of prevention, the one being deterrent prevention ... it is about raising transparency ... The second aspect of prevention ... is around your intrinsic motivations ... constructive prevention and essentially this is the focus on ethics, on ethics training, on how you as an individual think about how you conduct yourself, your views on corruption.”

DR Schoeman references SAPS annual reports for 2023/24 and 2024/25 describing internal mechanisms for reporting fraud and corruption, including risk and integrity management, ethics workshops, information security standards, restrictions on remunerative work, screening and gift declarations, and polygraph testing.

“Page 9 of SAPS' annual reports speaks to the mechanisms, their internal mechanisms for reporting fraud and corruption ... they mention measures carried out by the risk and integrity management section ... ethics workshops ... minimum information security standards ... restrictions around applications for additional remunerative work ... security screening, declarations around gifts and sponsorship ... measures for detection in terms of polygraph testing.”

DR Schoeman states that SAPS has mechanisms on paper for public sector integrity and corruption prevention, but there is a disjuncture between these mechanisms and the real-world impact.

“And so it would seem that all of these mechanisms are in place on paper ... all of the standard requirements that one would expect. Now, the question that I pose ... is having heard the testimony so far and hearing this list of mechanisms ... it seems to me that there is a disjuncture between what is on paper and the impact that we see in the real world.”

The Acting Minister of Police indicated in a recent Parliamentary question that lifestyle audits within SAPS have not yet been conducted but are still under discussion with SIU to second officials to perform these audits.

“My understanding is that no lifestyle audits have been conducted within SAPS as of yet ... I think it was last week ... where the Acting Minister of Police indicated that they were still in discussions with the SIU to second officials to SAPS to do these lifestyle audits for them.”

The current SAPS lifestyle audit framework relies on financial disclosure forms reviewed by ethics officers, lifestyle investigations by departmental investigators, and forensic lifestyle audits by certified auditors, with audits outsourced to external companies due to lack of internal audit capacity.

“a lifestyle review is something that is conducted by an ethics officer within a line department... The lifestyle investigation would be conducted by an investigator... An audit is once you involve a certified auditor... In the current framework... departments are outsourcing these audits to external company...”

No full lifestyle audits were escalated for senior management service members within the South African Police Service (SAPS) in past 5 years, only lifestyle reviews and investigations were conducted.

“Based on the lifestyle investigations conducted for senior management service members, no cases escalated to full lifestyle audits during the period under review.”

SAPS lifestyle investigations examine additional sources such as bank records and qualifications to detect unexplained wealth or corrupt income sources, while lifestyle audits apply forensic techniques and require more specialty skills than internal auditors usually have.

“The lifestyle investigation... would look at additional sources of info to determine unexplained wealth... lifestyle audit would be the next stage... apply forensic audit techniques... requires a very particular skill set as it requires auditors...”

Annual lifestyle reviews are conducted within SAPS with only a few escalating to lifestyle investigations, and all such investigated cases have been cleared with no referrals for lifestyle investigations between financial years 2021/22 and 2023/24 except 5 SMS members investigated and cleared in 2024/25.

“within SAPS, every year, these lifestyle reviews conducted, and some of them have led, in very few cases, to lifestyle investigations. In each case, they have been cleared... Between financial year 2021/22 and 23/24, no SAPS officials were referred for lifestyle investigation. In 24/25, 5 of 23 SMS members underwent lifestyle investigations and all were cleared.”

Lifestyle audits are costly, ranging between R30,000 to R50,000 per individual audit, and have turned up very little results in the public sector generally.

“a single individual being audited, that it would costs something between R30,000.00 to R50,000.00... these lifestyle audits have turned up very little...”

SAPS Special Investigating Unit (SIU) officers seconded to departments lack mandate and resources they would have normally had, limiting effective financial record access in lifestyle audits leading to reliance on auditee submitted records which can be incomplete or concealed.

“these SIU officials are seconded to the department... effectively no longer function with SIU's powers... they no longer have the same mandates, access to resources... To conduct a lifestyle audit, you would rely on the auditee... The challenge being... somebody could very well hide some of their bank records...”

Persons conducting lifestyle audits, whether private auditors or SIU auditors seconded to SAPS, have no statutory powers to collect information from financial institutions and rely entirely on information voluntarily provided by the person being audited.

“whether they are conducted by private auditors or by SIU auditors seconded to SAPS, the persons conducting lifestyle audits have no statutory powers to collect information from financial institutions . So they depend entirely on information that is voluntarily provided by the person they are auditing”

In many entities, given widespread concerns around corruption and misconduct in senior management, some have chosen to conduct blanket lifestyle audits for senior management which is irregular and not normal practice internationally.

“Within the current context where there are a lot of concerns around corruption and misconduct within the senior management service , what a lot of entities have opted to do is to go straight to the lifestyle audit process to have blanket lifestyle audits for these senior management service . In some ways , I think in international examples , this is irregular . It would not be normal practice to conduct blanket lifestyle audits .”

The current system only conducts lifestyle audits after a red flag has been triggered, with no system of random auditing in place.

“At the moment, the system only reaches this lifestyle auditing stage after it has gone through , after a red flag has been triggered below it . There is no system of random auditing that takes place”

The blanket lifestyle auditing approach reflects that the financial disclosure system and lifestyle reviews have not been effective in detecting misconduct.

“This blanket approach , I think , is reflective of the fact that the financial disclosure system , the verification , the lifestyle reviews so far have not been turning up anything .”

There have been no lifestyle audits conducted at SAPS generally.

“when you talk about the senior management service and lifestyle audits across the board , you are talking about the public service generally , not SAPS , because we have seen there have been no lifestyle audits at SAPS .”

In other jurisdictions, lifestyle audits usually involve much more thorough investigations including speaking to associates and determining business dealings to detect misconduct.

“In many cases , a full lifestyle audit in other jurisdictions would include speaking to their associates , determining , you know , who they have business dealings with , doing a much more thorough investigation .”

Many entities instituted blanket lifestyle audits across senior management due to suspicion that misconduct is happening but is not detected by current financial disclosure and lifestyle review systems.

“But at the same time , we know from experience , we know from media reports , we know from what we see in Commissions such as yourselves , we know that there are these things happening , but they are not being detected and so the current approach has been to institute these blanket lifestyle audits across these senior management service .”

The SIU has not yet been seconded to SAPS to support lifestyle audits as of 5 June 2026, despite a formal request by the National Commissioner on 5 August 2025.

“the South African police service has formally engaged the special investigating unit to assist with independent lifestyle audits . The National Commissioner signed a formal request on 5 August 2025 , which was submitted on 6 August 2025 , requesting the secondment of SIU personnel to support SAPS in conducting lifestyle audits . As of 5 June , the SIU has not yet been seconded to SAPS to support lifestyle audits .”

Despite advocacy and campaigns against corruption, it is difficult to change organizational culture within SAPS due to widespread misconduct experienced by officials in daily life.

“So the point that I want to make here is by SAPS ' own internal surveys , the way most people see their own organizational culture is that they do not see it as an institution with great integrity , that they recognize that their colleagues do not behave the way that they should . In many cases , they understand that that misconduct is rife . And so when we compare this to some of the initiatives mentioned in terms of advocacy programs , in terms of campaigns , in terms of statements to say that we do not tolerate corruption , it is very difficult to imagine how a message like that cuts through when people 's everyday lived experience is their colleagues engaging in misbehaviour .”

An internal SAPS survey conducted in 2022/23 found that only 24.4% of SAPS officials agree they conduct themselves professionally, and 31.6% agree the police do not abuse their power, indicating internal recognition of significant misconduct.

“The latest SAPS survey conducted in 2/23 found that only 24.4% of SAPS officials agree that the police conduct themselves professionally while 31.6% agreed that the police do not abuse their power .”

To turn around organizational culture of SAPS, reliance solely on messages about ethics and integrity is insufficient; strengthening legal and regulatory mechanisms and controls is necessary to enforce compliance and detect misconduct.

“And so to turn around an organizational culture like this , you cannot solely rely on messages about ethics and integrity . What you really need to do is focus on strengthening these other types of controls around your legal and regulatory mechanisms , ensuring that you have the right policy framework , the right controls in place , the right measures for detecting this kind of misconduct to bring people into line .”

Once rule-based compliance with financial disclosure is achieved in SAPS, ethics will start to develop over time as compliance becomes the norm.

“Once everybody starts complying with the rules , ethics start developing in and of itself over time .”

A middle group within an organization may not be extremely ethical or unethical, they might turn a blind eye to misconduct to avoid involvement, and ethical behavior must be enforced through rule-based mechanisms to restore integrity in public sector organizations including SAPS.

“n e i t h e r e x t r e m e l y e t h i c a l n o r u n e t h i c a l . T h i s i s a g r o u p o f p e o p l e t h a t g o a l o n g w i t h w h a t t h e c u l t u r a l n o r m i s ... A n d s o h e m a k e s t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t t o s w i t c h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e , t o w i n o v e r t h i s m i d d l e ... t o r e s t o r e e t h i c s ... through rule-based following and that is the kind of approach that I think that South Africa should be focusing on , I think particularly within SAPS , but as the broader public sector as well ...”

Where corruption is embedded in institutional culture, ethical appeals fail because the system rewards corrupt behaviour and punishes those who resist it.

“W h e r e c o r r u p t i o n i s e m b e d d e d i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l c u l t u r e , e t h i c a l a p p e a l s t e n d t o f a l l f l a t b e c a u s e t h e s y s t e m i t s e l f r e w a r d s c o r r u p t b e h a v i o u r a n d p u n i s h e s t h o s e w h o r e s i s t i t .”

An individual with strong personal ethics in a structurally corrupt system is powerless, lacks institutional support for ethical behaviour, and faces continued pressure to ignore misconduct, with examples from Zondo Commission and Madlanga Commission.

“A n i n d i v i d u a l w i t h s t r o n g p e r s o n a l e t h i c s o p e r a t i n g i n s i d e a s t r u c t u r a l l y c o r r u p t s y s t e m ... B o t h t h e Z o n d o C o m m i s s i o n a n d e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e M a d l a n g a C o m m i s s i o n p r o v i d e s u c h e x a m p l e s ...”

The SAPS annual report survey question measured the percentage of officials agreeing that their police colleagues conduct themselves professionally and ethically.

“p e r c e n t a g e o f o f f i c i a l s t h a t a g r e e d t h a t t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s , t h e p o l i c e , c o n d u c t t h e m s e l v e s p r o f e s s i o n a l l y a n d e t h i c a l l y . T h a t w a s t h e q u e s t i o n f r o m t h e S A P S r e p o r t .”

Financial disclosure system is the starting point of the integrity framework to identify conflicts of interest through disclosed companies and lifestyle audits, critical for ethical enforcement.

“t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f t h e i n t e g r i t y f r a m e w o r k ... i s t h e f i n a n c i a l d i s c l o s u r e s y s t e m ... w h e t h e r a n o f f i c i a l h a s c u r r e n t c o n f l i c t s o f i n t e r e s t ... t h e f i n a n c i a l d i s c l o s u r e f o r m ... c o m p a n i e s t h a t t h e y d i s c l o s e o n t h e i r f o r m s ... c h e c k w h e t h e r t h e y a r e o n t h e c e n t r a l s u p p l i e r s d a t a b a s e ... l i f e s t y l e r e v i e w ... l i f e s t y l e a u d i t ... builds on the initial disclosures.”

There are multiple, differing financial disclosure frameworks across South Africa's public service, leading to inconsistent standards, inefficiencies, and dispersed investigative capacity.

“a r e m a n y d i f f e r e n t d i s c l o s u r e f r a m e w o r k s . M e m b e r s o f p a r l i a m e n t h a v e a d i s t i n c t f r a m e w o r k ... E x e c u t i v e ... J u d i c i a r y ... L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t ... I n c o n s i s t e n t s t a n d a r d s ... d i s p e r s e d a c r o s s ... i n e f f i c i e n c i e s ...”

Failures in financial disclosure forms create blind spots and omissions, hindering understanding of conflicts of interest and preventing effective preventative controls.

“d o w n s t r e a m e f f e c t s w h e n w e g e t t h i s w r o n g , w h e n t h e r e a r e o m i s s i o n s i n t h i s i n i t i a l f o r m , a r e a s a n d b l i n d s p o t s t h a t w e d o n o t c h e c k , d o w n t h e l i n e w h e n w e a r e t r y i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d a n i v i d u a l ' s p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t s o f i n t e r e s t ... I t i s m u c h m o r e d i f f i c u l t t o p u t i n p l a c e p r e v e n t a t i v e c o n t r o l s ...”

The dispersal of investigative capacity and use of ethics officers who may lack appropriate skills undermines effective financial disclosure investigations, causing inefficiencies and challenges in criminal investigation preparation.

“d i s p e r s e d a c r o s s s o m a n y d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s ... o f f i c i a l s s u c h a s e t h i c s o f f i c e r s ... m i g h t n o t h a v e t h e p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l s e t ... i n e f f i c i e n c i e s ...”

Concealment of financial interests in immediate family members creates challenges for managing conflicts of interest in public service contexts such as Public Service Commission or line ministry.

“part of the challenge with not extending these requirements to your immediate family members is both the concealment of these assets and your financial interests, but the effect, the downstream effect that that has, for example, on managing conflicts of interest, if we, as I say, for example, as a Public Service Commission or line ministry”

Current financial disclosure forms only apply to individuals and not to their immediate family members, which allows concealment of financial interests through family members.

“the current form and disclosure requirements only apply to the individual, whether that is a public servant, elected official, etcetera. ... One of the easiest way of concealing your financial interests and wealth is to place these same companies in the name of your immediate family members”

Disclosure forms do not address beneficial ownership, enabling officials to hide assets using nominees or trusts.

“it does not deal with beneficial ownership. ... actors are sophisticated. They will put their financial interests ... in complex legal structures. ... so this starts blurring the lines when you are an investigator and starts making it much more difficult to determine who ultimately benefits from this asset or this company, who has direct control over it”

Currently, financial disclosure forms do not require disclosure of potential conflicts of interest in family members such as involvement with medical supplies in the Department of Health, posing direct conflict risks.

“if we are not aware of your wife or husband's financial interests in, for example, let us say, medical supplies and you work in the Department of Health, that can potentially pose a very direct conflict of interest and in the current regime, that is not something that we would be directly able to consider because we do not require that kind of disclosure to be made in the disclosure form”

Without extending disclosure requirements to family members and beneficial ownership, officials can circumvent financial disclosure rules by using nominees or trusts.

“what we are leaving open again for them to just use some kind of a nominee or intermediary structure that they can transfer all of those funds in, put it in a trust or find some kind of way that an official does not have to declare these assets or interests because they are not in your official name”

South Africa has been working on anti-money laundering reforms including beneficial ownership registers for companies and property to address investigatory difficulties.

“South Africa has been working on leaving the grey list in terms of the anti-money laundering requirements and the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force. ... a lot of the amendments introduced as part of those reforms were around introducing beneficial ownership registers for companies, for property and even in the case of trusts determining who is the ultimate beneficiary of an asset”

The current disclosure forms leave open significant gaps in disclosure of family member assets and beneficial ownership, allowing misuse for corruption and money laundering.

“we are leaving open again for them to just use some kind of a nominee or intermediary structure that they can transfer all of those funds in, put it in a trust or find some kind of way that an official does not have to declare these assets or interests because they are not in your official name”

It is possible for officials to prepare disclosure forms correctly by fully disclosing assets even if purchased under family members' names or beneficial ownership is complex, but current rules do not mandate this and create a vulnerability.

“by having this small arm's length of distance between you and an asset you can prepare your disclosure form entirely correctly. You can fill it out without having to worry about all of those things that you have not disclosed and you would be following the rules. And I think that is part of the challenge here that we have left open, I think, both with the family members and the beneficial ownership issues, we have left open two of the biggest gaps”

The gaps in requiring disclosure of assets related to immediate family members and beneficial ownership represent substantial vulnerabilities frequently exploited in grand corruption schemes internationally.

“we have left open two of the biggest gaps that we know internationally are used in grand corruption schemes and these are issues that are quite significant and quite substantial vulnerabilities”

Current disclosure forms require detailed information about assets such as properties including location, value, acquisition method, cost and origins, to track changes and detect undeclared assets.

“for each asset that you declare within a category, ... you would have to explain where it is located. You might have to explain what the value of the property is. ... When was this property acquired? How was it acquired? What did you ... pay? ... It is about more consistently being able to describe a full picture of your financial status ... to see the changes ... and so it helps us understand what these changes look like with time but also detect potential cases where somebody all of a sudden shows up with assets that have previously been undeclared”

The financial disclosure form currently excludes high value movable property other than vehicles such as jewellery, precious stones, livestock, virtual assets like cryptocurrencies, and monetary assets like cash or bank accounts which can hold significant value and are easy to transfer.

“currently are outside of the scope of the form, this includes high value movable property other than vehicles and so for example things like jewellery, precious stones, livestock and other similar high value items ... virtual and intangible assets ... cryptocurrencies or digital tokens ... monetary assets ... cash on hand ... bank accounts”

Certain asset types fall outside the scope of the current disclosure form, creating gaps in financial disclosures.

“types of assets that fall outside the scope of the current form. ... So within the current form the focus is largely on some of the more common and I guess high value items that one might consider. ... But I argue that there are several other common asset types that also need to be considered”

A new section added in 2023 to the financial disclosure form requires individuals to report liabilities such as loans they owe and loans they have given to others to provide a fuller picture of their financial means and relationships.

“it is a new section that was added I believe in the last amendment in 2023 that introduces a section where individual must report any liabilities, so loans that they owe somebody ... Also money owed to an individual ... Solo loans ... relevant for understanding financial means ...”

The form's treatment of assets used beneficially by a public official but legally owned by third parties is a significant issue highlighting the gap in disclosure regarding beneficial ownership.

“modern phenomenon where something is neither an asset, nor a loan in the true sense, but a public official has the right of use of an asset, either a house or a car, that belongs to somebody else ... this relates to our definition of beneficial ownership ... beneficial use ... joint ownership ...”

The current disclosure requirements allow officials to evade declaring assets like cars by claiming ownership belongs to others, even if they use the assets daily, which undermines the intent of disclosure.

“a senior General in the SAPS drives a R3 million car and then when it comes time to disclose, he says, well, it is not mine, so I do not have to disclose it ... it is his friend's car ... although it parks in his garage every day and he uses it every day ... current gap in requiring disclosure of beneficial ownership ... official can entirely declare that they own zero cars and would be following the rules”

Understanding income on the financial disclosure form should include a continuous narrative of the source, value, acquisition, and disposition of assets over time, not just accounting revenue and expenditure for a particular year.

“we need a kind of constant narrative throughout the financial disclosure form to understand the origins of each asset when it was purchased, what its value was at purchase, but also in many cases when it was disposed of ... we need to understand flow of financial means and what this looks like over time ... not necessarily talking about this in the same way as accounting practice”

The current financial disclosure forms are essentially a list of assets owned without accounting for changes over time or other beneficial interests, limiting their effectiveness for oversight and investigations.

“our current approach in the financial disclosure form is essentially a list of assets that one owns ... it is not intended to understand these changes over time ... to understand the additional kind of interest ... based on good practice internationally ... strengthening downstream processes to detect potential anomalies and to support investigations”

It is important to find a balance in improved disclosure requirements that captures full circumstances while remaining practical and understandable for compliance.

“I think this is an important question. I think you do have to find a balance between...”

There is a need to balance improved substantive content of disclosure forms with practical compliance burdens, as overly complex requirements could deter public service participation or lead to excuses for non-disclosure.

“Now, a question ... balance ... utility ... onerous ... drive people away ... presents a defence on non disclosure”

Many public servants have a relatively straightforward profile of assets and income to declare, typically limited to two or three categories such as house, car, and bank account.

“80% of your public servants will probably only have to declare two or three categories of information . It would be your house , it would be your car , maybe your bank account”

It is important to have comprehensive disclosure forms to detect people engaging in unlawful income and hiding it.

“It is important to have the complicated or the comprehensive form because you need to have enough information to catch people who are essentially making unlawful income and hiding it .”

Most public servants have lawful but onerous asset disclosure obligations, manageable in a digitized e-disclosure system that imports previous submissions to reduce workload.

“There may be one or two , or there may be a limited class of people who have behaved perfectly legally but nevertheless find it a bit onerous to disclose all of their assets for reasons unrelated to corrupt income . But with a e - disclosure system , that is a once - off onerous , for the most part , that is a once - off onerous process . You will just import everything thereafter and it is only if there are dramatic movements in your assets and income that you need to disclose that it is going to be an ongoing problem and those cases are going to be few and far between .”

Digitizing disclosures with automated import and algorithmic risk analysis can free resources and improve investigation focus on anomalies.

“There is a huge potential to free up those resources and to rather focus your human resources on investigating the anomalies , the strange cases .”

The e-disclosure system currently replicates paper forms but has significant untapped potential to aggregate and compare asset data to identify anomalies and risk.

“The e - disclosure system in many ways in its current form is purely replicating what you would have on a paper form but just in a digital format . ... There is a huge amount of untapped potential in using this as a data source for understanding how these assets interact with one another , for comparing across profiles .”

A digitized e-disclosure system can compare financial profiles across individuals in similar roles and levels to detect anomalous wealth and potential corruption.

“If you find an individual that has , you know , two or three times as much wealth as the person who works in the office next door to them , you might start raising questions like that .”

The current e-disclosure system integrates with national traffic information, Companies and Intellectual Properties Commission, and Deeds office to verify declared assets.

“So one of the functionalities that the system has currently is its integration with the national traffic information system , the Companies and Intellectual Properties Commission for a company's data and the Deeds office for property . So it is an important starting point to be able to verify what a person has disclosed and what are on the official records to determine whether the two of those add up”

The only red flags currently automated in the system relate to other remunerative work and gift declarations; comparative verification with prior years requires manual review.

“The only red flags that they currently have in the system is around other remunerative work and gift declarations”

The e-disclosure system currently does not automatically flag discrepancies between this year's financial disclosures and last year's disclosures; verification depends on ethics officers or Public Service Commission officials manually reviewing records.

“the system does not do is flag discrepancies between this year's disclosure and last year's disclosure”

The current e-disclosure digital architecture includes a gift registry and a section for uploading documents approving other remunerative work, but automated red flags for anomalies are very limited.

“the e-disclosure digital architecture includes a gift registry and includes a section where one would upload the documents showing that their other remunerative work was approved... the current system has very limited red flags, automated red flags, for detecting these kind of anomalies”

Public access to financial disclosures is limited and individuals within line ministries currently verify disclosures, which is a very small cohort; making disclosures public would dramatically increase accountability support from civil society.

“civil society is a fantastic resource for public accountability and making these kinds of disclosures public has enormous potential to support the verification process ... currently we are relying on individuals within line ministries to verify these disclosures. It is a very small cohorts of individuals”

Public financial disclosures enable civil society organizations and individuals to identify anomalies (such as suspicious acquisition of assets) and submit formal complaints, enhancing accountability.

“I can look at their public disclosure form online, determine this seems a bit odd, and submit a formal complaint to somebody to say that maybe they should investigate this”

Public disclosure is not foreign to South Africa and is already practiced in isolated cases such as in the local government financial disclosure framework where discretion exists to make disclosures public.

“the idea of public disclosure, it is not foreign in South Africa. It is something we already do in isolated cases ... in the local government framework, there is discretion to make financial disclosures public”

Members of Parliament currently have their financial disclosure forms published publicly, and the Parliamentary Monitoring Group distills this information into a website showing year-to-year disclosures of members of Parliament.

“members of parliament have their forms published publicly ... it is the parliamentary monitoring group that they themselves have distilled this information into a website so that you can see from year to year what a member of parliament disclosed”

Countries including Ukraine publish financial declarations broadly (e.g., Ukraine publishes declarations for nearly 800,000 individuals), demonstrating the impracticality of verification by a small number of ethics officers without broader public involvement.

“I mentioned here the example from Sri Lanka and from the Anti-Corruption Act that was recently adopted... but I mentioned, for example, Ukraine that publishes the declarations for nearly 800,000 individuals”

Public disclosure of financial forms need not include every detail; examples from Sri Lanka and the newly adopted Anti-Corruption Act show that disclosures can be published in redacted form that balances public access and individual privacy.

“they own a property in this city for example, or they own this make of car, but you do not necessarily say the address, you do not say what the registration number of the car is, etcetera... you can find a balance between public access and an individual's right to privacy”

Using broader public involvement and civil society organizations to assist in verification can strengthen verification processes and reduce the burden on ethics officers.

“leveraging the public more broadly to hold their neighbours accountable, for civil society organisations to look into these disclosures, we start outsourcing the kind of verification and start strengthening the verification measures”

In many countries, public service members must abide by codes of conduct and ethical requirements that include public disclosure obligations as conditions of service.

“that you have to abide to certain code of conduct, to certain ethical requirements and this kind of public disclosure would merely be part of those requirements as your conditions of service as a member of the civil service”

The Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) recognizes legitimate circumstances where privacy rights can be restricted, specifically citing corruption and corruption investigations as examples.

“even POPIA... it recognizes that there are legitimate circumstances in which privacy can be restricted and it specifically talks about corruption and corruption investigations”

The same privacy concerns apply to disclosure of immediate family members' interests, which need not be made public to respect their privacy, but this must be balanced against transparency requirements.

“those disclosures do not necessarily have to be made public because that then respects the privacy of the individuals that are outside of the public service”

Constitutional rights such as privacy may be limited in justifiable circumstances, including as defined in section 36 of the South African Constitution.

“we have section 36 of the Constitution which says there may be justification for the infringement of rights”

Public disclosure requirements for family members who are outside of the public service aim to respect their privacy.

“we are saying in the Sri Lanka example that you often have redacted sections where you would not extend this necessarily, the public disclosure requirements to family members that are outside of the public service to respect their privacy.”

Members of an official's immediate family are not public service employees, so public disclosure requirements do not apply to them.

“The members of your immediate family are not employees, so this would not apply to them.”

There are privacy concerns about extending disclosure requirements to immediate family members even outside of public disclosure laws.

“And that is where my privacy concerns arise.”

In international practice, there is often a requirement for initial disclosure by family members, which may be relevant in the South African context though there is uncertainty about the legal implications.

“I think that is a fair question. I do not think I would be able to confidently speak to...in international practice, I think it is something that you often find and I think there is a strong argument to be made for why it is relevant in the South African context.”

Within the government framework, there is no active push to make family members' disclosure public due to concerns about privacy rights.

“I have not yet come across a case where there is anybody within the government framework that is actively pushing for making these disclosures public. I am sure that people would have the same kinds of concerns around the right to privacy...”

Municipalities have discretion whether or not to make disclosures of council members or officials public and few municipalities apply this function due to concerns about privacy.

“It is very difficult to have reliable information...it is not...something that many municipalities apply. And I think, you know, for obvious reasons that they would be concerned around, you know, disclosing these.”

Disclosure requirements in parliament generally apply only to members themselves and do not extend to their family members.

“I do not believe it extends to family members, but I stand under correction. I am not as familiar with the requirements for members of parliament...”

The current disclosure form allows a declarant to comply fully while still holding substantial undisclosed wealth through family members, companies, nominees, or accumulating assets whose origin cannot be tested against legitimate income, which hampers the integrity system.

“Declarant can comply fully and honestly with every requirement of the current form while still holding substantial undisclosed wealth through a family member, exercising undisclosed control through a company, through a nominee arrangement, or accumulating assets whose origin and timing cannot be tested against legitimate income.”

The public official filer of disclosures is typically an elected official or member of the civil service and this includes them and their family members.

“the declarant effectively, who in most instances would be either an elected official, a member of the civil service, etcetera. So it would be public sector employees and their family members.”

There exists a foundational issue with weaknesses in the disclosure form affecting its efficacy.

“you describe the knock-on effects of the weaknesses of the disclosure form. It is an issue you have already addressed”

Design flaws in the disclosure form impact integrity management framework regardless of how well downstream processes are administered, indicating a need for amendments to the disclosure form.

“As conflict of interest management and lifestyle review processes rely on the information the form generates, these design flaws are not confined to the form itself. Without amendments to the disclosure form, the impact of the integrity management framework is limited regardless of how well downstream processes are administered.”

South Africa's financial disclosure form should be tailored to the country's specific context, corruption challenges, and scale, rather than directly adopting maximalist international best practices.

“In high income countries they do not have this kind of disclosure requirement and that might be the case because the level of corruption and the kinds of challenges that they deal with do not necessarily warrant that kind of level of disclosure and invasion of privacy... these issues should always be tailored to your specific context, to your specific challenges, the scale of the corruption issue that you have in a country.”

The StAR document titled 'Asset and interest disclosure: A technical guide to an effective form' provides comprehensive best practice guidance for disclosure forms including considerations like intellectual property rights, and is relevant for South Africa.

“It is the StAR document, it is titled: 'Asset and interest disclosure: A technical guide to an effective form.'... this particular form will include every type of imaginable type of asset... I think there are some universal principles that I think makes sense in every jurisdiction and I think questions around beneficial ownership, the family member question, I think are particularly important and I think are very relevant to the South African context.”

The recent StAR report assesses South Africa's financial disclosure form and e-disclosure system, identifying omissions and priorities to improve them according to international standards and good practice.

“This was an assessment conducted at the request of the Department of Public Service and Administration to both look at the form as well as the e-disclosure system and how it functions currently... to assess the current form against these international standards and good practice to determine what are some of the omissions in the South African context currently that should be considered and some of the priorities.”

A lifestyle audit or substantive investigation can be triggered by a whistleblower or interdepartmental complaint about suspected suspicious activity, highlighting the importance of the e-disclosure system and integrated databases for verification.

“One of the issues that can trigger a more substantive investigation such as a lifestyle audit is, for example, a whistleblower complaint or say an interdepartmental complaint that they suspect that there is maybe something suspicious happening with an individual that might warrant a more substantive investigation... this is also a core part of the verification process and why verification is so important... good practice is to also...”

Certain positions such as senior management service, supply chain management, or financial officers are considered high risk and should be subject to more scrutiny in lifestyle audits.

“If somebody is in these senior management service, that is a high risk function. If somebody is in supply chain management or a financial officer, that is potentially higher risk and so we should apply more scrutiny.”

There should be a risk-based approach to lifestyle audits and investigations to identify red flags for individuals with financial means beyond their disclosed means.

“you can use a risk-based approach... to identify red flags that then might be the basis for triggering a more intensive investigation or audit”

The current system for security clearance includes life style audits that are supposed to look at assets and ownership outside of normal employment, but the details are not yet established.

“It is supposed to do some form of lifestyle audit. The details of what is done, we have not yet established, but we will.”

Senior Generals' disclosure forms have external verification mechanisms, but often omit details that make it difficult to see if the disclosure is complete.

“all the forms submitted by senior Generals, they have an external verification mechanism to look for those things that Chair say, you know, they might complete it, but leave out a lot of detail that makes it difficult for an ordinary person to see that actually this is not a full disclosure.”

The Public Service Commission verifies disclosures for Senior Management Service, but there are gaps in disclosure forms and the current approach is largely about assessing compliance rather than identifying substantive red flags for investigation.

“the disclosures are currently verified for the SMS is through the Public Service Commission... some of the gaps in the disclosure forms and how that leaves some deficiencies in areas that we might miss the blind spots... the current approach is largely about assessing compliance.”

The current system is not geared up to substantively identify red flags requiring further investigation, partly due to capacity and institutional framework weaknesses.

“current system in its approach is not yet geared up to more substantively identifying the red flags that one would need to consider to determine whether more substantive investigation is necessary... I think that is also... the weakness of the institutional framework... what kind of capacity we are using to verify these disclosures... the kind of capacity that is needed for properly verifying these disclosures and for turning red flags into an investigation, I do not believe is there yet... that is reflective in the results that we see that all of these forms are verified and it turns up nothing.”

The e-disclosure system pulls data from CIP, NATIS and the Deeds office for verification but does not currently use SARS data, which could provide better indicators of wealth and income but faces legal limitations on tax information disclosure.

“The e-disclosure system... pulls data from the two systems, the three I think you say CIPC, the NATIS and the Deeds office for verification... what you have not listed and maybe suggested is whether it should not be able to pull data from the SARS system... The challenge... is that SARS has, in terms of its mandate, it is very restricted in disclosing taxpayer information and that creates certain limitations...”

There is a bill being tabled for comment that suggests the Financial Intelligence Centre might have a future role in providing data needed for financial disclosures, which is a positive development to fill current data gaps.

“there is a bill... that suggests that the FIC might have a future role in providing the data needed for financial disclosures... I think that is a very positive development... important to start filling in those gaps of what kind of data is needed to properly and fully verify these disclosures.”

The Public Service Commission verifies financial disclosures and identifies conflicts of interest, which are then referred to line ministries; ethics officers within line ministries conduct lifestyle reviews and verify disclosures below the Senior Management Service (SMS); the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) proposes to lead lifestyle audits for all public entities, or this function is performed by external contractors; any findings from that process are referred either to SAPS or the Hawks for criminal investigation or to the individual line ministry for disciplinary action.

“The Public Service Commission verifies financial disclosures and identifies conflicts of interest, which are then referred to line ministries. Ethics officers within line ministries conduct lifestyle reviews and verify disclosures below the SMS. The SIU proposes to lead lifestyle audits for all public entities, or this function is performed by external contractors. And any findings coming out of that are then referred either to SAPS or the Hawks for the criminal investigation or to the individual line ministry for disciplinary action.”

Currently, within the Public Service Commission, they verify the SMS financial disclosures; the SIU proposes to reach a point where there is a blanket proclamation allowing them to conduct lifestyle audits across the public sector, bypassing current arrangements of seconding officials to individual ministries to conduct audits.

“So currently within the Public Service Commission, they will verify the SMS, the financial disclosures. The proposal from the SIU... is that they would want to reach a point where there is a blanket proclamation that allows them to conduct lifestyle audits across the public sector, and that would then get around this current complexity around seconding officials to individual ministries to conduct these audits for them.”

Under secondment arrangements, SIU officials effectively function as members of the department rather than as SIU officials.

“under these secondment arrangements, effectively they function as if they were a member of that department rather than an SIU official.”

It is important for whatever entity has responsibility for financial disclosures and lifestyle audits to have accountability, access to the right resources, capacity, and the ability to perform the function correctly, because weaknesses in any part of the system cause collapse of the entire chain.

“I think it is important that whatever entity has this kind of responsibility, they need to have a level of accountability, they need to have access to the right resources, they need the capacity to perform this function correctly, because ... this is a whole value chain that connects to one another, and as soon as you have weaknesses in one area, it starts collapsing.”

The current system disperses the financial disclosure and lifestyle audit function across many different institutions with small roles, resulting in muddled responsibility and accountability when the system does not function properly.

“we have dispersed the same function across many different institutions that have a small part and small role to play in implementing the system... And so the kind of line of sight and responsibility for this function starts getting a bit muddled and starts getting a bit lost on who exactly is responsible for this, who do we hold accountable if the system is not functioning, because currently it is so widely dispersed.”

The National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC) recommended creating an office of Public Integrity, which would centralize the administration of disclosures for assessment and investigation flows from disclosure forms.

“The National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council has recommended the creation of an office of Public Integrity... one of the functions of that office would be the centralized administration of disclosure for assessment and investigation flowing from disclosure forms. Would that be correct?”

It makes sense to centralize the financial disclosure and related functions within one dedicated agency to pool resources, have line of sight and clear accountability for corruption prevention.

“I think it is something that makes a lot of sense to centralize this kind of function, to include it within the context of the broader corruption prevention landscape... putting all of these related functions into one entity so that you can pull these resources and ensure that there is line of sight and clear accountability for corruption prevention.”

The discussions with NACAC during their term from 2022 to 2025 revealed that NACAC had not fully considered the financial disclosure function as part of the preventive anti-corruption architecture and realized later they had already developed plans for a dedicated agency.

“In our discussions with them, I think it became clear that I do not think that they had fully considered the financial disclosure function as being part of the preventive architecture or something that should be considered within a dedicated corruption prevention agency. And so upon realizing that we had offered to write this research report for them. ... Their recommendations were largely cooked already, that they had already had their ideas and plans, and so we came in at a very late stage to provide this kind of recommendation that financial disclosures might be one of the areas to consider for our office of public integrity.”

The final NACAC report to the President included a section on corruption prevention and explained the concept and core gaps in the broad corruption prevention architecture, beyond financial disclosure, also covering corruption risk assessment and corruption proofing.

“this report was also published as part of the council's final report to the President, there is a section on corruption prevention, and we wrote this to basically explain what corruption prevention concept entails as a concept, and to identify some of the core gaps currently in the broader corruption prevention architecture... It also looks at corruption risk assessment and kind of corruption proofing ... and then helping them to rebuild those institutions.”

Ethics officers have a dual mandate to advise on disclosures and to verify those disclosures, creating a potential conflict of interest as they are officials within the Ministry and are asked to verify disclosures of their colleagues for potential corrupt conduct.

“this is a role that has a dual mandate, both to advise on disclosures and to verify those same disclosures, and so there is a potential conflict there in terms of independent scrutiny, and the reality is these are also officials who are based within the Ministry, and so these would be your colleagues that you are being asked to verify their disclosures to determine whether they are engaging in potentially corrupt conduct”

Within the South African context, known issues around capture and victimization of whistleblowers raise significant concerns about placing responsibility with inline ministries, potentially exposing ethics officials to pressure to overlook misconduct.

“within the South African context, the known issues around capture, around the victimization of whistle blowers, I think these issues raises significant concerns around having this kind of responsibility placed within line ministries. I think this potentially exposes them to significant pressure to look the other way”

Ethics officers often have other day-to-day roles besides the ethics function, and their training may not be focused on anti-corruption, potentially leaving them ill-equipped to apply the level of scrutiny ideally required.

“these are officials that are often designated to be the ethics officer in addition to their day-to-day activities... the training that they are coming with would not necessarily be on anti-corruption issues, and it might not be the case that they are necessarily fully equipped to be able to do this with the level of scrutiny that we would ideally want from something like this”

Recommendations for further investigation or disciplinary action by the SIU lifestyle audit are ultimately given to the head of department to consider and act upon or ignore, allowing possible conflicts of interest especially if officials themselves are implicated in corrupt networks.

“Even in cases where the SIU is seconded to conduct lifestyle audits, their recommendations for further investigation or disciplinary action are ultimately given to the head of department to consider and take forward or ignore... It might be that this official themselves are implicated in the corrupt network... I think it strengthens the argument for why you need some level of arm's length scrutiny”

Once an official leaves the department, the jurisdiction of the ethics officer ends, meaning ongoing investigations can be evaded by moving to another part of government.

“Once an official leaves the department, the jurisdiction of the ethics officer ends, meaning that an ongoing investigation can simply be evaded by moving to another part of government. This is not theoretical. This does happen.”

Although centralizing functions would probably be better, there is a possibility of bribery from the central point investigating or auditing, resulting in no action in respect of some individuals.

“Although centralizing would probably be much better, but I already foresee the possibility of those coming from the central point being bribed by those who are being investigated or on whom the audits are being performed, with the result that nothing will happen, at least in respect of some individuals.”

The current model of anti-corruption mechanisms is not working and needs to change to allow for more effective enforcement and oversight.

“what I think we have to recognize is that the current model is not working and that is something that needs to change”

The Public Service Commission's mandate only extends to the public service; therefore, it cannot apply the same level of scrutiny, independence, and sanctions to elected officials and judiciary members, limiting its effectiveness over broader corruption issues.

“One of the challenges with putting all of these mechanisms within the Public Service Commission is that the Public Service Commission's mandate only extends to the public service. So if we want to apply the same levels of scrutiny, independence, and sanctions to, for example, elected officials, to people within the Judiciary, etc., the Public Service Commission's mandate would not be able to perform that kind of function”

Gaps in financial disclosure requirements and a weak institutional framework have allowed misconduct and unexplained wealth among SAPS officials over the last five years; policy frameworks for sanctioning are inadequate to address this.

“The gaps in the financial disclosure requirements and the vulnerabilities of a weak institutional framework help explain why no misconduct or unexplained wealth has been detected among SAPS officials over the last 5 years. However, even if any discrepancies, conflicts, or unexplained wealth were to be detected, the policy framework for issuing sanctions against”

A consistent framework and reporting to the same independent entity helps apply consistent sanctions and accountability across various jurisdictions including elected officials.

“what you will often find in many jurisdictions is that you have one consistent framework that everybody applies to and that everybody reports to the same entity and having that level of independence then really helps to apply the same sanctions consistently and that can then extend to your elected officials”

The delegation of authority to heads of departments creates inconsistencies in consequence management and risks officials getting away with discrepancies even if detected.

“This delegation of authority allows for inconsistencies in applying consequence management based on the individual discretion of heads of departments and hampers effective oversight across 42 national and 97 provincial departments. This undermines the persuasiveness of the regime as officials can get away with discrepancies even if detected.”

Across the entire public service, only one dismissal for disclosure related issues has occurred in the last two years.

“There has literally across the entire public service only been one dismissal in the last two years.”

Sanctions for disclosure breaches in the public service over the last two years have been limited to only one dismissal.

“Only a single dismissal has thus far been reported in the public service over the last 2 years.”

The South African SIU lacks statutory powers to gather information for lifestyle audits.

“The SIU, when it is brought in to conduct the lifestyle audits, does not get the statutory powers to gather the information.”

Lifestyle reviews and investigations are included in the disciplinary process related to disclosure breaches.

“I would like to extend that to say that this also includes your lifestyle reviews, your lifestyle investigations.”

The document titled 'How to Put in Place Effective Sanctioning Provisions for Financial Disclosure Related Violations' provides comparative examples of sanctions from other countries to guide sanctions for disclosure violations.

“We have in this document, a few tables that provide examples from different countries on what this can look like legally to very particularly specify, for example, what the offence is for non-disclosure or for late submission.”

Currently, the sanctions for submission of false or incomplete disclosures in South Africa lead to ordinary disciplinary processes without clear consequences or severity scale, resulting in uncertainty for public officials.

“In the current system, this would be an ordinary disciplinary process ... you do not know how you get punished or whether you will be punished if you do not comply with the rules.”

There is 100% compliance with submission requirements in the South African Police Service.

“We saw 100% compliance in SAPS, for example.”

False or incomplete disclosure is a relatively low bar criminal offense in many jurisdictions, but verification processes seek to find undisclosed assets and require explanations for discrepancies.

“False disclosure itself is regarded as a criminal offence and it is a relatively low bar to be able to prove that ... Incomplete disclosure ... effectively there are assets that you have not disclosed ... when we are in that verification process, we compare this to what we have on records elsewhere and we find a particular instance where you have not disclosed a vehicle or house. You might have opportunity to explain why, what those discrepancies are.”

False disclosure is treated as a criminal offence in many jurisdictions, but South African public service currently only uses disciplinary processes that are not sufficiently persuasive to deter false disclosures.

“In many cases where you will find that false disclosure itself is regarded as a criminal offence ... we do not have the same kind of sanctions in the public service regulations ... you have very little persuasive measures to deter people from submitting false disclosures.”

Current sanctions for false or incomplete disclosures rarely involve criminal or strong disciplinary action, thereby limiting deterrence.

“Currently we do not have any kind of criminal or strong disciplinary sanctions for if we do find some kind of violation. You would just send that to a disciplinary process. So in effect you have very little persuasive measures to deter people from submitting false disclosures.”

A disciplinary process may be triggered if false statements are made on disclosure forms, leading potentially to criminal conduct investigation.

“If you were to lie on your disclosure form, perhaps the worst that can happen to you is that you go through a disciplinary process and it might trigger an investigation coming out of that to start looking into the criminal conduct.”

Asset forfeiture is an effective sanction for disclosure violations and can be linked to unexplained wealth or order regimes seen in other jurisdictions.

“In paragraph 33 you get to the sanction that would really bite, which is asset forfeiture ... I would like, if you can, also to link that issue to the unexplained wealth or deterrence regime ...”

Court processes in South Africa are sometimes slower than desired, making it less effective to prove criminal conduct for unexplained wealth offenses through the courts and suggesting administrative or civil penalties for non-conviction based confiscation instead.

“our court processes are sometimes much slower than we would want and clogging them up with this kind of offence to prove criminal conduct for unexplained wealth is perhaps not the best approach. And I think we can use, for example, the SIU’s special tribunal as an example of a civil process that is much more efficient at doing something like this for this kind of confiscation or penalties. And so my suggestion is rather to focus on these kinds of administrative or civil penalties for non-conviction based confiscation.”

Unexplained wealth should be considered illicit enrichment and a criminal offense, but criminal investigations for this can consume excessive resources and detract from addressing grand corruption schemes.

“you come across unexplained wealth, that this in itself, illicit enrichment, should be a criminal offense. The reason why I caution against this is you have to recognize that once you turn this into a criminal investigation, that the use a certain amount of resources that is then being focused on proving criminal conduct for, merely just for unexplained wealth. And you can end up in a state where you put so much resources in just investigating this kind of crime that you lose sight of the bigger issues, the grand corruption schemes, the issues that really matter and that are the most important.”

A more efficient process for addressing unexplained wealth would be to introduce legal mechanisms around non-conviction based confiscation to reduce resource strain and expedite sanctions.

“a more efficient process would be to introduce legal mechanisms around non-conviction based confiscation.”

Non-conviction based asset forfeiture cases exist that do not require proof of specific crimes, but go through the courts and require an underlying criminality to be proven though not a specific offence.

“There is in existence a dispensation that is not pegged on specific crimes and, but it goes through the courts system. It is not administrative and cases in that context are instituted by the Asset Forfeiture Unit. But although I do not remember the specifics now, I was last engaged in those sorts of cases when I was still in practice. So it also gets rid of the need to prove a specific offence. But I think there should be some, if I still remember the criteria, there should still be some underlying criminality, but you do not have to prove a specific offence for forfeiture to then follow.”

If a person can legitimately explain the origins of their wealth a forfeiture order will not be made, but if they cannot, then forfeiture would be a very powerful sanction in this context.

“if someone can legitimately explain the origins of their wealth, in circumstances where, well, you have the disclosure history, which you can point to and which might found good cause to issue an unexplained wealth order, if someone can explain the wealth, you know, they may have a separate problem explaining why they did not disclose it. But if they can explain a legitimate source for it, then it will not be forfeited. But if they cannot, then it would be and that would be a huge, a very powerful sanction in this context.”

Certain jurisdictions have add-on mechanisms based on unexplained wealth orders allowing authorities to issue instructions or orders to explain wealth not necessarily linked to criminal activity, allowing forfeiture in absence of reasonable explanation.

“there are other jurisdictions that have created an add-on which is based on what are called unexplained wealth orders, where an authority can issue an instruction or an order for you to explain wealth that cannot necessarily be directly linked to criminal activity, but cannot be explained with reference to legitimate income. And then those regimes make provision for forfeiture in the absence of a reasonable explanation.”

Current asset forfeiture regime depends on some proof, albeit on a civil standard, of underlying unlawful activity.

“our asset forfeiture regime currently depends on some proof, albeit on a civil standard, of underlying unlawful activity.”

Non-conviction based confiscation involves using evidence of unexplained wealth as grounds for confiscation without proving criminal intent underlying that wealth.

“I think what you have just described, this is what I mean by a non-conviction based confiscation, that you would use the same kind of principles just as you have articulated.”

Such non-conviction based confiscation would lead to confiscation of wealth that cannot be explained but not necessarily punishment.

“Well, it would not necessarily be punished. It would be the confiscation of wealth that cannot be explained.”

The bundle of documents includes comparative international research on public official asset disclosure and effective forfeitures systems, including a document titled 'Getting the Full Picture on Public Officials'.

“this is a group that have done a lot of work on understanding what this regime looks like internationally... There is a document titled “Getting the Full Picture on Public Officials” that sets out kind of a comparative standards across the board for the whole system and so the graphs that we mentioned on public disclosure of family members, for example, those are things that are captured in this document.”

The 'Asset and Interest Disclosure, A Technical Guide to an Effective Form' document details the categories of information that should be included in asset disclosure forms for public officials.

“the “Asset and Interest Disclosure”... speaks to what a form, an effective form could look like. So this gives intensive detail on all of the different types of categories. One might need to consider the specific information that is relevant within a category. So I mentioned, for example, beyond understanding that a person has a vehicle, you should know when it was acquired, through what financing means, etcetera. So this gives a lot more detail on what a form could look like practically.”

The 'Automated Risk Analysis of Asset and Interest Declarations of Public Officials' document provides guidance on using digital systems for asset disclosure and risk analysis in South Africa.

“this is another one of these kind of global research reports that provides guidance on what an automated asset and interest disclosures system could look like and what kind of risk analysis one can perform. So it gets into some of these issues around fully maximizing the use of a digital system, potential red flags that one could look into that could be applied to the South African system.”

Document 311 in the bundle specifically addresses South Africa's Financial Disclosure Form and E-Disclosure System of South Africa.

“311 is where you start, where the documents start addressing South Africa specifically. 311 is “Financial Disclosure Form and E-Disclosure System of South Africa”.”

There are existing rules in South Africa, such as the Public Administration Management Act, that restrict public servants from doing business with the state to prevent conflicts of interest.

“So I believe it is the Public Administration Management Act that introduces this restriction which effectively says that public servants of the public sector is not allowed to do business with the state.”

Potential conflicts of interest among senior management in the South African Police Service (SAPS) are identified and reported annually by the Public Service Commission, with around 30 cases reported each year.

“In the Parliamentary questions, there is this response where the acting Minister of Police mentions, I believe every year it was around roughly 30 changes, potential conflicts of interest that were reported by the Public Service Commission among the senior management service.”

To verify conflicts of interest, a main method is to check whether a public servant owns a company that receives government contracts via the central supplier's database.

“The main way for verifying that there is no conflict is to determine whether that company is on the central supplier's database. So these are companies that get government procurements, that tender for procurements.”

The authority to determine whether a potential conflict of interest is genuine in the public service rests with the Executive Authority, typically the Minister, who may appoint a panel to consider the conflict and provide independent recommendations.

“The authority rests with the Minister to determine whether this is a genuine conflict. In terms of the relevant regulations, the executive authority is supposed to appoint a panel of at least two persons to consider the interest and provide independent recommendations on what should be done.”

Existing regulations on conflict of interest management are thin and discretionary, leaving a lack of consistent oversight on how conflicts are handled within line ministries.

“The regulations are a bit thin in terms of what the potential solutions are, so it leaves it open to interpretation to the individual line ministries to determine how to deal with those conflicts and how to manage them... It is discretionary. There is little oversight in terms of how this is handled down the line.”

International best practice includes higher standards in prohibiting civil servants from engaging in business activities, not limited to business with the state but including business more generally.

“You would have much higher standards in terms of prohibitions on civil servants engaging in business, not just with the state, but in business more generally.”

In Poland, a public sector employee is not allowed to hold more than 10% interest or shares in a company, which helps reduce potential conflicts of interest.

“If I can use Poland as an example, in terms of their regulations, a public sector employee is not allowed to hold more than 10% of interest or shares in a company and so that helps diminish some of those potential conflicts of interest.”

In some countries like Japan, public sector employees are restricted from having certain outside business interests to maintain impartiality and public sector integrity and to avoid distractions and risks such as funneling bribes disguised as legitimate income.

“in other cases like Japan , they have restrictions which means that as a public sector employee , you are not allowed to be on the board of a company . You are not allowed to be the director of your own company and so it creates much , kind of higher standards for what kind of outside interests you are allowed to have in the first instance”

The current framework addressing corruption prevention in South Africa is fragmentary and incremental approaches have reached limitations; a substantive overhaul with a dedicated corruption prevention agency is needed.

“a lot of the fragmentation and weaknesses that we see in the current framework are a result of incremental attempts to improve the system ... the system in its current form has reached the limit of incremental improvements and has reached a point where you need the more substantive overhaul of how these functions are dispersed”

A dedicated corruption prevention agency should be established as part of a major overhaul to provide a more cohesive institutional framework beyond incremental improvements.

“a substantive overhaul that involves some kind of a dedicated corruption prevention agency ... incremental improvement is just not going to be enough . This is really a major overhaul that is needed”

There is a weakness in the current fragmented arrangement where disciplinary actions and investigations often stall at the departmental or HR level, causing cases to die and not progress.

“one of the weaknesses that you identify is in this fragmented arrangement that pertains now is disciplinary action , an investigation is done , a review is done , a problem is picked up and then it still must go to the head of department or human resources to make a decision whether to discipline or not and often that is where things die”

Documents specific to South Africa diagnose challenges, present international examples, and recommend measures including sanctions and the creation of a dedicated corruption prevention agency with functions on financial disclosure and conflict of interest management.

“the documents that I have mentioned that are written particular to the South African context ... introduces the international examples of how such measures are implemented in other countries and will usually end with recommendations ... suggestions for what we believe a dedicated corruption prevention agency could look like and it builds on NACAC's recommendations to add on some additional functions in terms of financial disclosure , conflict of interest management , etcetera”

Proposed legislative reform documents recommend considering a stand-alone legislative act to replace piecemeal regulations and encompass essential elements of a new disclosure system.

“it starts on 364 , but the recommendations on 367 have the legislative changes that need to be effected . So for example , item 2 talks about considering adopting a stand-alone act that will replace piecemeal regulation and encompasses essential elements of the new disclosure system and then it sets out”

A stand-alone legislative act on corruption issues might not engage with internal departmental disciplinary matters but may focus on criminal liability and asset forfeiture; other regulatory and parliamentary legislation would need engagement for labour and disciplinary matters.

“it may be that the stand-alone act will not focus on departmental discipline , it will focus on criminal liability , asset forfeiture . But if it is going to engage departmental , ja , labour matters and disciplinary matters , there is a world of other regulatory legislation and indeed parliamentary legislation with which it might have to engage”