Colonel Jakobus Jeremiah Petrus Prinsloo deposed to assist the Judicial Commission of Inquiry regarding criminality, political interference and corruption allegations made by Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi on 6 July 2025.
“I depose the statement to assist the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Criminality, Political Interference and Corruption in the Criminal Justice System arising from the specific allegations made public by Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi on the 6 July 2025”
The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) Port Shepstone office is distinct from the Port Shepstone Police Station, located approximately five kilometers apart.
“The DPCI Port Shepstone office is not a police station. There exists a separate police, Port Shepstone Police Station, which is approximately five kilometres inland from where the DPCI offices are”
Prinsloo started his law enforcement career in 1984, training six months at Pretoria West Police College, then worked at Port Shepstone Police Station charge office handling public complaints, joined the Port Shepstone Dog (K9) Unit in January 1986, SANAB after 1998 until its closure end 2003, then joined the Organised Crime Unit in 2004 which later became part of the DPCI in 2009.
“I started my law enforcement career in 1984. I did basic training in policing at the Pretoria West Police College for six months. After completing my training, I was posted at the Port Shepstone Police Station in the charge office, dealing with public complaints. In January 1986, I joined the Port Shepstone Dog Unit, called K9 Unit now. Thereafter in 1998, I joined the South African Narcotics and Alcohol Bureau, it was called SANAB. ... At the beginning of 2004... called the Organised Crime Unit ... later became housed within the DPCI when the DPCI was established in 2009.”
Prinsloo described his career progression: Warrant Officer in 2004, promoted Lieutenant in 2010, Captain in 2012, Lieutenant Colonel in 2019 until retirement.
“In terms of ranking in 2004, I was a Warrant Officer. In 2010, I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. In 2012, I was promoted to captain. In 2019, I was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, which rank I held until I retired.”
Colonel Prinsloo reported to Brigadier Nyuswa, who was Unit Commander of the Port Shepstone Organised Crime Unit after its establishment and before he retired, then to Brigadier Dube as Provincial Commander, later succeeded by Colonel W S Mhlongo; after some time Brigadier Nyuswa returned as Provincial Commander and Prinsloo reported to him until retirement.
“Accordingly, I reported to him. ... After Brigadier Nyuswa had left, I reported to Brigadier Dube, who was the then Provincial Commander. Brigadier Dube was also later retired, and she was succeeded by Colonel W S Mhlongo. After some time Brigadier Nyuswa returned as Provincial Commander. I reported to him until I retired.”
Major General Senona was appointed as Provincial Head of the DPCI in KwaZulu-Natal around August 2020, succeeding Major General Zikhali who took early retirement; Brigadier Mbatha acted in the interim.
“Before Major General Senona joined as the Provincial Head, Major General Zikhali was the Provincial Head of the DPCI in KZN. The latter took early retirement. Brigadier Mbatha acted for a few months until Major General Senona was appointed around August 2020.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo first met Major General Senona within the same week Senona was appointed, during which Senona called all commissioned officers to the Provincial Office and introduced himself before visiting each unit to get to know the members.
“I think it was within the same week that he was appointed. He called all the commissioned officers to the Provincial Office, and he was introduced to us. Later on, he visited each unit and got to know all the members as well.”
Major General Senona would have been briefed about operational matters concerning Colonel Prinsloo's office at the time of taking office around August 2020.
“...at the time that Major General Senona would have, or Major General Senona would have taken office, would he have been briefed about the office, your office, and other operational matters?”
The DPCI had multiple departments in each province during Lt-Col Prinsloo's time, including Serious Corruption Investigation, Serious Commercial Crime Investigation, Serious Organised Crime Investigation, and Priority Crime Specialised Investigation, each led by a Provincial Commander normally at the rank of Brigadier.
“The DPCI has different departments in each province. During my time there, it was the following departments. The biggest one was a Serious Corruption Investigation... There was a Serious Commercial Crime Investigation... And then the biggest one was a Serious Organised Crime Investigation... And Priority Crime Specialised Investigation... each of these departments' components are led by a Provincial Commander, normally at the rank of Brigadier.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo was part of the Serious Organised Crime Investigation in KwaZulu-Natal, which has five units each with a Unit Commander reporting to Brigadier Nyuswa, who reports to Major General Senona.
“I was in a Serious Organised Crime Investigation, which has currently five units in KwaZulu-Natal. Each of these units has a Unit Commander who reports to the Provincial Commander, Brigadier Nyuswa. He is the Provincial Commander for Serious Organised Crime Investigation. He, in turn, reports to the DPCI Provincial Head, currently being Major General Senona.”
The command structure in the police is very strict; officers must obey lawful commands of their commander or face serious consequences such as departmental charges.
“The command structure in the police is very strict. I am obliged to follow the instructions and command of my Commander, failing which I can face serious consequences. This is because ill-discipline is regarded as a serious issue within the law enforcement service... if it is a lawful command or instruction, I have got to do it. I cannot ignore it. There will be serious consequences for me. Most likely, I will be charged departmentally.”
DPCI Port Shepstone office is a two-story building rented from Mr Kamisa, used for administration, operating during working hours, with controlled access and security-vetted staff.
“I have been stationed at the DPCI Port Shepstone office since 004, before the establishment of the DPCI. I was the most senior that had been at that building since we moved into it. The office is a two-story building with a ground floor and a first floor. The DPCI is renting the building from a Mr Kamisa. The DPCI office is not a police station, it is for administration and operates during working hours... Only DPCI members and staff are permitted in the offices and the access is controlled. During my tenure, we had approximately 4 members plus four administrative staff... Both members and staff are security vetted.”
The DPCI Port Shepstone office building had universal coded padlock access, no system to monitor code usage, and was vulnerable to unauthorized entry if the code was obtained.
“The office building was accessible from the street, however, access to it was through the use of a code. The code was universal and not unique. All of us had the same code. The gate was not manned. If anyone would obtain a code, they would obviously get into the office building. I must also point out that there was no system to know who had used the code for access.”
Within the DPCI Port Shepstone office there was an unmanned reception area due to limited staff, and two walk-in safes on the ground floor which were not accessible from outside the building.
“Turning to the inside, there was a reception area, which was not manned due to the limited staff that we had. At the ground floor and first floor were offices. The two walk-in safes, strong rooms, were on the ground floor. The safe was not accessible from the outside of the building.”
The DPCI Port Shepstone office was located in a business area sharing perimeter with several businesses and had security shortcomings including lack of external cameras, alarm system, and backup electricity.
“The office was in a business area and shares a permitted perimeter with a hardware store, a Herald Newspaper office, with a mortuary, and the Liquor Authority, which only operates during the week. There was a service electric fence around the perimeter safe for the part which was bordering the Liquor Authority... The office had no generator or electric backup. There was no cameras or beams outside the office. Further, there was no alarm system monitoring movement on the outside or exterior of the building.”
The hardware store was a hardware shop in 2021 before being taken over by the Department of Human Settlement after the shop moved out.
“It was a hardware shop in 2021. Subsequent to that, the hardware shop, they moved out, and it was then taken over by the Department of Human Settlement.”
There is 24-hour security in the Department of Human Settlement via security guards, but there is no security and the alarm does not work in the DPCI office as of the date of the testimony.
“They have got 24-hour security guards there ... The DPCI office ... has got nothing ... The alarm does not even work any more.”
LT-COL PRINSLOODay 103 · 07 May 2026Refers to: 2021-10-30Location: Department of Human Settlement, DPCI office
The mortuary is no longer being used as such; the premises are now used as a bread distribution point where bread is delivered, packaged, and distributed but baked off-site.
“It is just the mortuary. It is not being used as a mortuary anymore. ... Bread gets delivered there, and then it is distributed again from there. So it is not a bakery as such. Breads are baked offsite, and it is just packaged into smaller trucks and distributed from there.”
There is no barrier or security preventing someone from walking from the forested/bushy area to the offices; anyone can walk in or observe and enter the offices without restriction.
“There is no barrier from that forest to your offices ... So someone can just walk across, or they can observe you as you leave and then come in.”
The Unit Commander delegated responsibility to control the safe to Warrant Officer AB Van Den Berg, and issued a handing over certificate for this in 2019.
“As a Unit Commander, I was only in control of the office. However, given the tasks and my other responsibilities, I delegated the responsibility to control the safe to Warrant Officer AB Van Den Berg. I attach hereby a copy of the handing over certificate in this regard, JJP2.”
Gun inspections are done weekly by the Unit Commander who must get hold of Van Den Berg to open the safe, inspect the firearms, record it in the occurrence book and fire arm register before leaving and Van Den Berg locks the safe and keeps the keys.
“I had to inspect the official firearms that is housed in that safe weekly. I would get hold of him, he would open up for me. Whilst he is there, I will inspect the firearms. Once I am done, make an OB entry, sign the firearm register and then I leave and he locks the safe. The keys are always with him.”
When Colonel Prinsloo was contacted by Brigadier Nyuswa to make the safe available for transferring cocaine, guns were removed, cocaine was placed inside the safe, keys were handed over to Nyuswa, and an occurrence book entry made after they left, but the handing over form for keys was not completed.
“Once I was contacted by Brigadier Nyuswa to make the safe available for him to bring it ... We removed all the firearms, placed the drugs in there, and then the keys were handed to them. We made the OB entry after they had left ... No, we did not complete this form.”
Strict access control to the safe must be applied as per National Instruction SAPS 13.
“... paragraph 20.5 ... deals with management of SAPS 13 stores. We will deal with the debate ... One must understand that access control to the safe must be strictly applied.”
In June 2018, a 24-hour security arrangement was made for high value exhibits stored at the location, specifically for a Port Shepstone drug lab case involving Mandrax tablets.
For a Durban case involving a larger number of people, the responsibility to supply guards for 24-hour security lies with those bringing exhibits to the unit, not LT-COL PRINSLOO's unit.
“It is a Durban case. It is a much bigger, they have got a lot more people than I have got at my unit. If there is exhibits they brought to my unit, they should have supplied the guards for it there at my unit, Commissioner.”
Two safes built to applicable SANBS standards were used to store firearms and office supplies; warrant officer Van Den Bergh held the keys and LT-COL PRINSLOO was not in control of the safes.
“Each of those two safes was built in line with applicable SANBS standards. Each had two locks. Warrant Officer Van Den Bergh had the keys. Just to be clear, I was not in control of the safes.”
The alarm system monitoring motion in the passages would not work during electricity outages, leaving the office exposed and posing a serious risk of exposure.
“The alarm would not work if there was no electricity... If there was interruption of the electricity supply on Saturday, for example, the alarm would be disarmed and the office would be totally exposed. Obviously this was a serious risk of exposure.”
The contract for armed response security with National Security & Fire cost R593.56 monthly and expired in March 2020; the office was vulnerable to break ins and had been broken into at least six or eight times.
“The contracted armed response security company was National Security & Fire. The monthly cost for armed response was R593.56... The contract expired in March 2020. This office was particularly vulnerable and had been broken into a number of times. I can count no less than six incidents.”
Break-in incidents since 2011 include theft of a vacuum cleaner, breaking through an asbestos roof, entering a garage and stealing a vehicle battery, breaking side windows and destroying an alarm, and breaking into Warrant Officer Pienaar's office in January 2020.
“The first one is 27 of December 2011... They stole our vacuum cleaner... Through the roof... In 2014, 8th of June, they broke into the garage... In 2018, 8th December, they broke in on one of the side windows... Completely destroyed our alarm... In 2020, 20th January, they broke through the window of Warrant Officer Pienaar, into his office.”
All break-in incidents were reported to Provincial Commander S R Singh of Counter Intelligence, who did an inspection and wrote a factual report recommending actions, also informing the District Commander and Visible Policing who requested frequent patrols and after-hour visits.
“All these incidents were reported to the Provincial Commander, Counter Intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel S R Singh. He also came to the office and did an inspection. He wrote a factual report... It was also brought to the attention of the District Commander and Visible Policing. We were requested to do frequent patrols... and members of the office were also asked to do after-hour visits.”
The break-in at Warrant Officer Warn's office involved breaking the window, forcing the burglar bars open, and entering from the pavement without setting off any alarms because there were no sensors in the offices.
“They broke the window, forced the burglar bars open, and they were in. No alarm could go off because there is no sensors in the offices.”
The incident where three laptops were stolen occurred on 15 January 2021 when the office of Captain Le Roux was broken into using the same method of breaking a window and forcing open burglar bars.
“It was the 15th of January 2021. They broke into the office of Captain Le Roux. ... They broke a window and forced open the burglar bars.”
On 6 and 7 October 2021, there was an attempt to break into an office by smashing two kitchen windows and trying to force open burglar bars, but they failed to gain entry due to the bars.
“They broke that window. ... They smashed the left one of the two windows with a brick and they tried to force open the burglar bars, but they failed.”
On 11 October 2021, there was an attempted break-in at a building housing a consignment of cocaine worth at least R200,000,000, but security was not increased nor was the consignment removed despite the risk.
“The 11 October 2021 break-in happens, you are responsible for the building ... There is an attempted break-in and you know that you have exhibits that are worth at least R200000000. What steps do you take to increase security or to say, I cannot keep this thing here, it is not safe in my office?...I did not do that, Commissioner.”
The office had been broken into previously on several dates: 2011-12-27, 2014-06-08, 2018-12-09, 2020-01-20. The office had an alarm monitored by National Security & Fire but this service was discontinued due to non-payment and currently alarm activates only after hours and on weekends.
“The office was previously broken into on the following dates ... This office is fitted with an alarm that was monitored by National Security & Fire. During April 020, ... they have removed us from their system and would not be rendering any services ... Currently, the alarm is activated after hours and on weekends.”
In March 2020, the armed response contract expired and an application for continuation on a month-to-month basis was made to National Security & Fire while a formal procurement process was underway, but the procurement was not approved.
“In March 2020, the armed response contract expired during April 2020. I made an application for the continuation of the contract ... while still engaging a formal procurement process. ... However, the procurement was not approved.”
An application for a contract continuation was addressed to Colonel Madhoe and Captain Van Niekerk who handles Supply Chain Management at the Provincial Office.
“It was also sent to Captain Van Niekerk at our Provincial Office . She deals with the SCM.”
Applications for continued contract with National Security & Fire were made multiple times in 2020 but no approvals or feedback were received.
“An application is hereby made for the current contract with National Security & Fire to be continued on a month - to - month basis while the procurement process is being done .”
The security system currently in place is working but is only an alarm that makes noise with no connection to any response service, making it ineffective especially during weekends when no one is present.
“The security system that is currently in place is working . However , should there be a break - in at the office , it will be a problem as there is no security contract in place .”
There were ongoing communications about payment owed to National Security and Fire, with warnings that services would be discontinued due to non-payment.
“On 14 December 2020 , National Security and Fire sent a further statement reflecting an amount of R3610 as outstanding . They then advised that they would remove us , the DPCI office , from their system and will not render any further services due to non payment . This was confirmed to me on 13 January 2021 .”
The security unit had no feedback on a matter processed by Captain Diedericks, requiring intervention.
“P a g e 6 2 o f 1 8 0 h a n d e d b y C a p t a i n D i e d e r i c k s f o r p r o c e s s i n g . T o d a t e , t h i s u n i t h a s h a d n o f e e d b a c k . Y o u r i n t e r v e n t i o n i s r e q u i r e d .”
Colonel Madhoe was initially involved in a security contract matter, but was replaced by Colonel Majozi who handled the matter with Captain Van Niekerk.
“We dealt with Colonel Madhoe. Then we were told suddenly he is no more there. So that is Colonel Majozi, he was then the one that we dealt with. Colonel, Captain Van Niekerk, she dealt with.”
A security contract approval request was sent on 13 January 2021 to Brigadier Nyuswa and Captain Van Niekerk together with full background details.
“On 13 January 2021, CA Colivier specially wrote an email to Brigadier Nyuswa and Captain Van Niekerk requesting an approval for the security contract. In that mail, she sent out a full background to the addressees.”
A break-in occurred on 14 January 2021 targeting the office kitchen window, but criminals were prevented from entering by burglar bars. The office alarm was not linked to a security company.
“On the night of 14 January 2021, another break-in happened... A rock was used to break the window of the kitchen. However, the criminals were prevented by the burglar bars from entering. On the very day, I wrote a factual report to Brigadier Nyuswa and informed him that the office alarm was not linked to security company.”
Requests for security and armed response were made to Supply Chain Management and Brigadier Nyuswa but were ignored despite repeated break-ins.
“Our request for security and armed response was again sent to Supply Chain Management and even sent to Brigadier Nyuswa. In fact, it had turned into a plea for help. It was very important that the DPCI’s office had a working alarm system linked to a security company. However, our request was ignored.”
There were numerous break-ins at Port Shepstone DPCI office. Despite the receipt of a large quantity of drug exhibits in June 2021, security was not upgraded or enhanced.
“On 22 June 2021, a large quantity of drug exhibits was received to be stored at the office. At the time, there was still no security service. Nothing had changed. Security was neither upgraded nor enhanced.”
A decision was taken in 2017 not to store exhibits at all five DPCI units in KwaZulu-Natal. Brigadier Nyuswa was aware of this decision.
“In fact, there was a decision taken in 017 not to store exhibits at all of the five DPCI units in KZN. Brigadier Nyuswa was and is well aware of that decision.”
Inspections at DPCI units are conducted quarterly by senior officers, reporting weaknesses and security issues to Brigadier Nyuswa.
“Every quarter, inspections are conducted at each of these five serious organised crime offices. They would normally take a senior officer from one of the other units. They say they are going to inspect Port Shepstone... Ultimately, that report, after the inspection, is submitted to Brigadier Nyuswa to show all the weaknesses and problems at the units.”
The DPCI offices were not allowed to keep exhibits and did not have a SAP 13 register due to unsuitability and security concerns, a fact known to Brigadier Nyuswa and General Senona.
“None of the DPCI offices were at the time actually allowed to keep exhibits. This is the reason the DPCI office did not have an SCP13 register. The DPCI office was particularly vulnerable and was not suitable to store exhibits, let alone the quantity we were asked to store. Both Brigadier Nyuswa and General Senona knew this.”
The Durban DPCI office lacks a strong room and occupies three floors with only drywall partitions, making it unsuitable to store drug exhibits.
“As far as I know, I do not think they have got a strong room. They occupy three floors and it is just drywalling between the offices. So as far as I know, there is no strong room there.”
Before 2017, exhibits were received with a SAP 13 register per instruction from General Zikhali. Later the security issue due to lack of facilities led to removal of SAP 13 register capability.
“We did that when we were still receiving exhibits before 2017, when that instruction came from General Zikhali... I think it was a security issue because of the lack of security at our facilities.”
General Flynn testified that a SAP 13 register requires approval from the National Head Office according to the National Instruction.
“General Flynn testified yesterday to say that in order to have a SAP 13 register, your office would have needed, according to the National Instruction, the approval from the National Head Office.”
On 22 June 2021, between 10 and 11 AM, Brigadier Nyuswa informed Lt-Col Prinsloo that provincial tracing teams seized a large quantity of cocaine from a container and instructed him to make storage available at his office, as secure storage was not available at the Forensic Science Laboratory due to flooding and dysfunction.
“On the 22nd of June 2021, between 10 and 11 in the morning, I received a telephone call from Brigadier Nyuswa. He informed me that the provincial tracing team seized a large quantity of Cocaine from a container and instructed me to make storage available at our office. He said he would take both sets of the safe keys with him once the exhibits were stored in the safe. He said the exhibits could not be stored at a Forensic Science Laboratory as they did not have a secure storage capacity. I knew that the laboratory had been flooded and was dysfunctional.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo was instructed by Brigadier Nyuswa to store seized cocaine at his office despite the acknowledged challenges and lack of security at the office, and he did not raise any issues regarding safety.
“No, Commissioner. It was an instruction from him for me to keep it there in my office. I did not raise it. He knows all my challenges there at my office.”
Despite a 2017 directive prohibiting storing exhibits in offices, General Senona instructed Brigadier Nyuswa to store exhibits at Lt-Col Prinsloo's office, and it is possible he had permission from the National Head to override the directive.
“Commissioner, I do not see it as an unlawful instruction because General Senona gave the instruction to Brigadier Nyuswa that it must be stored at my office. He could have gotten permission from the National Head to do it. I do not know.”
Brigadier Nyuswa did not discuss any alternative storage for seized cocaine, nor mention more secure options such as Durban Police Stations, Maydon Wharf or Isipingo Stations, despite knowing the vulnerabilities of the DPCI office and the lack of active security.
“During that call, Brigadier Nyuswa did not discuss other alternatives. He made no mention of any other storage. I know there were Durban Police Stations, Maydon Wharf or Isipingo Stations, which operate 24 hours. These would have been more secure. Brigadier Nyuswa never mentioned anything about taking the exhibits to Isipingo or booking them at the Isipingo Police Station. Brigadier Nyuswa was obviously aware of the storage capacity of the safe. Equally, he was aware of the vulnerabilities of the DPCI office and the fact that there was no active security.”
The seized exhibits were unpacked on the floor, not sealed, and wrapped in yellow and black covers labeled Jaquar and TikTok, handled contrary to the National Instruction and protocol on search and seizure, handling, processing, and disposition of illicit drugs.
“I noticed the photos that the exhibits were unpacked on the floor and not sealed. The exhibits were in a form of blocks wrapped in yellow cover labelled Jaquar and black cover labelled TikTok. They were also not in sealed bag. It appeared that the exhibits were being handled contrary to the National Instruction as amended and the protocol on search and seizure, handling, processing, and disposition of illicit drugs.”
Photos of the seized exhibits circulated on police WhatsApp groups indicating the drugs were seized in Durban, and later more details about the origin became clear.
“It was said it was drugs seized in Durban. Only later on during the day it became more clear where it came from. Same WhatsApp groups were explaining further on where it came from.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo instructed Warrant Officer A P Van Den Berg to clear the one walk-in safe, Room 2, and make it available for the seized cocaine, removing firearms and ammunition to another safe, with keys controlled by Van Den Berg.
“During the course of that same day, around 13H00 hours, I contacted Warrant Officer A P Van Den Berg and instructed him to clear the one walk-in safe, Room 2, and make it available for the exhibits. I told him that I was instructed by Brigadier Nyuswa that it would be used to store a large quantity of Cocaine which had been seized. Normally we use that specific safe to store official firearms and ammunition. The firearms and ammunition were moved to the other safe, Room 24. As I said above, Warrant Officer Van Den Berg was in control of the safe and keys were with him.”
The tracing team, composed of TRT and DPCI members and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dina Govender, arrived at the office around quarter past 4 with several vehicles including three Combi vans and a BMW sedan driven by Govender.
“Still on the day, quarter past 4, the members arrived at the office, several vehicles. They arrived at the same time as Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa... other members arrived in three Combis and a BMW sedan which was driven by Lieutenant Colonel Dina Govender. The tracing team is a team composed of TRT members and DPCI members... Members of the team included Lieutenant Colonel Dina Govender, who was their commander.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo did not question the 5-6 hour gap between the call from Brigadier Nyuswa instructing storage at his office and the arrival of the exhibits, presuming the time was taken to process and conduct forensics at the scene.
“Did you question perhaps when they arrived what was the gap about ? I did not question him, no. And did you wonder what may have happened in those 5 to 6 hour ? I presumed they would have been busy on the scene , processing the exhibits , probably had forensics there , taking fingerprints, all that type of thing .”
Vehicles including five cars in total, among them three Combis, arrived and parked near a secure gate and wooden doors leading to a driveway close to a walk-in safe (Room 2).
“There are 4 cars or 5 cars? Three Combis? Five cars. Five cars. And then they all parked by the gate... Some already parked in front of the gate. Others were in front of our building... They reversed up the driveway close to that wall there.”
Lieutenant Colonel Dina Govender was the only member who drove inside and parked in front of the three Combis inside the driveway; the gate was kept open during the offloading of exhibits.
“Lieutenant Colonel Dina Govender drove in, so he was parked in front of these Combis... Inside of the driveway, yes... When the exhibits were being offloaded, was the gate closed? No, it was not closed. It was open.”
Colonel Jacob, commander of Serious Organised Crime in Durban and then group leader for the SANEB section for drugs, was not present at the office with the tracing team on that day and never arrived.
“Colonel Jacob is the commander of Serious Organised Crime in Durban. He was not part of the members. He was not one of the people that arrived. No, he never came there... He is the commander now. I think at that stage he would have been the group leader for the SANEB section, for the drug section at Durban. I think he was in charge of the drug members.”
Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa interacted with members of the TRT and DPCI as they arrived but did not give any instructions until after the exhibits were placed in the safe.
“Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa were together and interacted with the TRT and DPCI members as they arrived. They did not initially give any instructions to us until after the exhibits were put into the safe.”
Warrant Officer Mpangase introduced himself as the investigating officer for the matter to Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo and was present at the office along with other tracing team members whose names Prinsloo did not know.
“It was Warrant Officer Mpangase and the other members from the tracing team. I do not know all of them... He introduced himself to me then also as the investigating officer of this matter.”
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo was not informed by Brigadier Nyuswa or Warrant Officer Mpangase that the exhibits had been at Isipingo or that any alternative locations had been considered.
“No one, not even Brigadier Nyuswa or Warrant Officer Mpangase, told me the exhibits had been at Isipingo. They also did not discuss that they had looked for any other alternatives.”
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo only saw WhatsApp groups indicating where the exhibits came from but was not told by anyone where the exhibits were seized or came from.
“I only saw on those WhatsApp groups where these exhibits came from. I was not told by any one of them where it was seized and where it came from.”
The coffee shop where Colonel Dina Govender went to buy coffee was just around the corner from the office, approximately 250 metres away, and not visible from the office.
“It is just around the corner. It cannot be seen there. It is just around the corner. It is 250 metres from the office.”
If the exhibits had been booked at Isipingo and supplied to Prinsloo, they would have used the SAP 13 number in their occurrence book entry and included it in their records.
“We would have just used that SAP 13 number in our occurrence book entry if they had booked it in there and they did supply it to us. We would have included it now in our occurrence book entry.”
The drugs consignment of 554 kilograms of cocaine was not properly booked at a police station of origin, violating normal procedure that should trigger red flags for illicit trafficking.
“why was this not a red flag to you that they did not tell you that there is a police station of origin where the exhibits are originally booked and a case is opened with a case number? If they were just bringing to you consignment of Cocaine, 554 kilogrammes, without knowing the station of origin, then surely that should have raised issues with you because they could have been trafficking Cocaine illegally”
The exhibits were brought in unsealed black carrier bags rather than in sealed evidence bags, violating proper evidence handling protocols.
“The first red flags that I saw was that these exhibits were not brought in evidence bags. They were not sealed. It was brought in the same black carrier bags that they found it in whatever, wherever the container was that they found it in. It was all put out nicely to take photos on the ground and then it arrived back in my offices still in those same bags, not sealed in evidence bags like it should have been done. It should have been processed by the proper people for DNA, for touch DNA, for fingerprints, all that. These arrived by me just back in those same bags that were seized in. It was completely wrong.”
The instruction to store the drugs as they were was described as unlawful in hindsight by ADV KHUMALO SC, but LT-COL PRINSLOO described it as not unlawful but acknowledged many red flags and acceptance by senior officers.
“But then it was an unlawful instruction. / I will not say it was unlawful, but the fact that there was a lot of red flags and the two senior this General and the Brigadier, was happy with it.”
LT-COL PRINSLOO did not consider at that time that he could be complicit in trafficking but acknowledged that everything about the consignment was wrong including handling and packaging.
“I did not at that stage think of it that way. It was just that everything they did concerning that consignment was wrong, the way it was handled and the way they packaged, and everything was wrong.”
Improper handling of exhibits that do not comply with prescribed police protocols makes the storage instruction unlawful.
“it is wrong because it does not comply with prescripts, and that is what makes it unlawful. It is not wrong because my brother and I think it is wrong. We are not policemen, but you are a policeman and you know how exhibits should be handled. And if it was not handled properly and you are being instructed to store it in your office simply because you have a safe, then that is unlawful.”
Improper handling and storage of unsealed drug packages without proper police station booking or documentation could implicate someone in illegal drug trafficking.
“if you say they are bringing drugs to you in packages that are not sealed, that drugs were not properly booked at a police station, there is no proper documentation or record, and it comes to you for storage, what if they had stolen drugs from a larger consignment that was properly booked and you were being made part of drug trafficking by your superiors?”
LT-COL PRINSLOO acknowledged it is not easy to question superiors in the police and that doing so could lead to serious consequences.
“in the police it is not that easy to question your superiors. For me to have questioned the General and the Brigadier, there would have been serious consequences for me.”
ADV BALOY SC accused LT-COL PRINSLOO of failing to raise security concerns about illegally stored high-value drugs despite knowing there was no security, instead complying with orders to keep them stored in an insecure location.
“you are confronted with a situation which clearly breaks every rule that you know about handling exhibits... You are keeping this huge consignment where you do not have security at all... You did not at all... raise concern. And still be told, no, we will keep it here. We hear your concern, but we will keep it here.”
The unsealed bags storing the exhibits are contrary to the National Instruction prescripts and known by senior officers like Senona and Nyuswa.
“the bags or the exhibits are not sealed properly as they should according to the National Instruction. And at least yourself, Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa would know that.”
Since at least 2017/2021, LT-COL PRINSLOO's office no longer had authority or could not store exhibits legally and no SAPS 13 register existed; senior officers Nyuswa and Senona aware of this.
“at least as of 2017, your office no longer has the authority or cannot store exhibits. So, the SAPS 13 register does not exist. You and Brigadier Nyuswa and General Senona would be aware of that. / in 2021. / And Warrant Officer Mpanga would be aware of it too.”
Instructions given by Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa to LT-COL PRINSLOO were contrary to the prescripts regarding exhibit storage; LT-COL PRINSLOO was compelled to obey.
“in terms of seniority, Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa were the ones giving you instructions and you are saying you had to obey those instructions and commands.”
There is no clear escalation mechanism within the SAPS or DPCI to address ongoing security concerns about the storage of seized drugs at different command levels and beyond.
“You still do not have security, and they are sitting there and you are raising the matter of security continuously... I would like to have more people watching this... Is there no mechanism where you can escalate it directly or copy, say, General Senona, but ultimately then General Lebeya? There is no such mechanism?”
Lt-Col Prinsloo claims there were strict instructions on reporting to Brigadier Nyuswa, then General Senona, and finally to the National Head, and speaking directly to the National Head would cause big problems for him.
“There are strict instructions at my line of reporting to Brigadier Nyuswa, from him to General Senona, from Senona to the National Head. If I spoke directly to the National Head, there would have been big problems.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo stated that if Brigadier Nyuswa did nothing about an issue, the matter ended there for him, implying no further action could be taken.
“If, as in this case, Brigadier Nyuswa does nothing about it, that is the end of it for you, as with the security thing. There is nothing more you can do about it.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo testified that the National Head was aware of the security challenges at his office and that quarterly and annual inspections were done by a national team which reported directly to the National Head.
“The National Head was also well aware of the security challenges at my office... these reports from those national inspections goes directly to the National Head... The National Head was well aware of my challenges there in Port Shepstone.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo said even after the October break-in and raising the alarm with Nyuswa and General Senona, he could not reach out to General Lebeya because it would have been going outside the prescribed line of reporting and got him into trouble.
“Even after the October break-in, having raised the alarm with Nyuswa again, and, say, Senona, you are saying you could never reach out, you were not allowed, precluded rather, reaching out to General Lebeya at that point because you are going outside of the prescripts.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo explained that communicating directly with the National Head past Brigadier Nyuswa and General Senona would have caused big problems for him.
“If I would have jumped Brigadier Nyuswa and General Senona and communicated with the National Head, even from the National Head's side, I would have been in big problems.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo believes Brigadier Naicker would have informed the National Head about the storage of drugs at his office; Brigadier Naicker is S.A.N.E.B coordinator and reports directly to the National Head regarding drug seizures.
“I would presume that Brigadier Naicker would have informed him. Brigadier Naicker is the SANEB coordinator ... All drug seizures are directed reported to him.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo testified that the National Head would have received factual reports of incidents like the break-in and was aware that drugs had been stored by him.
“So, he would have received that factual report of the break-in, and he knew that those drugs had been stored by me.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo states that if he had spoken directly to higher authorities outside reporting lines, he would have faced departmental charges and risked losing his job.
“I would have been charged departmentally. I could have lost my job.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo says that if disciplinary action came from an independent person, he might be absolved; if it came from members of the police force, he would still have problems.
“If it was an independent person, yes. But if it was a member of the force, then I would have still had problems.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo describes forming a human chain to offload bricks of cocaine which were not sealed in evidence bags, contrary to National Protocols.
“Immediately noticed that the bricks of Cocaine were not sealed in evidence bags ... We then formed a human chain to bring the exhibits from the vehicles into the walk-in safe.”
Brigadier Nyuswa and Major General Senona were present, observing and had no objection to the handling and storage of exhibits, implying they had ultimate responsibility and authority to issue commands.
“Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa observed this. They had no objection. ... As a Provincial Commander of the DPCI, Provincial Head, they had the ultimate responsibility and authority to issue commands.”
The office was no longer in control, and the exhibits were not booked or registered as required by the National Instruction since 2017 leading to a big risk of exhibits being stolen.
“Warrant Officer Mpangase was in charge and under the direct authority of Brigadier Nyuswa. My role and those of members from my office was to follow the instruction given by Warrant Officer Mpangase and Brigadier Nyuswa. Another strange thing is that they did not require the booking or registration of the exhibits at the office. We did not have a SAP 13 registered since this decision had been taken in 2017... Essentially, there was no booking of registration of the exhibits as required by the National Instruction... This was a big risk as the exhibits may have or could have been potentially stolen by any person handling them.”
The exhibits were not counted nor registered properly, and neither the responsible officers suggested counting or registering them, breaching National Instruction requirements.
“The exhibits were also not counted. Again, neither Warrant Officer Mpangase nor Major General Senona or Brigadier Nyuswa even remotely suggested that the exhibits be counted or registered somehow... In terms of the National Instruction, even if the office could receive the exhibits, it is required that all exhibits must be physically checked and marked... No notes set out information which must be provided...”
Lt-Col Prinsloo accepted the key to the safe after the exhibits were placed inside, but he did not have any control or say over the drugs stored there.
“Because of the fact, Commissioner, that I was just storing it. After placing it in there, they requested the keys, and they left with the keys... The fact is that if we had the SAP 13 there and it was going to be stored in my office and it is going to be under my control, I am going to have the safe keys, and that makes all the difference... Because I have got no say over those drugs, I do not have the keys to that safe.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo took the view that because of suspicious circumstances and lack of control over the exhibits, he did not want anything to do with them and considered it the responsibility of others.
“That is correct, Commissioner... So, is that the view that you took? Because of all the strange things that you are seeing happening, you took the view you want nothing to do with it, and this is their thing, let them do it... That is correct, Commissioner.”
The exhibits were offloaded through the driveway and the personnel left by the same route, not going to the front desk or main door for access checks.
“So, they got to the driveway. Did they at least walk throughout the office to check for other exit areas that is at least Warrant Officer Mpangase? Or they ended up at the human chain level?... They ended up there. And they all exited back that way as well when they left... So, they would not have gone to the front desk to check in the access from the main door?... No not on that day... Yes, I am talking about that day... So they offloaded... And they left the same route again.”
Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa were aware of the poor security and vulnerability of the office where the exhibits were stored, but neither Warrant Officer Mpangase, Brigadier Nyuswa, nor Major General Senona requested a security briefing or inspection.
“Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa came closer. I then locked the strong room, both the keys, and handed the two sets of keys to Brigadier Nyuswa. Neither Warrant Officer Mpangase nor Brigadier Nyuswa or Major General Senona are requested a briefing on the security of the office. They did not ask for an inspection. I pause to mention that at least Brigadier Nyuswa was well aware of the state of security. The vulnerability of the office and the previous break-ins.”
The office was not safe for storage of exhibits especially high-value ones, closed after hours and weekends, and exposed to heavy loadshedding, but Major General Senona requested regular after-hours visits and secrecy from others about the exhibits.
“It did puzzle me as to how the office would be considered to be safe to store the exhibit. It was simply not safe, let alone for such high-value exhibits as I state above. The office was closed after normal working hours and on weekends. Further at the time, the area was experiencing heavy loadshedding twice a day... Major General Senona requested that we regularly visit the premises after hours and that we must not tell any other members about the exhibits stored at our offices.”
Brigadier Nyuswa was very familiar with the inside and outside geography of the office and neighbors as he was the commander years back.
“Brigadier Nyuswa, was he familiar with the space inside and the outside and your neighbours? Basically, the geography of that place inside and outside?... He was very aware of it... Yes... And he was the commander many years back. He knows exactly the ins and outs of that office.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo and Warrant Officer Van Den Berg were instructed to make regular after-hours visits to the office and keep the information about the exhibits secret from other members.
“So, it is on that basis then that I ask, did you understand that request/instruction to refer only to the two of you, the regular visits?”
Lt-Col Prinsloo found it very strange that he had to secure the cocaine exhibits after hours but was not allowed to tell other members about it.
“Yes, it was very strange. I have got to secure it and visit it after hours, but I am not allowed to tell the members that we are keeping these exhibits there.”
There were previous break-ins at the office, prompting Lt-Col Prinsloo to sometimes make surprise morning checks past the office due to these security concerns.
Neither Brigadier Nyuswa nor Warrant Officer Mpangase nor Major General Senona gave formal instructions on how the exhibits should be secured and monitored, beyond a request by Major General Senona to occasionally pass by after hours and weekends; there was no formal plan and no officers were informed about these instructions except Lt-Col Prinsloo and Van Den Berg.
“Neither Brigadier Nyuswa nor Warrant Officer Mpangase nor Major General Senona gave instructions about how the exhibits should be secured and monitored other than Major General Senona's request to now and then pass by the office after hours and weekends. This was not a formal instruction or part of any formal plan. The request itself was difficult to implement as I was told not to inform other officers.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo would not fault Major General Senona for characterizing the order as an instruction since request and instruction are very close in law enforcement context.
“Commissioners are very close to each other. Request and instruction, yes. ... No, I would not fault him for that.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo said the order from Major General Senona was a request, not a formal instruction.
“The way that it was given to me I am not allowed to tell the members about it but they must regularly visit. You cannot do that. ... I would say a request.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo and Warrant Officer Van Den Berg knew about the request to secure the exhibits and regularly visit the office, but other members did not have these instructions.
“Myself and Warrant Officer Van Den Berg it was good for us because we knew about it and we went the extra mile to visit the office. But I could not expect that from the other members. I could not give them those instructions.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo did not request assistance from Brigadier Nyuswa or Major General Senona to get additional personnel for rotating members at the office.
Lt-Col Prinsloo testified the members were not informed of any plan for the exhibits, contrary to National Instruction and protocol requiring immediate transfer to Forensic Science Laboratory within 7 days.
“Present at the office at this time is Major General Senona, Brigadier Nyuswa, Lieutenant-Colonel Dina Govender, Warrant Officer Mpangase, and the other members of the Provincial Tracing Team, and Warrant Officer Van Den Berg and myself. We were not informed of any plan about the exhibits. I say that because the National Instruction and the protocol required that the exhibits be immediately sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. In exceptional circumstances, no later than 7 working days, we were kept in the dark about how long the exhibits would be kept in our office.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo said members would not often need anything from the safe as they each have their own personal firearms (SAp 108), not requiring the R5 rifle or office firearms.
“They are all issued with their own firearms that are on the SAP 108, the personal firearms. So, it is just very seldom that they would need a firearm. We do not have official firearm practise every year anymore. So, in those six months there is a possibility that there was no shooting practise, so there was no need for the R5 rifles, nothing like that.”
Warrant Officer Van Den Berg normally handles access to the safe; no other members need access.
“There is nobody need to go into that safe. Warrant Officer Van Den Berg, he is the one that normally goes in. If anything is needed by them, he would go and take it out and give it to them.”
Members did not ask why the safe was suddenly locked and not accessible from June to November, and why exhibits previously in the safe were no longer there.
“The issue never arose from June to November where one of your members ask, Colonel, can we go in here? What is happening here? Why are we suddenly required to drive around after working hours?”
The office stored large quantities of drug exhibits only for very short periods, including 2 million Mandrax tablets for two nights in June 2018, guarded by armed police officers.
“The only time was when we were to store two million Mandrax tablets in June 2018. Those exhibits were stored for two nights... we had police officers guarding the offices throughout, even at night”
The office safes were used to store large quantities of drugs temporarily, including 4.5 tons of dagga resin when Brigadier Nyuswa was Unit Commander.
“when Brigadier Nyuswa was still the Unit Commander there, we had stored a large quantity, four and a half tons of hashish (dagga resin) in one of those strongrooms”
On 23 June 2021 Brigadier Nyuswa instructed that Warrant Officer Mpangase be allowed into the office to take samples of exhibits; Mpangase was assisted by Warrant Officer Van Den Berg.
“On the 23rd of June 2021, Brigadier Nyuswa called me and told me that Warrant Officer Mpangase needed to come to the office to take samples of the exhibits... I then instructed Warrant Officer Van Den Berg to assist Warrant Officer Mpangase”
Warrant Officer Van Den Berg assisted to type out and draw up the register page CJC 202 and helped with the sealing of the evidence bags.
“According to him, he assisted them to type out, to draw up this page, this CJC 202. And he assisted them through the SAP 13 clerk in Port Shepstone to get the evidence bags. He was involved with the sealing of them.”
Brigadier Naicker, SANEB coordinator under DPCI, told Lt Colonel Prinsloo about the cocaine stored at his office but did not provide a plan for the exhibits storage.
“‘On the 29th of July 2021, I met Brigadier Naicker at our office at Port Shepstone. As I said before, he is the SANEB coordinator. That is the South African Narcotics Enforcement Bureau and that falls under the DPCI. ‘He told me about the cocaine stored at our office. I did tell him that I was not comfortable with the exhibits being stored at the office as the security was not up to standard.’ ‘He did not tell me, so I do not think he knew what the plan was with it.’”
Brigadier Nyuswa was aware of numerous applications to improve security and link to armed response at the office but no approval was received before exhibits were stored, leaving the office vulnerable.
“‘I had made numerous applications for these security alarm to be improved and linked to armed response. Brigadier Nyuswa was well aware of these applications. The latest application before the exhibits were received was on 13 January 2021, which was sent directly to Brigadier Nyuswa, together with a warning. However, no approval was received. The last application was made on 6 February 2023. At the time I left, there was no approval.’ ‘Just to CJC Commissioners, CJC 201 is another application that was sent, but it is just to show, as the witness had indicated earlier, that up to date, still, there is no armed response to that office, so it remains vulnerable.’”
In late October 2021, there was an attempted break-in at the office where exhibits were stored. The glass window was shattered by a stone during a weekend with severe load shedding, and the alarm was not working. Brigadier Nyuswa was informed but seemed unfazed and no steps were taken to enhance security.
“‘In late October 2021, there was an attempted break-in at the office. Someone tried to access the kitchen side of the office. The glass window was shattered by a stone. While there was an attempt to gain entry, the person was unsuccessful. The incident happened during the weekend, when there were severe load shedding. The alarm would not have been working as a result. After I investigated the incident, I prepared a factual report, which I sent to Brigadier Nyuswa. I had called him to inform him about the incident. He seemed unfazed about it. There was no steps taken by the Provincial Office to enhance security, even when the attempted break-in happened.’ ‘The attempted break-in should at least have raised an alarm at the Provincial Office, and Brigadier Nyuswa in particular. Immediate steps to ensure either the removal or the transfer of the exhibits or enhanced security should have been taken.’”
Lieutenant Colonel Jacob was appointed as investigating officer replacing Warrant Officer Mpangase and informed Lt Colonel Prinsloo, requesting to weigh the exhibits in November 2021.
“‘On the 4th of November 2021, I received a call from Lieutenant Colonel Jacob. The one we spoke about earlier, from the Durban Serious Organized Crime Investigation. He informed me that he was appointed as the investigating officer, replacing Warrant Officer Mpangase presumably. He asked me when I will be available, as he needed to come to the office to weigh the exhibits. I told him that I was not available the following week, from the 8th to the 12th of November 021, as I was going to a workshop. I told him that I would be available the week after that.’”
In late October 2021, there was an attempted break-in at the office involving someone trying to access the kitchen side by throwing a stone to shatter the glass window, but the attempt was unsuccessful due to the alarm not working because of load shedding.
“In late October 2021, there was an attempted break-in at the office. Someone tried to access the kitchen side of the office. The glass window was shattered by a stone thrown. While there was an attempt to gain entry, the person was unsuccessful. This incident happened during the weekend when there was severe load shedding. The alarm would not have been working as a result.”
After investigating the break-in incident, a factual report was prepared and sent to Brigadier Nyuswa, who was informed but seemed unfazed and took no steps to enhance security despite the break-in attempt.
“After I investigated the incident, I prepared a factual report, which I sent to Brigadier Nyuswa. I had called him to inform him about the incident. He seemed unfazed. There was no steps taken by the Provincial Office to enhance security even when the attempted break-in happened. The attempted break-in should at least have raised an alarm in the Provincial Office and Brigadier Nyuswa in particular. Immediate steps to ensure either the removal or the transfer of the exhibits or to enhance security should have been taken.”
On Sunday, 7 November 2021, LT-COL Prinsloo went to the office using the external sidestep, noticed nothing untoward, and entered through a chain and lock secured entrance.
“On the Sunday, the 7th of November 2021, I went to the office to pick up some documents which I needed for the Wildlife Trafficking Workshop that week. I went up the stairs to my office. I did not notice anything untoward. I parked at the bottom gate entrance and went up to my office on the first floor. The entrance was secured by a chain and lock.”
Management and admin people occupy the top floor, and they use the sidestep entrance to their offices, which prevents them from knowing what is happening downstairs.
“All the management as well as the admin people are on the top floor. That is correct. If they go up the sidestep into their offices, they would not know what is happening downstairs, is that your understanding? You are correct, Commissioner.”
The alarm at the office is activated and deactivated using a code entered on keypads located at the top entrance and bottom entrance where the BMW is parked.
“Each one of us has got a code. At that entrance of ours on top, as well as the bottom one there is a keypad there where you activate or deactivate it when you are done.”
The wooden doors at the driveway where exhibits are stored are locked from the inside without keypad access, and sensors inside the passage trigger the alarm if accessed without authorization.
“There is no keypad because nobody goes in there. It is locked from the inside. You cannot enter it from the driveway. If you jump over the gate you still cannot access that door. You must open it from the inside. You will trigger it with sensors that are in the passage there.”
On Monday, 8 November 2021, LT-COL Prinsloo was the first to arrive at the office at 06:00, noticed nothing unusual upstairs, and started working.
“On Monday, the 8th of November 2021 I reported for duty as normal at 06 h 00 hours. I am usually the first one at the office. I went straight up to my office at the first floor using the external sidestep. I did not notice anything untowards. I also did not smell anything. I then started working.”
Opening the door to the wooden doors storage area triggers the alarm due to sensors on the door even if the door is opened forcefully (like in a break-in).
“No, it will. It has got sensors. It is got sensors on the door.”
At about 06:50 on 8 November 2021, Warrant Officer BJ Pienaar phoned LT-COL Prinsloo about a big problem, and upon going down the stairs, Prinsloo smelled a peculiar scent of ground metal or steel and discovered Pienaar's office trashed with the safe door half open, blue chair in the passage, locks ground off, and the passage covered in dark powdery substance with all exhibits taken.
“It was about 10 to 7, Warrant Officer BJ Pienaar phoned me and said we had a big problem and I must come down to his office. As I was starting to walk down the steps, I could smell a peculiar scent / smell, which you normally have when metal has been grinded open with a metal or steel grinder. When I got down, I saw that Pienaar's office was trashed. I also noticed that the safe door was standing half way open and the blue chair which was inside the safe was standing outside in the passage and that both locks were grinded off. The passage was covered in dark powdery substance. I walked to the safe and saw that all the exhibits was taken.”
On 8 November 2021, after discovering the trashed office and missing exhibits, LT-COL Prinsloo walked back and discovered entry to Pienaar's office was gained by forcing open an aluminium window and removing burglar bars and forcing open wooden office door, with pictures taken of the scene.
“I walked back to Warrant Officer Pienaar's office and saw that entry into his office was gained by forcing open the aluminium window and the complete removal of the burglar bars from the wall and they then forced open his wooden office door. I attach her to pictures taken on the day showing the exterior and interior of the office.”
The torn open exhibit bags contained bricks of cocaine, which were taken out of the bags and possibly placed into black carrier bags which were also missing.
“It must be photo 3. It shows the entrance gate to that hardware shop. Photo 4 shows the chain and lock that was cut off. Then the next two photos, you can also see the one link, it was cut in half. Photo 7 on page 125, shows those concrete pipes, as well as the next photo on 126. Those are the torn open exhibit bags that those bricks of Cocaine were in. They actually took the exhibits out of the bags? Yes, they did. So how would that work? It would mean they would take each brick, put it in another container or bag? They could have taken those same black carrier bags because that was missing as well.”
Exhibit bags can link suspects quickly to a crime, unlike other evidence.
“I think the possibility is if they are caught or something with that, it can link them back. Nothing else can link them back, but those exhibit bags can link them back quickly.”
Burglars broke in through a window where the burglar bars had been removed.
“You can see where they broke the window open and you can see the part of the blind hanging outside there, and you can see that burglar bars is gone in front of that window.”
The burglar bar was one big bar covering all five windows, bent out of the wall to allow entry.
“Because it is one big burglar bar that covers all five of those windows, two small ones on either side and the big one in the middle, they have just, two sides, they got it out of the wall and then they just bent it in so they could get through.”
The fence and wall between the office and hardware shop is very easy to scale due to proximity and lack of risk identification.
“I do not have a sense of the distance between the wall and the window, but no one had identified this proximity, this wall, as a risk factor for the DPC office, because, I mean, if someone, it looks like someone could easily scale over that fence.”
There had been no discussion about fixing or reducing the risk of easy access to the office via the wall and window.
“And there had never been a discussion, at least that you are aware of, about fixing this, what looks like an obvious risk, for example, either bricking up the window or making the wall higher? There has never been that kind of discussion about what can we do to reduce this risk?”
Windows were made of easily removable aluminum frames allowing quick access by burglars.
“There you can see that the aluminium windows are not very strong. If you push a screwdriver or something in there, their hinges are just pop-riveted onto the frame. So it is very easy, you just put a strong screwdriver in there and you pop them out, and this is what happened here. So they took the whole window frame off there.”
Using a grinder on the burglar bars would make a lot of noise not easily heard outside, especially during weekends.
“If you use a grinder, for example, for these burglar bars, it would make a lot of noise, is it not? On the outside, ja. It will be much quieter on the inside for them, then you will not hear it so easily on the outside... and obviously, it must have been, well, it would have been over a weekend, no one would hear anything.”
Warrant Officer Pienaar was likely unaware of what was stored in the safe in his office.
“If he is not aware of what is in the safe, in as much as it is a problem, according to him, it may well have been firearms in the safe or water, I do not know what could have been, and I do not know what the explanation that Colonel Prinsloo would have given to other members when the firearms were moved to the other safe.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo states that Warrant Officer Pienaar was not present when the exhibits were brought in, contradicting Major General Senona's testimony that Pienaar was present.
The two locks on a door were cut precisely with knowledge of internal security mechanisms, indicating the perpetrators knew exactly what they were doing.
“whoever cut those locks knew exactly what they were doing, because on the inside of that door there is special mechanisms... they knew exactly how to still open it.”
The burglars mistakenly broke into the last window in the passage thinking it was the last window to enter the passage, but it was Warrant Officer Pienaar's locked office.
“They broke into the last window... meanwhile they broke into Pienaar's office... It is somebody that mistaken himself there, that was there.”
Brigadier Nyuswa was immediately called and was shocked upon learning about the burglary; he requested a special team from Durban LCRC to assist despite Port Shepstone LCRC already processing the scene.
“I immediately called Brigadier Nyuswa... He seemed shocked... He called a special team from Durban LCRC. He did not say why he called the Durban LCRC, especially because Port Shepstone LCRC had already started processing the scene.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo knew from Warrant Officer Van Den Berg's involvement how much and how many bricks of cocaine were stolen, specifically 541 kilograms valued at over 200 million.
“After Warrant Officer Van Den Berg was involved there, I knew how much, how many bricks there were... 541 kilograms of cocaine valued at over 200 million.”
Brigadier Nyuswa did not explain why a special team from Durban LCRC was called to assist the scene, and Port Shepstone LCRC stopped their work and watched.
“Brigadier Nyuswa did not specifically tell me... He just wanted that team from Durban to come and assist.”
Crime scene report normally goes to the investigating officer in charge, named as Brigadier Sibiya of UGU District Detective Commander, not to local office or detectives.
“Commissioner, it goes to the investigating officer, Brigadier Sibiya. He was in charge of the scene. He is the UGU District Detective Commander. He came out to the scene. He appointed Sergeant Jones from his office. He was going to be the investigating officer.”
The break-in was widely reported and it was appreciated that the local office was not suitable to investigate, so the case was taken over by Pretoria team.
“The break-in was widely reported, and it seems it was appreciated that the office was not suitable.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo was summoned on 11 November to Major General Senona's office in Durban and interviewed about the break-in by several senior officers including Lt Gen Mosikili and Brigadiers Nyuswa and Naicker.
“I was summoned to Major General Senona's office in Durban... I was interviewed about the break-in... Lieutenant General Mosikili conducted that interview... The other officers also asked me questions... I did tell Lieutenant General Mosikili that the alarm was not serviced and was not linked to a security company.”
All members at the office underwent polygraph testing following the break-in; Prinsloo's lasted six hours and he passed despite being treated as a suspect.
“All the members at my office were called for polygraph testing. We all underwent the test. All the members were subjected to a three-hour test. My test was for six hours. I was treated as a suspect, but I did pass my test nonetheless.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo denies that polygraph tests were conducted on all involved in the cocaine delivery at Port Shepstone; only he was informed and others were unsure.
“Commissioner, that was never communicated to us. It only communicated to me... So the rest of the officers, I do not know.”
The exhibits (cocaine) were never recovered; Prinsloo does not know the status or progress of the investigation regarding them.
“The exhibits were never recovered. I have been interviewed several times in relation to them. I do not know the status or the progress of this investigation.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo states that he, and presumably his superiors, did not act in line with the applicable National Instruction and Protocol regarding the investigation.
Warrant Officer Mpangase was said by Van Den Berg to have taken samples from the exhibits, but Lt-Col Prinsloo denies any samples were taken by Mpangase.
“I was later told by Warrant Officer Van Den Berg no samples were taken.”
There was no official register at Port Shepstone office recording officers who came to deliver the cocaine.
“Warrant Officer Van Berg made an OB entry for each time that they came, exact time they came, exact time they left. But as such, like a visiting register there, no we do not have that...”
Brigadier Naicker of SANEB was not present when the drugs were delivered, but as SANEB coordinator, he would have been informed as drug related matters go through his office.
“He was not? No. I presume he was informed, because all seizures of drugs gets reported through his office.”
Colonel Jacob called Lt-Col Prinsloo on 4 November without formal instruction or communication from Nyuswa, informing him that he is now the investigating officer, despite previously dealing with Mpangase.
“You received a call from Colonel Jacob, and then he said now he is the investigating officer... without you hearing from your superior?”
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo agrees that members of the DPCI are main suspects, but also states that some non-DPCI members were involved to bring the cocaine to his office.
Chairperson acknowledges a wide group of suspects including outside the DPCI and SAPS, who could have been informed about the cocaine's storage in Port Shepstone by law enforcement officers.
“So there is that wide, amorphous group of suspects as well, but number one is DPCI.”
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo mentions a tracing team composed of TRT and DPCI members with Commander Dina Govender as commander, ordinarily dealing with cash-in-transit cases.
“You said in paragraph 0, you say that the team of people that came included the tracing team, which is composed of TRT members and DPCI members, and then their Commander is Dina Govender.”
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo states that the team assisted Warrant Officer Mpangase with manpower to bring the drugs to Port Shepstone because they are well armed.
“The possibility is there, Commissioner, that they just assisted Warrant Officer Mpangase for manpower to bring the drugs there to Port Shepstone, because they are obviously well armed.”
Advocate Baloyi expresses concern that police officers lack the ability to raise concerns about the security of drugs stored in Lt Col Prinsloo's office and suggests empowering officers to escalate such matters to prevent incidents like the killing of Brigadier Nyuswa.
“You do not have the ability to raise matters of concern... I would have been much more interested to get security and other things in place... to empower police officers or enable police officers to take up these matters... matters should not have to die at Brigadier Nyuswa.”