The police officer contacted by a person after the theft activated Crime Intelligence due to recognizing General Lushaba's wallet as belonging to a member of Crime Intelligence; this supports no cover-up allegation in the docket.
“It can be because there is a statement in that docket from a police officer, a neutral police officer, who says that morning following the theft, Lushaba's place, he was contacted by a person, he named that person in the statement. This person says I picked up some items to the garage and because he knows the police officer is staying nearby, he took those items to the police officer and the police, this police officer activated Crime Intelligence because he could see from the card that this is a member's wallet and this member appears to be a member of CI. And the items were then taken to the police station ... And that is how, about a cover-up, there is nothing in the docket about that.”
The accused in the chargesheet are Lushaba, Mr Mogashoa, Glenn Hudson, and Eugene Pitout. Pitout and Hudson are members of Crime Intelligence while Mogashoa is a police officer at the station.
“Lushaba , Mr Mogashoa , Glenn Hudson , and one Eugene Pitout . These are the accused . And Pitout and Hudson , I think , are members of Crime Intelligence . Mogashoa is a police officer at the station .”
The relationship between prosecutors and investigators was not good, there were conflicts between these investigators and Crime Intelligence, and the cases were rushed to court with mistakes and loopholes, resulting in poorly conducted investigations.
“the relationship between the prosecutors and investigators was not good ... they made a lot of mistakes here ... it appeared they were rushing this case ... there is some conflicts between these investigators and investigators in Crime Intelligence ... The two cases were not supposed to be in court ... The cases were not properly investigated”
The documents discussed were about victims, people at Crime Intelligence, and related to the procurement of a forklift.
“The documents were basically talking about the victims ... more or less about the people at Crime Intelligence ... information relating to the procurement of the forklift.”
The flighted section 27 referral affidavit does not contain allegations of unlawful vetting and polygraph testing and could only have gotten those allegations from the section 27 referral because no dockets were requested at that stage.
“The allegations of unlawful actions regarding vetting and polygraph testing is not contained in the flighted section 27 referral. I could only have gotten the allegations from the section 27 referral because at that stage we had not even requested the dockets.”
The section 27 referral affidavit contained allegations of procurement irregularities regarding the procurement of a forklift and vehicles for the PKTT including awarding tenders.
“The section 27 referral affidavit I considered contained allegations of procurement irregularities regarding the procurement of a forklift by Crime Intelligence and procurement of vehicles for the PKTT, hence the reference to awarding tenders in the section 28(13) application and authorisation.”
High-ranking Crime Intelligence, SAPS, and political figures were alleged to have misappropriated money from SAPS and SSA and thus matters were kept vague.
“high-ranking Crime Intelligence , high-ranking SAPS , high-ranking political individuals that were alleged to have fleeted money from SAPS and SSA”
The confidential Crime Intelligence documents show a list of bank details of General Lushaba, suggesting information about the R50 million movement from Crime Intelligence account would have come from someone in Crime Intelligence involving either Advocate Johnson or Chief Perumal who were closely dealing with this.
“...the two of them would have or must have received information ... about the R50 million ... from Crime Intelligence ... funds being moved from a Crime Intelligence account ... That kind of information ... would have had to have come from someone at Crime Intelligence ... Advocate Johnson or Chief Perumal because they are the two people ... intimately dealing with this...”
There are allegations that high-ranking Crime Intelligence, high-ranking South African Police Service (SAPS), and high-ranking political individuals allegedly misappropriated money from SAPS and the State Security Agency (SSA).
“It is high-ranking Crime Intelligence, high-ranking SAPS, high-ranking political individuals that were alleged to have fleeted money from SAPS and SSA.”
The flighted affidavit included allegations of procurement irregularities within Crime Intelligence about a forklift, which were not mentioned in the Section 27 affidavit given on 5 December 2024.
“allegations of procurement irregularities within Crime Intelligence regarding the procurement of a forklift. On the one flighted, there is no mention of a forklift.”
Mr Adams was in possession of Crime Intelligence documents containing sensitive personal information, which the witness considered a criminal offence as the documents were slipped under his door.
“If it were up to me, I would have considered charging Mr Adams for possession of these documents. ... A vetting document ... contains your address, your ID numbers, ... your banking detail, and this document is ... in possession of it.”
Advocate Johnson signed off on a Section 28 summons following a complaint by Mr Adams that requested irrelevant documents, including lists of Divisional Crime Intelligence heads, performance assessments of Major Generals, advertisements, audio recordings, interview records, and documents General Jacobs refused to return.
“you signed off on a summons that asked for a litany of documents that had no bearing on the complaint, including a list of all Provincial Heads and Section Heads who were stationed in Division Crime Intelligence, the performance assessment of all Major Generals for that year, the advertisements for that position, audio recordings and interviews. Then you want documentary records that General Jacobs refused to return.”
Accused numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in the Mokwele matter were granted bail by the Magistrate's Court with conditions prohibiting them from visiting Crime Intelligence premises nationwide and designating Mr Brian Padayachee to assist them with collecting personal belongings.
““Accused number 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are prohibited from being at any premises of Crime Intelligence within the country, RSA, while the matter is pending.” ... “Mr Brian Padayachee will assist the accused with the collection of any matters or items of personal nature the accused may have at the premises in the Crime Intelligence offices.””
Crime Intelligence witnesses indicated they were subjected to intimidation and victimisation, justifying bail conditions that barred accused persons, including General Khumalo, from accessing Crime Intelligence premises.
““The assertion being that Mr Padayachee would be allowed to have access to Criminal Intelligence is incorrectly interpreted, mainly because we have witnesses at CI. Those witnesses had indicated that they had been intimidated and victimised. The condition for them not going to CI was to ensure that the witnesses were not intimidated.””
UNATTRIBUTEDDay 150 · 29 Jul 2026Refers to: 2025-07-06Location: Crime Intelligence premisesEvidence: Affidavit/press conference statements of Lt Gen Mkhwanazi (6 July 2025) and Ad Hoc Committee testimony (p. 542-543)
Colonel Padayachee filed an affidavit opposing the amendment of a bail condition restricting Crime Intelligence officials' access to CI offices, despite lacking security clearance to access CI information himself.
“Colonel Padayachee filed an affidavit in opposition of the amendment of that condition in circumstances where you, as his leader, knows that that condition would not make sense because Mr Brian Padayachee himself does not have any security clearance to access information that is within the CI offices?”
Bail condition number three was overly broad as it barred Crime Intelligence officials from every CI office in the country, whereas the intended purpose was only to protect witnesses employed within CI who feared the return of the accused.
“bail condition number three, that bail condition was way too wide for every Crime Intelligence within the country. These were Crime Intelligence officials, Chair, at head office. So, and the purpose for which I understood they were going to ask for that condition was merely based on the fact that there were witnesses still employed within Crime Intelligence and that these witnesses feared any of the accused coming back. That part made sense, but not the barred them from every Crime Intelligence office in the country”
Allegations relate to questionable appointment of General Khumalo as Head of Crime Intelligence nationally, with Minister of Police Bheki Cele involved and highly skilled generals in Crime Intelligence overlooked.
“The allegations related to the highly questionable appointment of General Khumalo as the Head of Crime Intelligence nationally. The following Minister of Police, Bheki Cele, was also involved whilst serving highly skilled Generals within CI were overlooked.”
Questions about performance assessments of Crime Intelligence provincial heads and section heads, as well as issues relating to Lieutenant General Jacob's refusal to return to Crime Intelligence and any related civil or labour proceedings, are raised but contested as not relevant to the mandate of IDAC.
“Where in your section 27 does this come from that there are issues about performance assessment, that there are issues about provincial heads and section heads, that there are issues about Lieutenant General Jacob? ... What does it have to do with your mandate what happened with Lieutenant General Jacob, what happened with interviews, what performance assessments of major generals in 2022/2023?”
The usual process of advertising Crime Intelligence positions should have been followed if other suitable candidates were available, rather than deviating through an approved deviation request.
“it would have given a better picture of whether or not there were other suitable candidates within the ambit of Crime Intelligence, and that you would therefore not have had to deviate but could have gone on the normal process of advertising for those positions”
Lieutenant General Jacob was not mentioned in Mr. Adams' affidavit and it was inaccurate to assert he had refused to return to Crime Intelligence based on the affidavit evidence.
“He is not mentioned at all. You single him out and you know that he has refused to return to Crime Intelligence, even though Mr Adams does not say that in his affidavit. He does not mention him at all, let alone that he has refused to return to Crime Intelligence.”
The investigation sought to determine the reason why Lieutenant General Jacob was not returning to his post, which necessitated appointing a different head.
“So what this sought to determine was why he, what was the reason for him not going back, which necessitated the appointment of a different head?”
The assertion that Lieutenant General Jacob refused to return to Crime Intelligence was not from Mr. Adams' affidavit but from information received outside the official documents, which raises concerns over its source.
“You know that he has refused to return to Crime Intelligence. Where do you get that from? It is not in the section 7 affidavit. It is not in the supplementary affidavit, which at this point are the only documents that speak to appointments in Crime Intelligence.”
Information about Lieutenant General Jacob refusing to return to Crime Intelligence was not documented in any affidavit or statement before the Commission, suggesting it was obtained through unofficial means.
“Someone told you that, told your investigators, and they did not tell you in any of the documents that are before us... It can only leave one explanation that this is information obtained in other ways, which are not properly explained on documents.”
The investigation into the Political Killings Task Team (PKTT) was not initiated based on a complaint by Mr. Adams, but rather appears to be driven by other motives or a "hidden hand" within Crime Intelligence.
“this is not Mr Adams' complaint ... this is now something else altogether”
Former Police Minister was involved in appointing General Khumalo as the Divisional Commissioner of Crime Intelligence without an interview process and without Khumalo having experience as a senior manager in Crime Intelligence.
“The former Police Minister was also involved in appointing General Khumalo as the Divisional Commissioner of Crime Intelligence without an interview process and without Khumalo having worked as a senior manager in Crime Intelligence.”
The appointment of General Khumalo as Divisional Commissioner of Crime Intelligence by the former Police Minister was done without an interview process and without Khumalo having worked as a senior police manager in Crime Intelligence, raising questions about the legitimacy of the appointment.
“The fact that the former Police Minister appointed General Khumalo as the Divisional Commissioner of Crime Intelligence without an interview process and without General Khumalo having worked as a senior policeman in Crime Intelligence.”
Major General Solly Lazarus, CFO of Crime Intelligence, was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for misappropriation and use of the slush funds.
“charging the CFO of Crime Intelligence, Major General Solly Lazarus, who was found guilty, Chair, and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.”
The appointment of General Khumalo as Head of Crime Intelligence nationally was highly questionable and involved the former Minister of Police, Bheki Cele, while several highly skilled generals within Crime Intelligence were overlooked.
“The allegations relate to the highly questionable appointment of General Khumalo as the Head of Crime Intelligence nationally. The former Minister of Police, Bheki Cele, was also involved in this, while several high-skilled generals within CI were overlooked.”
The investigation into whether suppliers delivered per awarded tenders is ongoing with IDAC, but it is suggested that the matter should be closed and returned to Crime Intelligence to deal with as a contract compliance issue.
“it is currently under investigation ... this matter should be closed ... it should go back to Crime Intelligence ... it is their contract ... it is non-compliance ... it should go back there”
IDAC should close the investigation and return the matter and documentation to Crime Intelligence for further action to recover monies and address non-compliance.
“it gets closed in IDAC ... it should go back there ... also to copy the CFO to indicate that there was non-compliance and monies need to be recovered ... it will be for Crime Intelligence to take action and to ensure the money is recovered”
There is no crime involved in the supplier's failure to deliver; it is a case of malperformance and money lost by Crime Intelligence, so IDAC has no jurisdiction to investigate.
“If there is a case of malperformance by a service provider ... Crime Intelligence lost money ... what is there to refer by IDAC? IDAC should simply say we have no jurisdiction ... It has nothing to do with our mandate”
There was an ongoing investigation into alleged manipulation of security vetting processes, recruitment, and employment regarding persons within Crime Intelligence including Brigadier Mokwele.
“complaint about manipulation of security vetting processes , but then it goes further to talk about recruitment and employment and manipulation in respect of other people besides Brigadier Mokwele”
The information about Madondo's security clearance was Crime Intelligence information that was not lawfully given to Mr Adams.
“It is Crime Intelligence information, he did not get it lawfully ... and he is telling your investigator ... that this was not given to me by General Madondo.”
General Madondo was given a lateral transfer without top secret clearance, posing a risk to Crime Intelligence (CI), South African Police Service (SAPS), and the country, according to an IDAC charge.
“We know the complaint is that she got this lateral transfer without a top clearance, top secret clearance certificate. At paragraph 3 it states: "Madondo poses a risk to CI, the SAPS and the country."”
General Madondo and Mr Adams do not have top secret clearance certificates but are handling intelligence documents they are not authorized to access, posing risks.
“General Madondo not having that clearance certificate poses a risk to CI, the SAPS and the country... equally too must Mr Adams. You agreed that he does not have a top secret clearance certificate, and yet he is handling documents seemingly that come from Crime Intelligence and for which he does not have lawful access or authorised access.”
Mr Adams is also being charged in the same investigation concerning unauthorized access to intelligence documents as General Madondo.
“If General Madondo not having that clearance certificate poses a risk... equally too must Mr Adams... handling documents seemingly that come from Crime Intelligence and for which he does not have lawful access...”
Allegation that money was syphoned from the secret fund account of Crime Intelligence to pay a deposit securing delivery of the forklift, with promises unfulfilled.
“he says: 'The supplier unknown to me was paid a deposit securing the delivery of a new forklift ... no forklift was received by vehicle management which was paid for by the use of these secret funds'”
There were suspicions that General Khumalo, Madondo, Madondo, and Lushaba manipulated procurement processes and processes to appoint individuals, but evidence shows approvals and signatures were made by relevant officials including General Lushaba as CFO.
“I suspect that General Khumalo and some other officers in Crime Intelligence, including Madondo and Lushaba, were manipulating procurement processes and processes to appoint”
There is a repeated narrative in the charge sheet and Colonel Padayachee's affidavits about the capture of Crime Intelligence for money laundering purposes.
“manipulated to appoint somebody as part of capture process, which you are still going to tell us about, as part of the capture of Crime Intelligence for money laundering to happen. You have repeated that. Your affidavits speak to that.”
There were failures in applying for and obtaining required top secret clearances within Crime Intelligence.
“There was a bypassing of vetting processes which, amongst others, manifested itself in the failure to apply for and get top secret clearance where required.”
A preparatory investigation was decided to be conducted for fraud and offences involving dishonesty related to activities within the South African Police Service and Crime Intelligence.
“you have decided to conduct a preparatory investigation. Judging by the date, I do not know if this is a different preparatory investigation”
An investigation was authorized under section 2(8) regarding members of Crime Intelligence and their top security clearances and failure to apply, specifically matters involving corruption and related offences.
“authorisation, it is common law offences of dishonesty, and then statutory offences including but not limited to contravention of corruption and gratification, and contravention of the provisions of, once again, PRECCA... application for investigation in terms of section 8(13)... authorisation to investigate members of the CI as regards their top security clearances and their failure to apply”
There was no authorization to investigate the vetting and issue of top secret clearances for various other members of Crime Intelligence separate from the mentioned authorisation.
“There is no authorisation regarding the investigation into the vetting and issue of top secret clearances for the various other members of Crime Intelligence”
Authorization regarding security clearances for other Crime Intelligence officers would have arisen only after their preliminary investigations which were granted on 30 May 2025.
“authorization into these matters regarding security clearances for other officers within Crime Intelligence would have arisen after their preliminary investigations... after you granted your authorisations, and that would have been in May, on 30 May 2025”
The section 27 affidavit only lists suspicions without substantiation and does not contain facts that ground reasonable suspicion of serious high profile corruption, commercial or financial crime; relying on it for investigation is fishing and outside powers.
“All that affidavit does is tell you that a civilian was unduly benefited over employees within Crime Intelligence. That is all it tells you... it is actually irrelevant for purposes of your decision, what triggered your decision... All that affidavit does is to list suspicions. It does not say what is the basis of those suspicions... Otherwise, you are going to be fishing... Your mandate and your powers do not contemplate you doing that.”
General Khumalo was acting as the head of Crime Intelligence at the time of the incident but only acted for a very short time and could not charge General Lushaba himself.
“he was acting for a very short time ... but he could not charge him self”
General Khumalo is the head of Crime Intelligence and others are senior managers implicated in the capture of systems and processes for private interest.
“the head of CI… and other senior managers ... depict the capture of systems and process for private interest”
The affidavit revealed only that a civilian was unduly benefited over employees within Crime Intelligence; this does not justify investigation for serious high profile or complex corruption or commercial or financial crimes.
“all that affidavit does is tell you that a civilian was unduly benefited over employees within Crime Intelligence. That is all it tells you.”
Advocate Johnson states that cases disappeared miraculously and that information came to him through his own investigators who had taken a section 27 referral affidavit from Mr Adams showing information was pushed under his door, indicating some Crime Intelligence procurement documents.
“This came to my knowledge through my own investigators who had taken the section 27 referral affidavit from Mr Adams... when he received information which he alleges was pushed under his door, which is part of the affidavit, he opened cases in the Western Cape.”
Mr Adams suspected General Khumalo and others due to finding an envelope pushed under his office door at Parliament containing Crime Intelligence procurement and vetting documents using secret funds.
“My suspicion about General Khumalo and others became more clearer when I found an envelope pushed under my office door at Parliament which contained some Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds and vetting documents.”
Advocate Johnson states the affidavit referred to information pushed under his door that included crime intelligence procurement documents secret funds and vetting documents.
“He found an envelope pushed under his office door that contained Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds and vetting documents.”
The referral affidavit raises concerns about General Khumalo, General Lushaba, and General Madondo manipulating procurement processes to appoint and promote certain members.
“I suspect that General Khumalo and other senior officers in Crime Intelligence, including Madondo and Lushaba, were manipulating procurement processes and processes to appoint and promote certain members.”
The affidavit authorizes suspicion of various offenses including those committed in an organized fashion related to activities of South African Police Service and Crime Intelligence.
“You indicate that you have reason to suspect that the following offenses have been committed, and you list them... They have been committed or are being committed or attempts have or are being made to commit such offenses in an organized fashion by inter alia the persons or entities in the annexure to be the institution of the investigation in terms of section 28(13) of the Act in relation to the activities of South African Police Service and Crime Intelligence and any other entity.”
There is a suspicion of corruption related to appointment and vetting of persons, possibly involving the Prevention of Organized Crime Act.
“It could not rule out the corruption... The Prevention of Organized Crime Act would relate to paragraph 4 and likely points to the laundering of money out of Crime Intelligence.”
Forgery and uttering are possible offenses connected to the manipulation of procurement processes to appoint and promote certain members to higher strategic positions within Crime Intelligence.
“There can be fraud, forgery or uttering in that manipulation to appoint and promote certain members to higher strategic positions within Crime Intelligence.”
An envelope was slipped under the door of Mr Adams' office containing Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds and vetting documents, which he did not share the contents of.
“He references an envelope, he says, was slipped under the door of his office in Parliament, containing some Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds of Crime Intelligence and vetting documents. So he tells you that I have that, but he does not share the contents of those.”
Mr Adams suspects manipulation of procurement processes and appointments within Crime Intelligence and Secret Service offices.
“The second suspicion is reflected at paragraph 4 and on my reading, that speaks to two suspicions. The first being manipulation of procurement processes and processes to appoint and promote certain persons within Crime Intelligence. That is at paragraph 4, the first part of paragraph 4. The second part calls for the need to investigate appointments at various Secret Service offices.”
Money laundering is suspected through various Secret Service offices, which are likely points for laundering money out of Crime Intelligence.
“there is a suspicion that there is money laundering... the Secret Service offices in the country are likely points to money laundering out of Crime Intelligence”
General Lushaba has been charged with housebreaking, defeating and obstructing regarding loss of Crime Intelligence equipment and non-disclosure of secret information, a matter currently in court.
“therein he has been charged not just with the housebreaking, but with defeating and obstructing with regards to the loss of the equipment of Crime Intelligence and the non-disclosure thereof and the fact that there is secret information contained therein. So what I am saying is that 6 is the Lushaba matter that is currently in Court.”
There is a suspicion of money laundering involving Secret Service offices as extraction points in connection with Crime Intelligence secret funds.
“There is a suspicion that there is money laundering, except that he would like IDAC to investigate whether that laundering happens through various Secret Service offices.”
General Lushaba is charged with housebreaking, defeating and obstructing regarding loss of Crime Intelligence equipment and nondisclosure of secret information.
“Therein he has been charged not just with the housebreaking, but with the defeating and obstructing with regards to the loss of the equipment of Crime Intelligence and the non-disclosure thereof and the fact that there is secret information contained therein.”
Advocate Johnson received information from time to time that led to suspicion about misuse of secret funds and vetting documents pushed under his door at Parliament related to Crime Intelligence procurement.
“he then says in paragraph 3 that that suspicion became even clearer when an envelope pushed under his door at Parliament contained Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds of Crime Intelligence and vetting documents”
General Khumalo and other senior officers in Crime Intelligence, including Madondo and Lushaba, are suspected of manipulating procurement processes and appointing or promoting certain members to higher positions.
“he says "I suspect that General Khumalo and other senior officers in Crime Intelligence , including Madondo and Lushaba , were manipulating procurement processes and processes to appoint and promote certain members to higher positions."”
Advocate Johnson's suspicion became clearer upon finding an envelope with Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds pushed under his office door at Parliament.
“My suspicion about General Khumalo and others became more clearer when I found an envelope pushed under my office door at Parliament , which contained some Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds of Crime Intelligence and vetting documents.”
An envelope containing Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds and vetting documents was pushed under Mr. Adams' door at Parliament, leading to suspicion regarding General Khumalo and others.
“That suspicion became even clearer when an envelope pushed under his door at Parliament contained Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds of Crime Intelligence and vetting documents.”
The suspicion about systematic capture of Crime Intelligence involves manipulation of procurement and appointment processes to appoint and promote certain members to higher positions.
“I suspect that General Khumalo and some senior officers in Crime Intelligence, including Madondo and Lushaba, were manipulating procurement processes and processes to appoint and promote certain members to higher positions.”
Mr. Adams' suspicion became clearer when he found an envelope containing Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds and vetting documents pushed under his office door at Parliament.
“My suspicion about General Khumalo and others became more clearer when I found an envelope pushed under my office door at Parliament, which contained some Crime Intelligence procurement documents using secret funds of Crime Intelligence and vetting documents.”
There are concerns regarding General Khumalo, General Lushaba, and General Madondo manipulating procurement processes and appointing/promoting certain members loyal to them in Crime Intelligence.
“I see concerns regarding General Khumalo, General Lushaba, General Madondo. ... I suspect that General Khumalo and other senior officers in Crime Intelligence, including Madondo and Lushaba, were manipulating procurement processes and processes to appoint and promote certain members.”
The affidavit suspects offenses committed or attempted in an organized fashion by persons or entities related to South African Police Service and Crime Intelligence.
“"These have been committed or are being committed or attempts have or are being made to commit such offenses in an organized fashion by inter alia the persons or entities in the annexure to be the institution of the investigation in terms of section 28(13) of the Act in relation to the activities of South African Police Services and Crime Intelligence and any other entity."”
The offenses include offenses under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, Prevention of Organized Crime Act, National Strategic Intelligence Act, Public Finance Management Act, Financial Intelligence Centre Act, and Police Act involving corruption, money laundering, procurement fraud, vetting issues, secret fund misuse, forgery, fraud, theft, uttering, defeat of justice, connected to Crime Intelligence and SAPS.
“Offenses listed related to the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, Prevention of Organized Crime Act, National Strategic Intelligence Act, Public Finance Management Act, Financial Intelligence Centre Act, Police Act and related offenses including money laundering, procurement fraud, forgery, fraud, theft, uttering, obstructing administration of justice related to Crime Intelligence.”
Forgery and uttering are related to manipulating procurement processes to appoint certain members to higher strategic positions within Crime Intelligence.
“forgery and uttering would have been in relation to manipulating of the procurement processes and processes for the appointment that there could be allegations thereof forgery and uttering.”
Forgery means forging signatures in procurement, appointment, or vetting documents for Crime Intelligence.
“Forgery... is where in terms for example with the documents... someone would have forged someone's signature either in the procurement documents, in the appointment documents or in the vetting documents.”
Manipulating procurement processes to appoint and promote certain members to higher strategic positions within Crime Intelligence can involve fraud, forgery or uttering.
“manipulating procurement processes and processes to appoint and promote certain members to higher strategic positions within the Crime Intelligence, that in that manipulation there can be fraud, forgery or uttering.”
Senior SAPS members implicated in corruption matters included Acting National Police Commissioner General Phahlane, General Ngwenya, General Nematunzela, and various other senior SAPS officials.
“The accused in those matters included, amongst others, then Acting National Police Commissioner General Phahlane, General Ngwenya, who was our first black female Deputy National Police Commissioner in the SAPS, and also at the time, the wife of Lieutenant-General Shadrack Sibiya, General Nematunzela, who was the Head of Analysis at Crime Intelligence, and various other very senior SAPS officials.”
IDAC allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence to further ongoing political interference in SAPS.
“That IDAC allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence in the furtherance of ongoing political interference in SAPS.”
IDAC allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant-General Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence to further political interference in SAPS.
“That IDAC allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant-General Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence in the furtherance of ongoing political interference in SAPS”
IDAC has allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant General Khumalo and other Crime Intelligence officials as part of ongoing political interference in the South African Police Service.
“That IDAC has allegedly pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant General Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence in the furtherance of ongoing political interference in SAPS”
The subpoena served on 4 July 2026 required appearance to give evidence on issues arising from Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi's testimony on political interference and criminal syndicates in SAPS and related bodies.
“On 4 July 2026, I was served with a subpoena in terms of section 32 of the Commission's Act 8 of 1947, requiring me to appear personally before the Commission on Monday 3 July 2026 to give evidence and to be questioned about ... matters arising from the evidence of Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi before the Commission ... Political interference ... criminal syndicates... SAPS...NPA...Crime Intelligence...IPID ...”
Advocate Johnson asserts that he has not been directed, encouraged, permitted or participated in any politically motivated prosecution or investigation against Lieutenant Colonel Khumalo or any crime intelligence official.
“I have not been directed, encouraged, permitted or participated in any politically motivated prosecution or investigation against Lieutenant Colonel Khumalo or any crime intelligence official”
IDAC denies allegations that it operated outside its mandate and that the criminal case against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo was politically motivated.
“11. I deny these allegations. I expand on this denial as follows here under 1.1 IDAC has a prima facie criminal case against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence. That matter was not pursued for any political purpose at the instance of any political actor or to advance any form of political interference within SAPS.”
The subpoena served on 4 July 2026 required testimony about allegations including IDAC operating outside its mandate, pursuing politically motivated criminal cases, and interference in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
“On 4 July 2026, I was served with a subpoena in terms of section 32 of the Commission's Act 8 of 1947, requiring me to appear personally before the Commission on Monday 3 July 2026 to give evidence and to be questioned about... matters arising from the evidence of Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi ... Whether criminal syndicates, organised criminal groups, politically connected persons, or other unlawful actors have infiltrated... SAPS, NPA, Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, Crime Intelligence, IPID... The factual and evidentiary basis for any allegations attributed to me...”
IDAC denies allegations of pursuing criminal cases against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo and other Crime Intelligence officials for political purposes or political interference in SAPS.
“11. I deny these allegations. I expand on this denial as follows here under 1. 1D A C has a prima facie criminal case against Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence. That matter was not pursued for any political purpose at the instance of any political actor or to advance any form of political interference within SAPS.”
The investigation and prosecution of Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence have at all times been dealt with through ordinary prosecutorial processes within IDAC and NPA, and the matter is presently before a court of law.
“The investigation and prosecution have at all material times been dealt with through ordinary prosecutorial processes applicable within IDAC and the NPA. The matter is presently before a court of law.”
Brigadier Nyuswa received a call from Warrant Officer Mpangase informing him about Crime Intelligence contact regarding a container at Isipingo potentially containing drugs; Mpangase was proceeding with Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob and Warrant Officer Sibiya, all from Durban Serious Organised Crime Unit.
“On Thursday morning of 22nd June 2021 , I received a call from Warrant Officer Mpangase from Durban Serious Organised Crime Unit , informing that Crime Intelligence has contacted him regarding a container at Isipingo , which might have drugs and that he was proceeding there with Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob and Warrant Officer Sibiya , all from Durban Serious Organised Crime”
The case dockets opened in Cape Town and Orlando related to the complaint express concern that colonels employed in Crime Intelligence were unsuitable for their appointed posts.
“The cases that were opened in Cape Town and Orlando relate to this complaint ... It is concerning to note that all the Colonels employed in Crime Intelligence , none of them are suitable for the post to which they are appointed”
The initial docket mentioned General Khumalo appointing family members and friends in positions at Crime Intelligence, but this was insufficient and needed more information.
“The initial docket just talked about General Khumalo, if I can recall, appointing family members and friends in positions at Crime Intelligence ... it needed more information.”
The complainant alleges that none of the people appointed in Crime Intelligence have the necessary skills, qualifications and experience and that many appointees are associates and relatives of Lieutenant-General Khumalo.
“The complainant alleges "none of the people appointed in CI have the necessary skills, qualification and experience", and that many of these appointees are associates and relatives of Lieutenant-General Khumalo.”
The complaint involved the use of Crime Intelligence funds to cover up that General Lushaba lost a laptop and to pay off a sex worker.
“Crime Intelligence funds were used to cover up the fact that General Lushaba lost the laptop, involved in some other things, and they did this by using Crime Intelligence monies to buy a new laptop for him and to pay off the sex worker”
The referral to IDAC concerns the abuse of Crime Intelligence monies and is limited in scope, not allowing investigation into other aspects of General Pienaar's conduct.
“the referral sent to you is limited... It was not an opportunity for you to go fish for other things that Pienaar did or did not do right”
The complainant alleges manipulation of promotional and security vetting processes to unduly benefit a civilian person employed by BMW who was appointed as a Brigadier and Head of Technical Support Service in Crime Intelligence without policing or management experience.
“Here is an allegation of a high-ranking officer involved in manipulating promotional and security vetting, so the undue benefit of a civilian person who worked for BMW South Africa before being appointed as a Brigadier and CI... She had no policing experience, no management experience and was appointed as the Head of Technical Support Services.”
The detail about Mrs. Mokwele's identity within Crime Intelligence was provided by Colonel Holtzhausen who gave a statement that is later included in the docket.
“The person that came up with Mokwele and the details is when, which, who I called and interviewed and eventually took a statement from, which is in the docket, was Colonel Holtzhausen.”
Investigation arose from complaints or allegations of manipulation of vetting processes and abuse of power regarding appointments to Crime Intelligence.
“The allegations only come forward to fact when we find that the processes have been manipulated ... appointment and vetting processes ... manipulation of security vetting processes ... abuse of powers.”
There were reasonable grounds to suspect that certain people were involved in allegations related to the capture of Crime Intelligence, leading to the request to verify and eliminate some documents.
“there were reasonable grounds to suspect that these people were involved in some of the allegations, so therefore, on reasonable grounds, these documents were requested to verify and eliminate”
There is no complaint or allegation in the Crime Intelligence file or any other document that Major General Madondo is involved in a scheme to capture Crime Intelligence.
Investigations related to Crime Intelligence fall within the scope where allegations are made and similar offenses are followed up within ongoing investigations.
“We are in the same scenario or the same investigation of Crime Intelligence within there, where the allegations is falling within Crime Intelligence, and within that same investigations, you are picking up similar stuff that is there, similar offenses that are there.”
Colonel Padayachee clarifies he does not have a free hand to investigate everything without authorization, but continues investigations within the scope of Crime Intelligence and related similar offenses based on applicable law and reasonable grounds.
“It is not about a free hand to investigate everything and anything. We are in the same scenario or the same investigation of Crime Intelligence within there, where the allegations is falling within Crime Intelligence, and within that same investigations, you are picking up similar stuff that is there, similar offenses that are there. We continue with it because it is still there. But if it is something else...”
General Khumalo and other officers in Crime Intelligence, including Madondo Lushaba, were suspected of manipulating procurement processes to appoint and promote certain members to high strategic positions within Crime Intelligence.
“I suspect that General Khumalo and some other officers in Crime Intelligence , including Madondo Lushaba , were manipulating procurement processes and processes to appoint and promote certain members to higher strategic positions within Crime Intelligence .”
Mr Adams wants IDAC to investigate appointments of various secret service offices in the country because such offices are likely points for laundering money out of Crime Intelligence without detection.
“Mr Adams would like IDAC to please investigate appointments of the various secret service offices , not officers , offices in the country , because that is the likely point for that money will be laundered .”
Investigation cases initially have no CAS number but are allocated a CIN (inquiry) number which may contain many legs (sub-investigations) under that inquiry number, especially in crime intelligence cases involving multiple individuals.
“When you look at all the cases, the inquiry is on Crime Intelligence. It is, how can I put it to you, it is one investigation that has many legs, so it is got one inquiry number, so we use that reference... the inquiry number is CIN with different legs in it”
The CIN reference number includes a serial number and a date indicating the inquiry's opening date, here stated as 12 December 2024, marking the start of a broad Crime Intelligence inquiry.
“It is a serial number... When you look at it, it is December 2024... the 12th December 2024”
Before December 2024, there was no broad Crime Intelligence investigation opened; the first broad inquiry registered on the system was in December 2024, marked by CIN 130/02/12/2024 authorization document 2813.
“And before December 2024, there was no Crime Intelligence investigation broad... When you look at the 2813, when it was authorised, 2813, in December 2024, so that is where we take our cue from an inquiry in December 2024”
The ongoing broad investigation into Crime Intelligence includes the appointments and promotions of General Khumalo, General Madondo, and others, integrated under CIN 130/02/12/2024 inquiry number opened in December 2024.
“We now have come to understand that you are investigating specifically the Mokwele appointment, but that happens in the context of a broader investigation... with many legs. So we are trying to find documents pertaining to the investigations of the appointments and promotions of General Khumalo, General Madondo, all those people listed there... that investigation will be part of that CIN number 130/02/12/2024”
The selection panel was requested from Crime Intelligence and the panel was selected by General Khumalo and sent to Head Office for approval; General N Khuoa was Acting Deputy National Commissioner at the time and approved the panel.
“The panels are requested from Crime Intelligence, meaning these are the people that, you know, they request to be on the panels. So, it is a request from Crime Intelligence, General Khumalo, these are the people that I select for the different posts and panels and it is sent to Head Office, Human Resources and it gets approved there. So, the approval of the panel takes place there and the Acting Deputy National Commissioner at that time was General N Khuoa. She approved it.”
General Khumalo, Head of Crime Intelligence, had the authority to select the panel for recruitment processes as allowed by SAPS prescripts, and the panel selection is subject to approval by Head Office.
“the prescript gives him the authority to choose that panel and then send it for approval”
IDAC inserted itself into the panel process questioning why Khan was not put on the panel, why others were selected, and why IDAC's role in Crime Intelligence interviews was challenged.
“IDAC inserted itself in the panel process, and IDAC said, why was Khan not put in the panel? Why was so-and-so put in the panel and not General Khan? Why does IDAC have that difficulty? Why is IDAC's business who should or should not be in the panel that interviews at Crime Intelligence?”
General Khumalo personally chose the panel and sent it for recommendation and approval, but there was concern that other Crime Intelligence Generals could have been selected for this sensitive and covert Crime Intelligence post.
“he chose that particular panel and sent it for recommendation, and it was approved. And the issue we have there ... other Crime Intelligence Generals that he could have used to sit on the panel because it is a sensitive Crime Intelligence post. It is a covert post.”
Colonel Padayachee says there are nine provincial heads in Crime Intelligence and three Generals, any of whom could have been chosen for the panel, not specifically General Khan.
“We have nine provincial Heads in the country, Crime Intelligence. We have maybe three Generals at Crime Intelligence. Anyone of those nine plus the three at Head Office could have been chosen to sit on the panel, not specifically Khan”
Colonel Padayachee interviewed General Khan regarding technical support post matters as he was a member of Crime Intelligence at the time.
“It was for the letter and to interview him with regards to the technical support post because he has been there in Crime Intelligence and was there at that time.”
Colonel Padayachee states that Major General Khan was the only General at Crime Intelligence besides General Khumalo; the other General was not present or suspended at the time.
“I think Major General Khan was the only General at that time at Crime Intelligence beside General Khumalo. The other General that was available was not there. He was suspended or I am not sure, but there were just the two Generals there.”
It is improper and highly influencing the content of General Khan's witness statement to provide him the file to review for preparation in circumstances where criminal charges are intended against senior members within Crime Intelligence.
“You are influencing the content of his witness statement ... That witness is no longer talking the absolute truth ... That is improper ... Have you ever given any other witness this file to say these are the contents ... ?”
Generals Khumalo, Madondo, and Lekalakala were granted bail with the condition prohibiting them from being at any Crime Intelligence premises while their criminal trial is pending.
“Generals Khumalo, Madondo, and Lekalakala have been granted bail with certain conditions ... that they were prohibited from being at any premises of Crime Intelligence within the Republic while their criminal trial is pending”
Colonel Padayachee identifies that an allegation involves the appointment of an outsider, a person from outside Crime Intelligence with no policing or management experience, into a specialised Crime Intelligence environment, which raises 'small flags' and requires investigation.
“this is Crime Intelligence ... a specialised component ... appointing a civilian or a person from the outside Crime Intelligence ... highly specialised environment ... small flags that come to my notice”
Colonel Padayachee confirms that the appointment was advertised externally for outsiders to apply, thus the appointment was not limited internally to Crime Intelligence personnel only.
“that was advertised externally ... I confirm that the advert was an external advert”
The investigator takes a holistic approach to a package of allegations including vetting issues, security clearance problems, and vetting manipulation, not just the single appointment matter.
“It was a whole lot of allegations on different vetting issues, security clearance, vetting manipulators, so it is a whole lot of different allegations that stay... a package of alleged corruption and Crime Intelligence.”
The section 27 referral leads to investigations including warrants of arrest and court appearances, but the current allegations discussed about corruption in Crime Intelligence are not contained in the referenced affidavit.
“We are dealing with the section 27 referral, which results in you investigating a warrant of arrest... but the genesis of it is what we are discussing now... the other allegations about corruption in Crime Intelligence... they are not contained in this affidavit.”
Chief Perumal assembled the investigators, briefed them on allegations relating to Crime Intelligence, and provided guidance which started the whole investigation.
“Chief Perumal assembled us as investigators... that was the briefing from him which started the whole investigation and the guidance from him.”
The act suspected to be committed by the employee is the capture of Crime Intelligence, meaning placing people in positions to manipulate tenders and give out information unlawfully.
“When we look at the investigation of Crime Intelligence, and when we talk about capture, it is when the division, your people are placed in specific positions to do certain things... It could mean tenders, manipulating of tenders, it could be giving out information on operations that are there.”
The panel chaired by General Khumalo appointed Ms Mokwele through a manipulated appointment process and as part of a scheme to capture Crime Intelligence.
“It is that particular panel, chaired by General Khumalo, appointed by General Khumalo, chaired by General Khumalo, that appointed Ms Mokwele ... when you look at that, here is another appointee coming into Crime Intelligence ... appointed for a specific purpose ... from a capture point of view.”
The witness states that after the meeting with General Mkhwanazi, the operation commenced which resulted in the arrest of four senior officers from Crime Intelligence and that everything was fine with no issues.
“Not very long after that, or a while later, the operation on the first matter commenced , which resulted in the arrest of four senior officers from Crime Intelligence . Everything was fine . There was no issues.”
Crime Intelligence has been a corrupt and dangerous environment where no single Divisional Commissioner stayed long without being removed for corruption, and the referral leading to arrests was unprecedented.
“It has been for more than three decades that Crime Intelligence has been the front in the media space on corruption. There is not a single Divisional Commissioner that has held his post and stayed there. Most of them were charged for corruption, for allegations of corruption and removed, and there was always acting, acting, acting. Crime Intelligence is a very closed environment, a dangerous environment too as well. ... it led to the arrest of the executive of Crime Intelligence.”
General Khumalo started to clean up rogue agents in Crime Intelligence who were collecting salaries but not doing any work, which led to interdicts and applications against him being brought.
“General Khumalo , when he came to Crime Intelligence , started to clean up the rogue agents that were collecting salaries but not doing anything . So when he started to clean up , they brought interdicts and applications against him .”
The summons issued to Colonel Brian Padayachee requires him to respond to allegations about infiltration, capture, exertion of undue influence, and corruption within the South African Police Service, the National Prosecuting Authority, and other criminal justice system components by criminal syndicates, politically connected persons, and unlawful actors.
“The summons requires me to appear before the Commission on Monday 13 July 2026 for the purposes of giving evidence and be questioned about the following. Matters arising from the evidence of Lieutenant General Mkhwanazi during his evidence before the Commission on 17, 18 and 19 September whether criminal syndicates, organised criminal groups, politically connected persons or other unlawful actors have infiltrated, captured, exerted undue influence over or otherwise compromised the South African Police, the NPA, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, Crime Intelligence, Independent Police Investigative Directorate or any other component of the criminal justice system.”
Colonel Padayachee denies the allegations that IDAC pursued a criminal case against Lieutenant General Dumisani Khumalo and other Crime Intelligence officials as part of ongoing political interference at SAPS, stating that the allegations are baseless and that IDAC has sufficient evidence to sustain the charges.
“I deny these allegations. They are baseless and devoid of merit. The IDAC has sufficient evidence to sustain the charges on the criminal cases against Lieutenant General Khumalo and other officials at Crime Intelligence. This criminal case is currently pending before the Magistrate's Court Pretoria. I deny as baseless any allegations of political interference or hidden agendas in respect of the investigations that are conducted by IDAC against these senior officers within Crime Intelligence and SAPS.”
Colonel Padayachee knew Major General Khan as a senior officer in Crime Intelligence but had no official working relationship with him during his time there, and he had reservations about Crime Intelligence senior officers.
“I know Major General Khan is a senior officer... I had strictly no official working relationship with him. I had my reservations during my time Crime Intelligence on senior officers there...”
There were seasoned veteran Crime Intelligence officers including the speaker himself at the merger of the new Crime Intelligence Service, and there were reservations about the rapid promotions such as General Khanca's promotion from Colonel to General.
“there you had seasoned veteran Crime Intelligence officers, as well as from the new Crime Intelligence, which one of them was myself that came in ... And when General Khanca came in, he was a Colonel and then next minute ... General Khanci is now a General. ... I had my reservations”
The reservations expressed relate to promotion irregularities within Crime Intelligence, indicating corruption with personnel recruited irregularly and promoted bypassing ranks.
“there were many things that took place during, and as mentioned by Mkhwanazi, which I support what he says about the corruption within Crime Intelligence ... some of them worked at supermarkets or wherever, that came into the police and ... they came in on the rank of a Captain ... a prominent person's wife was also promoted to a full Colonel ... it did exist during those times. But the manner in which it was done is questionable”
The corruption within Crime Intelligence involves people skipping ranks and being willy-nilly promoted, causing demoralization among long-serving personnel.
“But to go and skip ranks ... there are other people too ... went from Colonels to Generals ... especially starting at CI, that has put us where we are today with a system that has become so corrupt, where people are just willy-nilly promoted ... people that are sitting 20, 30 years in a particular rank with expertise, experience, hardworking, and suddenly somebody comes in and a while later, they are made a General”
Mr Adams filed an affidavit on January 6, 2025, alleging anonymous information about fraud and corruption within Crime Intelligence involving high-ranking police officials manipulating promotional and security vetting processes to benefit a civilian appointed as brigadier despite no policing or management experience.
“On or about early October 2024, I received information anonymously surrounding alleged fraud and corruption being perpetrated within Crime Intelligence ... manipulating promotional and security vetting processes to unduly benefit a civilian person ... appointed as a Brigadier in South Africa ... no policing experience and no management experience and was appointed as Head of the technical support service.”
ADV KHUMALO SC quoting Mr Adams' affidavitDay 139 · 14 Jul 2026Refers to: early October 2024Location: Crime Intelligence, South Africa
The manipulation of promotional and security vetting processes to benefit a civilian without policing experience is presented as a serious allegation that requires investigation under section 27 referral and a preliminary investigation under section 28 (13).
“serious allegation being made here, that there is manipulation of processes by high-ranking officers giving a civilian with no experience and appointing her in a Crime Intelligence post”
General Khumalo and other senior officers in Crime Intelligence, including Madondo and Lushaba, were manipulating procurement processes to appoint and promote certain members to higher strategic positions within Crime Intelligence.
“I suspect that General Khumalo and some of the other senior officers in Crime Intelligence, including Madondo and Lushaba, were manipulating procurement processes and processes to appoint and promote certain members to higher strategic positions within Crime Intelligence.”
Colonel Padayachee is the investigating officer authorized to handle a preliminary investigation into serious allegations concerning Crime Intelligence, relying on information from management and the chief criminal investigator, rather than directly on the section 27 referral affidavit.
“I am the investigating officer here at the tailend that receives the authorization. I am authorized there to be involved in the investigation. I look at the allegations, go out and see whether what is said here is true or not true. They are serious allegations.”
There are multiple investigations referred to as the Crime Intelligence matter, including the Lushaba matter, the Mokwele matter, and the Madondo matter, with a fourth matter still under investigation.
“You have the allegations on the different matters that are there. So the first one you had was ... the Lushaba matter. ... The second scenario is the Mokwele matter. And then you have the Madondo matter. I am not going to say about the fourth one, because that is still in the oven.”
Minister Cele appointed General Khumalo without an interview process and despite Khumalo not having worked as a senior police manager in Crime Intelligence.
“Then it introduces Minister Cele and the appointment of General Khumalo himself and there is an issue, a question, no, no not an issue being raised that he was appointed without an interview process and without having worked as a senior police manager in Crime Intelligence.”
Colonel Padayachee states he reports the truth to the Commission and is not manipulating facts, noting he has submitted a Zondo affidavit and highlights that a whistleblower in Crime Intelligence who exposed corruption has been in the witness protection program since 2012 and has received no punishment but protection.
“I am here, I am under oath, and what I am saying is the truth... I have submitted a Zondo affidavit. General Mkhwana may come and also say that, yes, he pointed it out then. We have a person sitting in the witness program since 2012 to date that exposed the corruption in Crime Intelligence. His punishment or his reward is that to date he is still in the witness protection Program”
The Colonel has led many investigations into corruption by police officials in SAPS, particularly in Crime Intelligence, and is aware of the dangers in prematurely releasing witness names which could jeopardize investigations and the safety of witnesses.
“I have led many investigations into corruption by police officials within the SAPS, with a specific reference to Crime Intelligence... It puts the investigation into jeopardy, and more importantly, it has the potential to put the life of the witness in danger.”
Witness O was very fearful to volunteer information given the environment at Crime Intelligence at the time and was aware that Advocate Johnson's husband, Colonel Junaid Johnson, worked at Crime Intelligence and had worked closely with General Khan.
“I was very fearful to volunteer information, especially given the environment at Crime Intelligence at the time. I was also aware that Advocate Johnson's husband, Colonel Junaid Johnson, worked at Crime Intelligence, and him and General Khan had worked closely together.”
Witness O started thinking about the assault incident again and was troubled after Advocate Johnson was appointed Head of IDAC in early 2022, knowing that Hawks were placed at IDAC to investigate matters at Crime Intelligence.
“When Advocate Johnson was appointed the Head of IDAC in early 022, I started thinking about this incident again, and it troubled me all over again. At the time, members of the Hawks were placed at IDAC to investigate matters at Crime Intelligence.”
Witness O approached the Hawks on the condition that his identity would be protected to inform them of the incident and prepared a statement of his recollection in August 2022, but nothing came of the investigation conducted by the DPCI officers.
“I approached them on the condition that my identity would be protected. I informed them of the incident and that I would prepare a statement setting out my recollection of the incident. I did so in August 2022. As far as I am aware, the DPCI officers investigated the matter, but nothing has come of it.”
The investigation team became familiar with crime intelligence officials who provided information, sometimes on unrelated ongoing investigations.
“While conducting investigations into Crime Intelligence, we became familiar with Crime Intelligence officials who would provide us with information. At times, these officers would provide information to ongoing investigations or matters that we were not aware of.”
Colonel Roe Loofse gives context of a 2018 event involving Advocate Andrea Johnson and Major General Feroz Khan, stating previous efforts to uncover crime intelligence matters were frustrated by media pressure and interference.
“Commissioners, for context, may be I should just refer to our investigation in 2020 in terms of Crime Intelligence and the conduct that we experienced at the time, which included the using of the media to put pressure on us when we investigated this matter from Crime Intelligence. Major General Khan played a huge role in that... So that media report was then placed and there was a lot of fallout in respect of that... So I expect no less now than what we went through.”
Colonel Roe Loofse states there was a 15 year struggle between police and National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to get Crime Intelligence matters on the roll, due to interference and impunity.
“So between the police and the NPA, we struggled about 15 years, 12 years to get a Crime Intelligence matter on the roll because of all the interference that we experienced.”
Colonel Roe Loofse confirms pattern of behaviour of impunity and interference in Crime Intelligence investigations, citing 2011 incident as example.
“This is a pattern of behaviour that I have experienced, and this specific incident just forms part of that pattern of behaviour. The impunity, the fact that they think they can get away with it, and they did for a long time... It is in that context that I am referring to what happened in 2011 because, how do I say, I have seen this movie before.”
In May 2022, in Crime Intelligence, a disclosure was made to Colonel Roe Loofse and Captain Mark McLean by a colonel and lieutenant colonel about an incident in 2018 involving Andrea Johnson and General Feroz Khan, deemed protected under the Protection Disclosure Act.
“Sometime in May 2022, a Colonel who was a captain at the time of the incident in 018, and a lieutenant Colonel when she approached us in 2022, in Crime Intelligence, approached Captain Mark McLean and me to make a disclosure which I deemed to be in terms of the Protection Disclosure Act of 26 of 2000. She informed us that in 2018, she shared an office with General Khan, who had been appointed as the Head of Operational Intelligence Support in September 2017...”
The Colonel received an email with subject 'Petle Complaint' containing attachments including an audio file recording of General Khan and documents relating to a criminal complaint against General Khan by Brigadier Petle.
“The subject header of the email was Petle Complaint. The email had photo attachments and an audio file. The email contained photographs of the A1 statement of Brigadier Petle, at the time a Crime Intelligence officer, in a criminal complaint by her against General Khan for assault common, intimidation as well as a J88 medical report and an audio recording of General Khan taken at the time of the alleged incident. The alleged incident took place on 26 June 018 and the A1 was commissioned on the same day at Silverton police station and the case opened under Silverton CAS number 422/06/2018.”
General Khan has a tendency to show off to friends by sharing Crime Intelligence documents that reflect on his importance, which is probably inappropriate but not sinister.
“It seems that General Khan has a tendency to show off to friends by sharing Crime Intelligence documents that sort of reflect on his importance ... it is probably not appropriate ... it is not sinister”
General Khan shared an internal delegation document from December 2020 about his increased powers within Crime Intelligence with Mr Sayed and Mr Vally, who responded positively but informally.
“Major General Khan was, going back to December 020, when he was delegated increased powers within Crime Intelligence. He shared that document first with Mr Sayed ... and Mr Sayed responded: "Well done, my bru." ... And Mr Vally said: "This is great news."”
General Khan was facing disciplinary troubles at Crime Intelligence and tried to avoid involving Mr Malema at first but later involved him after the disciplinary difficulties story leaked to the press and Mr Malema expressed determination not to resign and to fight and emerge victorious.
“General Khan is in disciplinary trouble at Crime Intelligence. He tells Mr Sayed. Mr Sayed says, should I get Mr Malema involved? General Khan says initially no. A few days later, the story of his disciplinary difficulties is leaked to the press and sometime thereafter, Mr Malema gets involved and by 22 September, Mr Malema is saying, you will not ever resign, no matter what. This is a fight, and we will emerge victorious.”
General Khan has a tendency to share Crime Intelligence documents to friends to show off his importance, which is probably not appropriate.
“General Khan has a tendency to show off to friends by sharing Crime Intelligence documents that sort of reflect on his importance...it is probably not appropriate”
General Khan leaked internal delegation documents within Crime Intelligence which should not be shared with friends, although this activity is not considered sinister by counsel.
“It is probably not appropriate...internal delegation documents within Crime Intelligence ought to be shared with friends...It is really...not sinister”
A letter on EFF letterhead was sent by Mr Sayed to the Minister of Police, Mr Bheki Cele, asking about his relationship with Timmy Marimuthu described as a druglord and about Crime Intelligence matters.
“Mr Sayed sends to General Khan a letter to the Minister of Police ... on the EFF letterhead ... addressed to Mr Bheki Cele, Minister of Police ... asks the questions about the Minister's relationship with Mr Timmy Marimuthu, who is described as druglord Timmy Marimuthu and Crime Intelligence matters.”
General Khan forwarded to Mr Sayed a disciplinary notice addressed to him by the then Divisional Commissioner of Crime Intelligence, alleging Khan exceeded his authority and performed unauthorised acts under his delegation.
“General Khan forwards to Mr Sayed a disciplinary notice that has been addressed to him by the then Divisional Commissioner of Crime Intelligence ... actually exceeded his authority and performed acts that he was not entitled to do purportedly under that delegation”
General Khan was in disciplinary trouble at Crime Intelligence and initially did not want Mr Malema involved; after news leaked to the media, Mr Malema got involved.
“General Khan is in disciplinary trouble at Crime Intelligence ... He tells Mr Sayed ... should I get Mr Malema involved? General Khan says initially no ... after the story is leaked to the press ... Mr Malema gets involved ... by 22 September, Mr Malema is saying 'you will never resign, no matter what... this is a fight, and we will emerge victorious'.”
A senior Crime Intelligence officer informed another member that a journalist appears to favour particular senior police officers, including General Khan's superior Lieutenant General Peter Jacobs, and suggested a counter was needed against the journalist.
“you have a senior Crime Intelligence officer informing another member ... that a journalist appears to favour particular senior police officers ... that is Lieutenant General Peter Jacobs ... the response from the other member is ... we need to do a counter”
Crime Intelligence is being used to mobilize resources against journalists who report unfavorably, which is not a lawful policing objective and reflects a dangerous misuse of intelligence capabilities.
“there is a willingness to use intelligence ... against a journalist who you are not comfortable with their reporting ... it is not a lawful policing objective”
The use of Crime Intelligence to target journalists for factional or retaliatory purposes shows the safeguards are not working, especially when senior officers or their allies contemplate such measures.
“where senior officers or their allies can even contemplate using such measures ... the safeguards are not working”
The journalist believes her housebreak was linked to her writing about Crime Intelligence surveillance of journalists, but the affidavit does not confirm the break-in was due to chat conversations.
“this journalist believes that the break-in was linked to her writing stories about Crime Intelligence surveilling journalists ... she does not say that at all ... she was not aware of the conversation until recently”
There is extensive reporting on Crime Intelligence and attacks on journalists which appear to come from Crime Intelligence, with the sequencing and timing warranting further investigation.
“there is a lot of reporting that was taking place on Crime Intelligence ... and then there are attacks ... all of it together is the context ... the sequencing is relevant ... it bears ... warrants further investigation”
General Khan holds a senior position within Crime Intelligence, making his financial disclosures particularly relevant given the responsibilities associated with that role.
“General Khan is very senior within Crime Intelligence ... that position is a particular position where that person deals with these types of issues”
It should be impossible for a full-time Major General in the police to be moonlighting as a director of 10 businesses, especially in an activity opposed to the work of Crime Intelligence, such as trading spare car parts.
“we find it should be impossible for a full-time Major General in the police to be moonlighting as a director of 10 businesses, at least two of those businesses indicate a trade in spare car parts, an activity diametrically opposed to the work of Crime Intelligence, given the high levels of vehicle crime in Gauteng.”
IPID was captured during the State Capture period by two Crime Intelligence officials controlling all investigations.
“unfortunately, by that stage, IPID was captured. It was during that State Capture period, and IPID was captured by virtue of the fact that two Crime Intelligence officials have been appointed to work in IPID and they were allegedly controlling all of the investigations that IPID did”
Two Crime Intelligence officials placed in IPID by the Minister of Police managed investigations but absconded from IPID after Robert McBride was reinstated and returned to Crime Intelligence.
“These two officials absconded from IPID and never came back. They went back to Crime Intelligence... placed by the Minister of Police”
In 2011/12 General Mkhwanazi protected one General in Crime Intelligence, Lieutenant General Mdluli, and in 2025 he protected five Generals in Crime Intelligence.
“in 2011/12 he was protecting one General in Crime Intelligence which was Lieutenant General Mdluli and in 2025 he is protecting five Generals in Crime Intelligence”
Major General Solly Lazarus, Chief Financial Officer of the Secret Service account of CI, had already been suspended and charged criminally for fraud and corruption.
“Major General Solly Lazarus, the Chief Financial Officer of the Secret Service account of CI had already been suspended and charged criminally for fraud and corruption”
On approximately 4 July 2023, while engaged in church-related activities in Meyerton and Vereeniging areas, the informant was stopped by individuals identifying themselves as Crime Intelligence members, who transported him in their vehicles, questioned him at an unknown residential property, and demanded his mobile devices without providing documentation or warrants.
“Approximately on the 4th of July 2023, while busy with church-related engagements in the Meyerton area and Vereeniging area, I was stopped by individuals who identified themselves as members of Crime Intelligence. They were driving three unmarked vehicles fitted with blue lights, namely a BMW 3 Series, a Golf 7 and a Toyota GD6. Two of them drove in the Isuzu KB300 bakkie which I was driving in and instructed me to sit at the back of the floor in between seats. I was transported to an unknown residential property and questioned. I was instructed to hand over my mobile devices without being provided with any documentation or warrant”
One of the Crime Intelligence members demanded the informant to open his phone gallery and made remarks implying that sending IPID to the Generals would not result in consequences.
“One of the individuals made a remark that, do I think that I can send IPID to the Generals and get away with it”
The Crime Intelligence members warned the informant they were watching his every move and then released him after several hours near the area where he was found.
“They also warned that they were watching my every move and after several hours I was then released. They dropped me off near the area where they found me”
The informant did not open a case against the Crime Intelligence members because the incident was masqueraded as an investigation and he was threatened, making him fearful and uncertain about what was transpiring.
“I did not open a case and I have my reasons because when this incident happened, it was masqueraded as an investigation or a further investigation, because mostly I was questioned on the details pertaining to the scene and the acquisition of information. But ultimately these individuals wanted my devices. And given the fact that I was threatened, particularly in relation to the knowledge of where my mother's house is, and being directed to the point that they are watching my every move, I was spooked to an extent, because I was not clear what was transpiring because it did not just seem like an ordinary thing”
Much of the documentary evidence relating to previous intelligence sharing engagements was lost when Mr Nku's mobile devices were forcibly taken by individuals alleged to be members of Crime Intelligence.
“much of the documentary evidence relating to previous intelligence sharing engagements was lost when my mobile devices were forcefully taken from me by individuals alleged to be members of Crime Intelligence.”
Warrant Officer Mpangase from the SANEB section reported involvement in a suspected drug shipping container operation at Isipingo.
“I was on duty when I received a call from Warrant Officer Mpangase from the SANEB section. He reports to Lieutenant Colonel Jacob who was the SANEB team leader at the time. He informed me that he was contacted by Crime Intelligence regarding a suspected drug shipping container at Isipingo.”
Brigadier Nyuswa recalls that he was contacted by Warrant Officer Mpangase who reported to Colonel Jacob regarding suspected drugs in a container at Isipingo.
“I was on duty when I received a call from Warrant Officer Mpangase. He reported to Colonel Jacob, who was the SANAB team leader at the time. Warrant Officer Mpangase informed me that he was contacted by Crime Intelligence regarding suspected drugs in a container at Isipingo.”
Brigadier Nyuswa explains the preference of operational officers and Crime Intelligence handlers to work with specific people such as Colonel Beukes and Colonel Jacob.
“the Crime Intelligence handlers, as well as the investigators... there is a Colonel Beukes from Crime Intelligence. He will always ask for Carl. And the others, I think it is a trust issue.”
Brigadier Nyuswa approved signing on Warrant Officer Mpangase's colleague, Colonel Jacob, to duty following a request from Crime Intelligence, despite Colonel Jacob being on leave and not personally signed on.
“We know that from his evidence ... that he was effectively signed on duty by Warrant Officer Mpangase because you did not speak to him ... He is on leave. You and him say Mpangase called you ... you approved it. So you signed him on to duty.”
Chief Mashaba states that Crime Intelligence was not involved on Thursday night because the operation was already in progress Friday morning and he did not have the luxury of time to wait for confirmation.
“Crime Intelligence, this thing already it is Thursday. On Friday it was in progress already. I do not think I had that luxury of time.”
The complainant gave false information to IPID which was withheld by the police and characterized as causing division within SAPS and Crime Intelligence.
“you giving information that is clearly false to IPID because you were the main complainant in the IPID complaint ... And that is material information that you withheld from IPID, from the police”
Cases Booysen CAS 252/10/2021 and Booysen CAS 52/10/2021 arose from the arrest and detention by General Khan, General Kadwa, Brigadier Sekgobela, Captain Sebola, Captain Nortje, Colonel Steyn, and the Gauteng DPCI team.
“Booysen CAS 252/10/2021 ... Booysen CAS 52/10/2021 case emanates from our arrest and detention by General Khan, Crime Intelligence, General Kadwa, Brigadier Sekgobela, Captain Sebola, Captain Nortje, Colonel Steyn, and the Gauteng DPCI team”
General Khan was at the crime scene and this raises concerns because as a Crime Intelligence officer, he is not supposed to be there or handle the crime scene.
“General Khan , he knows that he is not supposed to be at the crime scene . He cannot even handle the crime scene , but here at least he is putting himself at the crime scene”
On 9 July 2021, Sergeant Mogobo called for urgent assistance at the Scania warehouse in Aeroton where several police officers from Crime Intelligence, DPCI and Gauteng Traffic Department were trying to remove the contents of a container suspected of containing drugs.
“On 9 July 2021, at about 09:50, I received a telephone call from Sergeant Mogobo of Gauteng Highway Patrol. He informed me that he was at the Scania warehouse in Aeroton and that there were several police men who claimed to be from Crime Intelligence, DPCI and Gauteng Traffic Department who were trying to remove the contents of a container that he suspected to contain drugs and was supposed to be delivered to the Scania warehouse.”
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR MAPHOSHODay 116 · 09 Jun 2026Refers to: 2021-07-09Location: Scania warehouse, Aeroton
Chief Mashaba was arrested by the Hawks while involved in an undercover drug operation which he could not disclose due to the nature of the operation.
“At about 11:26, I received communication from Deputy Director Sekhonyane that Chief Mashaba is being arrested by the Hawks. I called Chief Mashaba and his phone was off. And just a few minutes after that, he called me. He then told me that he could not tell me that they had an undercover operation of drugs when I asked him earlier to join me for the visits to the K78. He told me that the operation was successful, but they are just having a misunderstanding with other members of Crime Intelligence.”
General Khan, as a Crime Intelligence member, was not supposed to attend and actively involve himself at the crime scene but did so, raising serious concerns and obstructing justice by causing the arrest of discoverers of drugs and non-arrest of suspects responsible for the drugs.
“General Khan, as a member of Crime Intelligence, was not supposed to attend and actively involved at the crime scene. ... The fact that he was called by a Sergeant and decided to attend the crime scene and intervene in the scene raises serious concerns. His action at the crime scene obstructed the justice whereby the people who discovered the drugs were arrested and the suspects responsible for the said drugs were not arrested and/or released and no investigation was instituted on the origins of those drugs.”
Crime intelligence and DPCI Hawks members at the crime scene appeared to be protecting the owner of the drugs instead of conducting a proper investigation and gathering information.
“The conduct of DPCI Hawks and Crime Intelligence members at the crime scene appears that they were protecting the owner of the drugs .”
In Lt-Col Sebola's experience, Crime Intelligence personnel do not become involved in operations if they are on the scene; they only supply information via reports or files to start investigations.
“They only supply us with information. If it is prior, they will give me their intelligence report. They can either submit an intelligence report on writing, they will just give you a file to start my investigation. If they happen to be at the scene, I do not know, they do not have any role to play.”
Warrant Officer Mpangase admitted in his statement dated 23 November 2021 that on the morning of 22 June 2021 he received information from Crime Intelligence about a container possibly containing approximately 27 kilograms of cocaine kept at Isipingo CHC Warehouse destined for Johannesburg.
“In the morning of the 22nd of June ‘21, I received information from Crime Intelligence that there was a container possibly containing approximately 27 kilograms of drugs, Cocaine, which was kept at Isipingo CHC Warehouse destined to Johannesburg. The container number was BEAU 5 …”
Warrant Officer MpangaseDay 113 · 04 Jun 2026Refers to: 22 June 2021Location: Isipingo CHC Warehouse, Johannesburg
Warrant Officer Mpangase stated that he, Lieutenant Colonel Jacob, Warrant Officer Sibiya (now Captain), and a Crime Intelligence member went to Isipingo to look for the alleged cocaine container.
“Myself, Lieutenant Colonel Jacob, and Warrant Officer Sibiya, now Captain, together with the Crime Intelligence member, proceeded to Isipingo to look for the alleged container.”
On 22 June 2021, Colonel Jacob received information about cocaine in a container from Captain Duma of Crime Intelligence and coordinated the operation despite being on vacation leave.
“On 22 June 2021 , I received information from Captain Duma of Crime Intelligence regarding Cocaine in a certain container . He called me just after 7 a.m. on the said morning regarding the information . Captain Duma also called Warrant Officer Mpangase regarding the same information . I called Mpangase after the call from Captain Duma . He indicated that he would brief the Brigadier accordingly . ... I informed Warrant Officer Mpangase that although I was on vacation leave , I was going to book on duty to conduct this operation or attend to this information .”
Sergeant Govender and Sergeant Mkhize were approached by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob and Captain Duma during container inspections when black canvas bags containing alleged cocaine were identified and loaded for transport to Isipingo SAP.
“Sergeant Govender... was approached by two other police officials dressed in civilian attire. They identified themselves as Lieutenant Colonel Jacob from DPCI and another Captain Duma from Crime Intelligence... identified some black canvas bags that allegedly had cocaine in them... transferred these black bags from the container into the H1 marked state vehicle... escorted by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob and his team to Isipingo SAP, where we assisted in offloading the black bags.”
Lieutenant Colonel Justice Jabulani Duma is the Unit Commander attached to the Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime unit in Durban within Crime Intelligence, KwaZulu-Natal.
“I am Justice Jabulani Duma. I am a Lieutenant Colonel in the South African Police Service. I am attached to Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime, Durban, Intelligence Collection in Crime Intelligence. And I am a Unit Commander in MPOC, Durban in KwaZulu-Natal.”
Lieutenant Colonel Duma matriculated in 1991, joined the South African Police in 1992, was appointed as a Constable in 1995, promoted to Sergeant in 1996, Warrant Officer in 2000, Captain in 2009, and appointed as Lieutenant Colonel and Unit Commander of Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime in Durban on 26 March 2012.
“I matriculated in 1991, joined the South African Police in 1992, before SAP was amalgamated to the South African Police Service in 1995 and appointed as a Constable. I served in the uniformed branch currently known as Visible Policing at Westville SAP. I studied technical assay in Durban, National Diploma, Policing Management, but did not finalise or complete studies. I was appointed to the rank of a Sergeant in 1996 and in the year 2000, I was appointed to the rank of a Warrant Officer. In 2009, I was appointed to the rank of a Captain. I joined Crime Intelligence in 012 and attached to Security Intelligence in Border Security, which is in Crime Intelligence KwaZulu-Natal, and became an intelligence operative. In 026-03-01, I was appointed as a Lieutenant Colonel and the Unit Commander of Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime, Durban, intelligence collection.”
There is no signed document stating the process to be followed for stopping a container; it is an operational process understood and referred to as a station order within Crime Intelligence at Durban Harbour sea border.
“There is no signed document that says this is the process we must follow. But it is like, I will put it this way, I will say we can call it a station order which the office must break it down to guide as to what the members need to do in the ground. This is a process you must follow when you stop the container.”
Crime Intelligence, border security, and ORS have been operating together for years with a memorandum of understanding to coordinate inspections and stopping of containers at Durban Harbour.
“Crime Intelligence, border security, and ORS, they have been working together for years, even before I came. They have been operating together... like a memorandum of understanding between the two offices because we rely on them when it comes to stopping containers and doing inspections because they have teams to conduct inspections.”
Crime Intelligence border security and ORS coordination works by verbal or email requests; a letter signed by the commander can be submitted if requested to place a stop on a container.
“Crime Intelligence does not need to issue documents to request a stop and detention of a container to arrest. It can be done verbally or by sending an email to arrest. However, an essay between one letter of request to place a stop signed by the commander can be submitted to ORS if requested to do so.”
Lt-Col Duma states the standard operating procedure when a container is stopped at Durban Harbour involves a briefing chain from Crime Intelligence to the commander of border security to section heads of visible policing and operations.
“The first thing is Crime Intelligence procedures . ... The operative will report to his commander , must brief the commander . ... And then the commander will brief the section head of visible policing and operations , right ? ... Operational responsibilities in border police ...”
The relationship between the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) and Crime Intelligence in drug busts is very good and characterized by ongoing trust and collaboration.
“Commissioners, I am going to say it is brilliant. We have a very good working relationship. I cannot do my work without them. And then once they have generated intelligence, they cannot do their work without us. So I would say it is highly, that is an incorrect word, I will say it is an ongoing working relationship with trust built between each other.”
If there is high confidence of drugs in a container and risk of theft, Warrant Officer Sander is prepared to use the necessary laws to seize and access the container without waiting for permissions to prevent narcotics moving quickly.
“If my information is 100% positive, I trust my CI, they say to me go to that container, there is drugs there, go there now quickly. I am going to do the same zest and zeal, and go there quickly and start working. ... I am not going to wait for their permission. I will use the necessary laws to go and seize that container and gain access so I can stop the movement of those narcotics. ... a container can move very quickly.”
If relying solely on intelligence information from Crime Intelligence that a container holds drugs, Warrant Officer Sander acts on reasonable suspicion, even if the information is wrong, because of the risk of delay and narcotics moving fast.
“Commissioner, maybe I heard this, so yes, I am relying on the reasonable suspicion. ... if that information is wrong and you have opened a container without the necessary authorisations, what are you relying upon, the suspicion that there are drugs there, and is it a reasonable suspicion if you are only relying upon the evidence or the information you are getting from a CI?”
Standard Operational Procedure at ports requires operational to brief commander on container smuggling intelligence, and commander to then brief section head of VPO, Visible Policing and Operations at ORS.
“Crime Intelligence procedures. When an operative has information relating to smuggling within containers at these ports at Durban Harbour, the intelligence operative must brief the commander on the information. The commander will analyse the intelligence and once all the relevant information is gathered, the commander will then brief the section head of the VPO, Visible Policing and Operations at ORS.”
Controlled drug deliveries have a high risk and challenges due to technical surveillance limitations and the risk of drugs going missing, which leads to charges for the officers.
“A controlled delivery is the ultimate to catch them red-handed. But the risk, the risk is huge... We have tried... if I do not explain it to the Commission, you are going to think we are not doing the job. But we are.”
ORS inspection team is appointed to conduct inspection once container placed at depot; border security commander informed before seals broken and may be present during inspection if dual stop by customs.
“As soon as the container is placed at a depot, ORS inspection team is appointed to conduct an inspection. In the event of the information is provided by Crime Intelligence , the commander of border security will be informed to be present before any seals are broken. If there is a dual stop by customs, then they may also be present during the inspection.”
SARS officers normally conduct their own operations under the Customs Acts and are not obligated to communicate with Crime Intelligence or other police units unless drugs or other illegal items are found during inspections that require police involvement.
“normally SARS conduct their own operations in terms of their customs acts. So they are not obliged to communicate with Crime Intelligence or anyone else unless they pick up something that requires the police, then may on their inspection, they will then say, oh, we found drugs here. Okay, call the Narcotics Squad to come in and continue”
Crime Intelligence officers do not interfere in cordoning off the crime scene, calling Local Criminal Record Centre or Forensics, conducting searches or making arrests; these are duties of Detectives, here specifically DPCI members.
“Crime Intelligence officers do not get involved in cordoning off the crime scene, calling of Local Criminal Record Centre or Forensics, conducting searches and making arrests, as this is the duties of the Detectives, which in this instance was the members of DPCI.”
Warrant Officer Sander developed and has been involved in training the Specialized Narcotics Investigation Program since about 2000, which includes training members of SAPS, SANEB, DPCI, Customs, Organized Crime, Crime Intelligence, and FSLA members.
“For the last , yoh , I began in about 2000 , traveling around the country , training the different Narcotics units , Crime Intelligence , and Organized Crime . We began developing a training program . It is the program that I mentioned now . It is the Specialized Narcotics Investigation Program . There was a team of us , and that is what I did . It trained the DPCI , the SANEB members , the Station members , Organized Crime , Crime Intelligence , Customs . We sit in with members from FSLA as well , so it is quite a cool course .”
The evidence leader may have failed to investigate allegations concerning crime intelligence involving property transactions, informant issues and procurement irregularities, resulting in suspicions of bias against Mr Mogotsi.
“this is an application to recuse Mr Chaskalson by the evidence leader to pursue his allegation that crime intelligence has bought properties, crime intelligence transactions. His evidence about the Section 252(A) operations, informant-related issues, and procurement irregularities is the case being made that Mr Chaskalson has failed to investigate those, and that failure has created an apprehension that he is biased against Mr Mogotsi.”
Mr Mogotsi was an informant for a brief period in 2001 according to Crime Intelligence records, but there is no record of him being an informant after that period.
“The Colonel responsible for administering Crime Intelligence records of all informants says you were an informant for a brief period in 2001, but there is no record of you being an informant ever after.”
Mr Mogotsi repeatedly refuses to incriminate himself when questioned about documents and evidence related to irregular property purchased by Crime Intelligence.
Adv Chaskalson states that Warrant Officer Mabizela was not killed but imprisoned and that Warrant Officer Mabuzza is still alive and active in Crime Intelligence.
“Warrant Officer Mabizela was not killed. Warrant Officer Mabizela was imprisoned. ... The only Warrant Officer Mabizela in Crime Intelligence ... You did not give us the name of Warrant Officer Mabuza so we could not investigate.”
Either there is a genuine investigation into illegal use of Crime Intelligence funds and appointments or the arrests are an attempt by organized crime to frame General Khumalo with false offenses.
“Either there is a genuine investigation into the illegal use of Crime Intelligence funds in relation to these properties and the illegal appointment of a Crime Intelligence Brigadier... The other option is that General Mkhwanazi was right and this was an attempt by Organized Crime to essentially frame General Khumalo in relation to false offenses.”
Mr Mogotsi shared screenshots purportedly showing properties purchased with state money by Crime Intelligence and details of someone illicitly appointed by Crime Intelligence with Mr Matlala.
“I have shared with him a whole range of properties illegally bought by Crime Intelligence and details of someone illegally appointed by Crime Intelligence”
General Mkhwanazi alleges that General Khumalo at a Crime Intelligence briefing accused him of having his own cartel and of not listening to Crime Intelligence.
“General Mkhwanazi . “ ... are having your interest and that may be you are having your own cartel. You do not listen to Crime Intelligence.””
Mr Mogotsi denies remembering any other case that he tried to open targeting someone else while working in Crime Intelligence, saying operations were not about opening cases.
Mr Mogotsi was previously asked to provide names of people for investigators to speak to about leads regarding Crime Intelligence complaints about property but declined saying he did not want to incriminate himself.
“Mr Mogotsi said that he did not want to incriminate himself.”
Mr Mogotsi states that the titled deed, amount of the property, and the registered person details related to Crime Intelligence purchases are available with the Commission.
“The titled deed, the amount of the property, the person whom the property is registered on. It is here, it is with the Commission.”
Warrant Officer Phakula states he did not know that Warrant Officer Magane was from the Crime Information Analysis Centre and assumed CIMAC is another link within Crime Intelligence.
“Honestly, I did not know, and what I understand even now is that CIMAC is another link of Crime Intelligence.”
Advocate Khumalos accuses Warrant Officer Phakula of misleading his superior by claiming Warrant Officer Magane is from Crime Intelligence when he actually works at Zonkizizwe Police Station and is not part of Crime Intelligence.
“The truth is you misled your superior, because what you told your superior is that Crime Intelligence has requested your assistance.”
Warrant Officer Phakula acknowledges that Warrant Officer Magane works in CIMAC, which is a department within Crime Intelligence, justifying his earlier statement that Magane is from Crime Intelligence.
“CIMAC is another department in Crime Intelligence. So that is why I said he is from Crime Intelligence.”
Adv Khumalo accused Warrant Officer Phakula of falsely stating that Crime Intelligence requested his assistance, which Phakula denied knowing about until the arrest.
“And that is not true. Crime Intelligence did not ask for your assistance. ... Honestly, I did not know about CIMAC until our arrest.”
Warrant Officer Rikhotso from Crime Intelligence caused obstruction by questioning the authority or enquiry file permissions at the scene, distracting the team from their work, and mentioning Major General Feroz Khan was coming to the scene.
“Warrant Officer Rikhotso from Crime Intelligence ... started asking if we have any authority or any enquiry file registered ... was causing some obstruction and distraction ... specifically said Major General Feroz Khan from Crime Intelligence was coming to the scene ... so we ignored him and proceeded with our duties ... a lot of police members, security officers and civilian members at the scene made it difficult to work.”
Lieutenant Colonel Maluleke from DPCI National Office and other officers were summoned by Warrant Officer Phakula to assist at the scene, and Major General Khan complimented the good work done despite the crowding at the scene.
“Lieutenant Colonel Maluleke from Crime Intelligence arrived and she was more than happy about the arrest and even complimented of the good work that we have done ... Lieutenant Colonel Maluleke from DPCI National Office arrived together with Warrant Officer Masuma also from DPCI as they were summoned by Warrant Officer Phakula to come and assist us with the scene ... Major General Khan arrived immediately after Warrant Officer Phakula ...”
Traffic police in Gauteng generally do not conduct investigations but rely on units like Crime Intelligence and Special Law Enforcement Unit (SLEU) to handle crimes including hijackings.
“Gauteng Traffic Police ... they do not do investigation ... They have units like Crime Intelligence ... Special Law Enforcement Unit (SLEU) ... They do almost everything ... When there are CITs they also respond”
Deputy Director Dumisani Pompi says he was told Mashaba could not tell him about the undercover drug operation and Mashaba's superior indicated that SAPS responsible for the operation will discuss misunderstandings with the Intelligence General Khan.
“He then told me and then he called him and then he told me he could not tell me that they had an undercover operation of drugs . This is Mashaba now . He finds him on the phone . After now he is arrested . That the operation was successful but they are just having a misunderstanding with other members of Crime Intelligence . The indication from him was that they are fine and they will handle the situation . This is Mashaba to his superior . And then this is what the superior says in the statement : “ for me this denote(d) that the responsible person for SAPS that approved this operation will discuss the misunderstanding with the General from Intelligence . ” This was a reference to General Khan, a telephone call from General Khan .”
Colonel Steyn's unit, with assistance from Crime Intelligence, recently gathered information leading to the discovery of a large, clandestine cannabis farm located in a remote area.
“my unit , with the assistance of Crime Intelligence , have picked up information of quite a large Cannabis farm .”
On 16 February 2022, members of DPCI Durban SOCI and Crime Intelligence seized 550 bricks (550 kilograms) of suspected cocaine at a container in Manucha Warehouse originating from Port of Santos in Brazil. The crime scene was properly managed and the exhibits were submitted to FS Laboratory in Silverton on 24 February 2022 and confirmed to be cocaine.
“On 16 February 2022 , members of the DPCI Durban SOCI , in conjunction with Crime Intelligence , followed up upon information in relation to a container that was at Manucha Warehouse , where 550 bricks , or 550 kilogrammes of suspected Cocaine , were seized from where they were hidden in the cargo in the container . The container originated from the Port of Santos in Brazil . The crime scene was properly dealt with in terms of crime scene management principles . The exhibits were photographed and sealed in forensic evidence bags . The exhibits were booked in at Umbilo on a reference number , and then the exhibits were submitted to FSL in Silverton on 24 February 2022 . FSL confirmed that the exhibits were Cocaine , and it was investigated under a Durban SOCI reference number .”
Brigadier Nkhwashu was informed by an informer in Crime Intelligence that his name was being mentioned in connection with the Katiso/Tau matter around Dec-Feb period, but he did not investigate or verify this information.
“My informer happened to be an informer of crime intelligence that I know for a fact. Now, when he told me, he said, I overheard those people at the crime intelligence saying that you are under investigation on the Katiso matter.”
Sergeant Nkosi sent a picture showing that members of Crime Intelligence, including General Khumalo, were arrested and held in custody to Mr Motsumi, who was not a member of SAPS.
“I did not discuss General Khumalo or his people ... The same people who were arrested there ... That is correct ... Including General Khumalo ... Yes ... Because he is there.”
Lt-General Shibiri described the investigative process involving a project team, headed by a project leader working with crime intelligence and multiple disciplines in the context of organised crime investigations.
“project lead has got a project team, a leader and it is a group ... crime intelligence ... determine the number in terms of the volume”
The crime intelligence is a separate division from the division detective service, and crime intelligence on a monthly basis develops crime threat analysis including indications of criminal groupings and syndicates.
“No, from the division detective service, we do not have intelligence. The intelligence is a division on itself. So as I was indicating, on a monthly basis, the crime intelligence will develop the crime threat analysis ... a criminal grouping in a certain area ...”
Lt-Gen Shibiri followed up with Brigadier Mkhabela and Brigadier Ntuli from Crime Intelligence regarding the drafting of the request for ballistic reports, confirming investigation ongoing and cooperation.
“called the Brigadier where she indicated in the morning, indicated that she is with Brigadier Ntuli from Crime Intelligence, who is responsible for, not cyber, counter. And then he is assisting her with the drafting of the request ... once when I met with some of the investigators, they indicated they were fine”
Lt-Gen Shibiri said the Crime Intelligence opened the investigative file and promised to prioritize the ballistic report.
“That file which is opened by Crime Intelligence is part of the investigating of the whole ... Then he promised to prioritize ... assign a specific person to deal with it so that he get the result in timely as we have requested.”
Risk assessment is conducted by crime intelligence and those sources who want to work with crime intelligence have their information shared with specific individuals.
“Crime intelligence was supposed to conduct a risk assessment... I handed over the sources because the sources wanted to work with those people... If they are willing to work with them, then I will.”
Lt. General Shibiri states he met Vusi Ndlala before in Crime Intelligence but does not want to be involved in revealing the details or testifying about it.
“He was working with the police and when I met him he was sourced somewhere at Crime Intelligence some other time back and I do not want to be involved in that and I do not want to testify about that because it is not...it is totally not okay to divulge such information. It is not allowed.”
