Referred to as: Colonel Prinsloo · Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo · retired Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo · Prinsloo · Lieutenant-Colonel Prinsloo · Lt-Col Prinsloo · LT-COL PRINSLOO · LT-Col Prinsloo · L T - C O L P R I N S L O O · Lt Colonel Prinsloo
Colonel Prinsloo testified that at Port Shepstone there was no SAPS transfer register or documentation for the receipt of exhibits or the safekeeping key, and no formality or documentation was done.
“Colonel Prinsloo testified that there was no SAPS transfer register completed or any form of documentation either in recording the receipt of the exhibits and then to the other part of the safe key. There was no formality or any documentation .”
Documents relating to testimony, reportedly claimed by Colonel Prinsloo and another to have been received two days before General Senona's statement, were provided as per a request from General Senona.
“the documents were provided on the basis of a request from General Senona . The request came in that week , and by the 29th , the documents were provided”
General Senona was not intended to be engaged as an implicated person regarding the Port Shepstone drug bust, but as head of DPCI-KZN as part of management ultimately responsible.
“He was never intended to be engaged on the matter as an implicated person . The thinking has always been to engage him as head of DPCI-KZN , ... at the end of the day would , except that the buck stops with him”
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo failed to disclose the visit to Maj-Gen Senona by Brigadier Naicker and the two Warrant Officers at Port Shepstone offices and no report or feedback concerning such visits were received by his office.
“Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo also failed to disclose the visit to me by Brigadier Naicker, who is from head office, and the two Warrant Officers at Port Shepstone offices...my office never received any report or feedback concerning such visitor inspections”
Maj-Gen Senona states he is not an expert in Supply Chain Management and saw the handing over document of the safe keys for the first time before the Commission; the Warrant Officer never completed the document or requested signing for the keys.
“That document was presented before this Commission by Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo...It was the first time I saw it...He never testified that he tried to complete that and so that they must sign for the keys or so...It never happened and he never testified in that instance.”
Brigadier Naicker was present at the inspection to check on certain SANEB cases and came with two Warrant Officers, but never informed the Commission about the visit or the storage of drugs found there.
“this Brigadier was there, and Prinsloo confirmed it, he was there. He came with two Warrant Officers to do inspections on certain SANEB cases ... they went aside and discussed the issue of the storage of drugs that were there and he never informed the Commission while he was here”
The knowledge of the storage of drugs at the exhibit office became known to others though it is unclear how they obtained this information, and Colonel Prinsloo is implied to have told others but did not inform the Commission.
“they went aside and discussed the issue of the storage of drugs that were there and he never informed the Commission while he was here”
Colonel Prinsloo did not inform Brigadier Naicker about the suspected cocaine; instead, Brigadier Naicker informed Colonel Prinsloo about it, not the other way around.
“your correct answer to Commissioner Khumalo would be no, that is not what you were saying ... Yes, it is not Colonel Prinsloo who informed Brigadier Naicker”
Evidence from Colonel Prinsloo and Brigadier Nyuswa shows the alarm system at Port Shepstone was not functioning due to loadshedding on that day.
“The evidence of Colonel Prinsloo and Brigadier Nyuswa... has established that the alarm system was not operational... because of loadshedding, the alarm... it could not work.”
General Senona did not think it necessary to deploy additional manpower or patrol units to guard the offices after the seizure because he relied on Colonel Prinsloo to indicate if additional security was needed.
“The directive I gave for the visit, at that stage for me it was sufficient enough unless if Colonel Prinsloo indicated that he needed additional, I would have done that. But he never, there was no stage where he requested additional manpower”
Major-General Senona claims it is the responsibility of the Unit Commander, e.g. Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo, to appoint an SAP 13 clerk for managing exhibit registers at DPCI offices, but he was not privy to all national instructions related to this.
“A s f a r a s I c a n r e c o l l e c t ... I t h i n k C o l o n e l P r i n s l o o ’s e v i d e n c e , h e s a i d h e a p p o i n t e d t h i s o n e t o h a v e c a s e a n d d e a l w i t h t h e s t o r a g e o f t h i n g s i n t h e s a f e . ... A s f a r a s I k n o w, t h e U n i t C o m m a n d e r c a n a p p o i n t a S A P 1 3 C l e r k ...”
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo, now retired, is the best person to respond to who assisted Warrant Officer Mpangase at Port Shepstone on the 23rd and 24th.
“I believe the best person who can respond to that question is Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo , the retired …”
Brigadier Nyuswa did not raise concerns about the safety of the suspected cocaine exhibits to Maj-General Senona; the concern was attributed to Colonel Prinsloo but was not communicated to Senona.
“it was never raised with me, this concern of Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo ... Brigadier Nyuswa never raised it with me ... The only thing he raised with me was this break-in ... He gave me that report ...”
General Senona instructed preparation of a strong room safe at Port Shepstone for storing exhibits and arranged escort from Isipingo to Port Shepstone DPCI, SOCI.
“I called General Senona and informed him of the dilemma and suggested a strong room at Port Shepstone premises. He agreed and instructed me to instruct the Acting Unit Commander at Port Shepstone, Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo, to prepare the safe for the exhibit... General Senona also instructed me to arrange for the provincial tracking team to escort the investigators from Isipingo to Port Shepstone DPCI, SOCI.”
General Senona instructed that Warrant Officer Mpangase would take samples of the exhibit in the strong room.
“General Senona called me and told me to inform Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo that Warrant Officer Mpangase would be going to the strong room to take samples of the exhibit.”
There was an attempted break-in at Port Shepstone DPCI premises in late October 2021, causing first voiced concern about the safety of the suspected cocaine exhibit in the strong room.
“Sometime late in October 1, while I was on leave, I received a call from Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo who informed me that there was an attempted break in at Port Shepstone DPCI premises. For the first time, he voiced concern about the safety of the suspected Cocaine exhibit in the strong room.”
B R I G A D I E R N Y U S W ADay 120 · 17 Jun 2026Refers to: October 2021Location: Port Shepstone DPCI premises
There were concerns about the security of the building, including alarm systems, communicated to head office in Durban prior to thefts, which were not initially raised by Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo.
“There was communication with the head office in Durban regarding the security of the building, alarm systems, and other issues around security prior to thefts, but Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo did not raise any of those concerns when first contacted.”
Brigadier Nyuswa visited Port Shepstone DPCI office on 2 November 2021, met with Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo and Lieutenant Colonel Mjali, and had a brief meeting about CIT (cash in transit) robberies.
“On the 2nd of November 2021, ... At the DPCI offices, I met with Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo and Lieutenant Colonel Mjali. ... We had a brief meeting. ... there is a meeting called CIT meeting, cash in transit meeting. We invite stakeholders and talk to them”
BRIGADIER NYUSWADay 120 · 17 Jun 2026Refers to: 2021-11-02Location: Port Shepstone DPCI offices
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo stated he received a call from Brigadier Nyuswa on 22 June 2021 between 10:00 and 11:00 AM informing him that a provincial tracing team had seized a large quantity of drugs (cocaine).
“On 22 June 2021, at between 10.00 and .00 in the morning, I received a telephone call from Brigadier Nyuswa. He informed me that the provincial tracing team had seized a large quantity of drugs, Cocaine, from a container.”
Brigadier Nyuswa disagrees with the timeline given by Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo and says that Colonel Jacob is not from the tracing team.
“I disagree, Commissioners. I think the timing of, the timeline of Colonel Prinsloo here is wrong. Also, what is also incorrect here, I never communicated that the tracking team, because Jacob is not from the tracking team, tracing team.”
Colonel Prinsloo instructed to make storage available at their offices and that he would take both sets of safe keys once the exhibits were stored, because the Amanzimtoti Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) did not have secure storage capacity due to being flooded and dysfunctional.
“He instructed me to make storage available at our offices. He said he would take both sets of the safe keys with him once the exhibits were stored in the safe. He said the exhibits could not be stored at the Amanzimtoti Forensic Science Laboratory as it did not have a secure storage capacity. I knew that the laboratory had been flooded and was dysfunctional”
According to Brigadier Nyuswa's diary entry and fuel claim, he first went to Isipingo and then detoured to Port Shepstone, which supports his version of events against Prinsloo's different timeline.
“I think I made a diary entry on that day, and if my memory serves me correctly, I even said there that we first went to Isipingo, and then from Isipingo to Port Shepstone. And that diary entry has the calculations of my kilometres, which I submitted at the end of the month of June to claim my fuel that I used on that day.”
Lieutenant-Colonel Prinsloo and Mpangase along with other members were counting the black bags at Port Shepstone, not the individual bricks inside the bags which had been presumably counted at Isipingo.
“And Lieutenant-Colonel Prinsloo and Mpangase and the members were counting these bags, not counting the bricks, counting the bags.”
General Senona instructed Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo to increase patrols and visit the office regularly for security after the exhibits were packed and left.
“General Senona told Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo that they must increase patrol and visit the office regularly.”
Brigadier N Y Swa said the instruction to take exhibits to Port Shepstone was General Senona's but based on an initial suggestion made by Brigadier N Y Swa.
“you instructed Colonel Prinsloo ... it was General Senona's instruction ... you made a suggestion ... it was then General Senona's instruction that the exhibits be taken there”
Brigadier N Y Swa admitted that their language choice in denying having instructed Colonel Prinsloo was conscious and deliberate.
“Yes I deny Colonel Prinsloo's allegation that I instructed him ... you even put instructing in inverted commas . So it is a conscious , conscious use of language .”
The drugs were stored at Port Shepstone Serious Organized Crime Investigation Unit under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Prinsloo, and Brigadier Nyuswa was responsible for the office location.
“The drugs were stored at Port Shepstone Serious Organized Crime Investigation Unit. There is a Unit Commander... Lieutenant-Colonel Prinsloo... falls squarely under the responsibility of Brigadier Nyuswa”
Decisions regarding movement or accommodation of exhibits at Port Shepstone had to be routed through Brigadier Nyuswa; Colonel Prinsloo followed his instructions.
“So even if I wanted to do anything with that location, it had to go via the Brigadier since it was his instruction. Colonel Prinsloo would only adhere to an instruction coming from Brigadier Nyuswa. It was not within my powers to make decisions regarding that without the intervention of the Brigadier.”
On the same day, Colonel Jacob called acting Unit Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Prinsloo at Port Shepstone to arrange for Officer Setshedi of FSL to take seven to ten bricks to FSL for weighing; Prinsloo indicated he was attending a wildlife workshop from 8-12 November 2021.
“On the same day, I called the acting Unit Commander at Port Shepstone, Lieutenant-Colonel Prinsloo, and indicated that I wished to come through with Warrant Officer Setshedi of the FSL who would take seven to ten bricks to the FSL for weighing. He indicated that he was going on a wildlife workshop from the 8th to the 12th of November 2021.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo first met Major General Senona within the same week Senona was appointed, during which Senona called all commissioned officers to the Provincial Office and introduced himself before visiting each unit to get to know the members.
“I think it was within the same week that he was appointed. He called all the commissioned officers to the Provincial Office, and he was introduced to us. Later on, he visited each unit and got to know all the members as well.”
The DPCI had multiple departments in each province during Lt-Col Prinsloo's time, including Serious Corruption Investigation, Serious Commercial Crime Investigation, Serious Organised Crime Investigation, and Priority Crime Specialised Investigation, each led by a Provincial Commander normally at the rank of Brigadier.
“The DPCI has different departments in each province. During my time there, it was the following departments. The biggest one was a Serious Corruption Investigation... There was a Serious Commercial Crime Investigation... And then the biggest one was a Serious Organised Crime Investigation... And Priority Crime Specialised Investigation... each of these departments' components are led by a Provincial Commander, normally at the rank of Brigadier.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo was part of the Serious Organised Crime Investigation in KwaZulu-Natal, which has five units each with a Unit Commander reporting to Brigadier Nyuswa, who reports to Major General Senona.
“I was in a Serious Organised Crime Investigation, which has currently five units in KwaZulu-Natal. Each of these units has a Unit Commander who reports to the Provincial Commander, Brigadier Nyuswa. He is the Provincial Commander for Serious Organised Crime Investigation. He, in turn, reports to the DPCI Provincial Head, currently being Major General Senona.”
The command structure in the police is very strict; officers must obey lawful commands of their commander or face serious consequences such as departmental charges.
“The command structure in the police is very strict. I am obliged to follow the instructions and command of my Commander, failing which I can face serious consequences. This is because ill-discipline is regarded as a serious issue within the law enforcement service... if it is a lawful command or instruction, I have got to do it. I cannot ignore it. There will be serious consequences for me. Most likely, I will be charged departmentally.”
DPCI Port Shepstone office is a two-story building rented from Mr Kamisa, used for administration, operating during working hours, with controlled access and security-vetted staff.
“I have been stationed at the DPCI Port Shepstone office since 004, before the establishment of the DPCI. I was the most senior that had been at that building since we moved into it. The office is a two-story building with a ground floor and a first floor. The DPCI is renting the building from a Mr Kamisa. The DPCI office is not a police station, it is for administration and operates during working hours... Only DPCI members and staff are permitted in the offices and the access is controlled. During my tenure, we had approximately 4 members plus four administrative staff... Both members and staff are security vetted.”
The DPCI Port Shepstone office building had universal coded padlock access, no system to monitor code usage, and was vulnerable to unauthorized entry if the code was obtained.
“The office building was accessible from the street, however, access to it was through the use of a code. The code was universal and not unique. All of us had the same code. The gate was not manned. If anyone would obtain a code, they would obviously get into the office building. I must also point out that there was no system to know who had used the code for access.”
The DPCI Port Shepstone office was located in a business area sharing perimeter with several businesses and had security shortcomings including lack of external cameras, alarm system, and backup electricity.
“The office was in a business area and shares a permitted perimeter with a hardware store, a Herald Newspaper office, with a mortuary, and the Liquor Authority, which only operates during the week. There was a service electric fence around the perimeter safe for the part which was bordering the Liquor Authority... The office had no generator or electric backup. There was no cameras or beams outside the office. Further, there was no alarm system monitoring movement on the outside or exterior of the building.”
Within the DPCI Port Shepstone office there was an unmanned reception area due to limited staff, and two walk-in safes on the ground floor which were not accessible from outside the building.
“Turning to the inside, there was a reception area, which was not manned due to the limited staff that we had. At the ground floor and first floor were offices. The two walk-in safes, strong rooms, were on the ground floor. The safe was not accessible from the outside of the building.”
The hardware store was a hardware shop in 2021 before being taken over by the Department of Human Settlement after the shop moved out.
“It was a hardware shop in 2021. Subsequent to that, the hardware shop, they moved out, and it was then taken over by the Department of Human Settlement.”
There is 24-hour security in the Department of Human Settlement via security guards, but there is no security and the alarm does not work in the DPCI office as of the date of the testimony.
“They have got 24-hour security guards there ... The DPCI office ... has got nothing ... The alarm does not even work any more.”
LT-COL PRINSLOODay 103 · 07 May 2026Refers to: 2021-10-30Location: Department of Human Settlement, DPCI office
The mortuary is no longer being used as such; the premises are now used as a bread distribution point where bread is delivered, packaged, and distributed but baked off-site.
“It is just the mortuary. It is not being used as a mortuary anymore. ... Bread gets delivered there, and then it is distributed again from there. So it is not a bakery as such. Breads are baked offsite, and it is just packaged into smaller trucks and distributed from there.”
There is no barrier or security preventing someone from walking from the forested/bushy area to the offices; anyone can walk in or observe and enter the offices without restriction.
“There is no barrier from that forest to your offices ... So someone can just walk across, or they can observe you as you leave and then come in.”
The Unit Commander delegated responsibility to control the safe to Warrant Officer AB Van Den Berg, and issued a handing over certificate for this in 2019.
“As a Unit Commander, I was only in control of the office. However, given the tasks and my other responsibilities, I delegated the responsibility to control the safe to Warrant Officer AB Van Den Berg. I attach hereby a copy of the handing over certificate in this regard, JJP2.”
Gun inspections are done weekly by the Unit Commander who must get hold of Van Den Berg to open the safe, inspect the firearms, record it in the occurrence book and fire arm register before leaving and Van Den Berg locks the safe and keeps the keys.
“I had to inspect the official firearms that is housed in that safe weekly. I would get hold of him, he would open up for me. Whilst he is there, I will inspect the firearms. Once I am done, make an OB entry, sign the firearm register and then I leave and he locks the safe. The keys are always with him.”
When Colonel Prinsloo was contacted by Brigadier Nyuswa to make the safe available for transferring cocaine, guns were removed, cocaine was placed inside the safe, keys were handed over to Nyuswa, and an occurrence book entry made after they left, but the handing over form for keys was not completed.
“Once I was contacted by Brigadier Nyuswa to make the safe available for him to bring it ... We removed all the firearms, placed the drugs in there, and then the keys were handed to them. We made the OB entry after they had left ... No, we did not complete this form.”
For a Durban case involving a larger number of people, the responsibility to supply guards for 24-hour security lies with those bringing exhibits to the unit, not LT-COL PRINSLOO's unit.
“It is a Durban case. It is a much bigger, they have got a lot more people than I have got at my unit. If there is exhibits they brought to my unit, they should have supplied the guards for it there at my unit, Commissioner.”
Two safes built to applicable SANBS standards were used to store firearms and office supplies; warrant officer Van Den Bergh held the keys and LT-COL PRINSLOO was not in control of the safes.
“Each of those two safes was built in line with applicable SANBS standards. Each had two locks. Warrant Officer Van Den Bergh had the keys. Just to be clear, I was not in control of the safes.”
On 11 October 2021, there was an attempted break-in at a building housing a consignment of cocaine worth at least R200,000,000, but security was not increased nor was the consignment removed despite the risk.
“The 11 October 2021 break-in happens, you are responsible for the building ... There is an attempted break-in and you know that you have exhibits that are worth at least R200000000. What steps do you take to increase security or to say, I cannot keep this thing here, it is not safe in my office?...I did not do that, Commissioner.”
Applications for continued contract with National Security & Fire were made multiple times in 2020 but no approvals or feedback were received.
“An application is hereby made for the current contract with National Security & Fire to be continued on a month - to - month basis while the procurement process is being done .”
Colonel Madhoe was initially involved in a security contract matter, but was replaced by Colonel Majozi who handled the matter with Captain Van Niekerk.
“We dealt with Colonel Madhoe. Then we were told suddenly he is no more there. So that is Colonel Majozi, he was then the one that we dealt with. Colonel, Captain Van Niekerk, she dealt with.”
A security contract approval request was sent on 13 January 2021 to Brigadier Nyuswa and Captain Van Niekerk together with full background details.
“On 13 January 2021, CA Colivier specially wrote an email to Brigadier Nyuswa and Captain Van Niekerk requesting an approval for the security contract. In that mail, she sent out a full background to the addressees.”
A break-in occurred on 14 January 2021 targeting the office kitchen window, but criminals were prevented from entering by burglar bars. The office alarm was not linked to a security company.
“On the night of 14 January 2021, another break-in happened... A rock was used to break the window of the kitchen. However, the criminals were prevented by the burglar bars from entering. On the very day, I wrote a factual report to Brigadier Nyuswa and informed him that the office alarm was not linked to security company.”
Requests for security and armed response were made to Supply Chain Management and Brigadier Nyuswa but were ignored despite repeated break-ins.
“Our request for security and armed response was again sent to Supply Chain Management and even sent to Brigadier Nyuswa. In fact, it had turned into a plea for help. It was very important that the DPCI’s office had a working alarm system linked to a security company. However, our request was ignored.”
There were numerous break-ins at Port Shepstone DPCI office. Despite the receipt of a large quantity of drug exhibits in June 2021, security was not upgraded or enhanced.
“On 22 June 2021, a large quantity of drug exhibits was received to be stored at the office. At the time, there was still no security service. Nothing had changed. Security was neither upgraded nor enhanced.”
The Durban DPCI office lacks a strong room and occupies three floors with only drywall partitions, making it unsuitable to store drug exhibits.
“As far as I know, I do not think they have got a strong room. They occupy three floors and it is just drywalling between the offices. So as far as I know, there is no strong room there.”
Before 2017, exhibits were received with a SAP 13 register per instruction from General Zikhali. Later the security issue due to lack of facilities led to removal of SAP 13 register capability.
“We did that when we were still receiving exhibits before 2017, when that instruction came from General Zikhali... I think it was a security issue because of the lack of security at our facilities.”
On 22 June 2021, between 10 and 11 AM, Brigadier Nyuswa informed Lt-Col Prinsloo that provincial tracing teams seized a large quantity of cocaine from a container and instructed him to make storage available at his office, as secure storage was not available at the Forensic Science Laboratory due to flooding and dysfunction.
“On the 22nd of June 2021, between 10 and 11 in the morning, I received a telephone call from Brigadier Nyuswa. He informed me that the provincial tracing team seized a large quantity of Cocaine from a container and instructed me to make storage available at our office. He said he would take both sets of the safe keys with him once the exhibits were stored in the safe. He said the exhibits could not be stored at a Forensic Science Laboratory as they did not have a secure storage capacity. I knew that the laboratory had been flooded and was dysfunctional.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo was instructed by Brigadier Nyuswa to store seized cocaine at his office despite the acknowledged challenges and lack of security at the office, and he did not raise any issues regarding safety.
“No, Commissioner. It was an instruction from him for me to keep it there in my office. I did not raise it. He knows all my challenges there at my office.”
Despite a 2017 directive prohibiting storing exhibits in offices, General Senona instructed Brigadier Nyuswa to store exhibits at Lt-Col Prinsloo's office, and it is possible he had permission from the National Head to override the directive.
“Commissioner, I do not see it as an unlawful instruction because General Senona gave the instruction to Brigadier Nyuswa that it must be stored at my office. He could have gotten permission from the National Head to do it. I do not know.”
Brigadier Nyuswa did not discuss any alternative storage for seized cocaine, nor mention more secure options such as Durban Police Stations, Maydon Wharf or Isipingo Stations, despite knowing the vulnerabilities of the DPCI office and the lack of active security.
“During that call, Brigadier Nyuswa did not discuss other alternatives. He made no mention of any other storage. I know there were Durban Police Stations, Maydon Wharf or Isipingo Stations, which operate 24 hours. These would have been more secure. Brigadier Nyuswa never mentioned anything about taking the exhibits to Isipingo or booking them at the Isipingo Police Station. Brigadier Nyuswa was obviously aware of the storage capacity of the safe. Equally, he was aware of the vulnerabilities of the DPCI office and the fact that there was no active security.”
The seized exhibits were unpacked on the floor, not sealed, and wrapped in yellow and black covers labeled Jaquar and TikTok, handled contrary to the National Instruction and protocol on search and seizure, handling, processing, and disposition of illicit drugs.
“I noticed the photos that the exhibits were unpacked on the floor and not sealed. The exhibits were in a form of blocks wrapped in yellow cover labelled Jaquar and black cover labelled TikTok. They were also not in sealed bag. It appeared that the exhibits were being handled contrary to the National Instruction as amended and the protocol on search and seizure, handling, processing, and disposition of illicit drugs.”
Photos of the seized exhibits circulated on police WhatsApp groups indicating the drugs were seized in Durban, and later more details about the origin became clear.
“It was said it was drugs seized in Durban. Only later on during the day it became more clear where it came from. Same WhatsApp groups were explaining further on where it came from.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo instructed Warrant Officer A P Van Den Berg to clear the one walk-in safe, Room 2, and make it available for the seized cocaine, removing firearms and ammunition to another safe, with keys controlled by Van Den Berg.
“During the course of that same day, around 13H00 hours, I contacted Warrant Officer A P Van Den Berg and instructed him to clear the one walk-in safe, Room 2, and make it available for the exhibits. I told him that I was instructed by Brigadier Nyuswa that it would be used to store a large quantity of Cocaine which had been seized. Normally we use that specific safe to store official firearms and ammunition. The firearms and ammunition were moved to the other safe, Room 24. As I said above, Warrant Officer Van Den Berg was in control of the safe and keys were with him.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo did not question the 5-6 hour gap between the call from Brigadier Nyuswa instructing storage at his office and the arrival of the exhibits, presuming the time was taken to process and conduct forensics at the scene.
“Did you question perhaps when they arrived what was the gap about ? I did not question him, no. And did you wonder what may have happened in those 5 to 6 hour ? I presumed they would have been busy on the scene , processing the exhibits , probably had forensics there , taking fingerprints, all that type of thing .”
The exhibits were brought in unsealed black carrier bags rather than in sealed evidence bags, violating proper evidence handling protocols.
“The first red flags that I saw was that these exhibits were not brought in evidence bags. They were not sealed. It was brought in the same black carrier bags that they found it in whatever, wherever the container was that they found it in. It was all put out nicely to take photos on the ground and then it arrived back in my offices still in those same bags, not sealed in evidence bags like it should have been done. It should have been processed by the proper people for DNA, for touch DNA, for fingerprints, all that. These arrived by me just back in those same bags that were seized in. It was completely wrong.”
The instruction to store the drugs as they were was described as unlawful in hindsight by ADV KHUMALO SC, but LT-COL PRINSLOO described it as not unlawful but acknowledged many red flags and acceptance by senior officers.
“But then it was an unlawful instruction. / I will not say it was unlawful, but the fact that there was a lot of red flags and the two senior this General and the Brigadier, was happy with it.”
LT-COL PRINSLOO did not consider at that time that he could be complicit in trafficking but acknowledged that everything about the consignment was wrong including handling and packaging.
“I did not at that stage think of it that way. It was just that everything they did concerning that consignment was wrong, the way it was handled and the way they packaged, and everything was wrong.”
LT-COL PRINSLOO acknowledged it is not easy to question superiors in the police and that doing so could lead to serious consequences.
“in the police it is not that easy to question your superiors. For me to have questioned the General and the Brigadier, there would have been serious consequences for me.”
ADV BALOY SC accused LT-COL PRINSLOO of failing to raise security concerns about illegally stored high-value drugs despite knowing there was no security, instead complying with orders to keep them stored in an insecure location.
“you are confronted with a situation which clearly breaks every rule that you know about handling exhibits... You are keeping this huge consignment where you do not have security at all... You did not at all... raise concern. And still be told, no, we will keep it here. We hear your concern, but we will keep it here.”
Since at least 2017/2021, LT-COL PRINSLOO's office no longer had authority or could not store exhibits legally and no SAPS 13 register existed; senior officers Nyuswa and Senona aware of this.
“at least as of 2017, your office no longer has the authority or cannot store exhibits. So, the SAPS 13 register does not exist. You and Brigadier Nyuswa and General Senona would be aware of that. / in 2021. / And Warrant Officer Mpanga would be aware of it too.”
Instructions given by Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa to LT-COL PRINSLOO were contrary to the prescripts regarding exhibit storage; LT-COL PRINSLOO was compelled to obey.
“in terms of seniority, Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa were the ones giving you instructions and you are saying you had to obey those instructions and commands.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo claims there were strict instructions on reporting to Brigadier Nyuswa, then General Senona, and finally to the National Head, and speaking directly to the National Head would cause big problems for him.
“There are strict instructions at my line of reporting to Brigadier Nyuswa, from him to General Senona, from Senona to the National Head. If I spoke directly to the National Head, there would have been big problems.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo stated that if Brigadier Nyuswa did nothing about an issue, the matter ended there for him, implying no further action could be taken.
“If, as in this case, Brigadier Nyuswa does nothing about it, that is the end of it for you, as with the security thing. There is nothing more you can do about it.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo testified that the National Head was aware of the security challenges at his office and that quarterly and annual inspections were done by a national team which reported directly to the National Head.
“The National Head was also well aware of the security challenges at my office... these reports from those national inspections goes directly to the National Head... The National Head was well aware of my challenges there in Port Shepstone.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo explained that communicating directly with the National Head past Brigadier Nyuswa and General Senona would have caused big problems for him.
“If I would have jumped Brigadier Nyuswa and General Senona and communicated with the National Head, even from the National Head's side, I would have been in big problems.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo said even after the October break-in and raising the alarm with Nyuswa and General Senona, he could not reach out to General Lebeya because it would have been going outside the prescribed line of reporting and got him into trouble.
“Even after the October break-in, having raised the alarm with Nyuswa again, and, say, Senona, you are saying you could never reach out, you were not allowed, precluded rather, reaching out to General Lebeya at that point because you are going outside of the prescripts.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo testified that the National Head would have received factual reports of incidents like the break-in and was aware that drugs had been stored by him.
“So, he would have received that factual report of the break-in, and he knew that those drugs had been stored by me.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo believes Brigadier Naicker would have informed the National Head about the storage of drugs at his office; Brigadier Naicker is S.A.N.E.B coordinator and reports directly to the National Head regarding drug seizures.
“I would presume that Brigadier Naicker would have informed him. Brigadier Naicker is the SANEB coordinator ... All drug seizures are directed reported to him.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo states that if he had spoken directly to higher authorities outside reporting lines, he would have faced departmental charges and risked losing his job.
“I would have been charged departmentally. I could have lost my job.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo says that if disciplinary action came from an independent person, he might be absolved; if it came from members of the police force, he would still have problems.
“If it was an independent person, yes. But if it was a member of the force, then I would have still had problems.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo describes forming a human chain to offload bricks of cocaine which were not sealed in evidence bags, contrary to National Protocols.
“Immediately noticed that the bricks of Cocaine were not sealed in evidence bags ... We then formed a human chain to bring the exhibits from the vehicles into the walk-in safe.”
Brigadier Nyuswa and Major General Senona were present, observing and had no objection to the handling and storage of exhibits, implying they had ultimate responsibility and authority to issue commands.
“Major General Senona and Brigadier Nyuswa observed this. They had no objection. ... As a Provincial Commander of the DPCI, Provincial Head, they had the ultimate responsibility and authority to issue commands.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo accepted the key to the safe after the exhibits were placed inside, but he did not have any control or say over the drugs stored there.
“Because of the fact, Commissioner, that I was just storing it. After placing it in there, they requested the keys, and they left with the keys... The fact is that if we had the SAP 13 there and it was going to be stored in my office and it is going to be under my control, I am going to have the safe keys, and that makes all the difference... Because I have got no say over those drugs, I do not have the keys to that safe.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo took the view that because of suspicious circumstances and lack of control over the exhibits, he did not want anything to do with them and considered it the responsibility of others.
“That is correct, Commissioner... So, is that the view that you took? Because of all the strange things that you are seeing happening, you took the view you want nothing to do with it, and this is their thing, let them do it... That is correct, Commissioner.”
The exhibits were offloaded through the driveway and the personnel left by the same route, not going to the front desk or main door for access checks.
“So, they got to the driveway. Did they at least walk throughout the office to check for other exit areas that is at least Warrant Officer Mpangase? Or they ended up at the human chain level?... They ended up there. And they all exited back that way as well when they left... So, they would not have gone to the front desk to check in the access from the main door?... No not on that day... Yes, I am talking about that day... So they offloaded... And they left the same route again.”
The office was not safe for storage of exhibits especially high-value ones, closed after hours and weekends, and exposed to heavy loadshedding, but Major General Senona requested regular after-hours visits and secrecy from others about the exhibits.
“It did puzzle me as to how the office would be considered to be safe to store the exhibit. It was simply not safe, let alone for such high-value exhibits as I state above. The office was closed after normal working hours and on weekends. Further at the time, the area was experiencing heavy loadshedding twice a day... Major General Senona requested that we regularly visit the premises after hours and that we must not tell any other members about the exhibits stored at our offices.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo and Warrant Officer Van Den Berg were instructed to make regular after-hours visits to the office and keep the information about the exhibits secret from other members.
“So, it is on that basis then that I ask, did you understand that request/instruction to refer only to the two of you, the regular visits?”
Lt-Col Prinsloo found it very strange that he had to secure the cocaine exhibits after hours but was not allowed to tell other members about it.
“Yes, it was very strange. I have got to secure it and visit it after hours, but I am not allowed to tell the members that we are keeping these exhibits there.”
Neither Brigadier Nyuswa nor Warrant Officer Mpangase nor Major General Senona gave formal instructions on how the exhibits should be secured and monitored, beyond a request by Major General Senona to occasionally pass by after hours and weekends; there was no formal plan and no officers were informed about these instructions except Lt-Col Prinsloo and Van Den Berg.
“Neither Brigadier Nyuswa nor Warrant Officer Mpangase nor Major General Senona gave instructions about how the exhibits should be secured and monitored other than Major General Senona's request to now and then pass by the office after hours and weekends. This was not a formal instruction or part of any formal plan. The request itself was difficult to implement as I was told not to inform other officers.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo said the order from Major General Senona was a request, not a formal instruction.
“The way that it was given to me I am not allowed to tell the members about it but they must regularly visit. You cannot do that. ... I would say a request.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo would not fault Major General Senona for characterizing the order as an instruction since request and instruction are very close in law enforcement context.
“Commissioners are very close to each other. Request and instruction, yes. ... No, I would not fault him for that.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo and Warrant Officer Van Den Berg knew about the request to secure the exhibits and regularly visit the office, but other members did not have these instructions.
“Myself and Warrant Officer Van Den Berg it was good for us because we knew about it and we went the extra mile to visit the office. But I could not expect that from the other members. I could not give them those instructions.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo did not request assistance from Brigadier Nyuswa or Major General Senona to get additional personnel for rotating members at the office.
Lt-Col Prinsloo testified the members were not informed of any plan for the exhibits, contrary to National Instruction and protocol requiring immediate transfer to Forensic Science Laboratory within 7 days.
“Present at the office at this time is Major General Senona, Brigadier Nyuswa, Lieutenant-Colonel Dina Govender, Warrant Officer Mpangase, and the other members of the Provincial Tracing Team, and Warrant Officer Van Den Berg and myself. We were not informed of any plan about the exhibits. I say that because the National Instruction and the protocol required that the exhibits be immediately sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. In exceptional circumstances, no later than 7 working days, we were kept in the dark about how long the exhibits would be kept in our office.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo said members would not often need anything from the safe as they each have their own personal firearms (SAp 108), not requiring the R5 rifle or office firearms.
“They are all issued with their own firearms that are on the SAP 108, the personal firearms. So, it is just very seldom that they would need a firearm. We do not have official firearm practise every year anymore. So, in those six months there is a possibility that there was no shooting practise, so there was no need for the R5 rifles, nothing like that.”
Members did not ask why the safe was suddenly locked and not accessible from June to November, and why exhibits previously in the safe were no longer there.
“The issue never arose from June to November where one of your members ask, Colonel, can we go in here? What is happening here? Why are we suddenly required to drive around after working hours?”
The office stored large quantities of drug exhibits only for very short periods, including 2 million Mandrax tablets for two nights in June 2018, guarded by armed police officers.
“The only time was when we were to store two million Mandrax tablets in June 2018. Those exhibits were stored for two nights... we had police officers guarding the offices throughout, even at night”
Warrant Officer Van Den Berg assisted to type out and draw up the register page CJC 202 and helped with the sealing of the evidence bags.
“According to him, he assisted them to type out, to draw up this page, this CJC 202. And he assisted them through the SAP 13 clerk in Port Shepstone to get the evidence bags. He was involved with the sealing of them.”
Brigadier Naicker, SANEB coordinator under DPCI, told Lt Colonel Prinsloo about the cocaine stored at his office but did not provide a plan for the exhibits storage.
“‘On the 29th of July 2021, I met Brigadier Naicker at our office at Port Shepstone. As I said before, he is the SANEB coordinator. That is the South African Narcotics Enforcement Bureau and that falls under the DPCI. ‘He told me about the cocaine stored at our office. I did tell him that I was not comfortable with the exhibits being stored at the office as the security was not up to standard.’ ‘He did not tell me, so I do not think he knew what the plan was with it.’”
In late October 2021, there was an attempted break-in at the office involving someone trying to access the kitchen side by throwing a stone to shatter the glass window, but the attempt was unsuccessful due to the alarm not working because of load shedding.
“In late October 2021, there was an attempted break-in at the office. Someone tried to access the kitchen side of the office. The glass window was shattered by a stone thrown. While there was an attempt to gain entry, the person was unsuccessful. This incident happened during the weekend when there was severe load shedding. The alarm would not have been working as a result.”
On Sunday, 7 November 2021, LT-COL Prinsloo went to the office using the external sidestep, noticed nothing untoward, and entered through a chain and lock secured entrance.
“On the Sunday, the 7th of November 2021, I went to the office to pick up some documents which I needed for the Wildlife Trafficking Workshop that week. I went up the stairs to my office. I did not notice anything untoward. I parked at the bottom gate entrance and went up to my office on the first floor. The entrance was secured by a chain and lock.”
On Monday, 8 November 2021, LT-COL Prinsloo was the first to arrive at the office at 06:00, noticed nothing unusual upstairs, and started working.
“On Monday, the 8th of November 2021 I reported for duty as normal at 06 h 00 hours. I am usually the first one at the office. I went straight up to my office at the first floor using the external sidestep. I did not notice anything untowards. I also did not smell anything. I then started working.”
At about 06:50 on 8 November 2021, Warrant Officer BJ Pienaar phoned LT-COL Prinsloo about a big problem, and upon going down the stairs, Prinsloo smelled a peculiar scent of ground metal or steel and discovered Pienaar's office trashed with the safe door half open, blue chair in the passage, locks ground off, and the passage covered in dark powdery substance with all exhibits taken.
“It was about 10 to 7, Warrant Officer BJ Pienaar phoned me and said we had a big problem and I must come down to his office. As I was starting to walk down the steps, I could smell a peculiar scent / smell, which you normally have when metal has been grinded open with a metal or steel grinder. When I got down, I saw that Pienaar's office was trashed. I also noticed that the safe door was standing half way open and the blue chair which was inside the safe was standing outside in the passage and that both locks were grinded off. The passage was covered in dark powdery substance. I walked to the safe and saw that all the exhibits was taken.”
On 8 November 2021, after discovering the trashed office and missing exhibits, LT-COL Prinsloo walked back and discovered entry to Pienaar's office was gained by forcing open an aluminium window and removing burglar bars and forcing open wooden office door, with pictures taken of the scene.
“I walked back to Warrant Officer Pienaar's office and saw that entry into his office was gained by forcing open the aluminium window and the complete removal of the burglar bars from the wall and they then forced open his wooden office door. I attach her to pictures taken on the day showing the exterior and interior of the office.”
The torn open exhibit bags contained bricks of cocaine, which were taken out of the bags and possibly placed into black carrier bags which were also missing.
“It must be photo 3. It shows the entrance gate to that hardware shop. Photo 4 shows the chain and lock that was cut off. Then the next two photos, you can also see the one link, it was cut in half. Photo 7 on page 125, shows those concrete pipes, as well as the next photo on 126. Those are the torn open exhibit bags that those bricks of Cocaine were in. They actually took the exhibits out of the bags? Yes, they did. So how would that work? It would mean they would take each brick, put it in another container or bag? They could have taken those same black carrier bags because that was missing as well.”
Exhibit bags can link suspects quickly to a crime, unlike other evidence.
“I think the possibility is if they are caught or something with that, it can link them back. Nothing else can link them back, but those exhibit bags can link them back quickly.”
Burglars broke in through a window where the burglar bars had been removed.
“You can see where they broke the window open and you can see the part of the blind hanging outside there, and you can see that burglar bars is gone in front of that window.”
The burglar bar was one big bar covering all five windows, bent out of the wall to allow entry.
“Because it is one big burglar bar that covers all five of those windows, two small ones on either side and the big one in the middle, they have just, two sides, they got it out of the wall and then they just bent it in so they could get through.”
Windows were made of easily removable aluminum frames allowing quick access by burglars.
“There you can see that the aluminium windows are not very strong. If you push a screwdriver or something in there, their hinges are just pop-riveted onto the frame. So it is very easy, you just put a strong screwdriver in there and you pop them out, and this is what happened here. So they took the whole window frame off there.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo states that Warrant Officer Pienaar was not present when the exhibits were brought in, contradicting Major General Senona's testimony that Pienaar was present.
The two locks on a door were cut precisely with knowledge of internal security mechanisms, indicating the perpetrators knew exactly what they were doing.
“whoever cut those locks knew exactly what they were doing, because on the inside of that door there is special mechanisms... they knew exactly how to still open it.”
The burglars mistakenly broke into the last window in the passage thinking it was the last window to enter the passage, but it was Warrant Officer Pienaar's locked office.
“They broke into the last window... meanwhile they broke into Pienaar's office... It is somebody that mistaken himself there, that was there.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo knew from Warrant Officer Van Den Berg's involvement how much and how many bricks of cocaine were stolen, specifically 541 kilograms valued at over 200 million.
“After Warrant Officer Van Den Berg was involved there, I knew how much, how many bricks there were... 541 kilograms of cocaine valued at over 200 million.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo was summoned on 11 November to Major General Senona's office in Durban and interviewed about the break-in by several senior officers including Lt Gen Mosikili and Brigadiers Nyuswa and Naicker.
“I was summoned to Major General Senona's office in Durban... I was interviewed about the break-in... Lieutenant General Mosikili conducted that interview... The other officers also asked me questions... I did tell Lieutenant General Mosikili that the alarm was not serviced and was not linked to a security company.”
All members at the office underwent polygraph testing following the break-in; Prinsloo's lasted six hours and he passed despite being treated as a suspect.
“All the members at my office were called for polygraph testing. We all underwent the test. All the members were subjected to a three-hour test. My test was for six hours. I was treated as a suspect, but I did pass my test nonetheless.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo denies that polygraph tests were conducted on all involved in the cocaine delivery at Port Shepstone; only he was informed and others were unsure.
“Commissioner, that was never communicated to us. It only communicated to me... So the rest of the officers, I do not know.”
The exhibits (cocaine) were never recovered; Prinsloo does not know the status or progress of the investigation regarding them.
“The exhibits were never recovered. I have been interviewed several times in relation to them. I do not know the status or the progress of this investigation.”
Lt-Col Prinsloo states that he, and presumably his superiors, did not act in line with the applicable National Instruction and Protocol regarding the investigation.
Warrant Officer Mpangase was said by Van Den Berg to have taken samples from the exhibits, but Lt-Col Prinsloo denies any samples were taken by Mpangase.
“I was later told by Warrant Officer Van Den Berg no samples were taken.”
Brigadier Naicker of SANEB was not present when the drugs were delivered, but as SANEB coordinator, he would have been informed as drug related matters go through his office.
“He was not? No. I presume he was informed, because all seizures of drugs gets reported through his office.”
Colonel Jacob called Lt-Col Prinsloo on 4 November without formal instruction or communication from Nyuswa, informing him that he is now the investigating officer, despite previously dealing with Mpangase.
“You received a call from Colonel Jacob, and then he said now he is the investigating officer... without you hearing from your superior?”
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo agrees that members of the DPCI are main suspects, but also states that some non-DPCI members were involved to bring the cocaine to his office.
Lieutenant Colonel Prinsloo states that the team assisted Warrant Officer Mpangase with manpower to bring the drugs to Port Shepstone because they are well armed.
“The possibility is there, Commissioner, that they just assisted Warrant Officer Mpangase for manpower to bring the drugs there to Port Shepstone, because they are obviously well armed.”
Advocate Baloyi expresses concern that police officers lack the ability to raise concerns about the security of drugs stored in Lt Col Prinsloo's office and suggests empowering officers to escalate such matters to prevent incidents like the killing of Brigadier Nyuswa.
“You do not have the ability to raise matters of concern... I would have been much more interested to get security and other things in place... to empower police officers or enable police officers to take up these matters... matters should not have to die at Brigadier Nyuswa.”
Exhibits were transported to the DPCI Port Shepstone Serious Organised Crime Investigation Unit premises for storage, with Lt-Col Prinsloo as Unit Commander; Maj Gen Senona took possession of the strongroom keys after storage.
“The exhibits were transported to the DPCI Port Shepstone Serious Organised Crime Investigation Unit is premises for storage . Lt - Col Prinsloo , who was the Unit Commander of the DPCI SOCI , was informed of the arrangement and allowed the strong room at the premises to be used to store the exhibits . General Senona took possession of the keys to the strong room after the exhibits were stored .”
Lt-Col Prinsloo was Acting Unit Commander reporting directly to Brigadier Nyuswa during the time of these events.
“Commissioners , he would have been reporting to Brigadier Nyuswa as a direct line of command as the Brigadier was or is in command of Serious Organised Crime Investigation .”
Lieutenant-Colonel Prinsloo, the unit commander of the DPCI SOCI, was informed and allowed the use of a strong room to store the drug exhibits at Port Shepstone.
“The unit commander of the DPCI SOCI, Lieutenant-Colonel Prinsloo, was informed about the arrangement and allowed members to utilize a strong room to store the exhibits.”