Hearing day 102

The Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) did not attend the scene on 22 June 2022 at the harbour because it was not a 'clan lab' scenario (a clandestine drug laboratory).

“the FSL did not attend the scene on 22nd June 2022 at the harbour, and the reason advanced was that FSL declined to do so because it was not a 'clan lab' scenario, meaning it was not a clandestine drug laboratory”

Colonel Jacobi requested the presence of the FSL at the scene but they declined, therefore the Local Criminal Records Centre (LCRC) or not the FSL should attend normal drug seizures per protocol.

“Colonel Jacobi indicated that he requested their presence at the scene and they denied it... even the protocol direct that LCRC, or the Local Criminal Records Centre, attend normal drug seizures and not the Forensic Science Laboratory”

The FSL was the wrong entity to be contacted at the harbour scene, and rather the LCRC should have been contacted.

“FS L in the circumstances was the wrong entity to make contact with... And the entity that ought to have been made contact with is the LCRC”

There is a requirement that exhibits seized must be sealed at the crime scene and not after transport to Port Shepstone.

“the requirement that the exhibits be sealed at the crime scene and not after they have been transported to Port Shepstone”

Flynn has no knowledge or record of whether the LCRC was contacted by investigators at the harbour on the day in question.

“I do not have knowledge of that... I do not have knowledge of that”

The Community Service Centre (CSC) or charge office is part of the police station where all activities start and where the SAP 13 register is kept to enter exhibits.

“the CSC is a Community Service Centre or the charge office... that is the heartbeat of the police station.. that is where all the activities start and that is where the register is kept to enter exhibits into”

All property and exhibits seized must be entered in the SAP 13 register of the relevant police station where the crime was committed or property found, then transferred to the relevant unit and entered in the SAP 13 of that unit.

“All property and exhibits seized must be entered in the SAP 13 register of the relevant police station where the crime was committed or where the property was found and then transferred to the relevant unit and entered in the SAP 13 of the relevant unit”

Police officers entering exhibits into SAP 13 must be specific and complete, including exhibit seal numbers and serial numbers of exhibits such as cash.

“it is expected of police officers entering exhibits into the SAP 13 to be specific and complete... exhibit seal numbers must be entered... serial numbers of cash need to be entered”

The property seized in Port Shepstone should be locked in a temporary storage facility at CSC and then handed over to the Station Commander or exhibit official, who was Warrant Officer Perumal at the relevant time.

“a l l p r o p e r t y e n t e r e d i n t h e S A P 1 3 m u s t b e l o c k e d i n a t e m p o r a r y s t o r a g e f a c i l i t y a t C S C , w h e r e t h e y m u s t b e k e p t s a f e l y u n t i l h a n d e d o v e r t o t h e S t a t i o n C o m m a n d e r o r e x h i b i t o f f i c i a l . I n t h e c a s e o f t h e P o r t S h e p s t o n e s e i z u r e a n d t h e S A P e n t r y a t I s i p i n g o , w h o w o u l d h a v e a t t h e t i m e b e e n t h e e x h i b i t o f f i c i a l ? W a r r a n t O f f i c e r P e r u m a l”

The transfer document regulated by SAP 13 is a separate document and not part of the actual register where exhibits are entered into.

“C o m m i s s i o n e r s , i t i s a s e p a r a t e d o c u m e n t . I t d o e s n o t f o r m p a r t o f t h e a c t u a l r e g i s t e r”

The SAP 13(g) transfer document is a required, separate document completed by SAP 13 officials whenever exhibits are transferred from one police station to another or between SAP 13 stores.

““ T h e t r a n s f e r d o c u m e n t , S A P 1 3 ( g ) i s c o m p l e t e d b y t h e S A P 1 3 o f f i c i a l i n a l l i n s t a n c e s w h e r e e x h i b i t s a r e t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m o n e p o l i c e s t a t i o n t o a n o t h e r o r b e t w e e n S A P 1 3 s t o r e s .””

Sub 3 of the SAP 13 regulation lists the information required to be provided in the transfer document.

“s u b 3 , a s I u n d e r s t a n d i t , l is t s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t m u s t b e p r o v i d e d i n t h i s s e p a r a t e d o c u m e n t t h a t i s c a l l e d a t r a n s f e r d o c u m e n t”

Both the transferring station (Isipingo Police Station) and the receiving station (Port Shepstone Police Station) are required to complete the transfer documents according to sub 3 and sub 5 of the SAP 13 regulations.

“s u b 3 r e g u l a t e s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a t r a n s f e r d o c u m e n t b y t h e t r a n s f e r r i n g s t a t i o n . ... s u b 5 r e g u l a t e s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a t r a n s f e r d o c u m e n t b y t h e r e c e i v i n g s t a t i o n ... In our instance, in this particular case, that would be Isipingo Police Station ... and receiving station ... Port Shepstone Police Station”

No transfer document or document template capturing the requirements of SAP 13 sub 3 or sub 5 has been seen by MAJ-GEN FLYNN.

“I a m n o t a w a r e o f a n y s u c h d o c u m e n t s ... I a m n o t a w a r e o f a n y s u c h d o c u m e n t”

There was non-compliance with the transfer of exhibits from Isipingo to Port Shepstone Police Station as per SAP 13 requirements.

“T h e r e w a s n o n - c o m p l i a n c e”

The receiving station for the transfer of exhibits in this instance would be either Port Shepstone Police Station or the DPCI SAP 13 office in Port Shepstone.

“o n e o f t w o , P o r t S h e p s t o n e P o l i c e S t a t i o n o r t h e D P C I S A P 1 3 i n P o r t S h e p s t o n e”

The transfer of exhibits in this case went to Port Shepstone Police Station and not to the SAP 13 office of the Serious Organized Crime Unit at Port Shepstone.

“it w e n t t o P o r t S h e p s t o n e P o l i c e S t a t i o n a n d n o t t o t h e S A P 1 3 o f t h e S e r i o u s O r g a n i z e d C r i m e U n i t a t P o r t S h e p s t o n e”

The transfer of exhibits from Isipingo Police Station to Port Shepstone offices occurred on 22 June 2022.

“t h e y w e r e s t o r e d o n t h e 2 2 n d o f J u n e 2 0 2 2”

Specialized units under the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI) and the Division Forensic Services may keep separate SAP 13 registers to record exhibits with divisional approval.

“S p e c i a l i z e d u n i t s r e s o r t i n g u n d e r t h e D i r e c t o r a t e o f P r i o r i t y C r i m e I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , D P C I , a n d t h e D i v i s i o n F o r e n s i c S e r v i c e s m a y , w i t h t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e D i v i s i o n a l C o m m i s s i o n e r o r H e a d , D P C I , k e e p s e p a r a t e S A P 1 3 r e g i s t e r s t o r e c o r d e x h i b i t s”

The Port Shepstone DPCI office is a specialized service unit under the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations as contemplated by SAP 13 sub 1.

“t h e r e i s d e a l t w i t h b y e x p e r t s ” , a n d I a m i n t e r e s t e d i n s u b 1 o f t h a t p a r a g r a p h . I t r e a d s : “ S p e c i a l i z e d u n i t s r e s o r t i n g u n d e r t h e D i r e c t o r a t e o f P r i o r i t y C r i m e I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , D P C I , a n d t h e D i v i s i o n F o r e n s i c S e r v i c e s m a y , w i t h t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e D i v i s i o n a l C o m m i s s i o n e r o r H e a d , D P C I , k e e p s e p a r a t e S A P 1 3 r e g i s t e r s t o r e c o r d e x h i b i t s”

The Port Shepstone DPCI office can only keep a separate SAP 13 register if approved by the National Head of the DPCI.

“t h a t w i l l o n l y b e a n a p p r o v e d S A P 1 3 i f i t w a s a p p r o v e d b y t h e N a t i o n a l H e a d o f t h e D P C I .”

Without approval as contemplated in SAP 13 sub 1, Port Shepstone DPCI office cannot retain a SAP 13 register.

“i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n a p p r o v a l s u c h a s c o n t e m p l a t e d i n s u b 1 , P o r t S h e p s t o n e D P C I o f f i c e s c a n n o t r e t a i n a S A P 1 3 r e g i s t e r ? ... T h a t i s c o r r e c t .”

MAJ-GEN FLYNN has no knowledge that the Port Shepstone DPCI offices have ever been approved to retain such an SAP 13 register.

“I d o n o t h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f t h a t ,”

The receiving station for the exhibits transfer in this case was stated as Port Shepstone Police Station, yet the exhibits were taken to Port Shepstone DPCI offices, which are two separate places.

“y o u i n f o r m e d t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r s t h a t y o u a r e n o t a w a r e o f t h e o f f i c e s h a v i n g b e e n c l e a r e d o r a p p r o v e d t o r e t a i n a n S A P 1 3 r e g i s t e r . I f t h a t i s w h e r e t h e y w e n t , w h y t h e n d o y o u c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e c e i v i n g s t a t i o n i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , i n p a r a g r a p h 8 , s u b 5 , w a s P o r t S h e p s t o n e P o l i c e S t a t i o n ? T h e s e a r e t w o s e p a r a t e p l a c e s .”

The exhibits were physically taken to the Serious Organized Crime Unit offices in Port Shepstone, stored in a walk-in safe, and two days later entered into the SAP 13 register at Port Shepstone SAPS while still in the same location.

“the officers took the exhibits to the Serious Organized Crime Unit, Port Shepstone, stored it there in the walk-in safe. And then only on a later date, on the 24th of June, the exhibits were entered into the SAP 13 at Port Shepstone SAPS, whilst it was still, until their burglary and theft, in the walk-in safe in Port Shepstone Organized Crime Unit”

It was required that Port Shepstone Police Station take control of the exhibits before entering them into the SAP 13 register at the police station in Port Shepstone, but there was no known transfer of control from the Organized Crime Unit to the police station.

“If Port Shepstone Police Station was intended as the receiving station, was it not required, therefore, to have taken control of the exhibits before they are entered into the SAP 13 at the police station in Port Shepstone? ... I am not aware of such”

The SAP 13 at Isipingo Police Station reflects the book-in and book-out process of the exhibits seized in the investigation.

“it is a copy of the SAP 13 at Isipingo Police Station ... this seizure was registered, was booked in and subsequently booked out at Isipingo Police Station ... That is correct”

The SAP 13 entry dated 22-06-2021 describes a DPCI inquiry number related to the investigation and refers to a package containing suspected cocaine.

“there is an entry 373 dated 22-06-2021... it is just reflecting 41, and then in brackets 541, multi one kilogram brick containing powder suspected to be Cocaine”

Each exhibit must be individually identified and described in the SAP 13 register at the first station where the crime is committed, consistent with National Instruction 8/2017, but the descriptions in the document are insufficient.

“I do not see any further description as I think contemplated by the National Instruction 8/2017 that each exhibit must be individually identified in the receiving, no, in the first station where the crime is committed... that is the totality of the description of the exhibit ... inconsistent with the response you gave that each single piece of exhibit has to be individually listed in the SAP 13”

Each brick of suspected cocaine should have been individually listed and fully described in the Isipingo SAP 13, including descriptions of the wrappings and bags containing them as part of the exhibits.

“each one of those bricks ought to have been listed in this Isipingo SAP 13 and fully described ... the wrappings, the bags in which it was, the additional wrapping around that bags with the carry handles ... all of those was then supposed to, after it was, the Cocaine was removed from those bags, to also form part of the list of exhibits”

The exhibits were not described properly at the crime scene but were instead taken to Isipingo Police Station where they were entered into the SAP 13 register.

“at the crime scene if conditions permit ... s per the directive ... It is supposed to be packaged correctly at the crime scene and then entered in the SAP 13 register at the crime scene. ... So we know that it did not happen at the crime scene. Instead, they were taken to the Isipingo Police Station and that picture we looked at where the exhibits, as they were at the Isipingo Police Station, that is the time they were entered into the SAP 13. Am I correct?”

Crime exhibits at Isipingo were not placed in evidence bags and sealed, as required for proper crime scene management and chain of custody.

“if they omitted to do it at the crime scene, ... even here, it was not done, Commissioners”

The exhibits at Isipingo police station were already contaminated unless the colleagues handling them wore gloves, and they were not properly photographed, sealed in exhibit seal bags, or entered into the SAP 13 register, causing risk during transport to Port Shepstone.

“the exhibits were already contaminated, unless the colleagues had gloves on ... could still have been photographed properly by LCRC, as well as properly sealed ... and entered into the SAP 13 register ... any thing can happen along the way”

If the exhibits had been properly handled at the crime scene, they would have been sealed and entered into the SAP 13 register at Isipingo police station, but this did not happen.

“at least we know from, and if the crime scene had been properly handled, then the exhibits... would have then been entered into the SAP 13 at Isipingo”

The entries in the SAP 13 register document the booking-in and booking-out process of evidence items at police stations, including transfer to another police station.

“we are having a conversation regarding the book-in, book-out process, that that requires registration in the receiving SAP 13 ... and immediately booked out to another police station where an SAP 13 would be completed”

Exhibits can be booked out from one police station to another or for legitimate purposes such as submission to the Forensic Science Laboratory.

“The exhibits can obviously and must be booked out to be submitted to the Forensic Science Laboratory”

An entry in the SAP 13 register dated 2021-06-22 stating 'items taken for analysis' is a false entry as the exhibits were never taken for analysis on that date and instead were moved from Isipingo to Port Shepstone and never submitted for analysis.

“this entry is a false entry, because the exhibits was never taken for analysis on that date. It is completely misleading. Of course, the exhibits went from Isipingo to Port Shepstone and was never submitted for analysis as depicted here”

The exhibits were entered into the SAP 13 register by Warrant Officer Mpangase, an investigating officer, with a signature of the community service centre member acknowledging receipt of the exhibits making that person the exhibit official responsible thereafter.

“the exhibits was entered by Warrant Officer Mpangase ... a signature of community service centre member who receives exhibits ... that person then becomes the exhibit official and is responsible for these exhibits from that point”

When exhibits are registered in the receiving police station, that station is responsible for the exhibits and must enter them into their SAP 13 register, and it must be identifiable who signed for receipt of the exhibits at the receiving station.

“when they are registered in the receiving police station, that police station takes responsibility for the exhibits and they are entered into that police station's SAP 13 ... there has to be somebody identifiable to say I received them and I signed the SAP 13 form”

The entry into the register at Port Shepstone Police Station was just a paper exercise to have a reference number for exhibits kept there and the actual exhibits were never taken out of the walk-in safe at the unit.

“it is clear that this was just an entry into the register at this police station to have a reference number for the exhibits that is been kept at Port Shepstone”

Warrant Officer Mpangase made a false entry under paragraph 6 claiming that the exhibits were taken for investigation when in fact the exhibits were not taken out and were only for submission for FSL analysis, not investigation.

“the entry is made at Port Shepstone Police Station. So it is incorrect, it is a false entry”

The exhibits recorded as received by Port Shepstone Police Station never left the DPCI offices in Port Shepstone, making the entry of receipt by Port Shepstone a misrepresentation.

“someone in Port Shepstone Police Station purports to be receiving something that never left the DPCI offices in the first place”

The exhibits referred to are suspected cocaine and no analysis was conducted on them despite them being taken for analysis initially.

“the exhibits were in fact Cocaine”

There is no independent corroboration that the exhibits registered at Isipingo SAP 13 are the same as those registered at Port Shepstone Police Station.

“There is no independent corroboration to come to the conclusion that what was entered in Isipingo is now entered at Port Shepstone”

If exhibits were booked out for investigation, no such investigation was done except for work by FSL, meaning the 'taken for investigation' entry by Warrant Officer Mpangase was a misrepresentation.

“If it was booked out for investigation, there was no investigation to be done on the exhibits except for the work to be done by FSL. So it was supposed to read, taken then for submission to FSL. That is what I would have suspected, not for investigation ... that is a misrepresentation”

The enquiry DPCI enquiry 28/06/2021 is a registered enquiry at the DPCI and when an enquiry is registered, a file is created and investigations start immediately.

“the enquiry is registered at the DPCI by the DPCI ... investigations start, a file is created ... and then the enquiry is booked out to an investigating officer”

The original enquiry related to the burglary and theft was contained in the Port Shepstone docket and there was no separate file documenting progress of investigations prior to the theft of drugs at the DPCI offices.

“that is all the evidence that was gathered subsequent to the burglary and the theft that is contained in the Port Shepstone docket”

The deliverer signature on the exhibit register likely belongs to the same person who signed under section 4.5, probably the Community Service Centre Commander or SAP 13 clerk.

“The deliverer obviously will be, and on face value it seems to be the same person that signed under 4.5, will be the Community Service Centre Commander, in all probability”

Warrant Officer Mpangase assumed full responsibility for exhibits when he booked them out from Isipingo Police Station and the items were taken out for analysis, not transferred to another police station.

“No, it does not remain under the custodianship or commando of the Isipingo Station Commander. Mpangase assumed full responsibility for the exhibits when he booked it out.”

There was no SAP 13 register at the Port Shepstone police unit to record reception of exhibits, causing booking in to be done via paperwork only.

“... there was no SAP 13 register at the unit in Port Shepstone, and that is why, in order to obtain a reference number for the exhibits, that is why it was just booked in, the paper exercise, at Port Shepstone Police Station.”

Exhibits taken out from Isipingo Police Station were supposed to be stored at a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) and no other police station or place.

“The only place it can be will be at a different police station. But in terms of this entry, it is supposed to be at the Forensic Science Laboratory. And at no other place.”

There is no known documentary evidence at Port Shepstone DPCI offices reflecting the arrival of exhibits at storage there on record.

“I am not aware of such, Commissioners.”

Port Shepstone Police Station maintains the position assumed by Isipingo Police Station that exhibits are powders suspected to be cocaine, but it does not deal with exhibits as definitely cocaine.

“Port Shepstone Police Station does not deal with the exhibits as definitely Cocaine, but, you know, maintains the position assumed by Isipingo as well that it is powders suspected to be Cocaine.”

There was no presumptive drug test conducted at the crime scene or Isipingo Police Station to confirm that the powder was cocaine; only the first batch at 3.1 is suspected to be cocaine, subsequent entries inaccurately describe the substance as cocaine.

“According to my knowledge, there was no presumptive test conducted at the crime scene or at Isipingo Police Station to indeed confirm that it was Cocaine. So, 3.1 is correct. From 3.2 onwards, if all speak about Cocaine, that will be inaccurate.”

In October 2021, an allegation was made that the Forensic Science Laboratory was contacted to expedite the analysis report but the FSL did not have space to store exhibits; no attempts were made to increase security or move the cocaine to a more secure location after an attempted break-in, despite prior significant seizures of cocaine at the premises.

“There is an allegation that FSL was again contacted on 27 October 2021 to expedite the analysis report. However, Warrant Officer Setshe reiterated that FSL did not have space to store the exhibits. This is after FSL had received 700 kilograms of Cocaine seized in Aeroton in July 2021. Curiously, no attempts were made to increase security at the premises or to move the Cocaine to a more secure location after the attempted break-in.”

There were six break-ins at the Port Shepstone premises before June 2021, and the latest before the theft was on 15 January 2021; a security breach report was submitted by Lt Colonel S R Singh to multiple crime intelligence and security heads in KwaZulu-Natal.

“General Mosikili refers to six break-ins at the premises before June 2021, with the most recent before the theft being on 15 January 2021. Most importantly, on 22 January 2020, Lieutenant Colonel S R Singh, Acting Section Commander, Counter Intelligence, Crime Intelligence KZN, submitted a report to the Provincial Head of Crime Intelligence KZN, Provincial Head of the DPCI KZN, Section Head, Operations, Crime Intelligence KZN, Section Commander UGU Cluster, Crime Intelligence KZN, and the National Head, Security Standards, Counter Intelligence to address the security breach at the Port Shepstone premises following the 20 January 2020 break-in.”

There were seven break-ins at the Port Shepstone Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI) offices from December 2011 to October 2021, excluding the last entry.

“seven break-ins at the Port Shepstone DPCI offices from December 2011 to October 2021”

Premises that have been broken into multiple times over a 10-year period are almost not secure, indicating many security vulnerabilities.

“there was , that it is almost not secured”

Security measures at the Port Shepstone DPCI office were not up to the required standard, allowing prospective burglars to gain access.

“the security measures at that office obviously was not at the required standard”

A letter from Lieutenant Colonel Singh dated 22 January 2020 was directed to five Heads of various units including the Provincial Head, Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations, KwaZulu-Natal.

“letter by Lieutenant Colonel Singh , and that you'll find still under the same annexure number , HFF4 at page 121”

General Senona would have inherited the security and operational issues at the Port Shepstone DPCI office.

“General Senona would have 'inherited' these issues”

At the date of the letter (January 2020), there was no Provincial Head appointed for DPCI KwaZulu-Natal, and a Brigadier was acting in that position.

“there was not a person appointed as the Provincial Head so one of the Brigadiers within the province would have been acting”

General Senona was promoted later during 2020 to the position of Provincial Head for the DPCI in KwaZulu-Natal and continues to hold this position.

“General Senona was only promoted and appointed later , during 2020 , to the position of Provincial Head for the DPCI in KZN”

A security breach at the Port Shepstone DPCI offices on 20 January 2020 was reported and investigated, with a case opened at Port Shepstone SAPS under CAS 268/01/2020.

“On 2020-01-20 , a breach insecurity at the above mentioned offices was reported... A case was opened at Port Shepstone SAPS vide CAS 268/01/2020”

General inspection revealed serious shortcomings in security at the Port Shepstone DPCI offices including the absence of CCTV cameras, warning alarm systems, and beam sensors.

“security measures . No CCTV cameras are installed in and around the premises . There is no early warning alarm system ... No beam sensors located exterior to the office accommodation”

Storing drug exhibits at the Port Shepstone DPCI offices, which only has two strong rooms and lacks adequate security measures, is extremely reckless and irresponsible.

“I am of the view that it is extremely reckless and irresponsible to place exhibits in such a strong room or a vault”

It would have been safer to store drug exhibits at any other police station that is 24-hour manned with armed officers, providing an additional security barrier absent at the Port Shepstone offices.

“It would have been more safe at any other police station that is 24 hourly manned , because at least you have got a human element then”

Lieutenant Colonel Singh's letter concludes with recommendations to remedy contributing factors leading to a physical security breach, including installation of perimeter beam sensors, infrared sensors, engagement with a contracted armed response company, and upgrading perimeter lighting.

““ It is hereby recommended that the above mentioned office initiate processes in order to remedy the contributing factors that lead to the physical security breach, which is: • Installation of perimeter beam sensors around the ground floor of the office accommodation. • Interior office accommodation infrared sensors. • Engagement with the contracted armed response company to ensure efficient service in terms of timeous visits to the site. • The upgrading and repairs of the perimeter lighting.””

General Flynn confirmed he does not have knowledge of whether recommendations from Lieutenant Colonel Singh's letter were carried out before a theft 18 months later.

“I do not have knowledge of such Commissioners .”

General Flynn confirmed that Brigadier Nyuswa was the Provincial Commander at the time of security recommendations to the DPCI office in Port Shepstone.

“Brigadier Nyuswa … As the person you say was the Provincial Commander at the time.”

General Flynn acknowledged a typographical error in General Mosikili's report regarding references to National Instruction 8 of 2017, specifically paragraph references.

“it is obvious that there was a typo in the report by General Mosikili where it is referred to 12. It is supposed to be paragraph 9(2) and as Advocate Sello indicated , there is no such 12 ( 2 ). So , it is supposed to be in totality referring to paragraph 9 ( 2 ) .”

General Flynn confirmed that National Instruction 8 of 2017, annexed as Annexure HFF2, is the correct instruction referred to by General Mosikili in his report.

“That is the correct instruction , National Instruction Commissioners , that is correct .”

General Flynn confirms that the document referred to by General Mosikili is indeed National Instruction 8 of 2017, with no known amendments made.

“I am not aware of any amendments that were made, so I think the detail reflected here is indeed correct”

General Flynn confirms that Major General Senon performed an investigation to establish if misconduct was committed in handling and storage of exhibits, in terms of SAPS Disciplinary Regulation 2016, and provided the outcome of the departmental investigation.

“That the National Head appoint a senior functionary at the level of a Major General to lead an investigation in terms of SAPS Disciplinary Regulations 2016 to establish whether misconduct was committed in the handling and storage of the exhibits... That the senior functionary provides the outcome of the departmental investigation in terms of Regulation 8(1) of the SAPS Disciplinary Regulation 2016”

General Lebeya does not approve the four recommendations discussed in paragraph 6 of the manuscript dated 28 January 2022.

“General Lebeya, because he does not approve the recommendations, he says, discuss paragraph 6?”

No disciplinary steps were initiated against Major General Senon or any of his subordinates.

“it is my understanding that no disciplinary steps were initiated against Major General Senon or any of his subordinates”

General Flynn has no knowledge of whether the audit and site inspection recommendations 6.3 and 6.4 have been carried out.

“I do not have knowledge in terms of the recommendations on 6.3 and 6.4”

General Flynn prepared a supplementary statement analyzing and comparing events related to 541 kilograms of cocaine seized since June 2021 with other drug busts and seizures in Durban during 2020 to 2022.

“in your supplementary statement in paragraph 1 that you prepared this statement to deal with the analysis that you conducted, where you compared the events that transpired relating to 541 kilograms of Cocaine seized since June 2021 and stolen from police custody in November 2021 and you do that comparison with other drug busts, seizures in Durban in the period 2020 to 2022”

General Flynn is not aware of any audit having been undertaken since the break-in at Port Shepstone DPCI buildings to check for compliance with the Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS).

“I am not aware of any such exercise”

General Flynn confirmed coverage of paragraphs 66, 67, and 68 through prior engagements.

“Do you confirm that we have covered what is raised in those paragraphs through the engagements we have had? That is correct, Commissioners.”

In January 2026, General Flynn called for enquiry files concerning identified drug busts in Durban during 2020-2022 to determine if the June 22, 2021 seizure shows a pattern of irregularities or is an anomaly.

“In January 2026, I called for the enquiry files in respect of identified drug busts in Durban during 2020 to 2022 to see whether the 22 June 2021 seizure is evidence of a worrying pattern of irregularities or whether it is an anomaly”

On 5 February 2020, the Durban Serious Organised Crime Investigation Unit seized 547 kilograms of suspected Mandrax hidden in a container offloaded from a vessel from China at the CHC depot in Prospect, Durban.

“On the 5th of February 2020, members of the DPCI Durban Serious Organised Crime Investigation Unit were summoned to a crime scene at the CHC depot in Prospect in Durban, where SARS Customs detected the consignment of suspected Mandrax. The suspected Mandrax was hidden in a container that was offloaded from a vessel that originated from China. The crime scene was properly dealt with in terms of crime scene management principles. The exhibits were photographed, weighed and sealed in forensic evidence bags. The mass of the suspected Mandrax was 547 kilogrammes.”

As of the hearing, there has been no outcome from the Mandrax seizure matter; investigation is ongoing with further inquiries necessary.

“Up to date, there has been no significant break from this matter, Commissioners, but we are looking into the matter again.”

The seized 547 kg Mandrax exhibits were booked at Isipingo SAPS and submitted to the Main Forensic Science Laboratory in Silverton on 12 November 2021, where it was confirmed to be Mandrax; the case is under investigation by Durban under a reference number.

“The exhibits were booked in at the Isipingo SAPS under a reference number. And then the exhibits were submitted to the Main Forensic Science Laboratory in Silverton on 12 November 021. FSL confirmed that the exhibits were Mandrax and the case was investigated by Durban under a certain reference number.”

After closure of the enquiry, FSL is informed of outcome and is responsible for disposition of seized drugs; the current status of the seized Mandrax is unknown to Maj-Gen Flynn.

“Upon closure of the enquiry, Forensic Science Laboratory are informed of the outcome of the investigation, and they then have the responsibility to dispose of the exhibits. So, the current status of the Mandrax, I do not have any knowledge of.”

Seized narcotics, once submitted to Forensic Science Laboratory, are not returned to SAPS facilities but are kept until finalised and subsequently disposed of.

“Once a narcotics specifically is handed or submitted to the Forensic Science Laboratory, it is never returned to a SAP 13 facility. It is kept at Forensic Science Laboratory until the matter is finalised and then disposed of.”

On 8 May 2020, Durban Serious Organised Crime Investigation Unit seized 35 kilograms of suspected cocaine from a container offloaded from vessel Polonia from the Port of Santos in Brazil; exhibits submitted to FSL in Amanzimtoti on 21 May 2020.

“On 8 May 2020, members of the DPCI Durban Serious Organised Crime Investigation Unit followed up upon information in relation to a container that was already offloaded from the vessel Polonia that originated from the Port of Santos in Brazil. Upon further investigation, 35 kilogramme bricks of suspected Cocaine were recovered from a container. The cocaine had the logos Nautica, BMW, MTA, Z and on the wrappings. The crime scene was properly dealt with in terms of crime scene management principles. The exhibits were photographed and sealed in forensic evidence bags. The mass of the suspected Cocaine was 35 kilogrammes. The exhibits were booked in at Maydon Wharf SAP 13 SAPS under a specific reference number. The exhibits were submitted to the Forensic Science Laboratory in Amanzimtoti on 21 May 020. FSL confirmed that the exhibits are cocaine.”

There were three cases in the list where exhibits were submitted to FSL in Amanzimtoti because the mass was less than bulk seizures ultimately submitted to FSL in Silverton.

“Commissioners, perhaps at this point in time, I should indicate that in this list, there were three cases where the exhibits were submitted to FSL in Amanzimtoti. The reason for that is that you will observe that the mass of these exhibits is much lesser than the bulk seizures that were ultimately submitted to FSL in Silverton.”

If a section 212 report were filed, it would be filed in the enquiry docket opened by DPCI.

“If such a report would have been filed, it would be filed in the enquiry docket opened by the DPCI.”

Upon finalisation of analysis, FSL prepares a section 212 statement or affidavit submitted to investigating officer forming part of case docket/enquiry evidence bundle.

“Upon finalisation of the analysis by FSL, a section 212 statement or affidavit is prepared and submitted to the investigating officer of the matter. That then forms part of the case docket or the enquiry, as part of the bundle of evidence in that case docket or enquiry.”

There was never a section 212 report or analysis report filed or received from FSL for the Port Shepstone seizure case.

“There was never a reports submitted or received from FSL.”

No report confirms that seizures at Port Shepstone were drugs or cocaine and such a report does not exist.

“Formally, therefore, we do not know whether what was seized at the harbour was in fact drugs. Is there a report that confirms that it was firstly drugs and secondly that in fact it was cocaine? There is no such report, Commissioners.”

Storage capacity constraints at Forensic Science Laboratory have delayed submission of seized exhibits as there is heavy workload and no sufficient storage facilities available.

“It is clear that there is multiple references to the fact that upon requests being made to FSL, they were informed that they do not have storage facilities available, obviously based on a heavy workload. So, there is multiple cases before this matters that needs to be dealt with before these exhibits can be submitted. So obviously it prolongs the submission of the exhibits to the Forensic Science Laboratory.”

Typically, it takes about 6 months from seizure to testing due to heavy workload and storage delays; paperwork sometimes exists to reflect this but often enquiries are made telephonically and entries made in SAP 5 investigation diary.

“It will take about 6 months for us to get to your consignment and test it. Is there any paperwork that reflects that all of that was done? In some instances, yes, Commissioners. In this specific case? But no. Predominantly, it is enquiries that was made telephonically, and then entries made in the SAP 5 in the investigation diary.”

The evidence collected in the narcotics case was lawfully transmitted to the United Kingdom via mutual legal assistance and led to a prosecution and a conviction there, demonstrating the transnational nature of the offenses.

“the evidence collected in this case was lawfully transmitted to the United Kingdom upon their request, obviously by means of a mutual legal assistance application, and the UK authorities managed to prosecute an individual in the United Kingdom and obtained a conviction on the matter relating to the facts of this narcotics”

Requests to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for storing drugs from recent seizures are expected to be in writing and recorded, but the general process is often conducted telephonically without written requests.

“I have a observation that predominantly it is being done telephonically... I think you confirm that it is expected to be in writing and recorded somewhere... And where the FSL is not in a position to store the drugs from a recent seizure because of lack of space, they would equally indicate in writing.”

Upon submission of exhibits to the Forensic Science Laboratory, a covering letter is required and acknowledged, and this procedure is being complied with.

“upon submission of the exhibits to the Forensic Science Laboratory, it needs to be accompanied by this covering letter that is acknowledged then, so you get an acknowledgement of receipt on the date that it was submitted... So that is indeed being complied with.”

There is no formal prescribed protocol that mandates requests to the Forensic Science Laboratory must be in writing, but if in writing, it provides proof of receipt and is undisputable.

“I am not aware of such protocol... but logic dictates that if it is in writing, it cannot be disputed, especially if there is proof of receipt.”

A request to the Forensic Science Laboratory for storage was rejected because it was not a Clanlabs scenario and it was correct that the FSL should not have been called; LCRC should have been contacted instead.

“when a request was made to FSL, it was rejected because FSL indicated that it was not a clanlabs scenario... your view was that that rejection on that basis was correct because they ought not to have called FSL. It is LCRC they ought to have called.”

There was never an intention to submit or test the seized drugs (541 kilograms of cocaine) at the Forensic Science Laboratory, raising concerns about handling and recording.

“there was never an intention to submit these drugs to FSL. And that is why I am reflecting now on all the other cases where predominantly the crime scenes were dealt with correctly and the exhibits found its way into a SAP13... it was never stolen or tampered with and then submitted to FSL... It is my strong view that there was never an intention to submit it to FSL... It looks to me like there was never an intention to submit the drugs to FSL. There was never an intention to have them tested.”

The seized drugs which were not tested were properly handled, recorded, and remained secure at the police station, never stolen or tampered with, before being sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory intact.

“the crimes scenes were dealt with correctly and the exhibits found its way into a SAP 13, remained in a SAP 13 at the police station. It was never stolen or tampered with and then submitted to the FSL... it arrived at the Forensic Science Laboratory intact.”

There has been no prosecution in South Africa up to date related to the seizure of 541 kilograms of cocaine on 8 May 2020.

“There was no prosecution up to date in South Africa, Commissioners.”

On 11 August 2020, members of the DPCI Durban Serious Organised Crime Investigation Unit recovered 20 kilograms of suspected cocaine from a container on the vessel Polonia, originating from the Port of Santos in Brazil.

“On 11 August 2020, members of the DPCID urban Serious Organised Crime Investigation Unit followed up upon information in relation to a container that was on the vessel Polonia that originated from the Port of Santos in Brazil. ... Upon further investigation, 20-kilogram bricks of suspected Cocaine were recovered from the container.”

Cocaine exhibits from the 20 kg seizure at Durban harbour were handled correctly, including photographic documentation and sealing in forensic evidence bags before submission to FSL in Amanzimtoti, which confirmed the substance as cocaine.

“The crime scene was properly dealt with in terms of crime scene management principles. The exhibits were photographed and sealed in forensic evidence bags. The mass of the suspected Cocaine was 20 kilograms. The exhibits were booked in a Durban Central SAPS under a reference number. Then the exhibits were submitted to FSL in Amanzimtoti ... and then FSL confirmed that the exhibits were Cocaine.”

In two cases, including the Durban cocaine seizure in August 2020 and the Manuchar case, the LCRC did not attend the crime scene; the reason for this absence is not clear.

“And here, Commissioner, there are two cases where LCRC did not attend to the crime scene. But the investigators themselves complied with directives by having contemporaneous notes, by taking photos of the exhibits, and properly securing by sealing the exhibits ... It is not clear what was the reason for the two incidents. It is this case and the Manuchar case, LCRC did not attend to the scenes.”

The presence of LCRC at seizure scenes is imperative for lifting fingerprints and touch DNA, tasks investigators cannot perform.

“It is very important, Commissioners, especially when it comes to the prospects of lifting fingerprints and touch DNA, which cannot be performed by an investigator. Although an investigator can take photos, compile into a photo album, and ensure chain of custody is maintained, investigators are not capable of performing that two very important aspects.”

Investigators compensated somewhat for the absence of the LCRC at the crime scenes by taking photos, making contemporaneous notes, and properly sealing exhibits.

“But the investigators themselves complied with directives by having contemporaneous notes, by taking photos of the exhibits, and properly securing it by sealing the exhibits there and then where it was recovered from the container.”

In the Durban cocaine seizure of 20 kg, the absence of the LCRC was somewhat offset by the actions taken by investigators at the scene, though some tasks were performed by investigators only because they had to be at the scene before criminals.

“In this case, I think you specifically pointed out that there is risk of non-attendants on the LCRC not attending the scene was somehow ameliorated by the actions of the investigators themselves. ... But the reason why the investigators moved in here and conducted the investigations was that they had to beat the criminals to the vessel, and specifically the container.”

In the Port Shepstone cocaine seizure of 22 June 2022, the LCRC did not attend the crime scene because they were not summoned; the investigator Colonel Jacobi called the Forensic Science Laboratory but did not request LCRC presence.

“In the Port Shepstone matter, the one that we have been dealing with, the LCRC did not attend the scene. ... It is because they were not summoned, Commissioners. ... Colonel Jacobi indicated that he called Forensic Science Laboratory, but there was no indication that he ever requested the presence of the LCRC ...”

In the Port Shepstone seizure, investigators did not take similar steps to cover for the absence of the LCRC as were taken in the Durban case; only a few photos were taken, and the work was described as shoddy and hurried.

“By no means, Commissioners. There were just a few photos taken of the exhibits there at the police station, at Isipingo, few photos of the exhibits in the container, and shoddy work, to say the least. It was as if the investigators were in a hurry.”

There was no urgency to call LCRC to the Port Shepstone scene, unlike the Durban cocaine seizure where urgency was due to trying to beat criminals to the container; the Port Shepstone scene was a controlled environment (a warehouse), easily containable.

“Commissioners, as explained by Colonel Jacobi, he indicated that the scene became busy with the perhaps individuals arriving at the warehouse yard. But I also explained that that is a controlled environment already, per se, as it is a warehouse. And it could have been easily contained where an outside perimeter, an inside perimeter could have been deployed.”

The reason LCRC was not called to the Port Shepstone crime scene was not officially stated; while Colonel Jacobi called the FSL, no explanation was given for not calling LCRC.

“I guess, importantly really, the question is, has Colonel Jacobi any way stated or given a reason why the LCRC was not called? We know he called the FSL. That is what the records show, or what is alleged. But he has not said anything about, or has he said anything about why the LCRC was not called?”

On 23 February 2021, members of the DPCI Durban SOCI investigated a container at Green Africa Container Yard where SARS Customs detected 9.9 kilograms of methamphetamine hidden in the cargo; the crime scene was properly managed and exhibits were submitted to FSL in Amanzimtoti and confirmed as methamphetamine.

“On 23 February 2021, members of the DPCI Durban SOCI followed up upon information in relation to a container that was at Green Africa Container Yard. SARS Customs detected narcotics during the search of the container with 495 packages, and it was in total 9.9 kilogramme. Containing Methamphetamine was seized from where it was hidden in the cargo in the container. The crime scene was properly dealt with in terms of crime scene management principles. The exhibits were photographed and sealed in forensic evidence bags. The exhibits were booked in at Brighton Beach SAPS under a reference number, and the exhibits were submitted to FSL in Amanzimtoti ... FSL confirmed that the exhibits were Methamphetamine.”

Referral to the FS Laboratory (FSL) should be immediate and within 7 days according to protocol, but in the case discussed, the referral was almost two months late, constituting non-compliance with the protocol.

“You are correct , Chairperson . According to the protocol , the exhibits must be submitted within 7 days .”

On 30 July 2021, members of the DPCI Durban followed up on information about possible smuggling of narcotics in shipping containers destined for Scania truck assembly plant in Gauteng. Officers found black bags suspected to be cocaine, but halted the process until LCR arrived.

“On 30 July 2021 , members of the DPCI Durban followed up upon information relating to the possible smuggling of narcotics concealed in the shipping containers destined for a major truck assembly plant in Gauteng , Scania . When the container doors were opened , the officers noticed black bags inside the container . As the officers suspected it to be bags of Cocaine , they halted the process until LCR arrived .”

Longer delay before referral to the FS Laboratory increases the risk of tampering with exhibits such as loss, tampering or other issues.

“The risk obviously reminds that there might be tampering with the exhibits is indeed true .”

Evidence collected from the container was properly managed with proper crime scene management including fingerprint, DNA, photographs, and sealing of exhibits. 29 bags wrapped in black tape and 999 bricks of cocaine totaling about 1000 kilograms were recovered and booked in at Maydon Wharf SAPS.

“There was proper crime scene management as the scene was investigated for fingerprints , DNA and photographed . A duplicate seal was recovered from the container . 29 bags , each wrapped in black tape with carry handles exposed , were recovered . 999 bricks of Cocaine were recovered from the bags . The mass of the Cocaine was approximately 1000 kilogrammes . The narcotics were transported to Maydon Wharf SAPS , where they were booked into the SAP 13 .”

Suspected cocaine could not be submitted to FS Laboratory immediately due to insufficient space in their vaults; exhibits were eventually accepted by FSL in Pretoria on 12 November 2021 after a burglary and theft of 541 kilograms of cocaine at Port Shepstone.

“It is alleged that the suspected Cocaine could not be submitted to FSL as they did not have enough space in their vaults . The exhibits were accepted by FSL in Pretoria on 12 November 2021 , after the burglary and the theft of the 541 kilogramme of Cocaine at Port Shepstone .”

On 16 February 2022, members of DPCI Durban SOCI and Crime Intelligence seized 550 bricks (550 kilograms) of suspected cocaine at a container in Manucha Warehouse originating from Port of Santos in Brazil. The crime scene was properly managed and the exhibits were submitted to FS Laboratory in Silverton on 24 February 2022 and confirmed to be cocaine.

“On 16 February 2022 , members of the DPCI Durban SOCI , in conjunction with Crime Intelligence , followed up upon information in relation to a container that was at Manucha Warehouse , where 550 bricks , or 550 kilogrammes of suspected Cocaine , were seized from where they were hidden in the cargo in the container . The container originated from the Port of Santos in Brazil . The crime scene was properly dealt with in terms of crime scene management principles . The exhibits were photographed and sealed in forensic evidence bags . The exhibits were booked in at Umbilo on a reference number , and then the exhibits were submitted to FSL in Silverton on 24 February 2022 . FSL confirmed that the exhibits were Cocaine , and it was investigated under a Durban SOCI reference number .”

Shortly after the burglary was detected, Forensic Science made the means to accommodate the major seizure of 1000 kilograms of cocaine and then it was submitted to FS Laboratory.

“Well , very shortly after the burglary was detected , Commissioner , I believe that my counterparts at Forensic Science made the means to accommodate this major seizure , and then it was submitted .”

Because LCRC was not present at the scene, potential DNA and fingerprint evidence that might have been collected was missed, which is a shortcoming.

“But because LCRC was not there , you still miss the DNA evidence that you might have been able to pick up , DNA and fingerprint .”

LCRC did not attend the scene of a particular narcotics seizure in February 2022, and it is unclear why Colonel Sibiya did not summon them.

“This is the other matter where LCRC did not attend the scene . It is not clear why Colonel Sibiya did not summon them .”

No convictions or prosecutions have yet been obtained in respect of the narcotics seizure cases referenced, although investigations are ongoing.

“That is correct , Commissioner . No , there was no convictions or prosecutions in any of these matters , Commissioners .”

There are protocols around seizure and storage of specific drugs including the use of forensic evidence bags marked with SAP 13 numbers.

“speaks to a protocol that must be adopted in the storage of the specific drugs as are listed there ... sealing and forensic evidence bags and have to be marked with the SAP13 number”

Major-General Flynn is familiar with the protocols for seizure and storage of drugs but believes the specified minimum requirements are not exhaustive.

“Yes, I am fully aware with specifically (b) ... I think 8 (a) is perhaps the most minimum requirements ... I am not aware of a specific protocol in terms of requirements for an SAP 13 facility”

All exhibits were sealed at the crime scene and no samples from the exhibits were submitted to FSL while they were still in storage.

“All the exhibits were sealed at the crime scene. No samples from the exhibits were submitted to FSL, whilst the exhibits were still in storage.”

Additional safeguards are necessary to ensure criminals cannot access evidence stored in a walk-in safe.

“Page 101 of 110 makes sense that they need to be additional safeguards to ensure that criminals cannot get to the actual exhibits that is placed in a walk-in safe.”

Unlike the June 2021 seizure, LCRC was called to process the crime scene for all other seizures except the second Polonia vessel and the Manuchar seizure.

“unlike the June 2021 seizure, 11.1, LCRC was called to the scene to process the crime scene in respect of all the other seizures, except for the second Polonia vessel seizure and the Manuchar seizure”

Bulk exhibits were submitted to FSL in Silverton except for three exceptions.

“All the bulk exhibits were submitted to FSL in Silverton, except for the three exceptions that I have highlighted.”

Drug trafficking at an organised crime level is facilitated by complex supply chains involving officials exploiting positions within logistics, border control, law enforcement, and commercial processes.

“The persistence of drug trafficking at an organised crime level is often facilitated by the complexity of modern supply chains and the involvement of officials who exploit positions of trust within logistics, border control, law enforcement, or commercial processes.”

In the 2021 cocaine seizure, storing the cocaine in Port Shepstone compromised investigation integrity and led to theft, impairing efforts to find traffickers.

“In my opinion, the Cocaine seized in 2021 should never have been stored in Port Shepstone. The crime scene management failings compromised the integrity of the investigation, and the subsequent theft of the Cocaine was severely compromised our ability to find the traffickers.”

General Senona was involved in the decision to take the cocaine to Port Shepstone and he kept the key; he played an active role and was privy to the activities.

“General Senona was involved in the decision to take the drugs, the Cocaine, to Port Shepstone. And in the end, he kept the key ... He visited the Port Shepstone offices shortly after the seizure and took possession of the key. That is active participation ... He was privy to the activities.”

In terms of legislation, polygraph tests form part of integrity testing and it is the National Head that directs who needs to be subjected to it.

“In terms of our legislation, I believe it is section 17(e) speaks to integrity testing. And as part of that process, polygraph tests are also part of the machinery that is deployed to determine deception or whether individuals were perhaps complicit in the Commissioning or taking part in any offence. And then it is upon the National Head to then direct who needs to be exposed to that process.”

General Senona was supposed to be subjected to a polygraph test due to his active role in the Port Shepstone matter but was not subjected to it.

“In my opinion, Commissioner, indeed, he was supposed to be exposed to the process as he played an active role in the Port Shepstone matter.”

Samples from Port Shepstone were not taken to FSL lab for testing.

“Were 7 bricks ever taken from Port Shepstone to the FSL lab for testing? No.”

There was a request for 7 bricks of cocaine to be submitted for testing but they were never submitted to FSL.

“Apparently, there was a request for 7 bricks of Cocaine to be submitted ... that was the only samples that were submitted.”

Warrant Officer Mpangase functioned as the investigating officer or "owner" of the enquiry in this case, being very active and responsible for investigation follow-ups.

“Warrant Officer Mpangase is quite the active person with this enquiry... would he have been therefore the owner of this enquiry?”

General Flynn confirmed Warrant Officer Mpangase was the investigating officer or 'owner' of the enquiry, with command and control responsibilities delegated to team leaders and higher-ranking officials.

“Indeed, the owner of the enquiry ... he is the investigating officer... but in terms of command and control, the responsibilities of the team leader... the Unit Commander, the Provincial Commander, as well as the Provincial Head...”

In a major drugs seizure, relevant team leaders and commanders have responsibilities for inspections and overseeing investigations, ensuring all leads are followed and exhibits are correctly submitted to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL).

“... in these circumstances where it is a major drug seizure... they have certain responsibilities in terms of inspections and overseeing the investigation... all the possible leads are followed up, exhibits are submitted to FSL... to ensure that there is a smooth transition of the exhibits from the SAP 13 facility... to the Forensic Science Laboratory.”

General Flynn's testimony concluded, and he was excused from the inquiry.

“Thank you, Chair. You are excused.”

The next witness must travel to Gauteng today and can only appear tomorrow morning due to travel arrangements already set.

“The next witness... is one who has to travel into Gauteng. And today is his travel date... can only be presented tomorrow at 09:30 in the morning.”

The travel arrangements for the next witness were made in advance for travel today and appearance tomorrow morning at 9:30.

“The arrangements that had been made already had been for him to travel today, to be present at 9:30 tomorrow morning... it was appropriate to retain the arrangements as were made.”