Hearing day 111

Crime Intelligence operatives provide intelligence which is sometimes just accepted and operationalised based on prior working relationship and trust.

“Commissioner, you get to know your intelligence operatives. Some of them will take a chance on information, but we do have members that we have worked for, for years. And if he comes to me with information, he presents the information to me, I will accept it as fact and I will operationalise it.”

The relationship between the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) and Crime Intelligence in drug busts is very good and characterized by ongoing trust and collaboration.

“Commissioners, I am going to say it is brilliant. We have a very good working relationship. I cannot do my work without them. And then once they have generated intelligence, they cannot do their work without us. So I would say it is highly, that is an incorrect word, I will say it is an ongoing working relationship with trust built between each other.”

Sometimes Crime Intelligence operatives attend the scene of seizures as covert observers, known as 'ghosts', who must not be identified in the community or normal policing space and do not get involved directly in the crime scene.

“When he comes to the scene, he does not get involved in my crime scene per se. He will be an observer. ... when I say they are a ghost, it is a person that must not be identified in a community space. It is also a person that must not be identified in the normal policing space. They are covert operatives.”

Crime Intelligence operatives do not actively get involved in crime scenes such as collecting exhibits or processing suspects, to avoid exposing undercover operatives in court.

“It is highly untoward that an operative gets involved actively with a crime scene and collecting exhibits, processing suspects and stuff like that because that means he is going to end up in court. So exposing an undercover operative.”

If Crime Intelligence operatives provide information about containers and have the necessary permissions, Warrant Officer Sander proceeds with inspections and arranges follow-ups as required, but does not verify the permissions independently.

“It is positive on both of the scenarios given to me at the moment. Yes, on both. ... But if the instruction given to me is the container is stacked for you, it is ready for inspection, go look there, I will go and look. But in the other version of when the information comes and then I have to do the necessary follow-ups and arrangements, yes, I do that.”

Warrant Officer Sander stated that one cannot enter a yard and start work without yard management being present, confirming presence with a member from operations or the yard.

“10 out of 10 times, you cannot enter that yard and start working without the yard management being present with you. So someone from operations, someone from the yard will be there, so that confirms your presence with that member.”

If there is high confidence of drugs in a container and risk of theft, Warrant Officer Sander is prepared to use the necessary laws to seize and access the container without waiting for permissions to prevent narcotics moving quickly.

“If my information is 100% positive, I trust my CI, they say to me go to that container, there is drugs there, go there now quickly. I am going to do the same zest and zeal, and go there quickly and start working. ... I am not going to wait for their permission. I will use the necessary laws to go and seize that container and gain access so I can stop the movement of those narcotics. ... a container can move very quickly.”

If relying solely on intelligence information from Crime Intelligence that a container holds drugs, Warrant Officer Sander acts on reasonable suspicion, even if the information is wrong, because of the risk of delay and narcotics moving fast.

“Commissioner, maybe I heard this, so yes, I am relying on the reasonable suspicion. ... if that information is wrong and you have opened a container without the necessary authorisations, what are you relying upon, the suspicion that there are drugs there, and is it a reasonable suspicion if you are only relying upon the evidence or the information you are getting from a CI?”

Warrant Officer Sander states that container yards operate as businesses where containers get paid for every day they are there and inspectors need cooperation from the yard to do their job effectively.

“That container in that yard gets paid for every single day that it is there. It is an economy in our country. But my job is to do my job, now and today. So I will extend the invitation, guys, I need to inspect this container now. How long? You are messing me around, I am doing it without you. It is under camera, I have got witnesses, I proceed.”

Warrant Officer Sander says inspectors must speak to the container yard manager or operations manager and need resources to move containers, as they are not equipped to do so alone.

“I do speak to the container yard manager. I will speak to the operations manager, I will speak to whoever is there. The more people there give me more resources. I do not have the resources to move certain items. I am not superman to lift a container. So for me to do my job in that environment, I need them.”

Warrant Officer Sander explains that securing containers at yard takes place with seals, sometimes by SARS or the yard itself to insure against loss, requiring cordial relationships between police and yards.

“When I close that container, I do not have a container seal. So if it is a SARS detention, SARS needs to be there to put their seal on, but then the container yard must still supply me the resources to reseal that container, which is their yard seal. For insurance, they need to document that because it is a loss to that company. So the cordial relationship must exist.”

Warrant Officer Sander describes that entry to container yards is a secure process requiring notification and often escort, vehicle scanning, and compliance with health and safety rules.

“You cannot just get into that yard without them knowing that you are there. It is a secure premises. For most of these yards, you either go in under escort, you are scanned in, they scan your vehicle, they do everything. Depending on the level of occupation health and safety, your vehicle might not even be allowed in. So you walk. So they know you are there, then it is just good manners to go and introduce yourself and say this is what we are busy with, we might be here a little bit, we might be here long, or I need the following resources.”

When a container is detained for inspection, shippers can choose which yard the container will be inspected at, often with notification and booking for space, but container yards like Durban Container Terminal must cooperate by providing resources and facilitating quick unpacking and movement upon request.

“If a container or a set of containers is brought in for inspection, and then they get detained, let us say they get detained before inspection, they will then say, take them to this yard. There is a booking that I can accommodate them for you for this week. Otherwise they will go into a stack where they are paying cheap rental while it is being installed. So in this case, CHC or LCS or Grindrod, they will say to you, okay, I have got five spaces for five containers today, then in two days' time you can do the next containers for inspection ... the shipping agent or the shippers, they do say, listen, this cargo is going to LCS, the cargo is going to Grindrod, the cargo is going to CHC. They can choose that. But there are some instances where we know that, like Durban Container Terminal, there is relationships, I need a container check today, I will phone them, hey guys, I need a favour, can I bring a container to you quickly?”

Warrant Officer Sander states that many container yards have issues with counterfeit goods.

“A lot of yards, especially with counterfeit goods.”

Warrant Officer Sander confirms that container depots could be involved in trafficking, based on received information though not yet proven.

“We could. Yes, Commissioner. Information has been received, but I have yet to prove it, Commissioner.”

Warrant Officer Sander details undercover operations conducted under section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act to detect drugs on vessels, involving boarding ships and using substances like baby powder as decoys.

“It is an undercover operation. It is conducted in terms of section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act. Me as an Investigating Officer, I have done a few of them. I have boarded vessels at sea. We found the drugs. We swabbed the drugs. We put baby powder. We put something, it looks the same, along with the ...”

Controlled drug deliveries have a high risk and challenges due to technical surveillance limitations and the risk of drugs going missing, which leads to charges for the officers.

“A controlled delivery is the ultimate to catch them red-handed. But the risk, the risk is huge... We have tried... if I do not explain it to the Commission, you are going to think we are not doing the job. But we are.”

Warrant Officer Sanders himself has not had a success with controlled drug deliveries, although others have.

“I have not had a success, Commissioner. But other people have had success.”

Suspects often know about surveillance devices or their presence and thus do not pick up the bait in controlled deliveries.

“On occasions, the suspects know the devices or the surveillance is in place. So they do not pick it up.”

The port environment is highly secured and controlled by syndicates, which makes autonomous surveillance operations nearly impossible without detection.

“The port itself is a fenced environment... every access point is controlled. If your syndicate controls the access to the port, they have got access to drug flow in and out... If I operate in the port, I cannot operate with autonomy without anyone around me...”

All port operations involving placing a transponder device on a drug container are known to the ship's crew and harbor, thus broadcasting the operation and reducing the likelihood of success.

“I must tell the captain, the ship's engineer, the first mate, that I need to go below deck and put a transponder and open the container... You are broadcasting your whole operation before it even starts.”

Some intercepted drug shipments have their own transponder devices that track the shipments independently from the police.

“We have intercepted drug shipments where we found their own transponder devices inside those bags. So they themselves are tracking their shipment...”

Criminals controlling drug shipments have better technology than the police, requiring the police to constantly change strategy.

“They have better technology than we do... So we have to out-think them all the time... So as of today we must now change our strategy again.”

During a drug bust at Maydon Wharfs, the police unpacked bags that were suspected to contain cocaine bricks and conducted fingerprinting and DNA analysis on the evidence.

“At this point LCRC is present, and as we are unpacking, we are starting to catalogue and diarise what we have found... We open one of the bags to establish what the actual contents is... going from a black bag that we suspect to contain Cocaine, going to establish that it contains bricks of suspected Cocaine... now what we are doing is literally opening each bag and decanting the contents of the bag into exhibit bags... fingerprinting... finish the DNA on the bags on the handles.”

The police use various sized plastic bags with unique alphanumeric identifiers for exhibit packaging when handling seized narcotics.

“They come from a tiny little bag like this, which we call a bullet bag... we call them computer bags, bed bags... they come in numerous sizes which the state has made for them. Each bag is unique in its alphanumeric substance...”

Warrant Officer Sander states he uses a crime scene kit in his vehicle for evidentiary operations.

“I have a crime scene kit in the back of my vehicle”

The team took from morning until night to bag all exhibits during the operation at the yard, which is not a bonded warehouse.

“We started in the morning. We finished in the night”

Sources give information to the police through a process including source claims that are documented and rewarded upon recovery and conviction, but may lose interest as their role is intelligence.

“A source gave certain information to the police, so a source claim would then be submitted through their processes. The source claim would have to come to me, because I would have to put a copy of this docket with it to show how the source gave the information or validated that source information. So they would then have an understanding of what I have done with the exhibits because the source gets rewarded on a recovery. The source gets rewarded on a recovery and then a conviction. So at a certain point, they might lose interest in the docket because their intention is intelligence.”

The intelligence operative sometimes arrives on scene and sometimes remains unseen to gather information that gets accounted for in the SAP 13 system.

“The intelligence operative that tips you off, and you say sometimes they will be on the scene and sometimes they are ghosts because they do not want to be seen, do they eventually get to know that what was offloaded, what they were tipped and what was offloaded is in fact fully accounted for on your SAP 13?”

Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) is not called to recovery scenes; investigating officers do sampling and guiding without involving clan labs or FSL.

“If an Investigating Officer calls FSL to come to the scene of a recovery to guide his members or her members with taking sampling, with doing sampling, have you ever heard of anything like that occurring, and why would that happen? ... Commissioner, I can say no, and I do not know why it would happen.”

Intelligence handlers maintain communication to track ongoing matters and ensure progress in investigations even long after initial information is gathered.

“They do of follow-ups. I have intelligence handlers that speak to me from matters way back because we still talk, and they have not been finalised. So they do check upon matters.”

Investigating officers do not receive assistance from FSL for sampling at a recovery scene; they conduct such work themselves.

“So you would not ever ask FSL to assist you with doing sampling of exhibits? ... Commissioner, that is what I am saying.”

Sampling on recovery scenes differs from FSL's chemical analysis labs; customs are involved in chemical sampling and detention of suspected illicit chemicals, not FSL on scenes.

“If I am dealing with illicit chemicals which I suspect to be used in the manufacture of narcotics... Customs gets involved, because Customs can take samples from containers and stuff like that, and they have a laboratory... But personally, Commissioner, I will say I have not had experience in sampling or doing that on the scene.”

Investigating officers can perform presumptive testing (like cocaine identification) on the scene without assistance from FSL.

“If you, as the Investigating Officer, wanted to know whether what you are dealing with is Cocaine on the scene, what you found, you could do a presumptive test. You would not need FSL to come out to do that. ... No, I would do that. A presumptive test I can do on the scene.”

Presumptive tests are investigative leads only, involving simple field tests, not formal analysis that FSL does.

“It is something totally different, Commissioner. Remember, a presumptive test does not come with a 212 statement. It is just an investigative lead. It is a little swab. It is the same as having a dog bark at the drugs. It is not what FSL does. It is a presumptive test just saying to me, yes, you are on the right track, carry on.”

Investigating officers have requested FSL to advise on how to destroy exhibits when FSL storage time is limited.

“Have you ever requested FSL to enquire from FSL how to go about destroying exhibits if they take time to make storage available for your exhibits? ... I have, due to correspondence in matters that I have, and it was requested to me that I correspond, that I can move exhibits to them for destruction. Yes, I have.”

Phones left at a scene are generally destroyed rather than returned or auctioned due to sensitive information; Exhibit Clerk is authorized to destroy such phones.

“If I have a suspect that has left a phone at a scene and the matter is finalised, a cell phone is now destroyed. So you authorise the Exhibit Clerk to have that phone destroyed. How they do it, they squash it, they break it, or they send it to a scrapyard, I do not know. But there is an authorisation that is done to destroy that exhibit.”

Only Forensic Science Laboratory is authorized to destroy exhibits, following strict protocols; Investigating Officers are not authorized to destroy exhibits themselves.

“There is only one authorised entity that destroys exhibits, and that is Forensic Science Laboratory. ... I am not authorised to destroy an exhibit.”

All firearms are sent to Division Ballistics to be destroyed; destruction does not occur anywhere else and is processed at a nodal point.

“Firearms are the same, Commissioner. All firearms go to Division Ballistics. Only they destroy them from there. It is not destroyed anywhere else. They all get processed at one point. We call it a nodal point.”

A June 2021 seizure involved a container classified as bone meal, which is a waste animal product detained automatically by Veterinary Services of the Department of Health.

“This relates to the June 2021 seizure... When the vessel arrives offshore, it submits a notice to discharge to the Port Authority... The person that packed this would have given it a classification and a commodity code... I see it is bone meal. It is an animal product. It is a waste product. There is a system in place that flags these items automatically. And what it does is it automatically places a detention on that consignment... The detention notice here is the Department of Health, Veterinary Services.”

Veterinary Services and Department of Health do not have their own bonded warehouse; inspections happen at the location chosen by the shipper.

“Veterinary Services and Department of Health do not have their own bonded warehouse and whatever. Where would these get inspected? The yard that the shipper has chosen?”

The South African Revenue Service (SARS) issued a detention notice dated 23 June 2021 related to illicit trade, one day after a seizure on 22 June 2021.

“there is a detention notice from SARS, a SARS detention notice, illicit trade . It is dated the 23rd of June 2021, so that is the day after the seizure . The seizure was on the 22nd of June”

SARS issues detention notices automatically and formally from its Illicit Trade Group to import managers for containers flagged for investigation after they have been placed in the yard.

“the detention notice is placed automatically. Now they are doing a formal notice, and that is what this piece of paper is. It is a formal notice from the SARS Illicit Trade Group to the import manager, saying we want to look at those 10 containers that you have landed .”

SARS was not suspecting drugs in the containers but was looking for illicit or wrongly declared goods.

“It is not because SARS suspects that there is drugs on these. They are looking for illicit goods .”

Warrant Officer Sander had his scarce skills allowance and service allowance cancelled with immediate effect on 14 July 2025 because he was placed at Supply Chain Management in the Provincial Office and was not performing operational duties.

“On 14 July 2025 , I received a written notice of cancellation of my scarce skills allowance and service allowance with immediate effect . The reason given being that I am currently placed in Supply Chain Management at the Provincial Office and not performing any operational duties .”

Warrant Officer Sander was temporarily placed at Provincial Support Services DPCI KZN pending the outcome of a corruption investigation against him and requested immediate written confirmation on the outcome and status of that placement.

“I was temporarily placed at the Provincial Support Services DPCI KZN , pending the outcome of the investigation . In the circumstances , I hereby request immediate written confirmation of the outcome of the initial investigation and the consequent status of my temporary placement .”

Warrant Officer Sander was notified on or about 19 December 2024 by Colonel Jacob that an investigation (case number KZN DPCI/DR4/2024) was finalized and he was issued a verbal warning for allegations against him.

“On or about 19 December 2024 , Colonel Jacob phoned me and informed me that the investigation under case number KZN DPCI/DR4/2024 had been finalised and that he was issuing me with a verbal warning in respect to the allegations against me .”

Warrant Officer Sander stated he never applied for transfer or replacement at Provincial Support Services DPCI KZN and currently holds a post of Investigator at Serious Organised Crime Durban.

“I have never applied for a transfer to or replacement at Provincial Support Services DPCI KZN , nor do I hold or occupy a specific post number at Provincial Support Services DPCI KZN . I currently hold a post of Investigator at Serious Organised Crime Durban .”

Warrant Officer Sander requested immediate reinstatement of his scarce skills allowance and service allowance and return to his position at Durban Serious Organised Crime to perform usual operational duties.

“I believe that I should be placed back in my position at Durban Serious Organised Crime to perform my usual operational duties as soon as possible with the immediate reinstatement of my scarce skills allowance and service allowance .”

Warrant Officer Sander was charged for failing to declare directorship in a shooting club related to victimisation issues within the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI).

“the verbal warning was in consequence of the alleged, well, that you failed to declare your directorship in the shooting club”

Warrant Officer Sander indicated that there were other members victimised and protection of certain DPCI members with serious allegations against them.

“the other issue was the protection of certain members at the DPCI who did have serious allegations against them”

Two senior Hawks officers were arrested on allegations, one of them being released on bail and returning to work without disciplinary action despite serious charges of extortion or corruption.

“One of the ladies there was arrested for extortion or corruption ... The person came back to work, nothing happened”

Employees under investigation within the DPCI do not experience impartial behaviour, as some remain at work without suspension or being moved.

“there is no impartial behaviour towards employees when there is investigations against them”

A whistleblower at the DPCI was victimised immediately after reporting complaints and subsequently moved to a different environment still within DPCI but another part of the province.

“The whistle blower got victimised straight away. The whistle blower has since moved to a totally different environment, but still within the DPCI, but in a different part of the province now”

The arrested colleague out on bail reports ultimately to General Senona, with immediate reporting to Colonel Mangole under him.

“who does that person report to ? Ultimately to the General ... The immediate is obviously the group Commander. It is Colonel Mangole... And Colonel Mangole falls under General Senona”

Warrant Officer Sander made a complaint about loss of exhibits and docket disappearance, but has not received an acknowledgement or written response to the complaint submitted to Captain Sibiya.

“The complaint was about the loss of exhibits... You submitted it to Captain Sibiya. Did you receive a response? No ... the answer is still no.”

An investigation was conducted related to complaints by Warrant Officer Sander but unrelated to the issues he complained about; the subject was found guilty in court but was not dismissed or discharged.

“there was a investigation but on different cases, not those cases ... The member was eventually found guilty in court, but the member was not dismissed, the member... discharge”

Warrant Officer Sander was temporarily placed in another department because his superiors were moving him out of the way due to him interfering with drug traffickers' activities.

“you were temporarily placed in another department because your superiors were moving you out of the way because you were stepping on the toes of the drug traffickers”

Warrant Officer Sander was informed by Colonel Jacob personally about suspects who stole drugs and their links to DPCI management.

“I was informed by Colonel Jacob personally who they are. But the links to the management are known ... Correct, Commissioner”

General Senona signed the letter that moved Warrant Officer Sander to another department.

“he is the one who signed the letter”

Warrant Officer Sander believes he has done a good job and made some good recoveries but has not received any accolade, appraisal, award, or nomination for his work.

“I have made some good recoveries. I think I have done a very good job. I do not need anyone else to tell me that. It is in my heart. If I was not doing a good job, I would not have been here. Never have I received an accolade, an appraisal, an award, or a nomination at the Prestige Awards or anything for the work done.”

Warrant Officer Sander asserts there is no other logical reason for his transfer except because he was interfering with someone's activities.

“There is no other logical reason, Commissioner. If I was not interfering with someone's activities, they would have left me. But if I was efficient to interrupt their activities, I was targeted.”

Warrant Officer Sander believes that once a complaint is found to have no merit, the person should be returned to their previous position, but he has not been returned, suggesting that they do not want him there.

“even if there was an initial complaint, you believe that once it was found not to have merit, you should have been returned to your old position? Correct, Commissioner. And the fact that you have not been returned suggests to you at least that they do not want you there? Correct, Commissioner.”

Warrant Officer Sander failed a polygraph test but was only unofficially informed and never received the official polygraph failure report until seeing it at the Commission.

“I am telling you, I have never seen that report until yesterday. It is scary. And then you see your name there, and you say, hold on, this is the thing that I have been looking for all my life just to say I did not do it. ... You put the report in front of me yesterday. I even said to you, am I allowed to even see this. It is the first time I have seen that. ... No, you failed. ... Until yesterday, all right, thank you.”

The polygraph examiner made serious errors during the polygraph examination, the test was considered invalid and Warrant Officer Sander was exonerated and the examiner stopped from conducting further tests.

“A non-conformance was opened and investigated against the polygraph examiner. The test was considered invalid so that the examinee was not prejudiced by the errors of the polygraph examiner. The polygraph examiner in question was stopped from conducting any further polygraph examinations thereafter.”

Lieutenant Colonel Justice Jabulani Duma is the Unit Commander attached to the Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime unit in Durban within Crime Intelligence, KwaZulu-Natal.

“I am Justice Jabulani Duma. I am a Lieutenant Colonel in the South African Police Service. I am attached to Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime, Durban, Intelligence Collection in Crime Intelligence. And I am a Unit Commander in MPOC, Durban in KwaZulu-Natal.”

Lieutenant Colonel Duma reports operationally to his Section Commander, a full Colonel, who reports to a Brigadier, the Section Head, who then reports to the Provincial Head of Crime Intelligence, who reports to the Divisional Commissioner.

“I report to my Section Commander, who is a full Colonel, and who reports to the Brigadier, who is the Section Head, who then reports to the Provincial Head, Crime Intelligence. And the next person in command will be the Divisional Commissioner.”

The Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime unit does not deal with narcotics.

“No, we do not deal with narcotics.”

The Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime unit investigates syndicates involved in serious and violent crimes such as armed robberies, cash-in-transit robberies, business robberies, and murders.

“basically, we are dealing with Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime, where we investigate syndicates involved in serious and violent crime nature, which is armed robberies, which include CIT’s and business robberies and murders.”

There is no formal need or structure for the Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime unit leadership to interact with the leadership of the Hawks, except for formal applications when assistance is required.

“No, there is no formal, unless it is something that needs an application where you need to submit when you request whatever, you will be requesting them to assist you with.”

Operational interaction between the Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime unit and the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) occurs at the ground level and involves a memorandum of understanding.

“Operationally, we do interact at the ground level. And at senior level, there is an interaction between CI Section Head, Provincial Head and Provincial Head of DPCI, which will also include National Prosecuting Authority.”

Lieutenant Colonel Duma matriculated in 1991, joined the South African Police in 1992, was appointed as a Constable in 1995, promoted to Sergeant in 1996, Warrant Officer in 2000, Captain in 2009, and appointed as Lieutenant Colonel and Unit Commander of Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime in Durban on 26 March 2012.

“I matriculated in 1991, joined the South African Police in 1992, before SAP was amalgamated to the South African Police Service in 1995 and appointed as a Constable. I served in the uniformed branch currently known as Visible Policing at Westville SAP. I studied technical assay in Durban, National Diploma, Policing Management, but did not finalise or complete studies. I was appointed to the rank of a Sergeant in 1996 and in the year 2000, I was appointed to the rank of a Warrant Officer. In 2009, I was appointed to the rank of a Captain. I joined Crime Intelligence in 012 and attached to Security Intelligence in Border Security, which is in Crime Intelligence KwaZulu-Natal, and became an intelligence operative. In 026-03-01, I was appointed as a Lieutenant Colonel and the Unit Commander of Multi-Dimensional Organised Crime, Durban, intelligence collection.”

The mandate of Division Crime Intelligence is to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse information to prevent and combat crime, and to provide Crime Intelligence in support of the operational requirements of the operational components of the SAPS.

“The mandate of Division Crime Intelligence is to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse information to prevent and combat crime... The primary focus is to provide Crime Intelligence in support of the operational requirements of the operational components of the SAPS.”

Operational processes and Crime Intelligence documents are classified and cannot be attached.

“I said that I cannot attach any documents about operational processes as all CI documents are classified.”

Reports of intelligence gathered are submitted to the commander who signs them off, after which they are registered and forwarded to the Intelligence Analysis Centre for dissemination to all operational components of the SAPS.

“Intelligence gathered is reduced to writing by the operative and submitted to the commander who will sign off the report. The report is registered and forwarded to the Intelligence Analysis Centre where the reports and the information get disseminated to relevant addresses which are on the reports within Crime Intelligence and all operational components of the SAPS.”

Adhoc information does not require approval from the commander to be operationalised and is a key performance area for members to conduct operations.

“The Adhoc information does not need any approval from the commander to be operationalised. But it is one of the members' key performance areas to conduct operations.”

Adhoc information refers to information that is not planned but comes in emergently and must be operationalised immediately.

“When we refer to Adhoc operation, we refer to information that is not planned. Information that comes in an emergency way where you just received it and then you have to operationalise. It is not information that is where maybe you have a progressive investigation that you have been dealing with, but it is information that just comes by the way and then you grab it and then you operationalise it.”

The process of gathering evidence or intelligence starts with identifying threats via crime statistics, conducting a threat analysis, gathering information from sources, and then planning, directing and conducting operations, followed by analysis, production, dissemination, action and feedback.

“Basically, we will be going back to our intelligence collection process where we sit, we look at the crime statistics, and we identify the threats that are a problem... we then task our sources on the ground to look into the threats... From there, you start gathering information with regards to the threats... you evaluate the information... you analyse it... you hand it to the analyst to analyse it... and then from there, you will know exactly what you are dealing with, which is the interpretation... and then from there, it is production... From there, you disseminate it... it is action which means you operationalise it... Once you have operationalised it, you get feedback from the operational team... and then from there, you close your investigation.”

The intelligence collection and operationalising process requires registration of enquiries, engagement with pre-project and full-blown project phases, and the involvement of multiple offices including DPCI, NPA, Asset Forfeiture, surveillance and other SAPS units.

“The process is that, as I have explained, which runs from enquiry to pre-project, then to a full-blown project... You will have to have your operational team, which will include DPCI, which will include NPA, and which will also include other offices like your Asset Forfeiture, and other relevant units within SAPS, your surveillance and everything.”

During operationalising, engagement with prosecutors is necessary to keep the focus on the threats and avoid deviation.

“In most cases, you will have to engage with the prosecutor to get the guidance going forward, so that you do not go off and focus somewhere else, so that you keep your gathering focused with regards to the threats that you are dealing with.”

Crime intelligence information must be signed off and disseminated to VISPOL for planning and readiness against threats like strikes or imminent crimes.

“He signs it off, it gets disseminated.”

Information from sources is reported to a handler who compiles intelligence reports and submits them to the commander for approval.

“The handler who collects information. The handler who is a foot soldier. He gathers information, he compiles intelligence reports, he submits to the commander. The commander reads the reports, he signs off the reports.”

Information received varies and requires different handling depending on whether it is early warning, imminent crime, or specific actionable intelligence.

“It depends what information you are reporting on. Is it information, early warning, something that needs attention? Or is it a crime that is about to be committed?”

Processes of Crime Intelligence are set out in a document called Operational Processes of CI which guides intelligence gathering.

“The processes of Crime Intelligence are set out in Operational Processes of CI, which is a guideline on intelligence gathering.”

Handlers in Crime Intelligence have registered informants as well as non-registered human sources who provide information without financial reward.

“Sources, you would have sources that you have registered as informants. Sometimes you have sources that are not registered. You would have contacts, people who provide you information, who are not expecting any financial pay.”

Ad hoc information is received in emergency situations and requires immediate operationalisation and cooperation for quick response.

“It is information that is not in the planning. Like, for example, if you are running an enquiry, you have a progressive investigation. But something that come now... you get a team to go over there and arrest him. That is what we refer to as Ad hoc cooperation.”

Standard Operational Procedure at ports requires operational to brief commander on container smuggling intelligence, and commander to then brief section head of VPO, Visible Policing and Operations at ORS.

“Crime Intelligence procedures. When an operative has information relating to smuggling within containers at these ports at Durban Harbour, the intelligence operative must brief the commander on the information. The commander will analyse the intelligence and once all the relevant information is gathered, the commander will then brief the section head of the VPO, Visible Policing and Operations at ORS.”

Borders security is responsible for gathering intelligence to address threats of all criminal syndicates involving cross-border crimes in land, air, and sea borders.

“Borders security is responsible in gathering intelligence to address the threats of all criminal syndicates involved in organised crime related to cross-border crimes in land, air and sea borders.”

Intelligence is only shared with section head to prevent information leaks, and is retained confidentially by them.

“The intelligence is only shared with the section head to prevent information from being leaked. We retain the intelligence pundits as well. We do not disseminate immediately in order to prevent the information from being leaked.”

Police or Directorate for Crime Investigation can board vessels within 12 nautical miles to conduct search and seizure of containers suspected to carry drugs under Section 16.3 of the Police Act.

“If the vessel is within 12 nautical miles, 24 kilometres at sea the police or the Directorate for Crime Investigation may use Section 16.3 of the Police Act to board the vessel and conduct a search and seizure.”

In counter-narcotics operations in the area, containers suspected of containing drugs are inspected with the involvement of DPCI if drugs are found positive.

“Basically, in operations that are conducted in this area let us say you are getting information of a container that is coming. Maybe your information says it has counter-narcotics. So, you have two ways of doing it. After requesting a stop or arrest to put a stop you can request the DPCI to be present or you can ask the ORS inspection team to open the container for inspection to confirm what commodities are inside or if there is drugs inside. And if there are drugs, if it is positive, then you summon the DPCI to come to the scene.”

Sensitive operations most probably involve counter-narcotics activities which require special handling of sensitive information.

“Sensitive operations most probably will be of counter-narcotics that will refer to sensitive information.”

ORS has an inspection team that, upon finding drugs during container inspection, contacts DPCI to attend the scene.

“Yes, ORS has an inspection team. When after opening a container, then they found drugs, they will contact the DPCI. Or you as a handler, you can also contact the DPCI.”

ORS is responsible for opening the container for inspection and, if drugs are found, contacts DPCI.

“Because the inspection will be done by the inspection team of ORS who will open the container for you. You are not going to open the container as an operative yourself. You will be there to say, this is a container. I have identified. Obviously, they will call you when it is ready for inspection and then you meet them there and you do inspection with them. You observe what is inside. And when they confirm, yes, it is counternarcotics then they will have to conduct the relevant units, which will include the DPCI.”

There is no written process for container inspections; decisions to involve DPCI or only ORS depend on discretion and operational context.

“As I explained, this is the process that we follow when we deal with containers. There is no written process that we can say, this is the office process that was designed. This is what we must do when we deal with containers. So, a handler can decide, here is the information I am getting of drugs. Do I take DPCI with? Or the container is still at the harbour. It must know it is still at the harbour. If it is still at the harbour, it is under the control of ORS. There is nothing wrong by using ORS before contacting the DPCI.”

If counterfeit goods are suspected instead of drugs, the container will be opened, and brand attorneys will be involved to confirm counterfeit status.

“Let us move away from drugs now. Let us say it is counterfeit. They will open. Then they will realise, oh, no, here, it is a possibility that these goods are counterfeit. We need to get brand attorneys to be present. And then we need to do a full unpack.”

ORS can inspect containers both inside and outside the harbour; if a stop is placed, ORS handles the container while it remains in the harbour.

“They can also do inspections when it is outside the harbour. But what I am trying to say, if they have placed a stop, then they will deal with it when it is staying in the harbour?”

Once the container is sealed and moved to the depot, brand attorneys take samples to confirm counterfeit goods, then commercial crime unit of DPCI takes over investigation.

“And then that container will be sealed using a polystyrene. They will seal it. And then it should be taken to the depot, where a date will be set for a full unpack of the container, where the brand attorney can then come and take samples to confirm whether it is counterfeit. Then they will be notified to take over that investigation.”

Operational communication between units such as ORS and DPCI is mostly via phone calls or informal liaison, not formal paperwork, but formal letters (SAP21) are used if necessary.

“You know, Commissioners, at the operational level, it works differently. It does not work with paper all the time. It works with understanding between units which are working operationally. Some of these things, there is no time to say, now here is a container, now you found counterfeit goods, then you must go to your office and write a letter to request DPCI. It does not work that way. You pick up the phone, you call. The person that you are speaking to, you will say, okay, speak to my commander. You speak to the commander, you explain. Or you speak to a commander who lies with the commander of DPCI at their level, at their seniority. They will liaise this, you know. But if there is a need for an official letter, which we refer to as SAP21, which is the letter that we write when we request any information or any assistance within the police, that will be drawn up.”

The police may detain any container for random inspection based on profiling or intelligence.

“The policemay detain any container for random inspection in terms of the customs, based on profiling or intelligence.”

Some containers may have passed customs and left the port; ORS does not control such containers but police can request detention and inspection anywhere.

“Some containers may have already been released by customs and may have already left the port. In this instance, ORS does not have control over those containers. However, the police can still request a detention wherever it may be and conduct an inspection of the container.”

If a commodity is found to be false declaration or under declaration by customs, customs takes over; if it involves criminal cases like illicit cigarettes, drugs, counterfeit goods, police take control and DPCI must be informed for investigations.

“It is also determined that the commodity was – if it is determined that the commodity was false declaration or under declaration , then customs will take over and do the necessary. Whether there is a criminal case , for example, illicit cigarettes , drugs , counterfeit goods or precursor chemicals , the police will usually take control of the commodities. Whenever there is information of drugs , DPCI must be informed in order to take over the crime scene for investigation.”

ORS inspection team is appointed to conduct inspection once container placed at depot; border security commander informed before seals broken and may be present during inspection if dual stop by customs.

“As soon as the container is placed at a depot, ORS inspection team is appointed to conduct an inspection. In the event of the information is provided by Crime Intelligence , the commander of border security will be informed to be present before any seals are broken. If there is a dual stop by customs, then they may also be present during the inspection.”

Normal operational process prioritizes personal communication and practical liaison first; paperwork comes later to ensure lawfulness.

“But on a normal operational process, there is no time to do letters and all those. That gets attended to at a later stage. It is all about communicating personally. Or maybe go have a meeting, go to the office, set up a meeting, discuss and continue. It works as always. Because at the end of the day, we have to work. As long as we know that we are still within the context of the law, we are not doing anything wrong.”

Customs may detain and inspect containers under Customs Act without police unless drugs are detected, in which case DPCI must be called for investigation and command/control of drug seizures and forensic processing.

“Customs may detain and inspect containers in terms of the Customs Act and do not require the police unless they have detected drugs. In that instance, DPCI must be called out to conduct an investigation. In the case of drug cases, DPCI will have to command and control. These seizures, packaging and forensic processing is controlled by DPCI.”

All depots must comply with instructions to hold or detain container until police inspection is done, after which if container is legitimate it can be released.

“All depots must comply with the instruction to hold or detain the container until the police have inspected the container. And if they are satisfied that the container is legitimate, then it may be released on instruction.”

ORS and customs have their own SOPs designed by the Union Commander in Sea Borders, always followed by Border Security; no written SOP document at office, but guided by intelligence operational processes.

“The ORS and customs have their own SOP which they follow. This SOP was designed by the Union Commander in Sea Borders and has all along been followed by Border Security through the years. There is no written SOP document available to provide in this regard at the office as we are guided by intelligence operational processes.”

There is no signed document stating the process to be followed for stopping a container; it is an operational process understood and referred to as a station order within Crime Intelligence at Durban Harbour sea border.

“There is no signed document that says this is the process we must follow. But it is like, I will put it this way, I will say we can call it a station order which the office must break it down to guide as to what the members need to do in the ground. This is a process you must follow when you stop the container.”

The commander is responsible for ensuring the container stopping process is followed within Crime Intelligence at Durban Harbour sea borders.

“In this instance, it would be a commander to ensure that it is followed. ... It would be the commander.”

Crime Intelligence, border security, and ORS have been operating together for years with a memorandum of understanding to coordinate inspections and stopping of containers at Durban Harbour.

“Crime Intelligence, border security, and ORS, they have been working together for years, even before I came. They have been operating together... like a memorandum of understanding between the two offices because we rely on them when it comes to stopping containers and doing inspections because they have teams to conduct inspections.”

Crime Intelligence border security and ORS coordination works by verbal or email requests; a letter signed by the commander can be submitted if requested to place a stop on a container.

“Crime Intelligence does not need to issue documents to request a stop and detention of a container to arrest. It can be done verbally or by sending an email to arrest. However, an essay between one letter of request to place a stop signed by the commander can be submitted to ORS if requested to do so.”

There is no formal written process adopted for stopping containers within this operational space at Durban Harbour, only procedures known verbally or operationally.

“As matters operate or for as long as you operated within this space, basically, there is no formal process that is adopted or that is written somewhere. ... No, we do not have.”

Once a container has passed through the port and been released to go to a depot, ORS does not have control over it anymore; one must liaise with the depot or transporter for inspection or stopping requests.

“If you pick up information after the fact, the container has already been - went through the port and released to go to a depot, it is not in the control of ORS anymore. It is in a depot where you now as a person that is getting information, you have to liaise with that depot.”

Police generally do not get refused access by depots for container inspection, as quicker inspections lead to releasing commodities and fewer complaints from buyers.

“Normally, I have never come to a depot that will refuse when the police want to do inspection because the quicker inspection is done and the commodity is released, it is good for them. Otherwise, their buying clients, start complaining. So, we have never come across where the depot will refuse.”

The procedural process involves a profiler sending an official detention form and request to the shipping line to move the container to a licensed inspection depot, which the shipping line controls and must comply with police requests to stop containers for inspection.

“Procedurally briefing the Brigadier, those containers falls under where a profiler has sent an email on official detention form and requested the shipping line have the container moved to a licenced inspection depot. The depot is determined by shipping lines, and they have their own depot that are conducted. All shipping lines must comply with the request of the police...”

Containers that have already been released and cleared by customs are no longer under ORS control and go to depots elsewhere where inspection requires liaising with the depot.

“LT-COLDUMA”

Lt-Col Duma states he had no prior insight into a visible policing and border police operations document until recently attempting to access it through the seaboard commander, but received no response until seeing it at the Commission.

“I have no insight of this document, I have never seen it. In fact, before I came here, I did, after consulting with your advocates, I did make contact with, via the seaboard commander to access this document to see what is in this document, and I did not receive any response until I see it here.”

The document under discussion was a visible policing document related to Durban Harbour policing, approved March 18, 2021, not a Crime Intelligence document.

“it is not Crime Intelligence, it is not a Crime Intelligence document, it is a visible policing document. So, I do not know much what is inside.”

Lt-Col Duma gathered intelligence about a consignment of drugs at a private depot in Durban, contacting the depot manager for permission to inspect container BEAU595535 placed for inspection on 2026-06-22.

“I was holding the rank of a Captain working at Security Intelligence in Border Security Durban. During the performance of my duties, I gained intelligence about consignment of drugs in one of the depots... I informed the manager that I had received the permission from transporter and clearing and forwarding agents to have container number BEAU595535, placed for inspection, and to be inspected by members of the SAPS on 2026-06-22... The container was secured by the depot manager of our assembly and operational team.”

Lt-Col Duma received intelligence by telephone on 21 June from handled sources, took caution to protect the information and its origin due to risk of harm to sources and previous deaths linked to insider revelations.

“the proper information was received on the 21st of June telephonically... I told you and the evidence leader about the risks and the danger that comes with people who provide information... I highlighted to you as to why I had written that paragraph like that and the evidence leader agreed. We all agreed on protecting the original list of information as it may have repercussions when we disclose our source of information.”

Lt-Col Duma explained the operational process of tracing a container upon receiving its number, contacting the transporter, clearing and forwarding agent and ultimately the depot manager to get permission for inspection, stressing the need to protect sensitive information to avoid compromising consignments.

“after gathering information and getting a container number, the first thing when you get a container number you need to contact ORS to try and trace where the container is exactly... I spoke to the transporter and I spoke to the clearing forwarding agent and they referred me to the depot manager. And then I contacted the depot manager. I spoke to her... I just mentioned that it is a container of interest... We just want to check the commodity... I did that to protect the information so that it does not leak that, you know, we lose the consignment.”

Lt-Col Duma acknowledged that he cannot recall the names of the transporter and clearing and forwarding agent he spoke to, but remembers the container number and the depot manager's name.

“I remember the container number. I know the manager at the depot that I spoke to. But the transporter and the clearing and forwarding, eish, I cannot remember their details. But I know I spoke to them.”

Lt-Col Duma confirmed the telephone call for permission to inspect the container was made to the transporter but does not recall with whom exactly he spoke.

“the telephone call, who did you speak to... from the transporter? Yes, from the transporter to get permission. That is what I am saying... I do not remember.”

Lt-Col Duma confirms that the container subject to inspection was from Mega Freight, the company responsible for that container.

“you would agree that it would be from , this is from Mega freight , this is the company that would have been responsible for that container .”

Lt-Col Duma was not informed of any detention on the container except for an email after the fact on 23 June 2021 showing SARS detention.

“No , not that I know of , except that I believe there is an email that came after , on the 23rd , it was after the fact , and it showed that it had SARS detention .”

Lt-Col Duma states he was instructed to attend the inspection on 23 June 2021, not on the 22nd when the drugs were seized at the CHC container depot.

“I only received the instruction to attend inspection on the 23rd .”

Lt-Col Duma acknowledges he did not interact with the person responsible for the drug seizure inspection on 22 June 2021 and is unclear of the procedure followed by the depot.

“No , no , I do not even know who he is , but I believe if I had interacted with the depot on the 21st , I am sure they would have interacted with him to say the police would be coming on the 22nd to do inspection . So maybe it would be a fault from the depot or the people I spoke to . Yes , but I do not know , his processes that must be followed , I do not know them .”

Lt-Col Duma states the standard operating procedure when a container is stopped at Durban Harbour involves a briefing chain from Crime Intelligence to the commander of border security to section heads of visible policing and operations.

“The first thing is Crime Intelligence procedures . ... The operative will report to his commander , must brief the commander . ... And then the commander will brief the section head of visible policing and operations , right ? ... Operational responsibilities in border police ...”

Lt-Col Duma clarifies the procedure applies only to cargo detained by ORS at the harbour and moved to container, and not to cargo that has moved to depot outside the harbour such as Cato Ridge.

“This procedure ... deals with the cargo that is detained by ORS , which is in the harbour , and which get moved to container . ... But those processes are specifically for Durban Harbour , containers that are coming through the harbour . ... Sometimes you will find that the container has moved from Durban Harbour , for example , to Cato Ridge . ... So , you cannot follow the same process ... because it is not under their jurisdiction ... It is outside the harbour . You now , as a member , have to liaise with the depot ...”

Lt-Col Duma describes the procedure when seal of container is broken at depot: representatives of the commodity and managers of depot should be present along with the police (ORS).

“In some instances , you will find that some representatives of that commodity will be there . ... All the managers of the depot will be there . Then the police will be there , which is the ORS will be there .”

Operational Response Services (ORS) members were present when the seal on the container was broken during a drug operation.

“I know there were ORS members that were there.”

ORS members were asked to give a lift to take drugs from Amanzimto to a Police Station.

“we know from other evidence that ORS members, I think, if I am not mistaken, were asked to give a lift to take these drugs to Amanzimto Police Station.”

ORS members were indeed present to observe the breaking of the seal on the container during the operation.

“If I am not mistaken, yes, they were there, Commissioner.”

The report submitted by LT-COLDUMA to his commander about the operation would typically include information about the presence of ORS at the seal breaking.

“I am sure I would have mentioned something.”

Customs clearance is considered the point at which a container is regarded as cleared when it travels or lands at a port.

“I would say when it is cleared by customs.”

A container involved in the case had already left the port before the investigation started, making it impossible for ORS to place a stop at the port.

“So in this instance, this one had already left the port. Although there was a SARS stop on it, but it already left the port. That is why we could not use ORS to place a stop.”

Although a container may be cleared by customs, the police can still place a stop on the container if it is suspected to have been involved in a commission of an offence.

“Although it is cleared by customs, but you can still place a stop as a police official if you believe that it is, there is, it has been used in a commission of an offence, you can still place a stop wherever it is.”

South African Revenue Service (SARS) had issued a detention notice for the container as early as June 14, 2021, although the container shipment arrived on June 21, 2021.

“On the 14th of June ... there is a stop, a detention notice for State Vet. So by the time it lands, it is been identified for detention. And if detention is by a State Agency, such as the SARS, according to this document ...”

Customs do not divulge most of their operations or information to the police or other agencies, maintaining confidentiality.

“Customs does not divulge most of their operations. They keep it to themselves.”

An inconsistency exists because SARS issued a detention notice on June 23, 2021, which suggests that the container was still under customs control when it was supposedly cleared on June 21, 2021.

“How can this container be cleared already on the 21st if SARS on the 23rd issues a notice of detention on it? It suggests that it is still under the control of customs.”

Lt-Col Duma initially thought some containers might have been released by Customs but later withdrew that statement, admitting he was not aware the consignment was stopped until the 23rd when he received an email, which was after the operation had been conducted.

“if I say that it was released by customs, I would like to withdraw that statement and say that I was not aware that it was stopped up until the 23rd when I received an email, but it was already after the operation has been conducted”

SARS officers normally conduct their own operations under the Customs Acts and are not obligated to communicate with Crime Intelligence or other police units unless drugs or other illegal items are found during inspections that require police involvement.

“normally SARS conduct their own operations in terms of their customs acts. So they are not obliged to communicate with Crime Intelligence or anyone else unless they pick up something that requires the police, then may on their inspection, they will then say, oh, we found drugs here. Okay, call the Narcotics Squad to come in and continue”

The ORS (Operational Response Service) has responsibilities over the CHC depot including Isipingo and Prospecton, according to their SOPs.

“The SOP of the ORS includes, specifies, CHC depot, Isipingo as an area of responsibility for the ORS”

Lt-Col Duma was not aware of the ORS SOP that includes the CHC depot area of responsibility and had not reviewed the SOP before writing his statement.

“No, I am not, Commissioner. I am not aware. I have not gone through the SOP and I requested it before when I was still busy with a statement. On my first consultation ...”

The consignment was still under the authority of SARS as it had not been cleared by Customs yet at the time of the operation.

“the consignment was still within the reach or authority of the SARS because it had not been cleared. So it had not cleared custom”

Lt-Col Duma introduced the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) after the container's seal was broken and then handed over the matter to DPCI to continue with the investigation.

“after the container was opened, from breaking the seal, I introduced the DPCI, we went to a place and pointed it out and met with the manager. Then from there, whatever happened from there, it was in the hands of DPCI to continue with it. So it was out of my hands by then.”

The purpose of briefing from a lower-ranked officer to a commander and then to the Section Head of Visible Policing at ORS is to ensure the Port Commander, who is responsible for the port, is informed about operations taking place.

“the purpose, Commissioner, is that the Port Commander who is in charge, he needs to know about operations that are taking place. He is responsible for the port. So whatever information that we want to ... at the hub, it has to go via him. It is a protocol that we follow that it has to go via the Commander”

Briefing ORS at early stages of a container operation includes details of what is going to happen, such as container numbers, suspected smuggling, detention request, and storage reasons.

“it will, you will provide the container number that you have to say this is a container that you have. You suspect it being used in smuggling whatever commodity it is and then your request it to be detained and placed for inspection and ja, you would probably explain the reason why you want to have it stored”

Lieutenant-Colonel Duma provided intelligence to Colonel Jacob and Warrant Officer Mpangase from the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) in Durban about a container suspected of being used to smuggle 27 kilograms of cocaine at the CHC Container Depot in Durban South.

“I provided the intelligence that I had gathered and requested their assistance to conduct an inspection of the commodity on one of the containers that was suspected of being used to smuggle 27 kilograms of Cocaine at CHC Container, Durban”

LT-Colonel Duma chooses which police officers to inform based on the commodity involved and the trust and working relationship with certain individuals rather than distrusting other members of the DPCI.

“It first depends what commodity you are dealing with... Normally, Commissioner, when it comes to that, it depends on the relationship and trust of members... you have to work with people that you trust in order to make sure that your information is safe and secure and is operationalized accordingly.”

LT-Colonel Duma had prior discussions with Colonel Jacob about a possible drug smuggling consignment about a week before 22 June 2026, initially as a warning without specific facts, and requested them to be on standby.

“We had some discussions where I went past their office, if I am not mistaken, and said, I am expecting there could be a consignment coming, but I do not have the facts yet... then on the 22nd, that is when I contacted them, early in the morning to assist.”

On 22 June 2026, LT-Colonel Duma met Colonel Jacob with two members, Warrant Officer Mpangase and Warrant Officer Sibiya, to brief them and provided the container number BEAU5955535 at the Isipingo area and pointed out the CSC container depot location.

“On the same day, it is approximately 9:20, I met Colonel Jacob with two members, Warrant Officer Mpangase and Sibiya... I briefed them and provided them with container number BEAU5955535... I then escorted them to the Isipingo area where I pointed out the CSC container depot.”

During the inspection of the container, DPCI detective members communicated with the depot manager to have the container inspected and noted the bill of lading and documentation indicated animal food as the commodity inside the container.

“Whilst at the depot, the DPCI Detective members communicated with the depot manager to have the container inspected. I noticed that the bill of lading and other documentation pertaining to the said container indicated that it contained animal food.”

Lt-Col Duma informed the authorities about the container number to stop it at the depot but avoided mentioning suspected drugs inside to prevent information leaks.

“I did discuss it with them because to have it stopped at the depot, you have to provide the container number, so I did inform them the container number but I did not mention what we are suspecting inside”

Lt-Col Duma did not interact directly with the ORS or his Commander at the time regarding the container; his interaction was with Ms Pillay and the DPCI.

“No, no . . . Ms Pillay, the logistics, Pillay, all I did was to check where the container was”

Lt-Col Duma and Commissioner Baloyi agreed that the container was still under ORS control as per their SOP, although Lt-Col Duma was not initially aware of this control.

“with Commissioner Baloyi we did come to a conclusion that it was under it was still under ORS control as per their SOP which I was in a position of and I did not know about it”

Lt-Col Duma wrote a report before the bust informing his Commander about the information received concerning the container.

“I did write a report which was submitted and then I went to ... The reports, the reports was written, yes, I think before if I am not mistaken ... The report prior to the bust which reports about the information”

Lt-Col Duma confirmed that the report prior to the bust that he wrote included information passed to the Commander.

“The reports after the bust would be a success but there is a report prior to the bust which reports about the information that has been received that we went to the Commander”

The report prior to the bust provided by Lt-Col Duma is part of a confidential bundle accessible at reference 316, as confirmed by Adv Sikhakhane and Lt-Col Duma.

“No. In fact, it is in your bundle that you shared with me . . . Attached the SOP of ORS, you should go to 316, you will find it there . . . So this is the report that you provided”

Lt-Col Duma did not provide any prior report or inform his Commander before the 21st of June 2026 about the consignment; it was merely communication with the source provider.

“No, there was no request complied. It was just a communication between me and the person providing me with such.”

Lt-Col Duma confirmed he informed his Commander about the consignment just before 21 June 2026, although the actual information was received earlier.

“Yes”

Lt-Col Duma's report to his Commander was diarised in the source file; no separate report except the one dated 21 June 2026 was found.

“I am sure I did diarise it in the source file of the source. I did diarise it, and then where I asked him to say, go and get new information on this, and then report back, but there is no report as such on it, except on the 21st, yes.”

Lt-Col Duma verified the container number by personally checking its existence at the depot and the authorities to ensure the number was correct and the container physically present.

“By ensuring that the container does exist, and it is in the depot ... so to me that is a verification that yes, the container number is correct, and it does exist because sometimes you can get a container number, but when you check with the authorities at the harbour or in the depot, then they do not have the container.”

Lt-Col Duma was working with information about a consignment of 27 kilograms of cocaine but was not able to verify the exact source or quantity.

“The information that you had at the time was that there were 27 kilograms of Cocaine and that is the report ... That is all, yes.”

Lt-Col Duma stated that it is impossible to know the exact contents of a container until it is physically opened.

“You have to verify the container number but to know exactly what is inside it is impossible to know until you open it.”

Lt-Col Duma is not a Counter-Narcotics specialist and was dealing with other threats in the northern region; he handled narcotics information as part of border security duties.

“I am not a Counter-Narcotics specialist. I do not know much about narcotics, drugs and everything but it is just a matter of working on information when you get it and then you work on it because if I may remember, at that time I was dealing with other threat up north but because it is border security you find yourself bringing information that you get, you have to attend to it whether it is airports or land borders or harbours”

Colonel Jacob was on leave when Lt-Col Duma contacted him on 22 June 2026 to report information.

“Colonel Jacob indicated to you that he was on leave when you contacted him on the 22nd of June 2026 . . . It is the 22nd .”

Lieutenant-Colonel Duma confirmed that Colonel Jacobi indicated he was on leave.

“Yes, Commissioner, he did indicate”

Colonel Jacobi indicated that he was on leave during the time of the drug bust.

“did Colonel Jacobi indicate that he was on leave ?”

Lt-Col Duma trusts some officers in his unit to share sensitive information with, and this trust depends on personal integrity.

“I have trusted information with them and expected them to assist me ... it is a common practice ... we share information with people that you have integrity with, that you have trust”

Lt-Col Duma requested Colonel Jacobi to assist on the operation despite Jacobi being on leave, expecting the person in charge to arrange assistance if needed.

“No, no, no, Commissioner. I requested ... if I insist ... someone must have said no, he cannot assist and then I insist”

Lt-Col Duma relayed prior communication with Colonel Jacobi about operational details and booking on duty despite Jacobi being on leave, with permission from the Provincial Commander.

“I told him that I was on leave but I was willing to book on duty if the Provincial Commander gave permission to do so... He said he will brief Nyuswa on the situation and get back to me... he called me and indicated that he had spoken to the Brigadier and that was in order with regard to me booking on duty.”

Lt-Col Duma did not speak to Brigadier Nyuswa directly regarding the operation or booking on duty.

“I did not speak to Brigadier Nyuswa .”

Lt-Col Duma explained the importance of sharing confidential drug-related information only with trusted persons to avoid jeopardizing the operation or the evidence.

“If you just share it anyhow there is a possibility that the whole container will go missing ... you have shared it with so many people ... you have already defeated the object of the operation”

Lt-Col Duma stated there is no hidden agenda in the way trust and information sharing happen in drug operations and that this is a common practice within their unit and with other members from the Crime Intelligence (CI) branch.

“There is no hidden agenda about that which made me request ... It happens with, for example, in most operations that have been conducted and involves drugs ... Detective from DPCI ... worked closely with someone from CI”

Lt-Col Duma informed Colonel Jacobi a few weeks prior about the information on a container at CHC container depot, but without specific details, and was following up.

“I had met them and I even went as far to say ... if I remember very well I had a meeting with them in their offices to say that yes, I am expecting something that might come up ... but I do not have details at the moment because I was still following up...”

Lt-Col Duma reported receiving information about a container at CHC container depot on 2021-06-21.

“your report ... it says that you received information about a container that is at CHC container depot”

Lt-Col Duma confirms that when he received the container it was already at the depot, implying he did not cause its detention or placement there.

“When I received the container, the container was at the depot.”

Lt-Col Duma was not aware that SARS had put a stop on the container until after the operation was conducted on 23rd; this stop was not brought to his attention beforehand.

“At the time I was not aware that SARS had put a stop on the container ... The only time that it came to my notice was on the 23rd when the operation was already conducted and it was not brought, I do not know, maybe DPCI it was brought to their attention that SARS had put in a stop, but to me it was not brought to my attention”

DPCI was not informed about the stop on the container until Lt-Col Duma's involvement caused their involvement, so they were unaware beforehand.

“we know it was not brought to the attention of DPCI, because DPCI becomes involved through you. It is because of your involvement that DPCI is involved.”

Depot Manager did not inform Lt-Col Duma that the container was under detention by SARS, nor was there any indication or obvious sign from customs officials or anyone else that the container was detained.

“The Depot Manager does not tell you that it is in fact under detention by SARS? ... there is no indication whatsoever from anybody, there are no custom officials, Depot Manager, nobody indicates to you and there is no obvious signs that this container is under detention.”

Lt-Col Duma states that he would only know about a SARS detention if he is told, since customs operates independently without informing them.

“people who will have the documentation will be most probably the depot who will know that there is a SARS detention but on my side, unless I am told, I will know that there is a SARS detention because the way customs operate, they do not come to us and tell us we have stopped such a container.”

Lt-Col Duma confirms that he does not have access to SARS profiling systems and would not know about stops on containers unless informed.

“but if we are not told we would not come to know that there is a SARS stop on it because we do not have access to their systems of profiling. We do not have access to profiling of containers.”

Lt-Col Duma was not familiar with the document from S&N Logistics containing special instructions about the container, issued on 19-06.

“No, I am not familiar with this document, Commissioner.”

When the seal of the container was broken during the operation, there were no customs or SARS personnel present, only SAPS, DPCI, and the Depot Manager.

“In the opening of this when, in this, now we are back in this operation, when the seal is broken there was no customs or veterinarian together with your police people. They were not there. You had only your SAPS, DPCI, the Depot Manager I think you say and, ja, pretty much. There was no SARS people there or customs people.”

Lt-Col Duma states he was not informed about the stop from customs before the operation and only learned of the stop after the fact via email, on the 3rd (month not specified).

“On my side it was not brought to my attention that there was a stop from customs. It only came to me after the fact. So if there was a stop I would have expected that I will be told that there is a stop and then would then, I am sure DPCI would have waited for other counterparts to be present if there is a stop, but in this case I do not know if they were informed. On my side I was not informed of SARS detention. The email only came on the 3rd.”

A container subject to diversion had the same seal number as the one Lt-Col Duma had an interest in, and this is documented in the statement paragraph 17.

“this is the container that was subject to this diversion was the same container which you had an interest on and you would also see that if I look at your statement, but we will go to this paragraph 17 of the statement”

Lt-Col Duma testified that without the container number, no action like detention by ORS could be taken to stop the container while at sea; the container in question was only identified on the 21st, and by then it had already been moved to the depot on the 9th, so no timely detention by ORS was possible.

“if you do not have a container number there is nothing you can do ... in this case I am only getting the container number on the 21st and by the look of things with this document it shows that this container was moved on the 9th so when I received the information the container was already at the depot”

Lt-Col Duma claimed no detention notice by ORS was known, only customs detention which was not brought to their attention.

“there was no detention by ORS that I know of, so the only detention that it had was customs which was not brought to our attention”

Lt-Col Duma contacted the profiling office to find who transported the container and was able to get details of a person to speak to, but this contact was a long time ago, around 2021.

“I did contact the profiling office... it has been a long time, 2021, but I did contact to find out because that is where I managed to get the transporter as to who was the transporter of the container”

The breaking of seal number H1905754 occurred in the presence of Lt-Col Duma, the Warehouse Manager, DPCI, and a worker with bolt cutters, with a photo taken before the seal was broken.

“the seal number H1905754 was broken in my presence as well as of the Warehouse Manager, DPCI, one of the workers working at the depot with the bolt cutter. Prior to the seal being broken a photo of the seal was taken and it was intact”

Numerous black canvas bags containing seven bricks of suspected cocaine were found at the container entrance, inspected by DPCI in Lt-Col Duma's presence, and the exhibits were conveyed to Isipingo SAPS by ORS.

“numerous black canvas bags were noticed at the entrance of the container. These bags were inspected by DPCI in my presence and found to contain bricks of suspected Cocaine. 7 bags were discovered ... exhibits were conveyed to Isipingo SAPS by ORS”

Paragraph 19 reports 26 canvas bags seized by DPCI members contained 20 1kg bricks of cocaine, plus one canvas bag containing 21 bricks, totaling 541 kilograms of cocaine with an estimated street value of about R243 450 million.

“The following exhibits that were seized by DPCI members were 26 canvas bags which contained 20 x 1kg bricks of Cocaine and 1 canvas bag contained 21 x 1kg of bricks Cocaine. In total, 541 kilograms of Cocaine were seized The estimated street value of the exhibits were about R243450 million”

26 canvas bags containing 20 1kg bricks each and one bag containing 21 bricks of cocaine were seized by DPCI members.

“The following exhibits that were seized by the DPCI members were 26 canvas bags ...”

The packaging in 26 bags had 20 bricks each and one bag had 21 bricks of cocaine, making the total number of bags 27.

“... 26 containing 20 times 1 kg bricks and the other bag which is a 27 one now, it is containing 21 bricks of Cocaine.”

LT-Colduma's role at the scene was to show the members where the scene was and observe to ensure the operation took place successfully and exhibits were recovered.

“My role at the scene was to show the members at the scene where the scene is, and then when I get there, was to observe for my own records to ensure that this operation takes place successfully and the exhibits are recovered.”

LT-Colduma left the scene with all DPCI members except one member, Colonel Jacob, whom he gave a lift home.

“I left the DPCI members, except one member that I, Colonel Jacob, that I gave him a lift home.”

LT-Colduma and others only found out the exact number of bricks at Isipingo Police Station during counting, not at the scene.

“And you found, you, and I am asking you, you in particular, you only found out when you got to Isipingo Police Station that …”

Not all bags were opened at the container; only one or two bags were opened, which revealed that the contents were drugs.

“From what I observed, they did not open all the bags. I think they opened maybe one or two bags, and they realize, no, this is drugs and after that bags were, not all the bags were open at the time.”

No further search of the container was done that day besides viewing the bags at the entrance.

“No. Not on that day. Maybe some other day, but not on that day. There was no further search done.”

The container was not sealed on the day of operation by the DPCI; however, it was resealed after removal of bags, possibly with an ORS seal.

“No, from what I observed, Commissioners, after the bags had been removed and placed in the police car, the container was sealed with another seal. If I am not mistaken, it could be a seal from ORS, if not the depot, but it was re-sealed.”

The bags were loaded in an ORS vehicle and transported to the station where counting was conducted.

“I mean, the bags were loaded in the ORS vehicle and transported to the station where the counting was conducted.”

DPCI was in charge of everything at the scene and the operation and handled the crime scene management and exhibits; LT-Colduma only stood back to observe as a Crime Intelligence member and prepared reports for the Crime Intelligence office.

“No, I did not have that because at that stage, DPCI was in charge of everything, so I just stood back and you know, observed.”

Crime Intelligence officers do not interfere in cordoning off the crime scene, calling Local Criminal Record Centre or Forensics, conducting searches or making arrests; these are duties of Detectives, here specifically DPCI members.

“Crime Intelligence officers do not get involved in cordoning off the crime scene, calling of Local Criminal Record Centre or Forensics, conducting searches and making arrests, as this is the duties of the Detectives, which in this instance was the members of DPCI.”

DPCI members at the scene took charge of the crime scene and made decisions regarding it, having experience and expertise in handling crime scenes.

“In this matter, DPCI members who were in the scene took charge of the crime scene and made decisions. DPCI have experience and are experts in handling crime scenes, and it is their mandate to handle the crime scene and exhibits.”

Lt-Col Duma disputes all allegations made by General Flynn that implicate him but confirms he was present at the scene throughout and called DPCI and SAPS people to the scene.

“you dispute allegations made by General Flynn to the extent that they implicate you ... you confirm your presence at the scene, and the DPCI and SAPS people who were there were called by you”