Referred to as: Captain Duma · CI operative · Duma · Colonel Duma · Lt-Col Duma · Lieutenant-Colonel Duma · LT-COL DUMA · L T - C O L D U M A · LT-Col Duma · Lieutenant Colonel Duma
Captain Duma, the CI operative, testified he had discussed information about the suspected drugs with Warrant Officer Mpangase and Colonel Jacob prior to 22 June 2022, but Warrant Officer Mpangase denies he had such discussions with Captain Duma before 22 June 2022.
“Captain Duma who is that CI operative , testified and in his statement said he had discussed this information with you and Jacob prior to this date . No t with me , maybe with Jacob , because the first time I got to know about this was on the 22nd .”
Captain Duma contacted Colonel Jacob and Warrant Officer Mpangase from DPC I Durban to request their assistance with an inspection of a container suspected of smuggling 27 kilograms of cocaine at CHC Container Depot.
“I contacted Colonel Jacob , who was the unit commander ... and Warrant Officer Mpangase from D P C I , Durban . I provided the intelligence that I had gathered and requested their assistance to conduct an inspection of the commodity on one of the containers that were suspected of being used to smuggle 27 kilograms of Cocaine at CHC Container Depot .”
Colonel Jacob confirmed asking Warrant Officer Mpangase to find out the availability of a certain person (implied Duma), noting that Mpangase was aware of Captain Duma's reservations about utilising others in the unit.
“I told him I will get back to him, that is Duma, and called Warrant Officer Mpangase to find out this availability. He indicated that he was aware of the situation by Captain Duma and he was sensitised about Captain Duma's reservations about utilising other members of the unit.”
On 22 June 2021, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob, Warrant Officer Mpangase, Captain Duma and Lieutenant-Colonel Sibiya met an African male introduced by Captain Duma from Crime Intelligence Unit, who provided information about 27 bricks of pure cocaine stored inside a container at CHC Depot 14th Avenue East in Prospecton.
“We met an African male who was introduced by Lieutenant Colonel Jacoba as Captain Duma from Crime Intelligence Unit. Captain Duma addressed us. Lieutenant Colonel Jacoba and Warrant Officer Mpangase and indicated that he has information from an informer about 27 bricks of pure Cocaines stored inside the container at CHC Depot at 14th Avenue East in Prospecton.”
The container with serial number BEAU5955535 was inspected by Lieutenant-Colonel Jacobs and others; the seal was intact but broken by an employee of the depot in the presence of management, DPCI members, Captain Duma of CIORS, and depot security members.
“The container with serial number BEAU5955535 was placed down for inspection and the shipping document were handed over to Lieutenant Colonel Jacobs. The doors of the container were inspected by Lieutenant Colonel Jacobs. The seal was intact with seal number, that. The seal was broken by an employee of the depot in the presence of the management of the depot, DPCI members, Captain Duma of CIORS members and depot security members.”
Lieutenant Colonel Sibiya accepts he was third in line of involvement after Captain Duma and Colonel Jacob, and below Warrant Officer Mpangase in the investigation tasks before 1st July.
“Of all the individuals that were involved in the scene and subsequently up to the 1st of July, in terms of the tasks, you were the third in line... Captain Duma... Jacob who was in charge... Warrant Officer Mpangase... and then yourself... Yes, you can say I was the third one...”
Lieutenant Colonel Sibiya explains that Colonel Jacob jumped out of the car before he parked and then called him to come and meet Captain Duma, who started briefing them.
“Then after parking and then Colonel Jacob called me. Then I went to them. Then he introduced me to Duma. He said this is Captain Duma from Crime Intelligence, he is the one with information. Then Captain Duma started briefing us.”
Lieutenant Colonel Sibiya clarifies that he was driving when Colonel Jacob exited the car and that the Colonel went towards Captain Duma's car for the briefing.
“We came around the parking, I stopped, he said stop, he jumped out of the car, I came in the other side of the parking, I parked, then he called me.”
Lieutenant Colonel Sibiya says it was the first time he had been to the CHC depot and they followed Captain Duma who said he had been to the depot for inspection of the container.
“Yes, it was the first time being there. Captain Duma just told us that he has been to the depot, so we will follow him to the depot for inspection of the container.”
Lieutenant Colonel Sibiya says that when they arrived at the CHC depot, Colonel Jacob jumped out of the car with Captain Duma and went to the offices of the depot managers, leaving others behind at the cars.
“There was some area where we parked. Then Colonel Jacob jumped out of the car with Captain Duma. When the vehicles were parked, Captain Duma and Colonel Jacob went to the offices of the depot managers. We remained next to the cars there.”
Lieutenant Colonel Sibiya states that after the meeting with the depot managers, they were accompanied by a lady who introduced herself as Mrs Pillay and showed them the container which was stacked with other containers on top and had container numbers to distinguish it.
“They came back with a lady, I think. She introduced herself as Mrs Pillay and other people that were accompanying them. And then she pointed at the container that we were interested in, but the container was stacked with other containers on top. They have got the container numbers, so that they used to distinguish which container is this.”
Lt-Col Sibiya observed that there were a lot of people at the depot during the processing of the crime scene, including members from management, DPCI, Captain Duma, and O.R.S members.
“I saw O R S members. I also saw people wearing reflectors from customs ... there were a lot of people ... management of the depot ... three of us from D P C I ... Captain Duma ... O R S members”
Colonel Sibiya denies that he, Colonel Jacob, Duma, and Mpangase together approached the depot manager; he states only Colonel Jacob and Duma went to the office while he stood in the parking area.
“No, that is incorrect. It is incorrect. I never went to the office. We were standing in the parking. It is only the two that went to the office.”
Lt-Col Sibiya and the team took protective measures, were armed when conducting the drug bust, and took safety as a priority due to uncertainty about who else was collecting the drugs.
“We fetched the drugs ... We were armed ... your first priority is safety ... you would take protective measures just in case you are ambushed”
Three vehicles were used to travel to Isipingo carrying exhibit bags and personnel from ORS and other officers including Colonel Jacob, Warrant Officer Mpangase, and Captain Duma.
“it was three vehicles. It was the Hyundai H1 that was carrying all the exhibit with the members from ORS. And the Golf that I was driving with myself, Colonel Jacob and Warrant Officer Mpangase and Captain Duma's Corolla behind us”
There is disagreement between Lt-Col Sibiya and others (including Mpangase and Colonel Jacob) about the role and participation of ORS in the counting operation, specifically whether ORS were part of the operation or merely providing transport.
“Mpangase does not mention them as part of his operation. He mentions you and Jacob and Duma, and Jacob, rather, and Duma. He does not mention them as part of an operation, including in the counting. You are the only one that is mentioning them as part of the operation to the point where you say they waited for the SAP 13. They were called for that. That is what they say in their statements. They helped transport this consignment to Isipingo. Maybe let me remove the words say part of the operation, but they participated in the operation by conveying the drugs from the depot to the police station.”
Colonel Jacob confirmed that he learned details about a 27 kg cocaine container not directly at the CHC depot but during a briefing meeting near the depot with Captain Duma before proceeding to look for the container.
“The 7 kilograms, the number was relayed to us at a briefing spot where we met Captain Duma, which was close by to the depot.”
Captain Duma warned or informed Colonel Jacob by 22 June 2021 intelligence of a possible shipment requiring investigation of a container.
“Much as you had received a call from Captain Duma on the 22nd of June 2021, you actually had had a conversation prior thereto... he had warned you... intelligence that there may be a shipment coming with this kind of cargo.”
The drug container was profiled based on intelligence from Captain Duma and was one of 10 containers brought on the vessel Ludo.
“this particular container, through the intelligence of Captain Duma, was quote-unquote profiled. It was one of 10 containers being brought on that vessel, the Ludo.”
On 22 June 2021, Colonel Jacob received information about cocaine in a container from Captain Duma of Crime Intelligence and coordinated the operation despite being on vacation leave.
“On 22 June 2021 , I received information from Captain Duma of Crime Intelligence regarding Cocaine in a certain container . He called me just after 7 a.m. on the said morning regarding the information . Captain Duma also called Warrant Officer Mpangase regarding the same information . I called Mpangase after the call from Captain Duma . He indicated that he would brief the Brigadier accordingly . ... I informed Warrant Officer Mpangase that although I was on vacation leave , I was going to book on duty to conduct this operation or attend to this information .”
Harbour areas including licenced depots have controlled access with boom gates manned by security guards; Colonel Jacob describes this as a controlled but not highly secure environment.
“When you enter the harbour , are these areas not behind some level of security so that I cannot just wander in ? ... There is a boom gate manned by a security guard , Commissioner . ... It is not the most highly secure , yes , but it is controlled .”
Colonel Jacob was officially on leave from 10 to 30 June 2021 but was called to attend the operation on 22 June 2021 after receiving information from Captain Duma and informing Mpangase, who was to brief Brigadier Nyuswa.
“I called Mpangase after the call from Captain Duma... He indicated that he would brief Brigadier, now you have clarified Nyuswa, accordingly. I asked him to inform the Brigadier that I was booking on duty to attend to the same...”
Captain Duma initially informed them at Isipingo that there were alleged to be 27 pieces of cocaine in a container, and information from CI indicated a container containing approximately 7 kilos of cocaine was kept there.
“We met with Captain Duma in the Isipingo area. He informed us that there were alleged to be 27 pieces of Cocaine in a container number ... ... entry is made by Warrant Officer Mpangase, he lists information received from CI was that a container containing plus minus 7 kilos of the drug Cocaine was kept at Isipingo ...”
Colonel Jacob had no idea of the quantity of drugs involved when he decided to book himself on duty for a potential drug bust at the Isipingo Prospecton warehouse while on vacation leave.
“at that stage when Captain Duma had called, he reminded me that, your member I told you there is something coming on a container? It is at Isipingo, I think he did tell me. But he did not give me quantity. And I told him I am on vacation leave. He did not have to insist that much. I was wanting to go, honestly.”
Colonel Jacob explained that Colonel Duma was no longer in an operational role but acting as Unit Commander in contract, and therefore operational matters were handled by the Brigadier instead.
“Colonel Duma had come back on a contract to work within the SAPS. It is those members that went off at 60 and there was an opportunity to come back on a contract. And the Colonel was not very much au fait with operational matters or anything of that nature. It is by virtue of her rank and seniority that she was Acting Unit Commander. And at that stage, they were rotating maybe on a two-week basis, I cannot recall. But there was not somebody placed there permanently or for a longer duration that now you could engage with and keep them posted on your developments.”
Sergeant Govender and Sergeant Mkhize were approached by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob and Captain Duma during container inspections when black canvas bags containing alleged cocaine were identified and loaded for transport to Isipingo SAP.
“Sergeant Govender... was approached by two other police officials dressed in civilian attire. They identified themselves as Lieutenant Colonel Jacob from DPCI and another Captain Duma from Crime Intelligence... identified some black canvas bags that allegedly had cocaine in them... transferred these black bags from the container into the H1 marked state vehicle... escorted by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob and his team to Isipingo SAP, where we assisted in offloading the black bags.”
Warehouse manager Ms Pillay and other warehouse staff were present during the operation that included DPCI members and Captain Duma from Crime Intelligence.
“at the end, where we land is the only people who were present in this operation were the DPC members, led by yourself, and Captain Duma from Crime Intelligence. And warehouse staff. Not only Ms Pillay, some other warehouse staff as well. But the manager was Ms Pillay.”
The search of the container was a consensual or voluntary search agreed upon with the clearing agent who was custodian of the container and the warehouse manager who was familiar with what was expected.
“in my mind, Commissioners, it was a consensual or voluntary search that was agreed upon. A t that point in time, the clearing agent was the custodian of that said container. And I took Captain Duma's word that, yes, he had phoned the relevant parties, and now he had spoken to the warehouse manager. And when we did arrive there, she was familiar with what, you know, we expected of her.”
Colonel Jacob took full responsibility for the container and did not make further inquiries to verify Captain Duma's version of events.
“So you take full responsibility for that container? - Yes, I did not go to any further or make further enquiries to ensure that this version of events was correct. I did not.”
Lt-Col Duma was not informed of any detention on the container except for an email after the fact on 23 June 2021 showing SARS detention.
“No , not that I know of , except that I believe there is an email that came after , on the 23rd , it was after the fact , and it showed that it had SARS detention .”
Lt-Col Duma acknowledges he did not interact with the person responsible for the drug seizure inspection on 22 June 2021 and is unclear of the procedure followed by the depot.
“No , no , I do not even know who he is , but I believe if I had interacted with the depot on the 21st , I am sure they would have interacted with him to say the police would be coming on the 22nd to do inspection . So maybe it would be a fault from the depot or the people I spoke to . Yes , but I do not know , his processes that must be followed , I do not know them .”
Lt-Col Duma states the standard operating procedure when a container is stopped at Durban Harbour involves a briefing chain from Crime Intelligence to the commander of border security to section heads of visible policing and operations.
“The first thing is Crime Intelligence procedures . ... The operative will report to his commander , must brief the commander . ... And then the commander will brief the section head of visible policing and operations , right ? ... Operational responsibilities in border police ...”
Lt-Col Duma clarifies the procedure applies only to cargo detained by ORS at the harbour and moved to container, and not to cargo that has moved to depot outside the harbour such as Cato Ridge.
“This procedure ... deals with the cargo that is detained by ORS , which is in the harbour , and which get moved to container . ... But those processes are specifically for Durban Harbour , containers that are coming through the harbour . ... Sometimes you will find that the container has moved from Durban Harbour , for example , to Cato Ridge . ... So , you cannot follow the same process ... because it is not under their jurisdiction ... It is outside the harbour . You now , as a member , have to liaise with the depot ...”
Lt-Col Duma describes the procedure when seal of container is broken at depot: representatives of the commodity and managers of depot should be present along with the police (ORS).
“In some instances , you will find that some representatives of that commodity will be there . ... All the managers of the depot will be there . Then the police will be there , which is the ORS will be there .”
Lieutenant-Colonel Duma provided intelligence to Colonel Jacob and Warrant Officer Mpangase from the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) in Durban about a container suspected of being used to smuggle 27 kilograms of cocaine at the CHC Container Depot in Durban South.
“I provided the intelligence that I had gathered and requested their assistance to conduct an inspection of the commodity on one of the containers that was suspected of being used to smuggle 27 kilograms of Cocaine at CHC Container, Durban”
LT-Colonel Duma chooses which police officers to inform based on the commodity involved and the trust and working relationship with certain individuals rather than distrusting other members of the DPCI.
“It first depends what commodity you are dealing with... Normally, Commissioner, when it comes to that, it depends on the relationship and trust of members... you have to work with people that you trust in order to make sure that your information is safe and secure and is operationalized accordingly.”
LT-Colonel Duma had prior discussions with Colonel Jacob about a possible drug smuggling consignment about a week before 22 June 2026, initially as a warning without specific facts, and requested them to be on standby.
“We had some discussions where I went past their office, if I am not mistaken, and said, I am expecting there could be a consignment coming, but I do not have the facts yet... then on the 22nd, that is when I contacted them, early in the morning to assist.”
On 22 June 2026, LT-Colonel Duma met Colonel Jacob with two members, Warrant Officer Mpangase and Warrant Officer Sibiya, to brief them and provided the container number BEAU5955535 at the Isipingo area and pointed out the CSC container depot location.
“On the same day, it is approximately 9:20, I met Colonel Jacob with two members, Warrant Officer Mpangase and Sibiya... I briefed them and provided them with container number BEAU5955535... I then escorted them to the Isipingo area where I pointed out the CSC container depot.”
Lt-Col Duma informed the authorities about the container number to stop it at the depot but avoided mentioning suspected drugs inside to prevent information leaks.
“I did discuss it with them because to have it stopped at the depot, you have to provide the container number, so I did inform them the container number but I did not mention what we are suspecting inside”
Lt-Col Duma did not interact directly with the ORS or his Commander at the time regarding the container; his interaction was with Ms Pillay and the DPCI.
“No, no . . . Ms Pillay, the logistics, Pillay, all I did was to check where the container was”
Lt-Col Duma and Commissioner Baloyi agreed that the container was still under ORS control as per their SOP, although Lt-Col Duma was not initially aware of this control.
“with Commissioner Baloyi we did come to a conclusion that it was under it was still under ORS control as per their SOP which I was in a position of and I did not know about it”
Lt-Col Duma wrote a report before the bust informing his Commander about the information received concerning the container.
“I did write a report which was submitted and then I went to ... The reports, the reports was written, yes, I think before if I am not mistaken ... The report prior to the bust which reports about the information”
Lt-Col Duma confirmed that the report prior to the bust that he wrote included information passed to the Commander.
“The reports after the bust would be a success but there is a report prior to the bust which reports about the information that has been received that we went to the Commander”
The report prior to the bust provided by Lt-Col Duma is part of a confidential bundle accessible at reference 316, as confirmed by Adv Sikhakhane and Lt-Col Duma.
“No. In fact, it is in your bundle that you shared with me . . . Attached the SOP of ORS, you should go to 316, you will find it there . . . So this is the report that you provided”
Lt-Col Duma did not provide any prior report or inform his Commander before the 21st of June 2026 about the consignment; it was merely communication with the source provider.
“No, there was no request complied. It was just a communication between me and the person providing me with such.”
Lt-Col Duma verified the container number by personally checking its existence at the depot and the authorities to ensure the number was correct and the container physically present.
“By ensuring that the container does exist, and it is in the depot ... so to me that is a verification that yes, the container number is correct, and it does exist because sometimes you can get a container number, but when you check with the authorities at the harbour or in the depot, then they do not have the container.”
Lt-Col Duma is not a Counter-Narcotics specialist and was dealing with other threats in the northern region; he handled narcotics information as part of border security duties.
“I am not a Counter-Narcotics specialist. I do not know much about narcotics, drugs and everything but it is just a matter of working on information when you get it and then you work on it because if I may remember, at that time I was dealing with other threat up north but because it is border security you find yourself bringing information that you get, you have to attend to it whether it is airports or land borders or harbours”
Lt-Col Duma's report to his Commander was diarised in the source file; no separate report except the one dated 21 June 2026 was found.
“I am sure I did diarise it in the source file of the source. I did diarise it, and then where I asked him to say, go and get new information on this, and then report back, but there is no report as such on it, except on the 21st, yes.”
Lt-Col Duma trusts some officers in his unit to share sensitive information with, and this trust depends on personal integrity.
“I have trusted information with them and expected them to assist me ... it is a common practice ... we share information with people that you have integrity with, that you have trust”
Lt-Col Duma requested Colonel Jacobi to assist on the operation despite Jacobi being on leave, expecting the person in charge to arrange assistance if needed.
“No, no, no, Commissioner. I requested ... if I insist ... someone must have said no, he cannot assist and then I insist”
Lt-Col Duma relayed prior communication with Colonel Jacobi about operational details and booking on duty despite Jacobi being on leave, with permission from the Provincial Commander.
“I told him that I was on leave but I was willing to book on duty if the Provincial Commander gave permission to do so... He said he will brief Nyuswa on the situation and get back to me... he called me and indicated that he had spoken to the Brigadier and that was in order with regard to me booking on duty.”
Lt-Col Duma explained the importance of sharing confidential drug-related information only with trusted persons to avoid jeopardizing the operation or the evidence.
“If you just share it anyhow there is a possibility that the whole container will go missing ... you have shared it with so many people ... you have already defeated the object of the operation”
Lt-Col Duma stated there is no hidden agenda in the way trust and information sharing happen in drug operations and that this is a common practice within their unit and with other members from the Crime Intelligence (CI) branch.
“There is no hidden agenda about that which made me request ... It happens with, for example, in most operations that have been conducted and involves drugs ... Detective from DPCI ... worked closely with someone from CI”
Lt-Col Duma informed Colonel Jacobi a few weeks prior about the information on a container at CHC container depot, but without specific details, and was following up.
“I had met them and I even went as far to say ... if I remember very well I had a meeting with them in their offices to say that yes, I am expecting something that might come up ... but I do not have details at the moment because I was still following up...”
Lt-Col Duma was not aware that SARS had put a stop on the container until after the operation was conducted on 23rd; this stop was not brought to his attention beforehand.
“At the time I was not aware that SARS had put a stop on the container ... The only time that it came to my notice was on the 23rd when the operation was already conducted and it was not brought, I do not know, maybe DPCI it was brought to their attention that SARS had put in a stop, but to me it was not brought to my attention”
DPCI was not informed about the stop on the container until Lt-Col Duma's involvement caused their involvement, so they were unaware beforehand.
“we know it was not brought to the attention of DPCI, because DPCI becomes involved through you. It is because of your involvement that DPCI is involved.”
Depot Manager did not inform Lt-Col Duma that the container was under detention by SARS, nor was there any indication or obvious sign from customs officials or anyone else that the container was detained.
“The Depot Manager does not tell you that it is in fact under detention by SARS? ... there is no indication whatsoever from anybody, there are no custom officials, Depot Manager, nobody indicates to you and there is no obvious signs that this container is under detention.”
Lt-Col Duma states that he would only know about a SARS detention if he is told, since customs operates independently without informing them.
“people who will have the documentation will be most probably the depot who will know that there is a SARS detention but on my side, unless I am told, I will know that there is a SARS detention because the way customs operate, they do not come to us and tell us we have stopped such a container.”
Lt-Col Duma confirms that he does not have access to SARS profiling systems and would not know about stops on containers unless informed.
“but if we are not told we would not come to know that there is a SARS stop on it because we do not have access to their systems of profiling. We do not have access to profiling of containers.”
Lt-Col Duma states he was not informed about the stop from customs before the operation and only learned of the stop after the fact via email, on the 3rd (month not specified).
“On my side it was not brought to my attention that there was a stop from customs. It only came to me after the fact. So if there was a stop I would have expected that I will be told that there is a stop and then would then, I am sure DPCI would have waited for other counterparts to be present if there is a stop, but in this case I do not know if they were informed. On my side I was not informed of SARS detention. The email only came on the 3rd.”
A container subject to diversion had the same seal number as the one Lt-Col Duma had an interest in, and this is documented in the statement paragraph 17.
“this is the container that was subject to this diversion was the same container which you had an interest on and you would also see that if I look at your statement, but we will go to this paragraph 17 of the statement”
Lt-Col Duma testified that without the container number, no action like detention by ORS could be taken to stop the container while at sea; the container in question was only identified on the 21st, and by then it had already been moved to the depot on the 9th, so no timely detention by ORS was possible.
“if you do not have a container number there is nothing you can do ... in this case I am only getting the container number on the 21st and by the look of things with this document it shows that this container was moved on the 9th so when I received the information the container was already at the depot”
Lt-Col Duma contacted the profiling office to find who transported the container and was able to get details of a person to speak to, but this contact was a long time ago, around 2021.
“I did contact the profiling office... it has been a long time, 2021, but I did contact to find out because that is where I managed to get the transporter as to who was the transporter of the container”
The breaking of seal number H1905754 occurred in the presence of Lt-Col Duma, the Warehouse Manager, DPCI, and a worker with bolt cutters, with a photo taken before the seal was broken.
“the seal number H1905754 was broken in my presence as well as of the Warehouse Manager, DPCI, one of the workers working at the depot with the bolt cutter. Prior to the seal being broken a photo of the seal was taken and it was intact”
Numerous black canvas bags containing seven bricks of suspected cocaine were found at the container entrance, inspected by DPCI in Lt-Col Duma's presence, and the exhibits were conveyed to Isipingo SAPS by ORS.
“numerous black canvas bags were noticed at the entrance of the container. These bags were inspected by DPCI in my presence and found to contain bricks of suspected Cocaine. 7 bags were discovered ... exhibits were conveyed to Isipingo SAPS by ORS”
Paragraph 19 reports 26 canvas bags seized by DPCI members contained 20 1kg bricks of cocaine, plus one canvas bag containing 21 bricks, totaling 541 kilograms of cocaine with an estimated street value of about R243 450 million.
“The following exhibits that were seized by DPCI members were 26 canvas bags which contained 20 x 1kg bricks of Cocaine and 1 canvas bag contained 21 x 1kg of bricks Cocaine. In total, 541 kilograms of Cocaine were seized The estimated street value of the exhibits were about R243450 million”
Lt-Col Duma disputes all allegations made by General Flynn that implicate him but confirms he was present at the scene throughout and called DPCI and SAPS people to the scene.
“you dispute allegations made by General Flynn to the extent that they implicate you ... you confirm your presence at the scene, and the DPCI and SAPS people who were there were called by you”
Lt-Col Duma confirms that the National Instruction 8/2017 was not followed to the letter at the scene, including that the LCRC was not called and the container was opened without proper sealing.
“while you were present at the scene, and the container was opened ... the prescripts of National Instruction 8/2017 were not observed, whether it was by you or the people you called”
Lt-Col Duma accepts that those who handled the scene, including himself or those he called, did not comply with the National Instruction to the letter.
“the simple point is that those who handled the scene did not comply with those prescripts ... the National Instruction was not followed to the letter”
Lt-Col Duma observed that the container was placed at the depot where space was insufficient for processing the exhibits, necessitating sealing and moving the container elsewhere.
“the container had already been offloaded, unpacked, and the commodity was placed around the depot ... for the number of bags that were there, definitely you needed a bigger space ... you need to seal the container, uplift it ... move the crime scene somewhere else”
Lt-Col Duma confirms there was no way to work at the scene as the space was inadequate and the container had to be moved or exhibits taken out.
“there is no way you could have worked there ... you could have done is to move the container completely somewhere else or alternatively take the exhibit out”
Lt-Col Duma explains that at the Isipingo SAPS station, the container took a lot of space in the parking lot, which was not conducive for processing exhibits.
“even when you were there at the station, they took a whole lot of space in the parking lot ... it was not conducive to process exhibits”
Colonel Jacob informed Lt-Col Duma that the container was moved to the station because there was no space at the depot, but Duma's observation is that a crime scene cannot be moved and there are only two choices: move container or take exhibits out.
“he did inform me... he moved them to the station because there is no space ... the crime scene is a crime scene, it cannot be moved ... there is two choices”
Lt-Col Duma states that someone had to make a decision whether to reseal the container and process elsewhere, or to move the exhibit out, and that in this instance the exhibit was removed.
“someone would have come up with a different idea... let us reseal this container and do it the other way ... or someone would make decisions and move the exhibit ... of which this is what happened”
Lt-Col Duma claims he provided accurate and strategic intelligence to DPCI which led to the successful operation and recovery of exhibits under his mandate, and that his actions were not part of any scheme to store exhibits unsafely.
“I provided accurate and strategic intelligence to DPCI, which led to the successful operation and recovery of exhibits as part of my mandate. My actions were not part of the scheme or design to store them in unsafe storage to make them vulnerable to theft.”
Lt-Col Duma states he did not know where the exhibits were stored after recovery, only that they were at Isipingo SAPS until he read about the theft in the news.
“I did not know where the exhibits were stored after the recovery. All I knew was that they were at Isipingo SAPS until I read about the theft in the news article.”
Lt-Col Duma states the malicious manner in which his name has been mentioned in the Commission has put his life and safety at high risk due to the drug cartels operating in Durban Harbour.
“The malicious manner in which my name has been mentioned in the Commission has put my life in danger and at high risk ... I request the Commission to assist me by testifying behind camera to protect my identity, safety and family.”
ADV Khumalo SC challenges Lt-Col Duma's claim of malicious intent in mentioning his name, stating that Duma was the person at the scene and present when exhibits were counted and booked.
“It seems to me that all that has happened is that you were the person who was placed at the scene and present at Isipingo when the exhibits were counted and they were booked there. So I am not sure what you regard as malicious.”
Lt-Col Duma explains his concern relates to protecting intelligence sources, citing the Warrant Officer testimony as an example of non-disclosure of information source.
“The Warrant Officer did not divulge the source of information to protect a CI member's identity ... I was expecting the same. It's not that I was not going to testify ... but considering how drug cartels operate, there have already been killings”
Lt-Col Duma wished his name was concealed in the Commission for safety reasons but is willing to testify if it is not.
“I expect that my name should have been dealt with in a more way where it is concealed , not because I do not want to come to the Commission , but to think of my safety as well . You know , at the end of the day , my safety is important .”
Lt-Col Duma stated he tried to do his work to the best of his ability on the day of the operation, which was conducted successfully with the drugs booked in SAP 13 as intended.
“on my side , I tried to do my work , which I did it to the best of my ability on the day and the information provided was positive . The operation was conducted successfully . The drugs were … in the SAP 13 , where I wanted them to be and I was happy on that day .”
Lt-Col Duma lost trust in the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) after drugs he recovered disappeared from the DPCI custody, describing it as disgraceful to SAPS.
“I lost the trust to the DPCI as a component ... I thought those drugs were lying in the forensic . So to gets stolen like that , ... It bring us back to square one , where we are trying to remove these drugs off the street and they are going back under the police watch . So it was a sore matter which is a bit disgraceful to the SAPS .”
Colonel Duma was involved as the supervisor of Warrant Officer Mabuza from the very first meeting with Mr Mogotsi's co-handler.
“Colonel Duma was involved as the supervisor of your handler, Warrant Officer Mabuza, right from your first alleged meeting with the man you describe as your co-handler.”
Mr Mogotsi says his co-handler, Brigadier Duma, was aware of his investigation into Mr Matlala and the related document sharing, contrary to claims that the co-handler was unaware.
“Brigadier Duma, who was senior to this co-handler, is the one who knew what I was doing. Even the notice for investigation went to Duma”
Mr Mogotsi admits that he never met Brigadier Duma in a way to provide extrinsic evidence and that people do not take pictures when they meet under these secretive conditions.
“I do not know what kind of evidence you want . . . you cannot say hey I was with this man then you take pictures”