Hearing day 86

There was a lot of communication via WhatsApp messages about internal matters between Sergeant Nkosian, CFO Mnisi, and Deputy Commissioner Umashi Dhlamini, with Sgt Nkosian interfering in a land invasion tender.

“between Sergeant Nkosian and Mnisi, the CFO, your CFO, and the point, I think we agree that there was a lot of communication about internal matters in relation to them ... you have got Sergeant Nkosian interfering”

Sergeant Nkosian sent WhatsApp messages directing to find vehicles for land to be given to Mfowethu related to the land invasion tender.

“there is an exchange of WhatsApp’s ... sent by Nkosi, and he says: "Captain, find below our vehicles for land to be given to Mfowethu."”

There is an established relationship between Sergeant Nkosian and figures like Matlala.

“what we have established within the evidence of this Commission is the relationship at the very least between Nkosian and figures like Matlala.”

Sergeant Nkosian was interfering in the current land invasion tender where service level agreements have been signed.

“now you are dealing with this current tender where there are service level agreements that have been signed, and that you have got Sergeant Nkosi interfering”

There is a list of what is missing in the Ngaphesheya bid and it seems to be interfered with.

“chat number 4 as well, which seems to be a list of what is missing in the Ngaphesheya bid, it would seem, and it would also seem that it is being interfered with.”

Commissioner Faro was identified as the person to sign the service level agreement representing the City.

“you are identified as the person to sign the agreement or representing the City.”

A service level agreement was concluded between the City and Elshadai Security Services in relation to the land invasion tender.

“at 499 is a service level agreement that was concluded between the City and Elshadai Security Services ... that was in relation to this land invasion tender that was pursuant to that .”

Commissioner Faro did not sign or see the service level agreements before going on leave and was not presented with draft agreements before signing.

“No, I was not presented with this agreements ... No draft was sent to me ... I did not receive it ... The only time is when I came back from my leave ... I have not seen these service level agreement before it was signed.”

When Commissioner Faro was on leave, Deputy Commissioner Spies acted in his stead and signed the service level agreements without Faro seeing or approving drafts beforehand.

“He was acting in my stead ... I have not seen these service level agreement before it was signed ... The only time is when I came back from my leave.”

Commissioner Faro was not aware of the agreements before going on leave and relied on the legal department and CFO to draw up the service level agreements.

“you must know these service level agreement is drawn up by the, between the legal department and office of the group financial services, which is the CFO ... I did not see this ... I did not receive the service level agreement before I went on leave.”

Commissioner Faro was not aware of the appointment of Elshadai before it was brought up at the forum, and he had not received the service level agreement beforehand to peruse.

“No, I was not aware of that. And I think, as I said yesterday, when the CFO is coming to this forum, I think those questions should be posed to him. I would prefer that is the case, because I am here to tell my side, and I am here to tell the truth. I have not received the service level agreement before hand to go through or to peruse.”

Commissioner Faro states he only became aware that Elshadai had been appointed and that the service level agreement was signed after it was done, during his leave.

“I only became aware that Elshadai has been appointed and there is a service level agreement after it was signed.”

Commissioner Faro stated that he did not sign the security level agreement because the security tender was withdrawn and readvertised, and the current security tender is being handled since APSS returned to Metro Police.

“No, we, I did not sign because we only had two tenders, and then obviously we have the service animals one. But the security one, remember the security tender was withdrawn and re-advertised, and then this was the land invasion one. So I have not signed the security level agreement because that one, as you know, the only one that we are starting now since APSS came back to Metro Police is this one that we are currently busy with.”

Commissioner Faro has never had to sign any agreements in the capacity as Chief of Police since 2023.

“Yes, you have never had to sign any agreements in that, whatever agreement, as Head of Police ? No t that I ... Not that can come to mind now, Commissioner Baloyi.”

Commissioner Faro denies having knowledge or being involved in the agreements related to service level agreements with million rand values, asserting that the processes after Metro Police's involvement fall under the department of Supply Chain Management.

“I do not agree with that statement. As I said, the processes after Metro Police's involvement stops, it is solely in the department of Supply Chain Management. Unless we are going to, maybe through this Commission, then change where there is gaps. If it is not the case that your involvement is therefore drawing up SLA’s and assisting with the SLA’s, and you get a meeting request to be there, and you get the involvement where you must actually, here is the successful bidder, so you can have a question and answer before the service level agreement comes to your table. It cannot be said, if you are not being said you must be involved, or that you are not involved, that you have failed. I do not agree with that statement.”

Commissioner Faro states that he would not sign documents without reading them thoroughly, and has been known to refuse to sign when documents are rushed to him without proper preparation.

“If I do not have time to read through it, I will not sign it, because what I picked up, people will know you are on your way out on meetings, because they are in contact with your secretaries and say, is the Chief available, and then if you want to go out by the door, they want to come with the documents. I have picked that up and I refuse to sign.”

Commissioner Faro does not know why there was a rush to sign the agreement especially when he was not in office.

“No, I would not know that. It can be a coincidence, or ... It can be because, but I do not want to speculate.”

The acting appointment to Commissioner Spies was for two days, 15 and 16 January 2026, with an additional acting letter expanding the dates from 19 December to 14 January plus two days.

“the acting stint was for two days, am I correct, 15 and 16 January 026 ? It is on this letter, but there is another acting letter from, I think, the 19th of December until the 14th, and then there was this two days that was extended.”

Commissioner Faro acknowledges that the Deputy Commissioner explained and updated him about what had been signed and done in his absence.

“So as I said, that he handed over to me, and then he did explain to me, and then obviously he had to tell me what he has signed, what he has done in my absence, so that I can be aware of it.”

Commissioner Faro has read and is satisfied with the agreements, and the Deputy Commissioner was happy with them at the time he signed off.

“Yes, I read through it. I read through the agreement, and the Deputy Commissioner, when he did his handover, he was, at the time when it was, when it was, when he went through it, he was happy with it.”

Commissioner Faro was not a member of the controversial WhatsApp group related to supply chain management and only became aware of it recently.

“Unfortunately, I was not in that WhatsApp group. So it is come to our attention now.”

Sergeant Nkosi shared WhatsApp groups related to three specific entities which raised concerns about apparent interference in the supply chain management process.

“obviously these entities, with hindsight of course, some of them are the ones that were shared with Sergeant Nkosi, correct?”

The entities appointed as service providers do not fully mirror the list that Sergeant Nkosi was exchanging with Dhlamini and Mnisi; only Elshadai, Ngaphesheya, and later Gubis were appointed.

“Commissioner, not entirely, but the three entities, that would be Elshadai, Ngaphesheya, and later on Gubis ...”

There is a formal supply chain management process at the City of Tshwane with strict compliance checks overseen by the Chief Financial Officer.

“There is a supply chain management process where people must comply with certain, and there is a checklist... So after they have done the checks and balances, obviously they feel that the service level agreement must be drawn up because these companies have met the requirements.”

There have been suspensions of the Chief Financial Officer and Deputy Commissioner Dhlamini relating to consequence management processes linked to supply chain issues.

“We know from your evidence but also from media reports that we can take note of that there has been suspensions of the CFO. We know that Dhlamini, Deputy Commissioner Dhlamini is also on suspension.”

It is worrying and unacceptable that a South African Police Service sergeant, not working for the City of Tshwane nor in supply chain management, could give guidance or prefer companies in the City's supply chain.

“He is not even working for the City of Tshwane. He is not even in the supply chain management environment of the City of Tshwane. He is a South African Police Service sergeant. It is very, very worrying that he could give guidance or he could actually prefer companies. It is unacceptable.”

An investigation within the City and Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department is ongoing to determine if tenders were properly awarded, including whether the companies met the requirements for appointment.

“Is there an investigation presently within the City and, or TMPD that is looking at whether these tenders were properly awarded, as in, for example, did Ngaphesheya meet the requirements for appointment?”

Some tenders (including the land tender) were awarded to companies linked to Sergeant Nkosi's brother, which were apparently influenced by Deputy Commissioner Dhlamini advising on compliance fixes.

“We know from Sergeant Nkosi's evidence that Ngaphesheya belongs to his brother, according to him. It is a company that belongs to his brother. We also know from that evidence that Commissioner Dhlamini, Deputy Commissioner Dhlamini, seems to have been involved in advising about the Ngaphesheya tender where it did not comply, advising this is how you fix it, we need this and that to be fixed.”

Commissioner Faro confirmed that investigation into tenders is ongoing at both City and TMPD levels, including consequence management and supply chain requirements.

“I am sure the City is busy with that investigation as well under the GAR, group audit and risk... We are busy with all the investigations in terms of TMPD... we are also looking at how the, as I said with the CFO, we require that information in terms of the points system, the documents, all of that we are also looking at.”

The TMPD is conducting disciplinary processes and also investigating tenders themselves concerning suspensions of individuals like Phiri.

“So what you are doing in TMPD, you are not just doing the normal disciplinary processes where Phiri has been suspended and he will go through a disciplinary hearing. Are you investigating the tenders themselves? ... Yes, I do, I am busy.”

If it is found that Ngaphesheya did not meet the requirements for tender award, the public can expect that the contract will be cancelled or steps taken to set it aside.

“Can expect, for example, that Ngaphesheya, if indeed it did not meet the requirements for to be awarded this tender, the public can expect that in time that contract will be cancelled... Or steps will be taken to cancel it and set it aside.”

Investigation into tenders is huge and wide, not limited to isolated cases, to ensure measures are put in place to prevent recurrence.

“This investigation is not going to be overnight... it is not going to be something that we want to drag on for five years because we are dealing with this on a daily basis... the investigation is quite huge and wide.”

Commissioner Faro emphasized the need for comprehensive consequence management across the entire procurement value chain, not just isolated disciplinary actions.

“If I want to do consequence management, it is the entire food chain and value chain... We must then say there is a gap. It cannot be like that.”

Commissioner Faro confirmed that consequences will follow non-compliance with the City of Tshwane's very clear supply chain management policy.

“The SCM policy is very, very clear of the City of Tshwane... So definitely there will be consequences.”

Commissioner Faro expressed concern about systemic siphoning of money and criminal activities in the TMPD that became apparent over recent weeks and were revealed at this Commission.

“I have come to learn with great shock and dismay on what was apparently taking place in the TMPD. It is not... issues of irregularities, but clear systems of siphoning of money and criminal activities.”

There is a need to study historical data, including previous tenders, to understand what went wrong and prevent future recurrence.

“we need to look at the history and historically in terms of even the previous tender and even the previous to look at it to see what happened that time as well in order for us to make sure what happened then, what now, and how we can correct it.”

APSS only became aware of the investigation on 1 July 2024 and began their investigation at that time, despite the investigation relating to events prior to that date.

“And I need to just remind the Commission that APSS only came to me 1st of July 2024, and we have discovered that even prior to that, as I said, the investigation is vast, and upon it came to me, we actually became aware of it and we started the type of investigation.”

The APSS investigation and remedial process is complex involving tenders, staff, and sites requiring assessments.

“And also, as Commissioner Khumalo yesterday also said in terms of the APSS, it is very complex. You deal with tenders, you deal with staff, you deal with sites, sites that you had to do your own assessment.”

There was a delayed discovery and handover of reports related to APSS, causing an immediate need to deal with a late tender starting mid-year FY 2024.

“July 2024, a couple of months after that, we had to figure out and stumbled across things to make sure, handover report was only given a month after I have discovered and stopped the ad hoc.”

There is concern that processes involving the Ngaphesheya bid were improperly influenced or corrupted between submission and adjudication.

“It seems to me that with some of the things that happened during the entire process, the people involved in the processes just go along with whatever is, whatever agenda is being pushed. Let us take the example of Ngaphesheya, which Mr Sikakhane drew our attention to... That there was a changes somewhere in between. That is not even a red flag. It actually tells you that something improper has happened somewhere between submission and adjudication.”

Authority figures must adhere strictly to procedure and not allow actions to be taken just because of who the person in authority is; failure to do so leads to consequences and management action.

“because of you, remember you are in uniform, so if somebody of authority comes, you are supposed to check certain things. You are spot on with it. That is even that we picked up, that you should, irrespective of who comes to you in a position of authority, if it is that you must have A, B, C, D, E in order to do F, you should not just be because the person is in authority... You cannot use the excuse that somebody in authority came to you and even if the person say I am going to bring it later and maybe it never came, so you must just do that. We will have to do consequence management on each and every one.”

Some people may be involved in criminality, impropriety, and bid rigging while others may be complicit by failing to oversee and detect such corrupt acts, facilitating corruption and bid rigging.

“some people will actually be involved in criminality, impropriety, bid rigging. But some will not be involved in that, but will be complicit in the sense that they do not actually look for what they should be looking for, which makes corruption, bid rigging, etcetera, easy.”

There is difficulty in accessing certain files such as a Phiri suspension letter relevant to Deputy Commissioner Dhlamini.

“that is your signature at the bottom.”

Deputy Commissioner Dhlamini's name was mentioned in context of serious and damaging allegations that warranted precautionary suspension, related to issues of interference.

“Deputy Commissioner Dhlamini's name was mentioned... he was simply saying that there are serious and damaging circumstances or, that warrant for him to be put on precautionary suspension.”

The process of requesting precautionary suspension involves procedural correctness and advice from HR, with a cover letter supporting the request by the employee, but it is normally initiated by the employer.

“I engaged with the HR department because I wanted to know, what do you do in a case like this... HR said Chief, I have perused the policy, and it does not make provision for such a request. It is normally initiated from the side of the employer... The letter from him is a request, and the reasons seem valid... I would however suggest a cover letter where you can indicate that after consideration of the request and the reasons, you support the request...”

Commissioner Faro accepted and supported the request for Deputy Commissioner Dhlamini to be placed on suspension.

“When you say you supported the request, you mean you accepted that there were valid reasons... for him to be placed on suspension? Definitely. Definitely, I accepted it...”

The allegations against Deputy Commissioner Dhlamini were understood to relate to interference, and these formed part of an ongoing investigation.

“It was obviously the allegations against him in terms of the 19th of March. It was obviously that possible, like you said, interference, etcetera. So that was the nature of the discussion... So it was around the issues of interference? 100%.”

The SCM (Supply Chain Management) system within Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department is compromised, with people circumventing written policy to appoint preferred service providers who may not qualify.

“It is clear that people are not complying with it and are finding ways to go around it and to get their preferred service providers to be appointed even when they do not qualify to be appointed... definitely I agree because you would not have been sitting here if it was not compromised...”

Commissioner Faro agrees there is compromise in the SCM system and emphasised the concern of infiltration by criminals hijacking the system to make millions from taxpayer money.

“My worry is that the Commission has so far only looked at the security services... can you give South Africans the assurance that there was no infiltration by criminals who have hijacked the system and they are making millions if not billions out of taxpayers' money and nobody is paying attention to it? I agree...”

The investigation will look beyond two tenders flagged by the Commission to include all related matters, including tenders already awarded or in place.

“we are going to look not only into this two tenders that has been identified or flagged by the Commission. We are looking at the entire, everything that you have mentioned that has got, even if it is, remember some of those were already awarded or some of them are already in place”

There is consideration of building in-house capacity for services, potentially appointing veterinarians directly to avoid external tenders and related corruption risks.

“Is it possible that I can maybe appoint a vet for the service animals? ... So the word for me is in-house capacity, then this, all these things will disappear ... I want two legal services within my office ... I can do that ... I have already recruited two very young Metro Police Officers”

The appointment of vets and other similar services can enhance skillsets internally and potentially remove the need for tenders prone to corruption and bid-rigging.

“I am just using the example of being a vet ... So we can just enhance your skills ... you don't need to have a vet on standby ... I was surprised when we went through the WhatsApp chat here to see that there are even tenders for the delivery of refuse bags ... If one sits down, a whole lot more could be removed from the tender system”

An investigation effort will continue even after the Commission concludes, aiming to report on progress made.

“any progress that we make, even if the Commission is not, is concluded, that we still, I would like to still report on all the things that I said is going to happen ... I do not want it to just be a talk, so, and then to say that ... we have done this now ... we are busy with that investigation, even long after Commission has concluded”

Most issues related to the Commission's focus happened during the tenure of Commissioner Spies as caretaker of the APSS unit before March 2025.

“the Commission would have heard evidence from Commissioner Spies ... this evidence was limited to his arrival at the TMPD, which was in March 2025 ... before Mr Spies took over in March, he was the caretaker in what we call now the APSS ... most of the issues ... would have happened during his tenure as caretaker of that unit”

Sean Ian Edward Eugene Bolhuis is the Deputy Chief of Police for Training and Innovation in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD) starting 1 June 2024, recommended by the Chief of Police and other senior city officials.

“I am an adult male South African citizen and the Deputy Chief of Police for Training and Innovation in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department, which is known as TMPD. Having assumed this role on 1 June 2024, I was recommended by a panel consisting of the Chief of Police and other senior city officials.”

Sean Bolhuis has 34 years of experience in municipal policing since 1992, started as a traffic officer in Pretoria Municipality, and has educational qualifications including a three-year national diploma and an ITO 4 higher diploma.

“I am a career traffic officer / Metro Police officer since 1992. I started my career as a traffic officer in the then Pretoria Municipality. ... In total, I have 34 years of experience in the municipality. I have a career-related ITO three-year national diploma and an ITO 4 higher diploma.”

Sean Bolhuis holds a valid top-secret security clearance certificate expiring December 2026 and is currently undergoing the vetting process again.

“I have a valid top-secret security clearance certificate, which will expire in December 2026. I am in the process of starting the vetting process again.”

It is not yet a lawful requirement in the City of Tshwane to have a top-secret security clearance for high-level positions, though there are security committee recommendations and premises for it.

“It is not a lawful requirement yet in the city, although it should be. ... those bases or building blocks are in place, but as I indicate, it is not policy yet ...”

All high-level advertised positions in Tshwane now require candidates to avail themselves for vetting for security clearance purposes.

“all high level positions in the city of Tshwane, when advertised, it is now a requirement within the advertise that you avail yourself for vetting purposes for security clearance.”

Senior management of the Metro Police should be vetted; Sean Bolhuis immediately avails himself for vetting as required in his position dealing with sensitive information.

“In the Metro Police itself, I am a deputy Chief of Police. It is imperative that your senior management of the Metro Police should be, must be vetted. If I had a way to force it through, I would, as I am also the chief of staff, which I will explain later. But it is cumbersome for me to think, and I will not mention names, that certain senior officials refuse to get themselves vetted. I immediately avail myself for vetting because it is required of me in my position when I deal with sensitive information.”

There is an ongoing issue with certain senior officials refusing to undergo vetting both internally in the Metro Police department and in the City of Tshwane.

“Certain senior officials refuse to get themselves vetted. ... That is a matter that we are still addressing within the department and in the city.”

Vetting is important due to involvement with sensitive information and meetings in Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), especially concerning national states.

“So vetting is very important.”

The Chief of Police referred to a form of security clearance known as vetting, but it is not a full vetting process; it involves checking criminal and illicit records annually for certain department and city members as requested.

“What the Chief of Police was referencing to, if I understand your statement correctly, is the security clearance. It is also commonly known as vetting, but it is not a full vetting. It is just security clearance. That process is ongoing on a yearly basis where we check for criminal and illicit records against members within the department and certain members in the city, when so requested by the city manager.”

The full vetting process is currently not required by law and is not formal policy in the city, though it should be.

“And that is the one that you say is not yet required by law? ... It is not informal policy yet by the city, but it should be.”

The full vetting process, not yet formal policy, is a comprehensive check done by a state security agency that includes lifestyle audit, financial checks, and background investigations of personal relationships.

“The vetting I am referring to is a full vetting done by, in our case as a municipality, by a state security agency, and it is a part lifestyle audit, financial check, proper vetting, your whole history, all your girlfriends, all your boyfriends, all your ex-wives, all those things. They check it all, and then you are either cleared or you are not cleared.”

The city requires senior position candidates to avail themselves for vetting and lower position candidates undergo security clearance or criminal record checks; adverts are public knowledge.

“Yes, as indicated in adverts now for senior positions, it is a requirement that you avail yourself for vetting. On lower positions, it would be for security clearance or to check for criminal records. Those adverts are public knowledge.”

There is a security committee established to advise the city on vetting policies for various levels and positions, operating intermittently but not yet fully functional.

“It is the job of the security committee, which has been established. Is it in full swing, full working? I am not hundred percent sure of the doings of the security committee at the moment, but they do it from time to time. And part of their function would be to advise the city to put in policy in place...”

Commissioner Bolhuis and Advocate Khumalo are cleared through the vetting process required for commissioners, implying others in the room should leave due to lack of clearance.

“I am cleared of all of those things. ... Both of us. Yes, we are cleared as Commissioner. So maybe the rest of the room must leave now.”

Commissioner Bolhuis is responsible for training, innovation, research, analytics, and information management for the Metro Police department.

“Responsibilities as the Deputy Chief, training and innovation are mainly responsible for the Team PD Academy, where we train Metro Police officers, traffic wardens, other officials, as per our academy curriculum. I am further responsible for police innovation, which includes research, analytics, and information management for the department.”

Different types of vetting exist for various positions; not everyone requires top-secret vetting, but Commissioner Bolhuis requires top-secret clearance due to his position.

“You can get different types of vetting. Not everyone will be vetted to top secret. In my capacity, I need top secret. Another person in another position in senior management might only need secret or something like that.”

Since Chief of Police Yolande Faro's appointment around October 23, the city has lobbied to fill critical and high-level Metro Police vacancies, filling many but some critical positions remain close to advertisement stage subject to budget and approval.

“Since the Chief of Police, Yolande Faro, has been appointed, I believe it was October 23, she immediately lobbied the city and the city manager to ensure that at least critical positions and high-level positions are being filled.”

Commissioner Bolhuis is functioning at Deputy Chief level despite the position being officially on a brigadier level according to approved structure, which is high stress and right-hand to Chief of Police.

“Although the position on the approved structure is on a brigadier level, I am functioning on a Deputy Chief level. It is a high, stressful position, the right-hand person to the Chief of Police, as indicated by some of the functions that I have already mentioned.”

The Chief of Staff position at the brigadier level has been vacant for a very long time, and the structure was changed incorrectly; a new structure proposed restoring it to Deputy Chief level but awaits approval.

“This position has been vacant for a very long time. Previously, I acted in this position officially, but then it was on a Deputy Chief level. The structure was then subsequently changed and put incorrectly on a brigadier level. The new structure that has been developed for the department, proposed structure that still needs to go for approval, it has been put back on a Deputy Chief level, where it should be.”

Since Chief of Police Yolande Faro's appointment, the city has lobbied to fill critical positions, and many have been filled; however, some critical funded vacancies remain close to advertisement pending city approval and budget.

“Since the Chief of Police, Yolande Faro, has been appointed, I believe it was October 23, she immediately lobbied the city and the city manager to ensure that at least critical positions and high-level positions are being filled. Subsequently, the department has filled numerous positions. We are still in a position where we have put forward critical vacancies that are now very close to advertisement level, subject always to final approval by the city and available budget, but these are funded vacancies.”

Commissioner Bolhuis is responsible for managing unfair labour practice arbitrations at the South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) on behalf of the department and Chief of Police.

“I am further responsible for the management and coordination of unfair labour practices arbitrations at the South African Local Government Bargaining Council, SALGBC. This includes: attending step 3 grievances as per the COT collective agreement on behalf of the department/Chief of Police...”

Commissioner Bolhuis acted as caretaker for Asset Protection and Security Services (APSS) from 1 July 2024 to 28 February 2025 when the Deputy Chief post was vacant, managing high-level oversight and dealing with APSS relocation from the city manager's office to Metro Police Department.

“I was the caretaker for Asset Protection and Security Services, known as APSS, for the period 1 July 2024 to 28 February 2025, as the divisional head [Deputy Chief] post was vacant. The function was transferred from the office of the city manager back to the team as from 1 July 024. ...As the caretaker of APSS, I did high-level management and oversight over the division. Upon assuming this task, I had to deal with a relocation of the APSS from the office of the city manager to the TMPD.”

No proper handover report was provided when the APSS transfer occurred, but a handover report was emailed to the Chief of Police by Ms Paledi Marota 10 months later.

“I was not provided with a handover report as one would expect... that a handover report was ultimately emailed to the Chief of Police by Ms Paledi Marota... on 10 April 025.”

Monthly budget meetings were held involving Deputy Commissioners and Chief of Police where APSS budget performance was discussed.

“We [the Deputy Commissioners and Chief of Police] had monthly budget meetings and APSS budget performance was mentioned/discussed.”

Ad hoc security services requests were assessed through a security assessment and only approved after budget scrutiny and necessary approvals.

“We dealt with adhoc individually and provided services only with the necessary approvals, including documentation... we would receive a request from a service delivery department that they need security services at a specific place... assess that request... by doing a security assessment... if we agree with them, then we determine the type of security that needs to be placed... they need to provide us with a GLO or the service delivery component within the city, falling mainly under the COO, would have to look for money... last resort would be to approach the CFO to ensure that there is money for this...”

APSS security function was continuously under-budgeted, and the yearly security services budget was insufficient.

“we were on a continuous basis under-budgeted for the function. So, the yearly budget allocated on a regular basis for security services were not sufficient.”

Final approval for finding additional funds for adhoc security services falls outside the TMPD unless it is covered by an approved budget, usually involving the Chief of Police, CFO, and city manager.

“Such final approval will not lie within the TMPD unless it is covered with the approved budget... The Chief of Police... can manage her own budget... then it goes through the processes recommended by the CFO, and it is finally approved by the accounting officer, which is the city manager...”

If the budget is sufficient, it would cover adhoc appointments, but due to limited funds, additional funds must be sought for adhoc services that are not semi-permanent.

“if the budget is sufficient, which it was never, ... then it would have covered adhoc as well. But due to limited funds available for a financial year... if it is not an adhoc service that has already been identified and has then become almost a semi-permanent situation, then no, you would not have funds available in that budget. You would have to look for additional funds...”

The Chief of Police has authority, either delegated or from legislation or protocol, to manage and allocate the approved budget for the division, while the CFO's authority extent is uncertain.

“The Chief of Police in her position as the group head... has certain authorities... She can manage her own budget that is been approved and allocated. So, if it falls without that budget, there is a process... The CFO... has the authority... to work within the budget that has been approved for the city. He can allocate and reallocate certain funding...”

The APSS division covers less than half of all its sites in the city and some ad hoc sites required additional oversight and onsite checks to prevent damage or vandalism.

“We do not even cover - I think we cover less than half of all our sites... Some of the adhoc sites that were referred to us as an example, I made sure... I went on-site personally with the team... One of such sites would be Klipgat waterworks where a contractor finalised their duties. No planning was made prior to that for security... We must secure that... if we did not secure that, there could have been damage or vandalism... as a city, as a department...”

Deputy Chief acknowledged having about 15-20% of his time devoted to high-level management and oversight of the APSS division due to its large scale and complexity.

“Some high-level management and oversight over APSS probably took about 15 percent or 20 percent of my energy and time to just ensure...”

The APSS division manages about 5000 people with multiple roles, including Deputy Chief Training and Innovation, Chief of Staff, and coordination of grievances and arbitration matters.

“I have a full-time job position as the Deputy Chief Training and Innovation... I have got another full-time job as the Chief of Staff... I have got a part-time job in coordinating Step grievances and arbitration matters... In a department of about 5000 people...”

Director Malatji was seen as an experienced senior manager in security, overseeing approximately 1300 security guards on a R2.9 billion contract, with some level of support and management, and no mistrust existed towards him at that time.

“my high-level management and oversight was very limited, and I had no reason to mistrust, at that time, Director Malatji. Seemingly, on paper and what I know from him, then he was an experienced senior manager in security. He had support, not much, but he had support, and they ran that division. The amount of people in that division... approximately just shy of 1300 security guards. On contracts still, not even fully absorbed into the city with all the benefits”

The allocation of ad hoc security sites was an informal practice and required informing the caretaker's office due to potential operational, financial, and contractual impacts.

“The allocation of adhoc sites, it is not a written-down process, but it was the practise that at least I had in place that my office needs to be informed of adhoc sites, like that explanation I gave about Klipgat and others. Because of the possible operational impact, and I am talking about that later, but I can just say this, it had to be brought to my attention because of operational, financial, and contractua l impact.”

Invoices for security services contracts were required to be co-signed by Director Malatji after operational checks and then co-signed by the caretaker, as a management mechanism to ensure that no untoward activities appeared on paper.

“I required Director Malatji to provide, once invoices have been signed by the operational component and then signed off by himself, he had to bring those invoices to me for co-signing. So, he would approve the invoice after all the checks have been done and I would co-sign. That was just a management mechanism to ensure that, on paper, there is nothing untoward.”

Commissioner Bolhuis did not mistrust the process of invoice co-signing at the time but later gave evidence that irregularities in invoices were identified by Director Veli Nwandule of Management Admin Support, who highlighted the need to follow a specific financial procedure that stopped invoices being brought back for co-signing by Bolhuis.

“I did not pick up anything immediately and I did not have any mistrust at that time. However, and I do give evidence about this later, when the director of MAS, Management Admin Support, Director Veli Nwandule, he indicated that there could be some irregularity within invoices. At that stage, the finance section has indicated both to me as the caretaker and to Director Malatji that they will have to follow a certain financial procedure, which then became the procedure they needed to follow, not bringing invoices back to me for co-signing. So that then stopped and that financial procedure that was implemented by the financial section was then followed. And then subsequently, the director of MAS, Nwandule, picked up their regularity because they will be in a better position to pick up on this because they have the contracts, the SLAs, the monthly expenditure, and if there is any further expenditure than what would have been the baseline from previous months or allocated to a certain service provider, they would pick it up. And subsequently, they did pick up.”

The Commissioner Bolhuis was informed about a report intended to facilitate the transition of the Asset Property Protection Service (APPS) from the City Manager's Office to the Tshwane Metro Police Department, which report was provided by Paledi Marota, received nine months late on 10 April 2025.

“The Chief of Police, Yolande Faro, testified that when she received an instruction that there has to be a transition of the APPS from the city manager's office to the TMPD's office, that she tasked you to oversee that process... she testified that she received this report, unfortunately, somehow nine months later, and this report came from a lady called Paledi Marota... The correct date would have been the 10th of April 2025... And lastly, on that score, you would have, at least at that stage, when this report came to your knowledge, you would have ceased acting or at least being a caretaker of the SP... That is correct. I already provided a full handover in writing in the month of March to the newly appointed Deputy Chief Spies.”

The report from the Office of the City Manager titled 'Reports on the Transfer of Asset Property Protection Services Unit from the Office of the City Manager to the Tshwane Metro Police Department' stated that the Executive Mayor had issued a letter on 15 April 2021 about the placement of the asset protection function and personnel in the City Manager's Office and that extensive consultation had taken place to ensure the seamless absorption of security guards.

“The purpose of this report is to transfer the Asset Property Protection Unit function from the Office of the City Manager to the Tshwane Metro Police Department temporarily with immediate effect... The Executive Mayor issued a letter dated 15 April 2021 titled Placement of Asset Protection Function and Personnel in City Manager's Office. The said letter stated the following. The implementation of the processes regarding the absorption of security guards is a critical deliverable for this administration. Extensive consultation and discussions have taken place on this matter to ensure it occurs seamlessly. It is for this reason that I took the decision to have this process placed and administered out of the City Manager's Office through the...”

The Asset Protection Function and Personnel based at the Tshwane Metro Police Department were temporarily moved to the Office of the City Manager effective from 13 March 2021.

“the current Asset Protection Function and Personnel that have been identified who are based at the Tshwane Metro Police Department temporarily are moved to the Office of the City Manager to report under Mr Pillay with effect from 13 March 2021”

Absorption of security guards means transferring security personnel from contract services to full city employment.

“the absorption means that these security personnel that is in your service through a contract ... when you do an absorption, you look at bringing those people, those security guards, into the employment of the city. They then become fully-fledged employees”

Consultative process between Deputy Chief Spies, the department, Group Human Capital Management and political leaders has been established to fast-track the absorption process of security guards.

“Since the appointment of Deputy Chief Spies, there has been a real movement. I do know for a fact I have sat in some of the meetings. There has been consultative process between Deputy Chief Spies, the department, and Group Human Capital Management and political leaders and leaders of the city to fast-track this process”

From 15 April 2021 up to the time the Asset Protection function was moved back to Tshwane Metro Police Department, not much movement happened towards full absorption of security guards.

“from 15 April 2021, up to the time that the function was moved back to the Metro Police Department, not much has moved in a direction of full absorption of the security guards”

The instruction by the Executive Mayor to transfer the Asset Protection Services Unit from Tshwane Metro Police Department to the Office of the City Manager was implemented as directed, including staff reporting and budget management.

“The instruction by the Executive Mayor for the Asset Protection Services Unit to be transferred from Tshwane Metro Police Department to the Office of the City Manager was implemented as directed. The transfer included the movement of staff reporting on the Asset Protection Services Unit and cost centre 923 for the budget and expenditure management of the unit”

The Asset Protection Services structure consists of 4106 approved positions, including 31 officials (permanent employees) and 1287 contracted security officers.

“The Asset Protection Services approved structure consists of 4106. Of this, there are 31 officials - official employees ... On a permanent basis, and a further 1287 contracted security officers”

The organisational structure of the Asset Protection Services Unit was not amended during its transfer from TMPD to Office of the City Manager, nor will it be affected when transferred back to TMPD.

“The organisational structure of the Asset Protection Services Unit was not amended during the transfer ... Therefore, the transfer ... back from the Office of the City Manager to Tshwane Metro Police Department will not affect the organisational structure of both departments”

Most of the positions in the approved structure of 4106 are vacant, explaining the discrepancy with the numbers of officials and contracted security officers.

“The 4106 is still the approved structure but most of those positions are vacant. That is why the mathematical - the mathematics will not make sense”

Between 15 April 2021 and the transfer of the function back to Metro Police, there was no serious attempt or plan to fill the vacancies in the approved structure.

“from 15 April 2021 up to the point where this function was transferred back to the Metro Police that there was no, I cannot say no, I do not know, there was not a serious attempt and project in place, plan in place to fill the vacancies of this approved structure”

The approved organizational structure for the Metro Police at that time was not feasible, practical, or funded, requiring total restructuring likely with fewer positions due to financial constraints.

“The structure that we have received, yes approved at that time, still approved because it is still on the structure, approved structure, is not a feasible structure for the Metro Police. It is not implementable. It is not practical. It is not funded. We are restructuring that process totally and it will probably be a lesser number because we are not in a financial situation...”

The Metro Police has additional vacancies but many will remain unfunded due to lack of automatic budget provision, leading to audit queries if vacant positions are not filled or removed.

“Now this is moved back to the Metro Police. Now the Metro Police sit with all these additional vacancies... Most of these vacancies will then be unfunded. Why? Because there would not automatically be a budget in place to fill it... it becomes an audit query.”

The Chief of Police giving the human resource function to Commissioner Bolhuis was an interim, semi-crisis management measure due to uncertainty and expected appointment of a Deputy Chief around October 2024, which eventually happened only in March next year.

“It would be typical for a Chief of Police to give such a function because it is interim to the Chief of Staff... We already expected as a department to appoint a Deputy Chief round about October 24 onwards... the appointment eventually only came in March the next year.”

Commissioner Bolhuis was overloaded with two and a half posts when given additional human resource functions, but it was considered the best decision under the circumstances by the Chief of Police and top management.

“You are already inundated with two and a half posts or positions and just on the human resource element... Would you say this was the best decision to add this transition to your tasks?... I think it was the best decision under the circumstances... The Chief of Police looked at this and looked at her situation with her top management... and determined that I would be the best suited candidate to deal with this...”

The operational budget allocation for asset protection services was increased by R305,611,361 from R489,374,219.15 to R794,985,580 due to additional funding requests submitted for Watchman Services, as the original budget was insufficient to provide guarding services through the appointed service providers.

“The operational budget allocation for asset protection services was increased by R305611361 from R489374219.15 to R794985580. This was due to a request for additional funding requests submitted to Group Financial Services for Watchman Services... The original operational budget allocation for Watchman Services was R245 million for 2023-24 financial year, which was not enough to provide the guarding services through the appointed service providers.”

The City appointed 22 security service providers through Tender TMPD 02-016.17 to supply physical security guarding services for three years from 1 February 2022, with a monthly service contract equivalent to 600 million per financial year.

“The City appointed 22 Security Service Providers through Tender TMPD 02-016.17 to supply the physical security [guarding] services... for a period of 3 years... The monthly service contract for the appointed service providers amounts to 0 million, which equates to 600 million per financial year.”

There was a regular short budgeting process for security services at the City of Tshwane, causing under-budgeting in previous financial years and requiring a process to ensure funds allocation for service delivery throughout the financial year.

“We were under budget. So, then we would, and which we did, we would look at the finances, and we will draft a ... We had the 22 companies... Then once you determine in your projection that you are going to have a shortfall, it was clear to me that there was a regular, short budgeting process... Whether that was deliberate... I am not a CFO... It was cumbersome for us to notice again that this financial year that I was the caretaker or part of it we have under budget.”

The adjustment budget process legally does not allow asking for more money beyond the approved budget; funds for Watchman Services must be sourced within the approved budget if there is a shortfall.

“If you do not do your work and you come to the adjustment budget only and ask for additional funds for Watchman Services, then it means the CFO in the city will have to find funds somewhere else within the approved budget and allocate it to Watchman Services.”

A financial upliftment process was started and subsequently approved to address a shortfall in the Watchman Services budget, recommended by the Chief of Police, CFO, and approved by the accounting officer.

“We started the process of upliftment and that upliftment process was subsequently approved. It is recommended by the Chief of Police, it is recommended by the CFO, it is signed off and approved by the accounting officer.”

The handover report regarding the Watchman Services budget was considered incomplete and insufficient, lacking detailed and historical information on budget reasons, allocation, and site coverage.

“I would have expected a handover report indicating to us as a department this, plus further historic information on the budget, why was the budget done the way it was done, why was it short budgeted for, what was the reasons, and what are the information - where is the information on all the sites, the sites that have been deemed critical ... it does not really touch on that. I find big holes in this report in hindsight.”

The budget discussed only applies to Watchman Services, not ad hoc services.

“this only is, it only relates to the Watchman Service, this budget, not the adhoc services.”

Ad hoc services are not included in the upliftment budget because such funds cannot be uplifted or adjusted outside the established budget; financial information must be factual, balanced, and audit-able for Watchman Services.

“If additional adhoc services come in, it would not have been included in that because you cannot do upliftment for funds or adjust your budget on maybes. It must be factual information, the books must balance, it must be available to be audited, to be clear-cut that this is the finances allocated for Watchman Services and spend it accordingly. So, no adhoc services, unknown adhoc services would not have been covered by that.”

Commissioner Bolhuis and team did not receive the promised handover report from the city as agreed in a specific meeting with the MMC for community safety and others.

“We did have one specific meeting with the MMC for community safety ... where it was agreed upon that all the information would be made available to us and in writing, emails, reports, at a certain time and that was not forthcoming. I did not perhaps in hindsight make enough of a follow-up...”

Due to lack of a formal handover, Commissioner Bolhuis and his team started sourcing information themselves and initiated a new tender process for Watchman Services as the existing tender was expiring.

“We started sourcing the information ourselves, we looked at what we had in front of us, and we were very busy starting the new tender as well, because we had to immediately, I think we started in August, immediately start with a new tender because the current tender was to expire soon and it is quite a process in the city to start a new tender.”

There is no budget whatsoever for ad hoc security services; only ongoing ad hoc services integrated into the operation are covered by the budget.

“Did you mean that there is no budget whatsoever for adhoc security services? No. Look, as I explained before, if adhoc has come in already and it is now part of the operationalisation on a daily, monthly basis, then that would have been counted in and worked in. But for something arising going forwards, that is not budgeted for whatsoever.”

It was understood by Commissioner Bolhuis' team that they were supposed to receive a handover report, but it was not forthcoming; follow-up on the matter was insufficient, and they had to improvise to find information themselves.

“It was understood by us that we were supposed to get a handover report... but it was not forthcoming. I did not perhaps in hindsight make enough of a follow-up, but if you are thrown in the deep end with such a thing, you find your way and that is what we did.”

Commissioner Bolhuis admits that the handover process for Watchman Services was not done in an acceptable manner and that they could have done better in managing the transition and budget handover.

“I am a very hard person on myself. Have we done the best? No, I do not think we have. Could we have done much better? Yes, we could definitely have done better. Could I personally have done more? I should have. And I stand for what I have done and what I have not done... The handover process is not done in a way that, as you testified, in the most, one would have said, acceptable manner...”

Commissioner Bolhuis claims elements within the city and department use system processes as mechanisms for corruption and wrongdoing, while they themselves were decent and loyal officials used unfairly.

“There are elements within the city and in our department that use the processes and things in place. They use that as a mechanism for their corruption and for their ill-doings. We were used as decent, law-abiding, loyal officials... We were used because it happened under our nose. And it is shameful.”

Commissioner Bolhuis states that upon the transfer of APSS unit, he inherited the tender TMPD 02-2016-017 related to the supply of physical security services in the City of Tshwane, starting from March 2022.

“I inherited the above tender with the transfer of APSS. In this tender, the city appointed 22 security service providers to supply the physical security [guarding] services to protect the property, asset, and personnel of the city of Tshwane for a period of three years, with effect from March 2022.”

Deputy Commissioner Bolhuis indicates uncertainty whether the relocation of the APSS from city manager's office to TMPD itself constitutes misuse or exploitation of officials.

“Deputy Commissioner, can I just, just to make sure that I understand... are you saying that the movement of APSS from the office of the city manager to TMPD... is that what you are referring to when you say you were used? And had you known better, you would have responded better? Not necessarily, but that could be the case, I do not know.”

Commissioner Bolhuis had to oversee the implementation of this tender until a new Deputy Commissioner took over.

“I had to oversee the implementation of this tender going forward until such time that the new Deputy Commissioner was appointed to take over.”

The tender for physical security to protect assets and personnel of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality originated from a request to advertise (TAR) issued by Mr. Tshukudu Malatji, Director Protection Services, on July 2016, co-signed by Mr. R R Mahlaule, then Deputy Chief of Police Specialized Services, and approved by then Chief of Police K S Ngobeni on 19 July 2016.

“The tender for the supply of physical security to protect the property, assets, and personnel of the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality originated from a request to advertise, which is a TAR, a tender issued by Mr Tshukudu Malatji, Director Protection Services, on July 2016, co-signed by the then Deputy Chief of Police Specialized Services, Mr R R Mahlaule, and approved on 19 July 2016 by the then Chief of Police K S Ngobeni, the late K S Ngobeni, may his soul rest in peace.”

Between January 2025 and February 2026, purchase orders were created for ad hoc security services from Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd, amounting to approximately R13,635,333.60 inclusive of VAT, for services allegedly provided during Commissioner Bolhuis' tenure as caretaker of APSS.

“The purchase orders created out of this process were registered on the TMPD system only on the following day, 6 March 2025. These included purchase orders for ad hoc services, ostensibly procured from Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd. In the aggregate amount of R1363533.60. ... Though these purchase orders were created and loaded on 5 and 6 March 025, after my acting stint as caretaker of APSS, some of these purchase orders refers to work and services allegedly provided during my tenure as caretaker.”

Commissioner Bolhuis denies giving permission or being aware of the skewed allocation of work favoring Gubis 85 Solutions during January and February 2025 or involving any other company in this manner.

“I reiterate that I never gave permission nor was I aware of such allocation of work to Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Limited during the time in question and in particular January 2025, February 2025 or to any other company.”

Commissioner Bolhuis expresses uncertainty about the financial procurement process, noting that invoices normally lead to the creation of purchase orders and payments processed by the CFO's office, but is unsure if purchase orders are created after the invoice or beforehand.

“I am not a financial expert, but I am not hundred percent sure about that process. I would assume that once the sites have been allocated to a service provider you would receive an invoice. Then the invoice in the department will go to the financial section, a purchase order would be created and then I believe it goes to supply chain management to the buyers to do something and then payment from the CFO's office.”

Commissioner Bolhuis states he does not play a direct role in how purchase orders are loaded onto the SAP system, nor how the financial process moves payments through the different stages including supply chain management and the CFO's office.

“I do not play a role how it is put on the system, we as a city use a SAP system, I do not play a role how it moves from the finance section to supply chain management, and I do not play a role how it moves from supply chain management to the CFO and his office for actual payment.”

Commissioner Bolhuis can make enquiries about late payments but is not physically part of the financial payment process, which follows MFMA and supply chain management procedures of the City of Tshwane.

“I can, as a senior official, make enquiries about late payments, why this has not been done, whilst all invoices submitted, those kinds of things, but not physically part of that financial process.”

Director Malatji runs the APSS unit and manages the contract day-to-day but does not attend the top management budget meeting.

“Director Malatji runs that unit or section division, he runs it basically into totality, day-to-day running, managing the contract. If it starts affecting the budget, he does not sit in the top management budget meeting”

Commissioner Bolhuis affirms that he had no involvement and was not informed about the allocation of ad hoc service sites, noting that internal operating procedures do not require his knowledge or approval for such allocations.

“Yes.”

The head overseeing APSS must be informed when there is an operational, financial, or contract impact in the unit.

“I must, as the head, as the overseer of APSS, I must be informed”

Information about ad hoc security services that affect the budget should have been communicated to the head of APSS office but was not.

“there is no way that the management of APSS could have thought there is no need for the head, the overseer, the Deputy Chief, not to inform him about these adhoc services, which will have a severe effect on our budget and operational implications”

The witness is not involved in confirming actual placement of warm bodies by service providers or in the payment processes related to those services.

“Definitely not. That would be part and parcel of the management and instructions by Director Malatji”

The oversight role does not extend to confirming deployment of warm bodies or payment processes; oversight starts higher up and ends before the financial office.

“you are not involved on that level, on confirming the warm bodies were actually deployed, but also you are not involved in the final leg where the payment processes are engaged ... oversight should have included the complete process till it leaves the financial office when it goes to supply chain management”

Mid-level people are responsible for contract management including ensuring service providers deliver as per contract and implementing penalty clauses for non-compliance.

“mid-level people that were supposed to go and check upon the service provider, we call it contract management, to ensure that they actually do what they say they do ... there is a penalty clause that must be implemented. That is part and parcel of the contract”

The process of oversight was flawed and could have been more hands-on especially with insufficient staff and systems; improvements occurred when Deputy Chief Spies got involved.

“in hindsight, I would say it is and it was a flawed process ...as he continues to involve himself more and more into this space and putting systems in place and instructions ... it is managed in a much better way”

The city has an internal audit function under the Group Audit and Risk Department (GAR) that conducts audits across all departments including Metro Police Department with a small component managing coordination and education on audit issues.

“We have internal audits in the city. It falls under the Group Audit and Risk Department, GAR, and they have the internal auditors. They do internal audits as they see fit in all departments ... in the Metro Police Department, we have a very small component that works closely with the internal auditors, but also looks internally to educate, to coordinate, and to manage possible audit issues”

The Auditor General did not raise, or the witness does not recall any issues in the 2024-25 financial year about the ad hoc security services.

“I cannot recall ... I do not think so, but I am not sure”

The witness will check and provide evidence if the Auditor General flagged issues related to ad hoc security services for the 2024-25 period.

“I will check in the break. I will see if I can find that information ... We will do so, Commissioner, definitely”

Director Tshukudu Malatji managed the APSS function from a management point of view and the day-to-day running of the function including management of the security contract.

“the very next level under me, while I was the caretaker of APSS, was Director Tshukudu Malatji, who managed the APSS function from a management point of view and the day-to-day running of the function, including management of the security contract in place”

While caretaker of APSS, the witness was not approached or made aware of any ad hoc allocation of sites to any security service provider in January and February 2025.

“While acting as the caretaker of APSS, specifically during January and February 2025, I was not approached nor made aware of any adhoc allocation of sites to any security”

Neither Director Malatji nor senior officials Dr. K.E. Madihlaba and Inspector Lebogang Phiri consulted the witness about allocation of sites to Gubis 85 Solutions.

“I was not consulted by Director Malatji nor by the then Senior Superintendent, now Colonel, Doctor K E Madihlaba, nor by the then Inspector, now Superintendent-Major, Lebogang Phiri, about the allocation of sites in question.”

The witness was not aware of nor involved in the allocation of ad hoc security sites to Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd and does not know the number or value of such allocations.

“I was not privy to the allocation of additional adhoc sites to Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd. As a result, I would not, and I do not know the number of sites allegedly allocated to Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Limited, nor the value of the services provided by Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Limited”

Inspector Phiri allocated numerous security service sites to Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd during January 2025 without proper authority.

“It has come to my knowledge recently that the then Inspector Phiri allocated numerous sites to one of the service providers, Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd. The schedule of sites allocated to Gubis 85 (Pty) Ltd during January 2025 is attached as Annexure SB4, notification for deployment letter signed by Mr A L Phiri.”

Inspector Phiri did not ordinarily have the necessary powers or delegation to allocate sites to any service provider in his role in Asset Protection Services (APS).

“Inspector Phiri was an inspector, Asset Protection Services. In such a position, he does not ordinarily have the necessary powers and/or delegation to allocate sites to any service provider.”

An inspector in APS is an entry-level supervisory position with no management authority over site allocations.

“On that level, Madam Commissioner, and in the attachment where we look at the job description of a generic inspector, it is a low-level supervision position. So I would then assume that he would have exercised supervisory, visionary role over junior personnel. It is not a management position. It is an entry-level, supervisory level.”

The power to allocate security sites to service providers is reserved for management level, not for inspectors like Phiri.

“The powers to allocate sites to service providers, is that a power that is reserved for management level? Yes.”

Inspector Phiri allocated 42 sites to Gubis 85 Solutions over about two months in early 2025, involving millions of rand of public funds, and this allocation was irregular and illegal.

“It is clear that it is irregular and it was completely illegal to do so, and that the person that allocated those sites, Mr Phiri implicated, had no authority to do so. ... it is 42 allocations over a space of two months running into millions of rands allocated to one company.”

There was no proper supervision or authorization for Inspector Phiri to deploy security guards to these sites, illustrating how municipal funds can be misappropriated.

“Because there is no supervision. Somebody who is not authorised to send security guards to sites in a space of a month, from the 14th of January until 13 February 2025, ... It is millions of rands of public funds.”

Inspector Phiri was the signatory issuing notification letters to Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd, allocating sites and setting out numbers of security officers, patrol vehicles, and monthly costs per site.

“Mr Phiri is a signatory, issued notification letters to the directors of Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd ... each notification letter mentioned the name of the allocated site, number of security offices to be deployed, number of patrol vehicles, and monthly cost per site.”

Inspector Phiri allocated 40 sites to Gubis 85 Solutions valued at over R141 million during 14 January to 13 February 2025.

“During the period of 14 January to 13 February 2025, Inspector Phiri allocated 40 sites to Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd to the value of R14101520.89.”

Director Malatji was the overall manager with authority over the function and delegation of powers related to site allocation, implying he would have had to authorize any delegation of power to Inspector Phiri.

“Malatji is the director, the manager over the whole function, yes ... that would be the assumption ... He would have been the one that delegates him or that gives him the power to do this.”

The witness, as caretaker, never allocated any sites to Gubis 85 Solutions nor instructed Inspector Phiri to do so or gave him delegated authority to allocate sites.

“During January 2025 to February 2025, as the caretaker, I never allocated these sites to Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd, nor did I instruct Inspector Phiri to do so, nor did I give him permission or the delegated authority for him to do so.”

If Director Malatji had authorized the allocations of ad hoc services, Commissioner Bolhuis would have serious issues with the exercise of that power.

“If Malatji, Director Malatji were the one that had authorised these allocations of adhoc services, would you take issue ... I would have a serious issue with that.”

Inspector Phiri did not have the power or authority to allocate sites; this was the function of APS management, specifically Director Malatji.

“In my view, Inspector Phiri did not have the power or authority to allocate sites to security service providers. The allocation of sites would have been the function of APS management, specifically Director Malatji.”

The complaint concerns that Mr Malatji was busy allocating operational responsibilities to service providers without informing his management, which impacts daily operations, budget allocations, and contract management.

“The issue would be that he is busy allocating operational responsibilities to service providers that might or will have a serious impact on your daily operations, your budget allocations, and contract management. And the fact that he does not inform his management of his actions, which is expected of him to do”

Allocating such operational sites is within Mr Malatji's powers but it is improper for him to do so in isolation and without consulting or reporting to top management.

“I believe it is in his powers to allocate such sites, but I do not believe it is proper for him to do it in isolation from the department and as his direct supervisor... it would have been his duty to at least consult and report it to top management.”

If it was an innocent mistake by Mr Malatji, it should be rectified and a management principle put in place; if deliberate and provable, disciplinary steps should be taken against him.

“If it was an innocent mistake, rectify it, put a management principle in place. If it was done deliberately and it can be proven, I would take up disciplinary steps against him as the manager...”

Even if the allocations were made within budget and fairly distributed among service providers, there is still an issue if Mr Malatji did not inform or seek approval from management.

“If there had been a fair distribution and all of that was done within budget, the Watchman Services budget, you would not have an issue that he made those allocations. Would you have an issue if he made those allocations and did not inform you or seek your approval even?”

Director Malatji was the day-to-day manager managing the whole process plus the contract; it was commonly understood he was responsible for the function from the City Manager.

“It was commonly known and understood that Director Malatji was the man, the person that ran APSS, that managed the day-to-day running, managed the contract.”

Mr Phiri signed deployment notices on behalf of Commissioner Faro, indicating delegated power in that context.

“It was very clear on the face of it that he was signing on behalf of Commissioner Faro. So that is clear that it is a delegated power.”

Mr AL Phiri did not have delegated powers to sign certain documents; if Director Malatji delegated authority downwards, it would have been to Mr Mahlangu, not Mr Phiri.

“I can with confidence say he did not have delegated powers because he could not have had delegated powers. If Director Malatji delegated authority downwards, he would have delegated it to Mr Mahlangu, who is the immediate level under him.”

Mr Phiri was acting in a delegated capacity when Deputy Chief Spies was acting as Chief, signing documents with delegated authority.

“But even when they were signing, it was clear that even then he was still acting under delegation, that two-day extension that he received as the Chief.”

Mr Phiri signed a document irregularly as he was not acting on delegated authority and signed in his own inspector capacity, which invalidates the document.

“If I look at the face value of this document, there is no indication on this document that Mr Phiri is acting on a delegated authority... it is signed in his own information signature and level as an inspector. So, this document is irregular.”

Dr K E Madihlaba allocated two security sites to Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd via notification letters dated 20 and 21 January 2025, deploying 24 security officers and patrol vehicles, with the total value being R1060345.02 per month.

“Dr K E Madihlaba allocated two sites to Gubis 85 solutions (Pty) Ltd through notification letters dated 21 January 2025 and 20 January 2025 respectively. These notification letters deployed 24 security officers per site, two patrol vehicles for one site and one patrol vehicle for another site. The total value attached to these allocated sites was R1060345.02 per month.”

Dr K E Madihlaba did not have the authority to allocate the sites to Gubis 85 Solutions, which authority lies with Director APS S Mr Malatji, who never gave such permission or delegated it to Mr Phiri or Dr Madihlaba.

“I did not authorise Dr K E Madihlaba to allocate the two sites to Gubis 85 solutions (Pty) Ltd, nor did Dr K E Madihlaba have authority to allocate sites because such authority lies with the Director APS S , Mr Malatji. At no stage has Mr Malatji informed me that he gave permission for the allocation of these sites and/or that he delegated the allocation of sites to Mr Phiri and to Dr K E Madihlaba.”

The notification letters for site allocations were all dated the same day with effective dates being the 5th and 15th of January, indicating an irregular and implausible allocation by one person across multiple Pretoria regions in one day without following proper procedure.

“Especially on page, except for the first two, all of these notices are dated the same day. And with all of them, the effective date being the 5th of – so they are drafted on the 14th and the effective date being the 15th of January... this allocation cuts across almost all the regions in Pretoria on the same day.”

There are two entries with signatures attributed to Doctor Madihlaba, one indicating a notification and the other indicating a letter, with some date discrepancies noted between the signature date and the document date.

“there are two entries that say, Madihlaba signed this notification latter, no later. Latter is a l-a-t-t-e-r. So there are two of those entries, one after the other.”

The notification letter dated 21 January 2025 was signed by Doctor Madihlaba and Khumalo on 20 January 2025, which is an anomaly with dates that do not match the production date of the letter.

“the notice on the top right is dated 21 January, and then ... it will say notification for redeployment ... effective from 1 January 2025 at 06:00 on a month-to-month basis ... the date thereby both Doctor Madihlaba and Khumalo... will be the 20th.”

It seems the date mismatch between the 21 January and 20 January 2025 on the notification letter indicates it was signed before being produced, raising questions about authenticity.

“So that will explain. I think they wanted to say the dates do not match because this date would have been ... this thing would have been signed a day before it was produced if this notice anything to go by.”

The total contract value in a document was over R15 million, with deductions for two items signed by Madihlaba worth just over a million, resulting in a balance of 14 million related to the allocation to Phiri.

“The document ... gives the total value ... just over R15 million. Then it showcases the deduction of the two that were signed by Madihlaba, which is just over a million, and it comes to that 14 million because the heading of this document ... would be a summary of sites allocated to Gubis by Phiri.”

Phiri has been placed on suspension and is facing a disciplinary hearing related to the issue involving the one million deduction in the dealings involving Madihlaba.

“Mr Phiri has been placed on suspension.”

An inspector in the APS cannot allocate services worth millions of rands to service providers under the Municipal Financial Management Act and Local Government Municipal Systems Act without proper delegation and adherence to procurement protocols; Doctor Madihlaba functioned at the senior superintendent level.

“an inspector in the APS cannot allocates services worth millions of rands to service providers under the Municipal Financial Management Act number 56 of 2003, also known as the MFMA, and Local Government Municipal Systems Act number 32 of 2000, without proper delegation and adherence to procurement protocols ... Doctor KE Madihlaba functioned on this level.”

Adv Bolhuis states that the investigation concerning Madihlaba and the one million deduction is ongoing, but he is not involved in the details and does not know if Madihlaba is suspended currently.

“I know it is part of an investigation, but that is all I know. I am not privy to the details of that investigation. I am not involved with it myself. As far as I know, he is not on suspension at this stage, but it is part of an investigation.”

Gubis Solutions (Pty) Ltd was improperly allocated sites between January 2025 and February 2025.

“It is therefore my view, from the above, that Gubis Solutions (Pty) Ltd was improperly allocated sites between January 2025 and February 2025.”

Director Veli Nwandule is the Director for Management Administration Support in the department, responsible overall for finance and the departmental budget under the supervision of Deputy Police Commissioner Dlamini.

“Director Nwandule is ... the Director for MAS, Management Administration Support ... responsible for finance and the departmental budget, under the supervision of Deputy Police Commissioner Dlamini.”

An email sent on 2 October 2024 by Commissioner Bolhuis highlighted the importance and urgency of resolving the issue of non-payment to security service providers under APS.

“Please urgently advise on the slow (non-payment) of security service providers. What are the issues and how can we urgently resolve it? Your immediate attention to this will be highly appreciated.”

Director Veli Nwandule reported sitting with 35 variable requisitions in his SAP inbox without SLA, letter of appointment, or invoices attached as part of Asset Protection contract issues.

“Director Veli Nwandule responds... I am sitting with 35 variable requisitions in my SAP inbox. I also indicated that on each requisition no SLA, no letter of appointment, no invoices were attached on the system”

Service provider was told by Director of Protection Services that Metro Police Cost Centre owner did not want to pay them, and original invoices were not hand-delivered despite requests.

“Further to unprofessional conduct, the service provider was told the Metro Police Cost Centre owner does not want to pay them. I am still waiting for the original invoices to be hand-delivered as per the promise of the ladies I spoke to (Winnie and Ulander).”

Tsukudu Malatji emphasized that Asset Protection is responsible for contract management and that all related documentation must be kept safe at his office for reference and responses.

“Asset Protection is responsible for the management of this contract. Any documentation relating to the management of this contract must be kept safe by my office for ease of reference and response to all sorts of enquiries.”

Veli Nwandule confirmed receipt of only 22 invoices for August 2024 after a long delay despite patient efforts and highlighted procedural expectations regarding payment release.

“I hereby acknowledge receipt to your original invoices after a long and unnecessarily delay. Thanks to the patient messenger I sent to your offices. I confirm that I only received 22 invoices for the month of August 2024.”

There was a strong exchange of emails between Veli Nwandule and Tsukudu Malatji regarding why there is low or no payment to service providers.

“you get is this strong exchange of emails between at least appears to be Veli Nwandule and Tsukudu Malatji.”

Veli Nwandule is the cost centre owner and responsible to release funds for payment only if all procedures and documents are in place, and he refuses payment if not.

“Director Nwandule that he is refusing to release payments if not all procedure is followed and documents are handed in as per his explanation, which immediately became the system in place to ensure that this is done procedurally correct.”

Asset Protection Unit was returned to Metro Police which has its own finance section handling contracts and service providers like Watchman Services, distinct from other departments.

“AP S has been returned back to Metro Police and it is common knowledge that Metro Police, not like other departments, have their own finance section because we do deal with contracts and service providers like the Watchman Services and others.”

There was a problem of Phiri only starting to be dealt with late, from January 2025 onwards, despite relevant documents and invoices existing earlier from at least October 2024.

“...we do not seem to be dealing with the problem of Phiri only in January 2025 or February and so on. This phenomenon of not submitting invoices and all relevant documents seem to have existed, at least when you look at this email, as it is discussed, as early as 20 October 2024...”

There might have been a long-standing process of manipulating systems, which could have been for financial gain or corruption, possibly ongoing even before the function returned to the Metro Police.

“...there could have been a long-standing process of manipulating whatever systems is in place, or lack of systems, for that matter. Whether that was for financial gain or for corruption... It could be that the systemic rot and corruption has been going on for quite some time, even before the function was returned to the Metro Police...”

In respect of problematic payments to Gubis, there were WhatsApp exchanges involving Mr Mnisi, Deputy Commissioner Dlamini and others, detailing required invoice uploads, payment uplifts and eventual payment approval.

“...in these WhatsApp exchanges where Mr Mnisi is involved in processes of invoices must now be uploaded, there must be an uplift of the amounts that must be paid, and eventually even the Deputy Commissioner Dlamini is involved in it, right? And eventually somebody says, yes, all sorted payments will be made...”

Director Nwandule oversees the process for payments related to the security contract extension, while CFO is not involved in the initial approval matrix but comes in later for payment release stages.

“...Director Nwandule does not define a role for the Chief Financial Officer in this approval of payments matrix... The CFO does not fit into this process... from there it goes to supply chain management. And from there to the CFO for payment...”

On 28 February 2025, the City Manager sent an extension letter to Gubis 85 Solution (Pty) Ltd for the security contract, which pertains to the total amount paid since March 2022 to January 2026 of approximately R292,300,046.84.

“On 28 February 2025, the City Manager sent an extension letter to Gubis 85 Solution (Pty) Ltd... The total amount paid under TMPD 2/2016/17 to all service providers since inception (March 22 to end of January 2026) is R2923000467.84.”

Commissioner Bolhuis was involved in communication and supply of information, letters, reports and documentation to the City, CFO and BAC regarding the extension of the contract during the relevant period.

“I was involved in communication and supply of information, even letters, reports, documentation to the City and to the CFO and also to the BAC in regards to the extension of the contract, yes.”

The extension letter sent on 28 February 2025 was sent to the other 21 service providers as well, not exclusive to Gubis.

“...that this extension letter was also sent to the other 21 service providers. It was not exclusive to Gubis...”

Cain Mpofu is a senior person in the supply chain management process of the City of Tshwane, and was copied on the extension letter communication.

“...Cain Mpofu... he is a senior person in the supply chain management process of the City of Tshwane.”

Because a new tender could not come into place, it had to be extended procedurally as per MFMA regulations, which was done.

“Because the new tender could not come into place, then as per the MFMA, you will have to extend it in a certain procedural manner, which we have done.”

A request to uplift an amount of 91 million for the 24/25 funds for security services was made to meet financial obligations during the contract extension period, recommended by CFO Gareth Mnisi, Chief of Police Commissioner YRC Faro, and approved by City Manager JMettler.

“...a request was made to uplift an amount of 91 million for the 24/25 funds for security services, specifically to pay for the invoices submitted by the service providers for the period of May to June 2025... The request is recommended by the CFO, Gareth Mnisi, and the Chief of Police, Commissioner YRC Faro, and approved by the City Manager, Mr JMettler.”

Deputy Commissioner Dlamini stated that the deployment of adhoc security guards had grown exponentially with additional sites added in January and February 2025, totalling 43 sites.

“...the deployment of adhoc security guards had grown exponentially and indicated that an extra 37 sites were added in January 2025, with a further six sites added in February 2025, into total 43 sites...”

The WhatsApp message from CFO Gareth Mnisi requests assistance with loading the approval for a budget upliftment to enable payment.

“loading the approval for budget upliftment. The team needs to upload with the budget team in order to enable payment.”

Commissioner Bolhuis took a screenshot of the WhatsApp message from CFO Gareth Mnisi and retains it as evidence.

“I took a screenshot from my phone.”

The term 'budget upliftment' is used in the City department to describe a request for additional funds upon realizing a department is running out of funds for a certain function.

“It is a term that we, Madam Commissioner, that we use in the City, in the department. It is when you realise early in the financial year that you are running out of funds for a certain function to complete, that you write a memo or report to the City Manager...”

The CFO Gareth Mnisi is the person who releases funds upon approval for budget upliftment requests.

“The CFO, Mr Mnisi, would be the one who actually releases funds, but now he wants you to initiate the process so that he may then release funds.”

The upliftment permission for budget funds was already done, but CFO Gareth Mnisi requested loading of that information for further processing.

“The upliftment permission was already done. So he is requesting me to load that information.”

The Commissioner Bolhuis forwarded the WhatsApp message and attached upliftment document to Deputy Commissioner Umashi Dlamini and others for action.

“I forwarded it to Deputy Chief Dlamini, Deputy Police Commissioner Dlamini. I cc'd the Chief of Police, CFO and whoever, relevant people...”

CFO Gareth Mnisi was waiting for the approved report or memo to be uploaded so that he could release funds.

“He is obviously waiting for that approved report or memo to be uploaded through our finance sections somehow so that he can then release funds.”

The budget upliftment process starts in the department, not the CFO, but requires CFO consultation and approval before funds are released.

“When you do upliftment, it is not a process started by the CFO. It is a process you start in the department. We consult with the CFO... The Chief recommends, CFO recommends, it goes to the City Manager and is signed off.”

Someone in the department must have informed the CFO Gareth Mnisi that the budget upliftment was happening but the process was still holding because of the department.

“Someone is alerting him that it is still lying by us and we are hanging onto the document and not processing it, but I am speculating.”

Deputy Commissioner Umashi Dlamini sent an email on 12 March about engaging the requesting department to persuade the CFO to approve or make funds available for ad hoc duties to avoid overburdening the budget.

“And that email would have been sent on 12 March.”

There is a recurring request for additional funds to cover irregular ad hoc services in the contract, involving ongoing financial adjustments beyond the original budget uplift.

“there is a request for more funds the whole time... this is additional to that, and it is because it mentions ad hoc services”

Commissioner Bolhuis forwarded all of the CFO's WhatsApp messages and the annexure to Deputy Commissioner Umashi Dlamini as a package.

“There is this text from the CFO and then you said you forwarded all of that as a package with the annexure to Deputy Commissioner Umashi Dlamini.”

Deputy Commissioner Dlamini, as Divisional Head of Support and Administrative Systems, is involved in consulting and collaborating with other Deputy Chiefs regarding financial issues within the Metro Police Department's finance section.

“the Deputy Commissioner Dlamini is the Divisional Head of Support and Administrative Systems, and the finance section falls within that... they will elevate the matter to Deputy Police Commissioner Dlamini and he will then consult or collaborate with the other Deputy Chiefs”

Deputy Commissioner Dlamini consults with Deputy Chief Spies to ensure coordination between related departments and the availability of funds for service payments to avoid budget overburdening.

“he is now consulting with Deputy Chief Spies to ensure sister departments... they make funds available so that these services can be paid and we do not overburden the budget”

Commissioner Bolhuis was the caretaker of the AP S during January and February and should have been informed about additional sites being added and their budget impact before Deputy Commissioner Dlamini was informed, but asserts he was copied on communications and was not consulted directly.

“you are the overseer, or the caretaker of the AP S in January and February... that is correct, Madam... I believe I am copied in most of these communications from the onset... I was the caretaker, it happened under my watch to inform me”