Hearing day 87

Director Malatji was appointed as director on 1 June 2013 and has held the same position and responsibilities since then.

“I was appointed on the 1st of June 2013... I held it since 013...”

Director Malatji reports to the Deputy Chief of Police, currently Commissioner Spies who joined TMPD in March last year.

“I report to the Deputy Chief of Police. Currently, it is Commissioner Spies who just joined TMPD in March last year.”

Before reporting to Mr Nava Pillay, Director Malatji reported to Deputy Chief of Police Rex Mahlaulo, who retired recently at time of testimony.

“Before reporting to Mr Nava Pillay, I reported to the Deputy Chief of Police, Mr Rex Mahlaulo, who is retired as we speak.”

Director Malatji has a line of command in his Asset Protection Services including Reginald Mahlangu (Beauty Director), Dr Elvis Madihlaba, and Inspector Phiri who reports to Senior Superintendent Madihlaba.

“I have got the Beauty Director Mahlangu, Reginald Mahlangu, who reports directly to me. I have got Dr Elvis Madihlaba, who is reporting to Reginald Mahlangu in terms of our operational structure. And I have got senior security officers... particularly Inspector Phiri, who are reporting to Senior Superintendent Mahlaba.”

Before reporting to Commissioner Bolhuis, Director Malatji reported to Mr Nava Pillay in the Office of the City Manager.

“Before Commissioner Bolhuis, I was reporting to Mr Nava Pillay in the Office of the City Manager.”

Around 2015-2016, Director Malatji was reporting to Deputy Chief of Police Commissioner Bolhuis.

“Around 2015, 2016, I was then reporting to Deputy Chief of Police, Commissioner Bolhuis.”

Inspector Phiri was promoted in 2026 to the rank of Major and reports to Reginald Mahlangu, the current Acting Director for 10 months where Director Malatji is absent.

“They have been promoted not long. He is also at the level of colonel, who is also reporting to Reginald Mahlangu, who is the Acting Director at the moment, since I am not in the office for the past 10 months or so... I am told he has been given the position of a major... It was this year, according to the information I heard, 2026.”

The Asset Protection Services Section was established under TMPD Specialized Policing Division to protect property, assets, and personnel of the City.

“hence, the Asset Protection Services Section was established under TMPD, Specialised Policing Division. The objective was to protect the property, assets, and personnel of the City.”

In 2016, the then Chief of Police Steve Ngobeni instructed Deputy Chief of Police Rex Mahlaulo to prepare tender TMPD2 2016-2017 for advertising.

“During 2016, the then Chief of Police, the late Mr Steve Ngobeni, in- instructed former Deputy Chief of Police Rex Mahlaulo to prepare tender TMPD2, 2016-2017 for advertising.”

Director Malatji assisted Deputy Chief Mahlaulo with tender specifications for TMPD 2 2016-2017 and submitted them for review and forwarding to Supply Chain Management Department.

“I assisted as requested and submitted the tender specification to him for reviewing, consideration, inputs and further handling...The tender specification documents were then forwarded to Supply Chain Management Department for further handling.”

The Tshwane Metro Police Department (TMPD) did not have capacity to protect its property, assets, and personnel around 2016-2017, nor did the City of Tshwane municipality.

“TMPD did not have capacity to protect its property, assets, and personnel. It was not only TMPD, but the City of Tshwane as a municipality did not have capacity to protect its properties, assets, personnel.”

The Supply Chain Management advertised tender TMPD 2 2016-2017 in September 2016 together with other tenders.

“The Supply Chain Management subsequently advertised their tender, TMPD 2, 2016-017, in September 2016 together with other tenders.”

Director Malatji was appointed by the City Manager to serve in the bid evaluation committee to evaluate the TMPD 2 tender along with other members from different city departments.

“I was thereafter appointed by the City Manager to serve in the bid evaluation committee together with other members from different relevant departments of the city. The tender was evaluated accordingly by the BEC members, including myself.”

Director Malatji states he has no knowledge of anything wrong with the tender TMPD 2 he was involved with.

“Commissioner, I am not having knowledge, as I am seated here, of anything that might have gone wrong with the tender TMPD2 that I was a member of.”

There was communication from within the City of Tshwane to an outsider alerting the outsider that a particular tender was non-compliant and suggesting urgent correction to make the tender compliant.

“in respect of some tender there was communication from within the City of Tshwane to an outsider, alerting the outsider to the fact that that particular tender was non-compliant, indicating the nature of non-compliance and suggesting that urgent correction be made to make the tender compliant”

It is possible for tenders to be corrected after submission but before evaluation due to officials having access to physical files which may be manipulated.

“It could be a number of factors, which might include the fact that for as long as tenders are submitted on files like this, and to these files, officials have access to each and every file. I am talking here specifically within the supply chain management environment. Such incidents could take place.”

Tenders submitted as physical files are vulnerable to complaints in the public space that documents are taken out and replaced, leading to issues with tenders.

“going forward, tender responses should be more electronic right as compared to the filing system. And that would make it difficult. Because out there in the public space, there are complaints to the effect that files are submitted, documents are taken out, and all of that. This is what we are hearing in the public space when people are complaining about issues of tenders and the like.”

Malatji asserts that during his participation in the tender TMPD 2 (2016-2017) as a BEC member, there was no complaint or indication that documents were tampered with.

“I can assure the Commissioner and this Commission, that from the beginning to the end, we never had a situation where there was a complaint to the effect that documents were tampered with, and so forth and so on.”

Documents went missing during a tender process that led to litigation and awards being made without an evaluation process taking place.

“part of what was alleged in the litigation was that documents had gone missing. And in the end, an award was made, or awards were made without the evaluation process having taken place.”

Malatji was not informed of any irregularities occurring during the BEC's job or in communication reported back to supply chain management.

“us or myself as a member who participated, being called and getting informed about irregularities that might have happened in the run-up to the BEC completing its job and handing over the report and the documents back to supply chain management. Such communication, no.”

Malatji confirms his knowledge is limited to his period of participation as a BEC member and not after.

“So, your focus is only at the stage of your participation as a member of the BEC. Yes. So, what you are telling us relates to that stage only. Exactly. So, you would not know what happened later, and you would not know whether issues were raised about missing documents.”

Malatji does not know details about the litigation at the center of the tender TMPD 2.

“And what was at the centre of the litigation, do you remember? I do not know, Commissioner.”

The tender TMPD 2 was subject to awards made under a court order due to litigation concerning missing documents.

“But it is this tender that was, or rather, in respect of which awards were made pursuant to a Court Order, is it not? It is so, Commissioner.”

Malatji was not aware that documents were removed from municipality offices to a college for evaluation purposes.

“Are you saying you never became aware that there were irregularities or allegations that documents were removed from municipal offices to a college where evaluation was done? No. I wanted to assure... Those reasons were purely on security issues that, as the BEC have observed, right, before we could start with the actual evaluation process... The storage facility was accessed without control by city officials, right, and that concerned the BEC.”

There was no access control to the storage facility adjacent to the boardroom, cameras were not working, and city officials accessed it freely, causing concern to the BEC.

“The facility which was adjacent to the boardroom where we were supposed to conduct the storage facility was accessed without control by city officials... The cameras were not working.”

Tender Evaluation Committee (BEC) member Director Malatji suggests that tender documents were received and kept in a room, but acknowledges allegations that documents were removed and some went missing before the process was complete.

“From the evidence we have heard, tender documents were received, they were in a room, there are allegations that documents were removed, some documents were missing at some point”

Director Malatji admitted he became aware tender documents were taken out of premises to a college for safekeeping but denies knowing any documents went missing during the evaluation process.

“I never became aware of documents that went missing. Hence, the documents were taken out of the premises, down to the college, and when the actual process of evaluation started, each document was gone through, and I am not aware of any missing documents”

There was a complaint and lawsuit regarding the tender documents being removed and some missing, leading the municipality to attempt to cancel the tender, but the court ordered the tender must proceed with evaluation, stating no basis to cancel.

“the municipality cancelled this tender because of a complaint about documents having been removed and being retained, some documents missing. Then it went to court, and the court directed that this tender must continue. There is no basis to cancel it, and the processing or the evaluation of the tender should proceed”

Director Malatji admits he was the nominated contact person for the tender and clarifies he is the director responsible for the relevant function but not in supply chain management.

“I was the contact person... I am not in Supply Chain Management. I am the director responsible for the function”

Director Malatji denies knowing about the complaint or allegation that documents were removed and missing, which led to a court order that the tender must proceed and not be cancelled.

“You say you never became aware of that... tender went to court because there had been a complaint or an allegation that documents were removed and some documents were missing, and the Court Ordered that that is the basis to cancel the tender.It must proceed to evaluation.You say you never became aware of that”

Director Malatji says he was not aware of any reasons why the tender was taken to court or the basis for the litigation.

“I never became aware of those reasons”

Director Malatji was intimately involved throughout the tender process including development of specifications, being a member of the Bid Evaluation Committee (BEC), evaluating bids, preparing reports for bid adjudication, yet claims ignorance of litigation related to missing documents.

“my involvement ... started when I developed the tender document ... I am a member of the BEC ... you do the evaluation ... prepare a report ... tender went to court ... litigation ... I find it very strange ... you are intimately involved from the beginning, through all stages, but just before evaluation... you turn your back and forget the whole thing ... you have no idea what happened”

Director Malatji was involved in preparing the bid specification and considers it "his bid", but he did not participate in the Bid Adjudication Committee (BEC) process where the report is taken after submission to supply chain management.

“it is basically your tender. The very fact that you are asked right at the start to prepare the bid specification, it is your bid.”

Advocate Baloyi pointed out that since Director Malatji was appointed by Deputy Commissioner Mahlaule to represent the APSS department in the tender, Malatji is the client with a direct interest and responsibility for the tender, and it is difficult to accept he does not know why the tender runs into problems.

“this is a tender for his department, APSS, and he appoints you to be the representative, to be the person that deals with it, but you are the client ... it runs into problems ... you do not know anything about it ... You are the one that is responsible for this service. You are the one with a direct interest to get this tender finalised.”

Director Malatji heard informally about the bid being challenged but had no formal engagement or information that the bid was taken to court.

“I heard it like any member of the public that this bid was being challenged ... I just wanted to emphasise that there were no formal engagement and information that this bid has been taken to court in this instance.”

Advocate Baloyi rejected Director Malatji's explanation about only hearing like any member of the public and not making inquiries, emphasizing it is difficult to accept his ignorance given his role as client representative.

“I find it very difficult to accept that your remained ignorant of the issues that are delaying your tender ... You must have known, you must have asked the questions ... There is no way you did not ask that question.”

Director Malatji explained that within the department there are different stages of involvement, and at a certain stage he is not involved irrespective of whether the issue affects him; he relies on superiors to inform him of issues pertaining to the bid.

“At a certain stage, I do not get involved, irrespective of whether the issue they are discussing at top management ... such a thing never took place, hence I was never informed.”

Director Malatji was never formally informed or engaged about issues behind the litigation of the tender; he only heard rumors but no official information was given to him by top management.

“the reasons behind why this tender was litigated, it was never brought to my attention. I heard in the corridors ... but from the top management ... such a thing never happened.”

Director Malatji stated he was not aware of any information given to BEC members about missing documents that led to the cancellation of the tender.

“I am not aware of any information that was given to the BEC members about missing documents.”

Director Malatji stated he did not know about the allegation that 50 bids went missing which was cited as reason for the tender cancellation.

“I did not know, I did not become aware of that allegation [that 50 bids went missing].”

Director Malatji was not aware of any session where BEC members were informed that the tender was not being awarded.

“Commissioner, I am not aware of any session where BEC members were informed of the tender not being awarded.”

The tender process started in 2016 and by 2023 no appointment had been made despite BEC having evaluated the bids.

“And then you specifically, I mean let us say you are now in 2020, it is a tender that started in 2016, it is now 2023, four years later, and you are aware that nobody has been appointed.”

Director Malatji was the contact person and face of the tender bid and was in the evaluation committee, but admitted between May 2017 and 2019 he was taken out of the space and may have missed reasons communicated for the tender delays.

“Between May 2017 to 2019, I was not in that space. They took me out of that space, right. And I must mention that there might have been communication to the effect that the tender is not moving, these are the reasons and the like. But now, since I was taken out of the position for almost two years, I might have missed. I am not sure, Commissioner.”

Director Malatji indicated that between 2017 and 2019 he was taken out of the BEC space after the BEC had completed its work.

“Yes, 2017 to 2019 I was taken out of the position, but that was after the BEC has completed its work.”

Director Malatji was aware of instructions given around the Court Order relating to the City of Tshwane's tender.

“Yes, I am aware of the instructions by the Court Order.”

A Court Order awarded tender TMPD 22016-2017 to 22 security service providers including Gubis Solutions (Pty) Ltd, and the City of Tshwane was served with this order on 22 October 2021.

“The city of Tshwane was later served with a Court Order which awarded tender TMPD 22 2016 - 2017 to 22 security service providers including Gubis Solutions (Pty) Ltd. I attached a copy of the Court Order dated the 22nd of October 2021 marked as Annexure TB 3.”

Director Malatji was not aware of what influenced the agreement that became the Court Order.

“No, no.”

All municipal departments require security services from asset protection services, including various properties and personnel, involving clinics, cemeteries, water reservoirs, pump stations, electric substations, markets, regional offices, emergency services, executive mayor, mayoral committee members, and any official whose life is in danger.

“The properties, assets, and personnel which require protection are from all the departments, including TMPD. The said properties and personnel include clinics, cemeteries, water reservoirs, pump stations, electric substations, storage facilities, markets, regional offices, emergency services, executive mayor, mayoral committee members, and any official whose life is in danger, the list is exhaustive.”

Director Malatji is responsible as director for protection services to ensure protection of council premises and personnel, monitor internal and external guards.

“My role as the director responsible for protection services is to ensure that protection of council premises and personnel is executed, to monitor internal guards, to monitor external guards,”

Director Malatji was responsible for the protection of council properties since his appointment in 2013, despite other functions being taken away from him since 2017.

“I have remained consistently responsible for that function”

Director Malatji oversees a team within Asset Protection Services that monitors private guards and in-house security services protecting council assets and reports regularly on their performance.

“I have got a team within the asset protection services, which team's job is to monitor performance of both private guards and in-house security services... They make sure that security guards are in place, security measures that are put in place on specific sites are working... they report back”

Since 2018 the city has been unable to protect all its assets due to financial capacity constraints, leading to coverage of only about half the assets under private security guards and some under in-house security.

“since 2018 to date, the city has not been able to protect all its assets ... out of more than 1000 assets ... we were covering almost 545 sites... financial capacity ... the budget has not been able to enable us to cover every asset...”

Since about three years ago, the city opted to insource security officers, but the number remains insufficient to cover all required sites for asset protection.

“the city went on and decided to in source security officers, and yes, the number is not enough to enable us to cover all the sites that the city needs to be covered”

Of about 545 guarded sites, most are guarded by private security guards, while a smaller portion are guarded by in-house security.

“out of 545 ... we are utilising private security guards to guard them, and there is some ... that have been guarded by in-house ... 547 are guarded by private guards and 127 are guarded by in-house”

Director Malatji had no formal input into a handover report compiled when the asset unit was moved back to TMPD, as he was not invited by his supervisor Mr Nava Pillay.

“I was not invited by my supervisor there ... I do not remember having a meeting in order to compile or make inputs into the handing over”

The executive decided to move the asset unit back to TMPD and gave a date on which the unit was recalled without further consultation with Director Malatji.

“a decision has been taken by the executive ... the date the unit would be going back to TMPD and that was it”

Contrary to a report claim, Director Malatji states that security service providers are monitored continuously, with monitoring teams on the ground 24/7 of deployment at about 545 sites.

“security service providers were ... continuing to be monitored ... monitoring teams are on the ground monitoring 24-7 deployment of security service providers ... 545 sites”

Due to shortage of personnel, it is not practical to cover every site daily with monitoring, but monitoring is ensured for effective security.

“in practical terms it would always not be easy to cover every site daily ... given the shortage of personnel ... we have been doing what we could to ensure basically the monitoring is in place”

The TMPD did not monitor the deployment at least twice a month as stipulated by the Service Level Agreement due to personnel capacity constraints.

“the review of the monitoring reports revealed that the TMPD does not monitor the deployment at least twice a month as stipulated by the SLA”

Director Malatji accepts that monitoring was not done twice a month as required by the SLA due to lack of personnel and capacity constraints.

“I would not, I would not with certainty say I dispute what I disagree with what the paragraph is saying, more especially when they are talking twice a month... personnel capacity is always the issue... possibility is that yes, somewhere we are not able to reach the target.”

Director Malatji confirms inspection reports are used for site monitoring and are reviewed at the office to ensure monitoring is conducted.

“which inspection reports are completed on site, they are brought to the office, right, and we go in through them, we check, right, and make sure that indeed this monitoring team is doing its work.”

Director Malatji admits that some invoices were probably paid when services were not rendered.

“probably, yes, Commissioner.”

Director Malatji accepts that because of capacity constraints, verification of service provider invoices is based on the invoice claims and not always on site monitoring.

“probably that some invoices were paid even though services were not rendered as reflected in that invoice because you would not know if monitoring does not happen as regularly or as agreed, then you dependent entirely on the service provider to say in their invoice we did deploy our people... I accept that.”

Triotic Protection Services is an entity appointed by the City under TMPD 2, 2016-2017, currently rendering guarding services to the city.

“the entity is one of the entities that are appointed by the city in terms of TMPD 2, 2016-017. And it is currently rendering guarding services to the city”

Director Malatji states he was not involved in outsourcing or previous contracts for provision of security services prior to the TMBD 2016-2017 tender.

“I was not involved.”

During evaluation at the BEC, Triotic Protection Services was recommended for appointment among other bidders for TMPD 2, 2016-2017.

“all the bidders including Triotic, I think, they were recommended”

Director Malatji became aware that Triotic Protection Services is linked to Mr Eugene Modise only as the inquiry progressed, not at the time of evaluation.

“At that time, I was not aware. I became aware after - I became aware as we went on, you know, as we went along, that it is linked to Mr Eugene Modise, right.”

Triotic Protection Services is linked to Mr Eugene Modise.

“Are you aware that that company is linked to Mr Eugene Modise?”

Director Malatji is not certain about the exact directorship documents for Triotic Protection Services at the time of tender evaluation due to passage of time.

“Since this has happened some years back, I would not with certainty say the documents, more especially CIPR documents that were submitted, right, indicated whether he was the sole director or there was somebody else, right. I would not with certainty say that”

According to a News24 article, Triotic Protection Services had lucrative security contracts at ANC Madibeng Municipality in the northwest and Lephalale as of February 2023, with Modise as sole director and shareholder until that time.

“New News 24 has established that Triotic Protection Services , in which Modise was the sole director and shareholder until February 2023 , has got lucrative security contracts at the ANC Madibeng Municipality in the northwest and Lephalale .”

According to policy and SEM regulations, companies linked to people in the service of the state should not be appointed.

“in terms of your own policy and the SEM regulations , companies linked to people in the service of the state ought not to be appointed”

According to a news article, Mr Modise at the time of the tender award was secretary of the ANC in the Tshwane region since 2018, implying he was in the service of the state at that time.

“When the Tshwane Council awarded Triotic , the contract in February 22 , Modise was secretary of the ANC in the Tshwane region , a position he has held since 2018 .”

Director Malatji accepts that he cannot dispute with certainty that Mr Modise was linked to Triotic Protection Services at the time of the tender.

“I would not be able to dispute it with certainty”

Director Malatji agrees that if Mr Modise was in the service of the state at the time of the tender award, Triotic should not have been appointed.

“If one assumes that , just to follow the caution from Commissioner Baloyi , Mr Modise was in the service of the state , would you agree that , or anyone , for example , who is a director , would you agree that he ought not to - Triotic would not have been appointed ? I agree .”

There is uncertainty whether Mr Modise was a counsellor or an employee of the state at the time of the tender award in 2022.

“was he or was he not a counsellor or an employee of the municipality ? Because if he was not , then as Commissioner Baloyi suggests , it is questionable whether we should be entertaining this line of questioning . Unless it can be put to Director Malatji that he was in fact an employee and therefore he should not have participated in the tender .”

Director Malatji stated that the entities recommended under TMPD 2, 2016-2017 have continued rendering services since their appointment by the court order on 22 October 2021.

“The said entities were again appointed under TMPD 2 , 2016-2017 . They have rendered services since their appointment by the court on the 22nd of October 2021 . They are currently rendering the same security services to the municipality .”

Director Malatji was involved in the bid specification process for TMPD 2, 2016-2017, assisting the department as requested by then Deputy Chief Rex Mahlaule and served as a BEC member.

“I was involved in the bid specification in respect of TMPD 2 , 2016-2017 . I assisted the department as requested by the then Deputy Chief Rex Mahlaule , and I was later appointed as a member of the BEC .”

If the requirements for the composition of the BEC are not met, there would be issues with the composition of the BEC.

“if any of those requirements are not there, there would be some issue with the composition of the BEC”

The BEC report must be considered by the Bid Adjudication Committee (BAC).

“the BEC report must be considered by the Bid Adjudication Committee”

The Bid Evaluation Committee (BEC) must be composed of officials from departments requiring goods or services and at least one supply chain management practitioner of the municipality or municipal entity.

“Abide evaluation committee must, as far as possible, be composed of officials from departments, requiring their goods or services, and at least one supply chain management practitioner of the municipality or municipal entity.”

Director Malatji was involved in all meetings and resolutions of the BEC regarding the same tender, attending meetings and being part of the resolutions taken for TMPT 2 from 2016-2017.

“I was involved in all the meetings and resolutions of the BEC in respect of the same tender”

There would be difficulty if the BAC is not involved in considering the BEC report.

“there would be some difficulty if the BAC is not involved”

Director Malatji saw for the first time a report or memorandum sent by Thembeka Mphefu about what transpired in the evaluation of tender 2 for 2016-2017.

“No, I am seeing it for the first time, Commissioner”

Supply Chain Management (SCM) assessed the tender process and found violations in the tender evaluation stage, rendering the bid non-compliant and unauthorized removal of bid documents from SCM premises to an unconfirmed venue.

“SCM assessed the process followed violations of the tender evaluation stage were noted, thus rendering the bid as non-compliant. ... unauthorized removal of the bid documents from SCM premises to a venue that had not been confirmed as appropriate”

Both Director Malatji and the BEC found the supply chain management premises unsafe to proceed, resulting in documents being removed.

“the BEC found the supply chain management premises unsafe to proceed. Hence the documents were removed there.”

The BEC failed to execute its duties in accordance with the terms and conditions of the BEC appointment letter, indicating challenges in its functioning.

“The committee failed to execute its duties in accordance with the terms and conditions of the BEC appointment letter”

Supply chain management was involved in the process and gave integrity assurances about moving the documents or bids, including inspection at the venue at Premosa.

“supply chain management was involved ... a senior guy within the supply chain management acquisition department ... even went to an extent of seeing the venue at Premosa and gave it a go ahead”

There was a resignation of an SCM official from the BEC process, contributing to non-compliances and improper constitution of the BEC according to regulations.

“there was non-compliance since there was a resignation of an SCM official from the process, from the BEC”

The bid was not evaluated in accordance with the prescribed SCM policies and procedures, constituting an abuse of the supply chain management system.

“the bid was not evaluated in accordance with the prescribed SCM policies and procedures”

The bid was cancelled due to identified irregularities and abuse of the supply chain management system, with recommended steps to combat these abuses.

“... in a concerted effort to combat the abuse of supply chain management system, SCM recommends that ... ... the bid be cancelled ...”

It would have been quite unfortunate if a tender worth about 80 million were awarded in light of the irregularities found.

“it would be quite unfortunate that 80 million or so, a tender of that nature, would have been awarded in the light of these irregularities”

The integrity of bids handed over to the BEC was maintained in that all bids received were in line with the compiled list, though the bids were not sealed when handed to the BEC, as the unsealing was done by supply chain management administrative officials before.

“The integrity of the bids received handed over to the BEC ... The bids are normally received sealed by supply chain management administrative officials. They get unsealed by supply chain administration to ... before they are handed over to the BEC. As a result, the bids handed to the BEC were not sealed.”

Bids are normally received sealed by SCM administration officials at the point of submission (when bid closes).

“at the point when they are submitted, when the bid closes, when they submit them”

The BEC took bids from supply chain management premises to Tshwane Leadership Academy in Premos due to security issues as supply chain management officials had uncontrolled access, and cameras were not working.

“The BEC took bids from supply chain management premises to Tshwane Leadership Academy , Premos . Movement of the bids was necessitated by security issues absorbed by the BEC. For instance, movement of SCM officials in and out of the storage was not controlled. Cameras in the building were not working and the supply chain management officials had unlimited access to the storage facility.”

There were missing bids and documents and removal of bids from supply chain management premises, noted by the BEC, which impacted the procurement process, but Director Malatji is not aware of any missing bids specifically related to this removal.

“Circumstances around the missing bids and documents and removal of the bids from supply chain management premises, which were noted by BEC and the impact of all of this on the procurement process. I am not aware of any missing bids documents regarding the removal of the bids from supply chain management premises.”

The Chairperson of the BEC was concerned about security issues at the supply chain management premises and was the one suggesting moving the bids to ensure quality work.

“Actually, he is the one who was saying, since there are these security issues that I am also observing, right, it would be in the interest of doing quality work by considering to move.”

The move of the bids was approved by the Chairperson of the BEC and did not have any negative impact on the work of the BEC.

“We - I am referring to the BEC , made a request to move from the supply chain management building , which was approved by the Chairperson of the BEC . And the removal of this bid did not have any negative impact on the work of the BEC.”

A decision was taken to move the function to Premos, and the work subsequently continued there.

“Hence, at the end of the day, a decision was taken to move the function to Premos, and it was moved there, and from there we went on with our work.”

Director Malatji is not sure if the Chairperson of the BEC had the authority to approve moving the bids but is aware that the Chairperson interacted with senior supply chain management officials before the movement was effected.

“I am not sure if he had the authority to do that, but what I am aware of, right, he interacted with one senior official within the supply chain management before the actual movement was effected.”

Director Malatji accepts that if the BEC had no authority to move the bids and there was no court order permitting the removal, the integrity of the bids could have been compromised.

“If maybe just before we break for lunch, if the BEC had no authority, as the report suggests, right, and let us forget the Court Order to remove the bids, do you accept the following possibilities, that the integrity of the bids could have been compromised ? I accept .”

Mr AL Phiri was an Inspector for Asset Protection Services and worked directly under command and control of Dr Elvis Madihlaba.

“Mr AL Phiri is an Inspector within the Assets Protection Services. He is working directly under command and control of Dr Elvis Madihlaba.”

Mr Phiri was not empowered to allocate sites or deploy services within TMPD.

“He is not, Commissioner, empowered to allocate sites.”

Director Malatji became aware in December 2024 of deployments involving Gubis and complaints that Gubis had been rendering ad hoc services for almost seven months without being paid, with explanation that payment was delayed as Department of Water and Sanitations had sent letters to deploy and pay for services.

“I became aware of deployments involving Gubis late in 2024 , around December . When I got, I received a call from Gubis , and the call was about them complaining that they have been rendering ad hoc services , it is almost seven months, they have not been paid ... And his explanation was that, yes, when they instructed us to deploy on the sites, they informed us that they are going to pay for these services.”

There were interactions between the office of Director Malatji and the Gubis, including the Department of Water and Sanitation regarding ad hoc security services from January to March.

“Thereafter, from January, February, March, there were interactions between my office and Gubis, including the Department of Water and Sanitation around these ad hoc services.”

Department of Water and Sanitation officials stated they hoped to pay for the ad hoc services but the budget did not allow it.

“Department officials that no, we were hoping to, not hoping, we were going to pay for this ad hoc services, but something happened, the budget is not allowing.”

Requests for ad hoc services involve an email from the requesting department to Director Malatji's office, which acknowledges receipt and follows up for payment vote number details and budgeting.

“The requesting department would send me an email, for example, requesting ad hoc services. I would acknowledge receipt of this email and go back to them to say, colleagues, from which vote number are you going to pay this? They would then come back to me, provide me with the vote number, GL account number, from which they would be paying for these services.”

There was a city-wide communication that any request for ad hoc services must be directed to Director Malatji's office for due diligence.

“There is communication City wide, which communications say when there is a request for ad hoc services to be deployed, such a request should be directed to my office so that I can make sure due diligence is done.”

Director Malatji's office then instructs operational teams, including Dr Madihlaba's office, to conduct security risk assessments of sites requiring ad hoc security services before deployment.

“I would then instruct the office of Dr Madihlaba, right, to go and conduct security risk assessment on the site and or sites to which security, ad hoc security services are required. They would go, they would come back, then I would then say, we need to allocate the company that is going to be able to execute and or perform these functions and we take it from there.”

Once quotations from the security service company are obtained and approved by the requesting department, deployment proceeds and ongoing site management is handled by operational teams under Dr Madihlaba.

“Once we have agreed, we then get the quotation from the company in question and we send it to the requesting department for them to approve. When they have approved, then we deploy. Once we have deployed, it become now the responsibility of my office through operational management team under Dr Madihlaba to ensure that they are treating those sites like any other site where on we have deployed security officers.”

In this case, the prescribed procedure for ad hoc service deployment was not followed, resulting in delayed awareness and communication issues about outstanding invoices.

“Unfortunately, Commissioner, in this case, this procedure was not followed, hence, my statement to say, I knew after a very long time and part of the communication with them was, send me through details of these invoices and all of that, just for me to be able to know which sites, how many guards were involved and all of that.”

Discussions and communications about outstanding invoices occurred at the executive management level, but Director Malatji was not involved or informed.

“...along the way, discussion about these outstanding invoices was between my office and them and I became aware that at the executive management, there were discussions, there were meetings, there were emails exchanged, systems. But, at that level, I never participate, I was never informed of, come on board.”

Initial requests for explanation about the invoice issue started with Deputy Chief of Police Commissioner Bolhuis and then Commissioner Spies, who requested explanation from Director Malatji.

“It started initially with Commissioner, Deputy Chief of Police, Commissioner Bolhuis. And, after Commissioner Spies was appointed, he also requested me for an explanation. The same explanation that I am giving to the Commissioner, I gave it to him.”

Director Malatji received emails indicating high-level discussion about outstanding invoices, but he was not invited to participate and he cannot currently access these emails as he no longer has access to his office.

“And, as I was … would receive emails as part of people who are cc'd on those emails, hence, I could see that there was discussion, high level discussion, about these outstanding invoices. There were proposals and or options suggested at that level where I was not invited to make any input. Such emails, unfortunately, due to the fact that I am not having access to my office, I cannot avail to the Commissioner now, but, I made a commitment, I can avail them as part of my evidence to the Commissioner afterwards.”

Director Malatji personally is primarily authorized to issue notification of deployment letters for ad hoc services in his department.

“Primarily, it is myself. It is myself who is authorized, or, I can, within instruction, allow Dr Madihlaba or Phiri or any other to, say, allocate the ...”

Director Malatji did not issue any instruction to Dr Madihlaba or Phiri in January and February 2025 to issue deployment letters for ad hoc services.

“I did not, Commissioner.”

Director Malatji admitted he knew on 12 March 2025 that sites had been added for ad hoc services.

“Yes. I know. I knew.”

Advocate Khumalo challenged Director Malatji's truthfulness about the timing of his awareness of the allocation letters, asserting he knew by March 2025.

“No, it cannot be now recently because in March 2025, you knew that these letters had been issued to Gubis.”

Director Malatji recently became aware of allocation letters given to Gubis 85, contradicting earlier testimony that he only learned recently.

“To be quite honest, I do not have the exact date, but it is now recently.”

Ad hoc security services are requested by any department within the City as soon as they realize they need security outside of existing services, triggering a process managed by Director Malatji's office including due diligence and quotations before deployment.

“Ad hoc services arise the moment the department realizes that there is a need for security at either of their sites and they would ... Any department within the City. The moment it realizes that they need security outside the ones that they are having, it becomes ad hoc security services. And they would send a request or they should send a request to TMPD, my office, right, for those services. And once those services, I meant those requests are received, my office would kickstart the process of making sure that due diligence is done before the actual deployment is affected. So due diligence, Commissioner, would include the, it would include my office acknowledging receipt. I would instruct the operational team to do the security risk assessment, and once they are done with that, we would identify a need for a GL account from the department to commit that they will be responsible for the payment of that ad hoc security services that they are requesting. And I would go back to them to say kindly provide GL account from which these services would be paid for the period that you are requesting. They would do that. And also the issue of we will then get the quotations and get them to sign, approve those quotations. Once this process is done and we deploy, I instruct deployment of the companies so identified and approved by the department. I must make a mention that ad hoc services is the responsibility, payment thereof is the responsibility of the department that is requesting ad hoc services.”

Gubis, a contractor security service, complained to Director Malatji about unpaid ad hoc services rendered to them by 14 January 2025.

“there was a call with Gubis and yourself. And they were complaining that they had rendered services. Adhoc services.”

Director Malatji did not request internal reporting or reports from his officials but verified the information through the department which confirmed the deployments.

“To be quite honest, no, Commissioner. My focus at the time was to confirm the accuracy of that information. What I did was to check with the department ... The department officials confirmed that indeed this allocations were done.”

Director Malatji requested a report from Gubis through Mr Calvin Mahlangu, the director of Gubis Security Solutions, to verify the services rendered and deployment details.

“I asked for the report.”

Director Malatji confirmed that his team was regularly meeting and confirming deployment of guards at specified sites and monitoring was taking place.

“I spoke with my team. We were meeting regularly about this and they were confirming that indeed, yes, these services are in place ... they have their guys monitoring to ensure that those sites are meant and ... they produced evidence to that effect.”

Director Malatji was satisfied that the services were done and confirmed by both his team and department officials.

“I was satisfied because both the department and my team members confirmed that indeed these guys were deployed. Yes, I was satisfied.”

Director Malatji agreed that there were multiple deployment letters involving Gubis, but he could not specify which ones were relevant.

“I am not in a position to specify they were, there were a whole lot of it, a whole lot of them.”

Director Malatji said that Gubis came to complain about non-payment to his office because they realized that promised payment was not happening and they thought he could help.

“I think they realize that whatever they were promised would happen, was not happening ... they thought Director Malatji would be able to help us get paid.”

Director Malatji acknowledged that Gubis had deployment letters signed by his office's officials, enabling them to approach him for payment issues.

“They got these deployment letters in their possession... signed by officials from my office.”

Director Malatji instructed Gubis to ignore the usual payment process and suggested they come directly to his office because of payment delays from the department and CFO's office.

“Guys, you ignored the process and you chose to do what you did. And now afterwards you are coming to me.”

Director Malatji said that his office, together with the department, allocated the ad hoc services to Gubis and that Gubis came to him because they were not winning contracts with the department and were not being paid by the CFO's office as promised.

“It was my office with the department that allocated ad hoc services to Gubis... they were not winning with the department... not getting what they hoped to get in the office of the CFO...”

According to Director Malatji, it was the Department of Water and Sanitation that told Gubis they should deploy additional security in December.

“With the December one, you say it is the Department of Water and Sanitation that had said to them they should deploy additional security.”

Director Malatji confirmed that the deployment letters were from December and January 2025 and related to outstanding payments they spoke about in December.

“I am talking about deployment letters pertaining to the outstandings that we spoke about in December ... also talk to the one attached here as evidence of January 2025.”

The Department of Water and Sanitation identified the need for a deployment, but the deployment letter was issued by another department, which falls under Director Malatji's responsibility.

“Th e W a t e r a n d S a n i t a t i o n d e p a r t m e n t i d e n t i f i e d t h e n e e d , m a y b e s p o k e t o G u b i s , b u t y o u r d e p a r t m e n t d i d t h e d e p l o y m e n t l e t t e r”

Director Malatji confirms that the deployment letter was signed by their department, making their department responsible for ensuring payment to the deployed services.

“y e s , t h e y s i g n e d t h e d e p l o y m e n t l e t t e r”

Director Malatji admits that due process was not followed in issuing the deployment letter for the ad hoc services, specifically the security risk assessment and payment confirmation procedures were omitted.

“Yes, because due process was not followed ... To ensure that when there is a request for ad hoc services, we do security risk assessment ... we confirm with the department requesting these services that they are going to pay ... We go further to confirm with the department the vote number ... So you say all of that was not done.”

Director Malatji admits that although he was aware of the irregularities in the ad hoc deployments since December 2024, he did not take disciplinary action against his officials due to time constraints and ongoing investigations.

“But in terms of taking disciplinary action against my officials, that I did not do at the time, and I take responsibility for not having done that ... I think time was not just allowing for me to immediately ... we are focused on this because ...”

Director Malatji acknowledges that despite knowing about the irregularities from December 2024 and the suspension in July, he failed to discipline the responsible subordinate, thereby sending a message that such irregular conduct and payment of money could continue without consequence.

“So you had a good seven months to take disciplinary action against the subordinate and you did not ... You do not do anything about it ... It sends a message to Mr Phiri and others that this is okay to do ...”

Director Malatji confirms Mr Phiri gave the deployment letters for the irregular months in 2024.

“Yes, I understand it is Mr Phiri ... Correct.”

Director Malatji says his focus was on understanding the issue when it was raised and gave explanations as requested, but admits it was wrong for a colleague to continue irregular actions knowing it was wrong and he did not stop it.

“I was ... my focus was on getting to understand ... I did give explanation ... I do not want to say it was right for me not to take steps ... it was wrong of my colleague to continue doing something that by the time ... was wrong and they continued ...”

Director Malatji states that he did not stop the irregular ad hoc allocations because there were ongoing discussions at the executive levels involving senior members, making it difficult for him to act.

“Though this was irregular, there were already discussions at the top ... executive members ... It was not easy for me ... even my superiors aware ... I suggested to my superior ... but never the less ... I did what was requested, being to provide information ... But now the question is, why did I not stop.”

Adv Khumalo accuses Director Malatji of allowing irregular ad hoc deployments costing the City of Tshwane millions of rands to continue despite awareness from 2024, questioning why he did not stop them.

“Ad hoc deployments are being done irregularly and they are costing the City of Tshwane millions of rands, millions, and you do nothing about it ... Why did you not stop them?”

Director Malatji did not stop the deployment of all ad hoc guards despite being given clear instructions to do so from 13 March 2025.

“you are now given a clear instruction that you must stop deployment of all adhoc guards with effect from tomorrow morning, in other words, with effect from the 13th of March 2025 . But you did not do that . You did not comply with this instruction”

Director Malatji refused to comply with the instruction to cancel all ad hoc security services deployments completely.

“Did you comply with it ? No, no, I did not cancel them all, I did not comply .”

Director Malatji was not happy about the irregular ad hoc services but explained they were initiated by the Water and Sanitation Department who were responsible for payment.

“I am not happy . These irregular adhoc services , right , the Commissioner must appreciate that they were initiated by Water and Sanitation .”

Director Malatji defended his non-compliance by explaining that he needed to discuss with his superiors and that some ad hoc services were allocated to other departments without problems.

“When I asked you earlier why did you not cancel them , you said there were discussions with your superiors . That was your excuse . Yes .”

Director Malatji admitted that improper ad hoc security deployments continued even after the instruction to stop them was given.

“Yes . That's some of the adhoc deployments were irregular . Yes .”

Director Malatji did not comply in entirety with the instruction to terminate ad hoc security services on 13 March 2025, claiming the instruction was inclusive of services without issues.

“Yes , because this instruction , in my view right , was inclusive of those that did not have a problem right .”

The irregular ad hoc security services were originally provided by Water and Sanitation Department with the understanding they would pay the service providers.

“This , when this adhoc services were dished out right , they were dished out by Water and Sanitation Department with the understanding between them and the service provider that they would pay from them .”

Director Malatji requested Commissioner Spies to put the cancellation of irregular ad hoc services in writing and later called the companies involved to a meeting to terminate the services, which happened about four months after the instruction.

“I requested Commissioner Spies to , to put it in writing ... I drafted a letter for him to sign , and I called them into a meeting . Actually , I am the one who drafted a letter for him to sign , and I called them into a meeting ... I handed those letters of cancellation over to the three companies ...”

Director Malatji acknowledged that discussions regarding payment issues occurred but the issue to stop irregular deployments was not about payments but the propriety of allocations.

“I agree with you , Commissioner . The issue with regard to the instruction terminate this , it was not really about payments .”

Director Malatji admits there was a serious oversight on his part in not terminating services and sorting out payment issues earlier, leading to continued costs.

“I think, Commissioner, like I said, that could have been, actually has been an oversight on my part.”

Director Malatji was unable to comply with an instruction due to ongoing communications involving his supervisor, Commissioner Spies, about paying for services.

“The communications were about paying for these services ... involving my supervisor, Commissioner Spies”

Mr. Baloyi SC asserts that in January and February, Phiri issued deployment letters without authority, causing a R14 million expense to the municipality, and that Director Malatji had the power to stop this but failed to act, making him responsible for the irregular expenditure.

“We know that in January and February, when Phiri issued these deployment letters, which you have already admitted he did not have that kind of authority ... it cost an expense of R14 million ... You were the effective cause of that R14 million expense ... You failed to do that ... you chose not to tell departments to direct their requests to you ... You did not ... you failed ... you are responsible for that irregular expenditure of 14 million rand.”

Director Malatji acknowledges responsibility but points out that departments also disregarded instructions to route all ad hoc security service requests through Asset Protection Services, TMPD.

“I think, given the way things have transpired, at the end, yes. But I want the Commissioner not to lose sight ... the departments said they would avail funds ... the department instructed Gubis to deploy security officers on sites they identified ... I was not involved or aware at that point in time.”

Director Malatji acknowledges that the cost of irregular expenditure in his department has cost the City a lot of money and accepts his responsibility as a manager to prevent wasteful and irregular expenditure.

“Yes, it has cost the City. ... I do. [responsibility to prevent wasteful and irregular expenditure]”

Director Malatji regularly interacted with contracted security firms including Gubis as part of his contract management duties, including initial contract starting periods and operational engagements.

“I had several interactions with Gubis, including the rest of the 22, more especially round about at that time, because that was when the contract was starting. That was when the deployment was kicking off, and immediately after it kicked off, that was when we, when I interacted with them for operational reasons. By the way, as the director responsible for the function, I meet with these service providers regularly, even though sometimes it does not happen, but in terms of the service level agreement, I am to meet with them almost every month”

The 2024 and January 2025 deployements were irregular, resulting in costs to the City and indicating wasteful and irregular expenditure for which Director Malatji accepts responsibility.

“I think it is established that the , let us just call them the 2024 deployments, were irregular, and the 2025, January deployments, which we have in file, were equally irregular.”

There was an accusation from Veli Nwandule accusing Director Malatji's department of creating 13 requisitions to the tune of 8 million without invoices and expecting the blind release of these requisitions.

“"13 requisitions have been created by yourselves to the tune of 8 million without invoices, and yet you expect me to blindly release these requisitions."”

Director Malatji denies creating requisitions without invoices and recalls exchanging emails with Veli Nwandule but is uncertain whether he responded to the specific allegation email.

“I do not recall myself creating requisitions without invoices. I do not recall that. ... I remember exchanging emails with Veli Nwandule, but as to this specific issue, I am not sure if this specific email forms part of the exchange that we had.”

Director Malatji confirms that the increasing costs of ad hoc security services were becoming a budget concern.

“did you share his sentiment that the adhoc services were increasingly out of budget ? I did , yes .”

Director Malatji states that normally a request for ad hoc services from departments such as Water and Sanitation comes via email, followed by an assessment and issuance of deployment notices.

“normally ... you would get an email from a department , I would imagine these are all from Water and Sanitation . That would be requesting these services and you assess them ... then you issue a notice for deployment , correct ? Yes .”

Director Malatji states he would not allocate a large number of sites to one security company because it would create challenges for the City and other contracted providers.

“I would not allocate such a number to one security company because that itself would create a challenge, right, not only for me, but for the City. It would even create a challenge with other contracted service providers once they realize that Gubisi is allocated 37 sites at a go and some are not even located on one, hence I am saying I would not allocate such a large number to one security company.”

Director Malatji admits oversight for not cancelling additional ad hoc security services added in January and February despite instructions to cancel all ad hoc services.

“Like I previously said, that it could, it has been an oversight on my part...I am not implying that somebody might have done it to hide information, but I am saying as far as this is concerned...I would not carry out the instruction immediately...”

Director Malatji states he was not able to access his office for the past 9 months due to suspension conditions, affecting his ability to respond to emails and instructions timely.

“I got it difficult to access my office for the past 9 months or so to date because conditions of my suspension included that I should not find myself next to any of office of the municipality, right, except when I am called upon to appear before the hearing.”

Mr Revo Spies issued an instruction to officials in Director Malatji's office not to provide him any information that might assist in preparing his testimony for the Commission.

“Mr Revo Spies issued an instruction to some of the officials that are in my office not to give me any piece of information that I might need in order to prepare myself for today's testimony.”

The instruction from Mr Revo Spies created an environment of fear within the department, making it very difficult for Director Malatji to prepare his testimony effectively.

“The instructions so issued have created an environment of fear within the department... It really made my testimony very difficult if not rendering it ineffective.”

Director Malatji was suspended in July 2025 following an investigation by Commissioner Spies who established that he had committed misconduct.

“You were suspended in July of 2025... Commissioner Spies had investigated your conduct and had established that as far as he was concerned, you had committed misconduct.”

Director Malatji received a call from an investigator in September (post-suspension) regarding the misconduct case and was taken through the allegations.

“it was in September... that I received a call from the investigator who was calling to say... I am investigating this case of misconduct against you and I wanted to check if we could meet just to take each other through what the allegations are.”

Director Malatji failed to declare directorships of his companies and failed to penalise service providers whose actions led to municipal losses, resulting in charges and suspension.

“I failed to declare directorships... I failed to penalise service providers who, whilst they are deployed, had activities happening that led to the municipality losing what you call. I am facing these two charges.”

There was no charge against Director Malatji for failing to comply with any instruction.

“There is no charge of me having failed to comply with any instruction.”

A lot of money has been paid irregularly benefiting some service providers, including Gubis, in the context of ad hoc security services.

“a lot of money has been paid, which is irregular and that benefited some service providers within... and amongst them, it is Gubis.”

Director Malatji was initially unaware that Gubis 85 Solutions (Pty) Ltd received many allocations for ad hoc security services until a complaint was made and the matter was investigated.

“before I received that complaint, I was not aware.”

Director Malatji's immediate superior before Revo Spies was Sean Bolhuis, who became aware of the ad hoc security services after December 2024 and started requesting reports.

“before Revo Spies... he became aware that there are these ad hoc services, and then we started exchanging, communicating around them. He started asking me for reports.”

Sean Bolhuis did not stop the ad hoc security services after becoming aware of them.

“he did not stop those services.”

Director Malatji responded stating the ad hoc services were called upon and requested by the department, and payment commitment was from the requesting department.

“My response was, this adhoc services were called upon, were requested by the department, not requested, were done by the department, and I based my response on information that I gathered during investigation”

Director Malatji did not specifically inform Commissioner Spies that Mr Phiri approved the ad hoc service deployments at the time of the communication, but later agreed Mr Phiri's actions indicated his office was allocating the services.

“Not specifically, Commissioner. I did not tell Commissioner Spies that it is Mr Phiri, because at that point in time, I was of the view that these were requested directly by the department from the service provider. But given the clarities that we went through today, right, yes, I agree that whatever Mr Phiri has done, obviously, on record indicates that it was my office that was allocating. But to be specific, I did not indicate that to Commissioner Spies.”

Director Malatji is unaware if Commissioner Bolhuis responded to a query about how certain service allocations came about but confirmed a response was given to store or give background.

“I am not aware, but I am aware that Commissioner Bolhuis wrote to us to respond and or give a background as to how it came about that this were done, and we did that.”

Director Malatji was not aware initially of multiple allocations to Gubis Solutions but later recognized them as a reliable service provider.

“I am unaware that Gubis Solutions received many allocations for provision of adhoc services, however, I am aware that Gubis Solutions has been one of the reliable service providers.”

Director Malatji stated he did not generate purchase orders for Gubis Solutions February to June 2025 for ad hoc services; purchase orders are generated by finance officials at TMPD headquarters.

“I did not generate purchase orders for Gubis Solutions during February to June 2025 for adhoc services. Purchase orders are created by the responsible finance officials at TMPD head office.”

Director Malatji said his supervisor requested funding for TMPD2, which Chief of Police and Municipal Manager approved; Umashi Dhlamini was not involved in the funding request.

“My supervisor requested funding. I prepared the report and the Chief of Police, the Municipal Manager, approved the funding request. Umashi Dhlamini was not involved in the funding request.”

Director Malatji stated in 2024 his supervisor was the City Manager, not Bolhuis nor TMPD people.

“Because the 2024 year, you were still under, who was your supervisor then? It was not Bolhuis and it was not people in the TMPD. Yes. It was the City Manager.”

Director Malatji acknowledged he was incorrect about the period covered by procurement documents related to protected services not within TMPD, which were actually up to June 2024, not 2025.

“The documents you attached are for the year ending 30 June 2024. So I think the question that you were being asked related to the 2025 year ... So maybe when you supplementary your statement, you can deal with that question but focusing on the 2025 year.”

Director Malatji described his working relationship with Commissioner Revo Spies since Spies' appointment as Deputy Chief of Police Asset and Protection Services on 1 March 2025; Spies' employment functions are materially the same as Malatji's.

“My working relationship with Commissioner Revo Spies since his arrival at the TMPD. Mr Revo Spies was appointed as Deputy Chief of Police, Asset and Protection Services on the 1st of March 2025. ... There is no material difference from my employment functions and his employment responsibilities.”

Director Malatji admits a mistake was made regarding the actual advert related to Mr Revo Spies' appointment and will rectify it in a supplementary statement.

“I agree with the Commissioner. I think a mistake here was made with regard to the actual advert that caught upon Mr Spies, Revo Spies’ appointment ... I will rectify it.”

Revo Spies introduced himself as Director Malatji's supervisor in March 2025 and lectured about his experience including arresting and dismissing corrupt police officials and closing a police station in Soweto associated with corrupt officers.

“Mr Revo Spies then introduced himself to me and my work team as my supervisor on the 5th of March 2025 ... including arresting and dismissing corrupt police officials, he made mention of his involvement in the closing of one of the police stations in Soweto back then ...”

Due to a complaint by Revo Spies regarding alleged misconduct, Director Malatji was suspended in July 2025 pending a disciplinary hearing, with Revo Spies as the main witness and their working relationship described as poor.

“Due to a complaint by Mr Spies regarding the alleged misconduct, I was then suspended in July 2025 pending outcome of disciplinary hearing ... Mr Spies is the main witness on the same reported allegations ... Our working relationship is therefore not good ...”

Revo Spies was appointed Deputy Chief of Police, Asset Protection and Security Services on 1 March 2025, but the TMPD structure at that time accommodated only the position of Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services, which is almost a civilian position.

“Mr Revo Spies was appointed on the 1st of March 2025, to the position of Deputy Chief, Asset Protection and Security Services. At that point, the structure ... was having the position of Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services ... The difference is Divisional Head is almost a civilian position ...”

Director Malatji suspects Revo Spies was appointed through a corrupt and irregular recruitment process and notes an anonymous complaint to the Public Protector's office questioning Spies' qualifications and employment approval.

“I am suspicious that Mr Spies was appointed through a corrupt and irregular recruitment process ... an anonymous complaint ... at the Public Protector's office ... His qualifications were questioned. His employment position was advertised despite not being approved on TMPD employment structure ...”

Security management functions are not functions of the Metro Police Department by law, but regulated under the Private Security Industrial Regulations Act, requiring registration as a security practitioner.

“The security management function ... are not functions of the Metro Police Department by law ... regulated by the Private Security Industrial Regulations Act ... if a man or woman is not registered as a security practitioner, that person or organization cannot perform ...”

Commissioner Bolhuis acted in the position of Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services before Commissioner Spies was appointed, and that position was not non-existent but existed as a Divisional Head role.

“Somebody within the police department of City of Tshwane was acting in this position even before Commissioner Spies was appointed. That was Commissioner Bolhuis ... He was not acting in a non-existent position ... He acted in the position of Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services ... which became vacant prior to Spies’ appointment.”

The structure approved on 4 June 2025 was only little accommodating of Commissioner Revo Spies' position, implying the structure before June 2025 allowed all occupants to hold the position of Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services.

“The structure approved on the 4th of June 2025 was so little accommodating Commissioner Revo Spies because ... before this new one, everyone would be occupying the position as per the structure being the Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services.”

Director Malatji alleges that if there is corruption in the appointment structure, it must be attributed to the Chief of Police or whoever approved the structure, not Deputy Commissioner Revo Spies, as he does not create the structure.

“the person then that you are accusing of corruption can not be ... must be the Chief of Police then... It cannot be Deputy Commissioner Spies ... He is not the boss of the TMPD”

Director Malatji agrees that corruption, if any, must involve those who came up with the new structure including the Chief of Police and whoever was working on structuring issues.

“It could be those who came up, right, with the new structure ... which would include the Chief of Police and whoever they were working on the issue of structures around it.”

There is a duty to identify the person or body responsible for approving the police structure, which could be the Chief of Police, City Manager, or Council.

“Somebody is responsible for approving the structure ... either the Chief of Police ... or the City Manager, or it is the Council.”

Director Malatji is suspicious that Commissioner Spies was appointed through a corrupt and irregular recruitment process, but does not definitively say that corruption occurred.

“I am saying I am suspicious that Mr Spies was appointed through a corrupt, irregular recruitment process. I am suspicious. So I am not definitely saying somebody is corrupt.”

The problem with the TMPD structure arose from June 2025 when the structure changed and got approved to accommodate Commissioner Spies, while before that the position was Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services.

“The problem was ... when I looked at the appointment requirements ... these appointment requirements are earmarking specific individual ... The structure of the TMPD before June was the Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services. Now, he got appointed whilst the structure was talking to Divisional Head ... It was only in June that the structure was changed and got approved.”

The position that was advertised was not the one that existed in the structure before June 2025—the pre-existing position was Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services, not Deputy Chief, Asset Protection Services.

“The position that existed prior the advertisement was the Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services, not the Deputy Chief, Asset Protection Services.”

Mr Bolhuis was acting in the position of Divisional Head, Asset Protection Services and was already appointed as Deputy Chief responsible for training.

“I take it that he was acting in the position of the Divisional Head ... he was already appointed as Deputy Chief responsible for training ...”

Director Malatji is suspicious that Commissioner Spies is not registered with PSIRA as required for persons appointed to perform, supervise, or manage private security services.

“I am suspicious that he is not registered with PSIRA, which is a requirement for any person appointed to perform, supervise, manage private security services.”

Director Malatji suspects the City made appointment requirements as registration as a Traffic Officer and Metro Police Officer for security management positions to prevent security professionals from applying.

“Why would the City make registration as a Traffic Officer and appointment as a Metro Police Officer an appointment requirement for the position in security management? And I therefore drew a conclusion that they are making this appointment requirements because they are well aware that there are security professionals out there who would obviously develop interest into the position and apply.”

Director Malatji admits he does not know any fact that Commissioner Spies is not registered with PSIRA, saying it is just a feeling based on how appointment requirements were designed.

“I do not know any fact. It is just a feeling. It is based, the feeling is based on how the requirements for appointment were designed.”

Advocate Khumalo states Metro Police officers do not fall under PSIRA jurisdiction as they are public security, not private security.

“If you are a Police Officer or a member of the Metro Police, you do not fall under PSIRA jurisdiction because you are not regarded as private security sector. You are in public security, not in private security.”

Director Malatji explains that Metro Police officers are not members of SAPS, SANDF, or State Security Agency and thus are not covered by Section 199 of the Constitution regarding security service registration.

“Metro Police officers are not members of the South African Police Service, right. Metro Police officers are not SANDF members as per Section 199, nor employees of the State Security Agency.”

Director Malatji stated he raised the issue of PSIRA registration with the office of the Chief of Police in writing before Commissioner Spies was appointed as a complaint or inquiry.

“I raised the issue of the PSIRA with the office of the Chief of Police. That was in writing, long before Commissioner Spies could be appointed.”

Director Malatji confirms he has not lodged any grievance, complaint or report with the City regarding the three suspicions listed about Commissioner Spies since his appointment.

“Since his appointment, I have not. The only correspondence I made was prior to his appointment, and then this appointment gave rise to what I was complaining about... So the short answer is you have not lodged a grievance, a complaint, or a report about Commissioner Spies as it relates to the three suspicions that you have listed in the statement.”

Director Malatji disputes allegations made by Commissioner Spies that he was non-compliant with instructions and not working well with him, saying generally he complied with instructions and any misses were not deliberate.

“I have listened to the allegations made by Commissioner Spies about me... I disagree and dispute these allegations in this regard... generally, Commissioner Spies informed the Commission that I was not complying with instructions, I was not working well with him... generally, I have complied with instructions that were given to me by Commissioner Spies, despite the differences that I have alluded to... I might have missed one or two, and the Commission should not take it that I missed that instruction because I did not work with him...”

Director Malatji admits being on suspension and receiving a salary for almost 10 months without performing beneficial work for the City or the community of Tshwane, indicating a commitment to the community despite differences with colleagues.

“I am sitting here for 10 months, almost 10 months on suspension, getting a salary, and I am very much guilty of receiving, of getting paid, right, for so long without doing anything to benefit the City or the community of Tshwane... I am sitting here receiving a salary for 10 months without doing anything... But with me, I need the Commissioner to note this... My commitment is that... in 2017 to 2019, I was not suspended but taken out of the position and continued to be paid without doing anything...”

Since his suspension in July, Director Malatji has not sat in a hearing or started a disciplinary process and has not pleaded; the process has been repeatedly postponed.

“since my suspension in July, we never sat in a hearing and started. I have not pleaded, right. Every now and then they would postpone, they would postpone”

Director Malatji confirms he was reinstated back to his position after being taken out in 2017-2019 without suspension.

“I was placed back in your position... Back in my position.”